IR 05000445/1979013
| ML19247B072 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 06/15/1979 |
| From: | Crossman W, Renee Taylor NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19247B069 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-445-79-13, 50-446-79-13, NUDOCS 7908070130 | |
| Download: ML19247B072 (5) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION IV
Report No. 50-445/79-13; 50-446/79-13 Docket No. 50-445; 50-446 Category A2 Licensee: Texas Utilities Generating Company 2001 Bryan Tower Dallas, Texas 75201 Facility Name:
Comanche Peak, Units 1 & 2 Inspection at:
Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Glen Rose, Texas Inspection conducted: May 14-31, 1979 Inspector:
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. G. Taylor,~ Reside /nt Reactor Inspector, Projec's Section Date'
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43 /f Approved:
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Crossman, Chief, 1:ojects Section Ifate
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Inspection Summary:
Inspection on May 14-31, 1979 (Report No. 50-445/79-13; 50-446/79-13)
Areas Inspected:
Routine inspection by the Resident Reactor Inspector (RRI) of safety related construction activities including installation and welding of reactor coolant and other piping systems, piping system hangers, containment penetrations; and follow up on various unresolved items.
The inspection involved fif ty-six inspector-hours by the Resident Reactor Inspector.
Results:
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- R. G. Tolson, TUGCO, Site QA Supervisor kJ. V. Hawkins, TUGCO/G&H Product Assurance Supervisor
- Denotes those who attended the management interviews.
The RRI also interviewed and had discussions with various persons employed by the constructor, "rown & Root, in quality control and construction capacities.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Findings (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-446/79-07): Misorientation of Reactor Vessel Support Structures.
The RRI observed, during the course of several in-spections, that the reactor vessel supports have been placed in their correct positions and the necessary shear steel has been grouted in place.
The reinforcing steel added to replace the reinforcement cut during the drilling for the shear steel has been placed as designed by the engineer.
The work has progressed to a point where the normal work activities will progress toward placement of the reactor vessel in the near future.
3.
Potential Sign #ficant Construction Deficiencies (10 CFR 50.55(e))
a.
On May 18, 1979, the licensee reported that it appeared that an unidentified quantity of pipe hangers designed by ITT-Grinnell may not meet seismic criteria.
It appears that a method of computing seismic stresses may not have been appropriately conservative as compared to a newer computer program currently in use by Gibbs &
Hill, the project A/E. This item will be considered an unresolved matter pending receipt of further information regarding the extent of the problem.
b.
On May 22, 1979, the licensee reported that the A/E had discovered that pipe wall thickness requirements established in the project piping specifications may not have been adequately conservative to meet ASME Code stress requirements.
The licensee is evaluating the extent of the problem and corrective action requirements.
Until such information is available, this matter shall be considered unresolved.
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4.
Safety Related Pipe Installation and Weiding The RRI observed a portion of the welding of field weld FW-5 as shown on isometric drawing BRP-SI-1-RB-037-0 in line 10-SI-103-2501R2.
The line will run f rom safety injection accumulator TBK-SI ATAT-01 through several valves and connect to the reactor coolant loop. The weld was being per-formed by an automatic GTAW machine in accordance with qualified Welding Procedure 99025-2.
Qualified welding machine ope ~rators BAL and AIZ were controlling the process.
Weld material was issued on Weld Material Requisition A019881 covering Sandvik heat 745599.
The RRI reviewed Certified Material Test Reports for the weld material and examined the fabrication records for the two pipe spools being joined by weld FW-5.
All documentation was found to be in accordance with the requirements of the project specifications and the ASME Code for Class 2 piping with the exception that there was no documentation to the effect that the -4 pipe spool had been solution annealed after hot bending.
The licensee informed the RRI that the necessary documentation does exist at the vendor's facility (ITT-Grinnell) and will be forwarded to the site in the near future. The missing documentation of solution annealing was the subject of an unresolved item in Inspection Report No. 50-445/79-07 and will not be separately considered here.
The RRI also reviewed the radiographic film for the single shop weld in pipe spool -3 as made by the vendor and the radiograph film for the examination of weld FW-5.
Both sets of film displayed sensitivity meeting the requirements of ASME Section V and the welds met the acceptance criteria of ASME Section III for Class 2 welds.
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No items of' noncompliance or deviations were identified.
5.
Reactor Coolant Pipe Weldi_ng The RRI reviewed all of the radiographic examination films for reactor coolant loop welds FW-1, FW-2, FW-4, FW-6, FW-7, FW-9, FW-12 thru 14, FW-17, FW-18, FW-24, FW-25, and FW-27.
All of these welds r.et the acceptance critcria of ASME Section III for Class 1 welds and the film displayed sensitivities required by ASHE Section V.
The only significant anomaly indicated by any of the radiographs was a linear indication outside of the weld zone in a reactor vessel " safe-end."
This indication har been the subject of a potential significant construction deficiency as indicated in Inspection Report No. 50-445/79-01, paragraph 3.c.
This indication, which appears to be entrapped slag, is on the borderline of being either acceptable or non-acceptable.
It is understood that the license has made the decision to direct the vessel fabricator, Combustion Engineering, through the licensee's vendor, Westinghouse, to excavate the attachment, examine the indication and make appropriate repairs in the interest of safe and reliable operation of the reactor. The exact time frame for this work has not been fully determined. The RRI will follow this work closely as it occurs.
No items of noncompliance or deviations sere identified.
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6.
Containment Mechanical Penetrations The RRI selected containment mechanical penetration M1-4 as being typical of the larger penetrations.
This particular unit is one of four main steam components.
The component was fabricated by Gulf-Western Energy Products Group in accordance with Project Specification NS-74, " Mechanical Pene t ra tions. " The component, which is a single, relatively large forging, was fabricated from material meeting the requirements of SA-350, Grade I.F-2.
According to the vendor documentation, as verified by the licensee, the forging was ultrasonically examined priar to being machined into its final shape and found satisfactory.
The component was hydostatically tested as required by the ASME Code for Class 2 components but was not Code stamped since no welding was involved in the fabrication.
Under these conditions, the component is treated as material which is not required to be verified oy an Authorized Nuclear Inspector.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
7.
Review of Quality Assurance Procedures for Installation of Piping System Hangers The RRI accomplished an extensive review of the licensee QA procedures for quality control inspection and verification of piping system supports and hangers. The FSAR in Section 3.2 commits the licensee to design, fabricate and install safety related piping systems in accordance with ASME Section III, including the Summer 1974 Addenda.
Section III includes Sub-section NF, " Component. Supports." With this document as a basis, the RRI reviewed Project Specification MS-46A, " Nuclear Safety Class Pipe Hangers and Supports."
This docwnent appeared to be consistent with the requirements of the Code document.
The licensee'- production and QC program is contained within CP-CPM-6.9, " General Piping and Inspection Procedure," and referenced supplementary procedures. The QC program depicted by CP-CPM-6.9 appeared to be adequate for the intended purpose; i.e., provide instructions for inspection of hanger installations and documentation thereof.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
8.
Site Tours The RRI toured one or more plant areas several times weekly during the reporting period to observe the progress of construction and the general practices involved, particularily in regard to facility housekeeping. Two of the tours were made during portions of the labor force second shift.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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9.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or dcviations. Two such items are identified in paragraph 3 and will be referred to in fut..re reports as:
50-445/79-13 - Pipe Hanger Seismic Design 50-445/79-13 - Pipe Wall Thicxness Criteria 10.
Management Interviews The RRI met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) on May 18, 1979, to discuss findings which had developed during the period.
In addition, the RRI met informally nearly every day during the period with the licensee site QA supervisor to discuss items of immediate interest such as significant construction deficiencies.
Included within these in-formal discussions has been the continuing progress of the program offered by the licensee to improve pipe welding activities (see Inspection Report No. 50-445/79-03).
Licensee generated statistical data and other day-to-day data available to the RRI indicate a significant improvement in welding performance with a comparable significant reduction in the amount of repair work required to obtain acceptable welds. The licensee representative reiterated that all welds accepted by him will have fully complied with the ASME Code requirements and commitments made in the FSAR.
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