IR 05000458/2006010

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IR 05000458-06-010; 6/5-26-2006; River Bend Station; Baseline Inspection, NRC Inspection Procedure 71111.21, Component Design Basis Inspection
ML062410519
Person / Time
Site: River Bend Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 08/29/2006
From: Clark J
Division of Nuclear Materials Safety I
To: Hinnenkamp P
Entergy Operations
References
IR-06-010
Download: ML062410519 (19)
v • d • e


Text

August 29, 2006

SUBJECT:

RIVER BEND STATION - NRC COMPONENT DESIGN BASES INSPECTION REPORT 05000458/2006010

Dear Mr. Hinnenkamp:

On June 26, 2006, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your River Bend Station. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on July 25, 2006, with Mr. D. Vinci and other members of your staff.

This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Jeff Clark, P.E., Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety Docket: 50-458 License: NPF-47

Entergy Operations, Inc.

-2-

Enclosures:

Inspection Report 05000458/2006010; 05000Doc2/2006010 w/Attachment - Supplemental Information

REGION IV==

Docket:

50-458 License:

NPF-47 Report No.:

05000458/2006010 Licensee:

Entergy Operations, Inc.

Facility:

River Bend Station Location:

5485 U.S. Highway 61 St. Francisville, Louisiana Dates:

June 5 through July 25, 2006 Team Leader:

W. C. Sifre, Senior Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 1 Inspectors:

M. E. Murphy, Senior Operations Engineer, Operations Branch J. P. Adams, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 1 B. W. Henderson, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 1 Accompanied By:

H. S. Anderson, Contractor H. Epstein, Contractor Approved By:

Jeff Clark, P. E., Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety

Enclosure-2-

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000458/2006010; 6/5-26-2006; River Bend Station; baseline inspection, NRC Inspection

Procedure 71111.21, Component Design Basis Inspection.

The report covers an announced inspection by a team of four regional inspectors and two contractors. No violations were identified. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.

NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Licensee-Identified Violations

No findings of significance were identified.

REPORT DETAILS

REACTOR SAFETY

Inspection of component design bases verifies the initial design and subsequent modifications and provides monitoring of the capability of the selected components and operator actions to perform their design bases functions. As plants age, their design bases may be difficult to determine and an important design feature may be altered or disabled during a modification. The plant risk assessment model assumes the capability of safety systems and components to perform their intended safety function successfully. This inspectible area verifies aspects of the Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems and Barrier Integrity cornerstones for which there are no indicators to measure performance.

1R21 Component Design Bases Inspection

Main article: IP 71111.21

The team selected risk-significant components and operator actions for review using information contained in the licensees probabilistic risk assessment. In general this included components and operator actions that had a risk achievement worth factor greater than two or Birnbaum value greater than 1E-6.

a. Inspection Scope

To verify that the selected components would function as required, the team reviewed design bases assumptions, calculations, and procedures. In some instances, the team performed independent calculations to verify the appropriateness of the licensee engineers' analysis methods. The team also verified that the condition of the components was consistent with the design bases and that the tested capabilities met the required criteria.

The team reviewed maintenance work records, corrective action documents, and industry operating experience information to verify that licensee personnel considered degraded conditions and their impact on the components. For the review of operator actions, the team observed operators during simulator scenarios associated with the selected components, as well as, observing simulated actions in the plant.

The team performed a margin assessment and detailed review of the selected risk-significant components to verify that the design bases have been correctly implemented and maintained. This design margin assessment considered original design issues margin reductions because of modification, or margin reductions identified as a result of material condition issues. Equipment reliability issues were also considered in the selection of components for detailed review. These included items such as failed performance test results; significant corrective actions; repeated maintenance; 10 CFR 50.65(a)1 status; operable, but degraded, conditions; NRC resident inspector input of problem equipment; system health reports; industry operating experience; and licensee problem equipment lists. Consideration was also given to the uniqueness and complexity of the design, operating experience, and the available defense in depth margins.

The inspection procedure requires a review of 15-20 risk-significant and low design margin components, 3 to 5 relatively high-risk operator actions, and 4 to 6 operating experience issues. The sample selection for this inspection was 26 components, 6 operator actions, and 8 operating experience items.

The components selected for review were:

  • High-Pressure Core Spray Injection Valve E22-MOVF004
  • Division II 4.16 kV Medium Voltage Switchgear 1ENS*SWG1B
  • Division I 480V Motor Control Center 1EHS*MCC16A
  • Division I 125 V dc Switchgear 1ENB*SWG1A
  • Defeating main steam relief steam supply valve interlocks
  • Loss of circulating water pump with failure of feed flow transmitter and instrument air system leak
  • Emergency containment venting The operating experience issues were:

Grand Gulf Nuclear Sation technical specification differential pressure based upon pre-operational testing and modification for new strainers and debris assumptions did not address that technical specification values may be affected by the new method of determining the amount of debris on the strainer.

  • Woodward 2301A load sharing and speed control failure - originally applicable to Woodward 2301A governors and concerns River Bend governors.
  • Impact Evaluation for River Bend Sation on Significant Event Report 2-05 "Gas Intrusion in Safety Systems."
  • Review of design basis limiting values for pump flow and differential pressure requirements.
  • Perry Operating Experience (OE 21581) failure to recognize transitional inoperability of high pressure core spray during evolutions that shift suction path from the suppression pool to the condensate storage tank.
  • Screen Plant Hatch 1&2 NRC finding - vortexing in the condensate storage tank was not accounted for in calculating condensate storage tank level setpoint in technical specifications for automatic switchover from condensate storage tank to suppression pool.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

On July 25, 2006, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. D. Vinci and other members of his staff who acknowledged the findings. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during this inspection.

A-1-ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel

R. Biggs, Coordinator, Safety and Regulatory Affairs
K. Bornman, Engineer
R. Buell, Auditor, Quality Assurance
R. Cole, Supervisor, Engineering
R. Gauthreaux, Supervisor, Engineering
H. Goodman, Director, Engineering
K. Huffstatler, Technical Specialist IV
N. Johnson, Manager, Programs and Components Engineering
R. King, Director, Nuclear Safety Assurance
D. Lorfing, Manager, Licensing
B. Mashburn, Manager,Design Engineering
R. McAdams, Supervisor, Engineering
T. Moffitt, Engineer
J. Schlesinger, Supervisor, Engineering
A. Soni, Manager, Engineering Projects
C. Stafford, Manager, Operations
D. Vinci, General Manager, Plant Operations
D. Williamson, Engineer, Licensing
J. Wilson, Engineer

NRC personnel

P. Alter, Senior Resident Inspector
M. Miller, Resident Inspector

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

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