IR 05000445/1979029
| ML19294B283 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 01/17/1980 |
| From: | Crossman W, Renee Taylor NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19294B276 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-445-79-29, 50-446-79-28, NUDOCS 8002280130 | |
| Download: ML19294B283 (5) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION IV
Report No. 50-445/79-29; 50-446/79-28 Docket No. 50-445; 50-446 Category A2 Licensee:
Texas Utilities Generating Company 2001 Bryan Tower Dallas, Texas 75201 Facility Name:
Comanche Peak, Units 1 & 2 Inspection at:
Comanche Peak Steam Elect:Ac Station, Glen Rose, Texas Inspection conducted: December 3-31, 1979 Inspector:
6 f2Mbd
/ // 7 /90 j4v R. G. Taylor, Resident Reactor Inspector, De.te Projectc Section Approved:
M', Mdc[t
/ //>/70 prG4 W. A. Crossman, Chief, Projects Section Date Inspection Summary:
Inspection During December 1979 (Report No. 50-445/79-29; 50-446/79-28)
Areas Inspected:
Routine inspection by the Resident Reactor Inspector (RRI)
of construction progress and practices; electrical cable installation activities; electrical penetration assemblies; installation and welding of safety-related piping systems; and verification of storage and maintenance of safety-related components.
The inspection involved fifty-five inspector-hours by one NRC inspector.
Results:
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Principal Licensee Employees
- R. G. Tolson, TUGCO, Site QA Supervisor
- L.
F. Fikar, TUSI, Executive Vice President
- J. R. Merritt, TUSI, Construction & Engineering Manager Others
- P. Van Teslaar, Westinghouse Nuclear Services Division, Site Manager The RRI also interviewed other licensee and Brown & Root e:ployees during the inspection period.
- Denotes those persons with whom the RRI held on-site management meetings during the inspection period.
2.
Site Tours The RRI toured the saf ety-related plant areas several tLmes weekly during the inspection period to observe the progress of construction and the general practices involved.
Two of the tours were accomplished during the second shift work period.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified during these general tours.
3.
Electrical Penetrations The RRI noted that mechanical installation effort relating to the electrical containment penetrations was approximately 50% complete.
The installed penetration assemblies were enclosed in temporary coverings to protect them from damage.
The RRI also examined vendor documentation (Bunker-Ramo, Inc.)
supporting the various production inspections and tests as well as the qualification type test datt The bases for the examination were:
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a.
FSAR Section 8.1 b.
IEEE 317-1972, Electric Penetration Assemblies in Containment Structures for Nuclear Power Generating Stations c.
Project Specification ES-12, Electric Penetration Assemblies and Accessories, Revision 1 with Addendum 1 Project Specification ES-12 describes five types of penetrations by application.
Four to twenty-four units of each type are to be supplied and installed.
The production data packages obtained by the RRI for this examination contained material for eleven assemblies of three different types.
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The RRI selected at random two assembly packages of each type for detailed review.
These six packages contained data substantiating that each assembly had met the requirements of ASME Section III, Subsection NE for Class MC compocents and the requirements of paragraph 6 of IEEE 317-1972 for the production tests which relate to the leakage and electrical characteristics.
Review of the vendor test report on prototype testing, however, presented a different picture.
Contained within the data package obtained by the RRI was a letter f rom the A/E, Gibbs & Hill, to the licensee stating that the vendor data was " Approved except as noted." The exceptions noted within the text of the letter and within the body of the two reports appeared to be both editorial and technical in nature.
The technical exceptions were of a quantity and magnitude to raise a question as to uhether the penetration prototype assembiles had, in fact, met qtalification requirements.
The RRI also noted that there was no objective evidence available to substantiate that the prototype models tested and the production models installed are essentially replicates.
This matter will be considered as unresolved pending availability of information substantiating that electrical penetration assemblies installed or to be installed have been fully qualified.
4.
Electrical Cable Installation The RRI observed the installation of two safety-related train A (orange)
cables during one of the evening shift inspections.
Both cables were even conductor No. 12 AWG and were installed in the same cable path.
One cable was identified as No. E0 139161; the identity of the other was not deter-mined by the RRI.
These cables were both approximately 414 feet long and were installed in a combination of conduit and cable tray between the appli-cable switch gear room and the cable spread room.
The RFI observed that the craf t labor personnel handled the cable carefully and that Quality Control personnel monitored the flow of the cable.
The RRI verified that the cable routing at each direction transition was in accordance with the applicable cable pulling card.
All work and inspections appeared to con-form with Proj ect Specification ES-100, " Electrical Erection," and the related construction and quality control procedures.
Review of the cable pull card indicated that all required information as to cable reel number, actual length, etc., had been entered.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
5.
Comoonent Storage and Maintenance The RRI observed that the reactor vessels for both Units 1 and 2 were properly covered and sealed to prevent contamination or other damage.
The Unit 1 core support structure was fully enclosed and thus protected from damage.
The RRI also observed that the electric drives and electric motor operated valves had their space heaters energized and were otherwise adequately protected. Observations in the several fabricated piping storage areas indicated consistent segregation of carbon and stainless steel com-ponents and that all ecmponents were capped and maintained off the ground as required by site procedures and good practice.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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6.
Saf etv-Related Pipe Installation and Welding The RRI obsnrved the handling and installation practices as they pertain to pipe spools and valves in both units during the inspection period.
These activities were observed to be consistent with project procedures and accepted industry practices.
The RRI observed qualified welder APL manually welding FW-6 as identified on isometric drawing BRP-SI-1-RB-038-4 in line 10-SI-1-106-2501R2.
The weld filler metal was type 316 stainless steel manuf actured fro = heat 746100 by Sandvik which was verifled by a review of the certified material test report to meet requirements of ASME Section II.
Ihe components being joined were pipe spool SI-1-RB-038-4 and check valve 1-8956D.
The RRI reviewed vendor documentation for these components which indicated full compliance with the requirements of ASME Section III for Class 2 service.
In addition, the RRI examined the radiographs for the following welds and found then to be consistent with the requirements of ASME Section III for the service class indicated by the last number in the line designation.
Weld Isometric Drawing Line Designation W-19 BRP-SI-1-RB-033-2 6-SI-1-09 2-250lR1 W-17 BRP-SI-1-RB-16 6-RC-1-029-250lR1 W-1 BRP-SI-2-RB-48 3-SI-2-339-250lR1 FW-3 BRP-SI-1-RB-21 3-SI-1-303-250lR1 W-8 BRP-SI-1-RB-033-2 6-SI-1-092-250lR1 W-7 BRP-SI-1-RB-16 6-SI-1-101-250lR1 W-6 BRP-SI-2-RE -033 3-SI-2-303-250lR1 W-8 BRP-SI-1-RB-16 6-SI-1-101-2501R1 FW-4 BRP-SI-1-SB-33 10-SI-1-083-250lR2 FW-28R2 BRP-CS-1-AB-03 6-CS-1-239-151R2 W-1 BRP-SI-2-AB-04 4-SI-2-001-250lR2 W-9 BRP-CS-2-RB-22 3-CS-2-079-250lR2 7.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncom-pliance, or deviations.
One such item is discussed in paragraph 3 of this report and will be hereafter referenced as " Qualification of Electrical Penetration Assemblies."
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8.
Management Interviews The RRI met with one or more of the persons identified in paragraph 1 on Decenber 4, 7, 11, 13 and 18, 1979, to discuss various inspection findings and to discuss licensee actions and positions.
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