IR 05000443/2025003
| ML25342A001 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook |
| Issue date: | 12/09/2025 |
| From: | Matt Young Division of Operating Reactors |
| To: | Coffey B NextEra Energy |
| References | |
| IR 2025003 | |
| Download: ML25342A001 (0) | |
Text
December 9, 2025
SUBJECT:
SEABROOK STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000443/2025003
Dear Bob Coffey:
On September 30, 2025, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Seabrook Station. On December 3, 2025, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with David Sluszka, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Due to the temporary cessation of government operations, which commenced on October 1, 2025, the NRC began operating under its Office of Management and Budget-approved plan for operations during a lapse in appropriations. Consistent with that plan, the NRC operated at reduced staffing levels throughout the duration of the shutdown. However, the NRC continued to perform critical health and safety functions and make progress on other high-priority activities associated with the ADVANCE Act and Executive Order 14300. On November 13, 2025, following the passage of a continuing resolution, the NRC resumed normal operations. However, due to the 43-day lapse in normal operations, the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation granted the Regional Offices an extension on the issuance of the calendar year 2025, third quarter integrated inspection reports normally issued by November 15, 2025, to December 31, 2025. The NRC will resume the routine cycle of issuing inspection reports on a quarterly basis beginning with the calendar year 2025, fourth quarter integrated inspection reports, which will be issued 45 days after the fourth quarter ends on December 31, 2025.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Seabrook Station.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Seabrook Station.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Matt R. Young, Chief Projects Branch 2 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket No. 05000443 License No. NPF-86
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Number:
05000443
License Number:
Report Number:
Enterprise Identifier: I-2025-003-0047
Licensee:
NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC
Facility:
Seabrook Station
Location:
Seabrook, New Hampshire
Inspection Dates:
July 1, 2025 to September 30, 2025
Inspectors:
T. Daun, Senior Resident Inspector
S. Flanagan, Resident Inspector
N. Eckhoff, Health Physicist
J. Lilliendahl, Senior Emergency Response Coordinator
D. McHugh, Reactor Inspector
Approved By:
Matt R. Young, Chief
Projects Branch 2
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Seabrook Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Inadequate Operability Determination of Nuclear Instrumentation Drift Resulted in a Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000443/2025003-01 Open/Closed
[P.2] -
Evaluation 71111.15 The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation of Seabrook Station Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation when the station performed an inadequate operability determination of nuclear instrumentation drift which resulted in a failure to comply with a technical specification action statement for an inoperable overtemperature delta-temperature (delta-T) function on one channel.
Additional Tracking Items
None
PLANT STATUS
Seabrook Station began the inspection period operating at 100 percent rated thermal power and remained at, or near, full power for the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in Inspection Manual Chapter 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Ocean service water system with the 'B' train of the cooling tower service water system out of service on August 25, 2025 (2)
'A' and 'B' diesel fuel oil transfer lineup following fuel oil transfer surveillance on September 8, 2025
Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the emergency feedwater system between July 22 and August 5, 2025.
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Primary auxiliary building (PAB-F-3A/B-Z) on August 5, 2025 (2)
'B' diesel generator room (DG-F-2B-A) on August 18, 2025 (3)
'B' switchgear room (CB-F-1B-A) on September 3, 2025 (4)
'A' diesel generator room (DG-F-2A-A) on September 29, 2025
- (5) East main steam and feedwater pipe enclosure (MS-F-1A-Z, MS-F-2A-Z, MS-F-3A-Z, MS-F-4A-Z, MS-F-5A-Z) on September 30, 2025
Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the on-site fire brigade training and performance during an unannounced fire drill in the 'B' diesel day tank room on July 30, 2025.
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during maintenance activities on the turbine control system and a heater drain valve control system repair on September 4-5, 2025.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator training conducted in the plant reference simulator on August 27, 2025.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) Instrument air system following compressor failure on July 9, 2025
- (2) Start-up feedwater pump on July 21, 2025
- (3) Cooling tower functions following risk recategorization on September 3, 2025
- (4) Effectiveness of structures monitoring program, chapter 5 (equipment impacted by building deformation), inspections on September 10, 2025
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Risk management actions associated with emergency feedwater during start-up feedwater cross-tie valve maintenance on July 21, 2025
- (2) Risk management actions for elevated risk during electric emergency feedwater pump run and instrument and control system work on August 21, 2025
- (3) Risk management actions associated with diesel fuel transfer pump flow verification on September 8, 2025
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) NI-N-41 upper detector channel drift on June 8, 2025
- (2) Emergency feedwater steam supply valve leak on July 10, 2025 (3)
'A' emergency diesel generator jacket water heat exchanger following increasing chloride levels on August 25, 2025
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk
The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
- (1) Nuclear instrument cabinet N42 following potentiometer replacement on August 3, 2025 (2)
'B' safety injection discharge cross connect valve following preventative maintenance on August 5, 2025 (3)
'B' residual heat removal system following valve work and calibration on August 26, 2025 (4)
'B' cooling tower following fan maintenance on August 28, 2025 (5)
'B' atmospheric steam dump valve following air leak repair on September 18, 2025
Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
- (1) Supplemental emergency power system diesels annual surveillance on July 29, 2025 (2)
'A' emergency diesel generator monthly surveillance on August 19, 2025
- (3) Diesel generator fuel oil transfer pumps flow verification surveillance on September 8, 2025
Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) Turbine driven emergency feedwater pump quarterly surveillance on July 24, 2025
71114.02 - Alert and Notification System Testing
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensee's maintenance and testing of the Seabrook Station alert and notification system on August 18-21, 2025, for the period of August 2023 through July 2025.
71114.03 - Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the readiness of the licensee's emergency preparedness organization on August 18-21, 2025.
71114.04 - Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the following submitted emergency action level and emergency plan changes:
- Procedure change request 2486521, Revision of Emergency Plan Activation On-shift Responder Locations, dated May 28, 2024
- Procedure change request 2514784, Revision of Site Area Emergency and General Emergency Checklists Administrative Improvements, dated June 12, 2025
- Procedure change request 2488191, Revision of the Site Perimeter and Offsite Monitoring and Environmental Sampling Composite Sample Point Annotation, dated July 10, 2024
This evaluation does not constitute NRC approval
71114.05 - Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01 - 02.11) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the maintenance of the emergency preparedness program on August 18-21, 2025, for the period of August 2023 through July
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.06 - Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment
Walkdowns and Observations (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following radioactive effluent systems during walkdowns:
- (1) Personnel access building filtered exhaust monitor (RM-6532)
- (2) Containment enclosure air exhaust monitor (RM-6568)
- (3) Steam generator flash tank monitor (RM-6519)
Sampling and Analysis (IP Section 03.02) (3 Samples)
Inspectors evaluated the following effluent samples, sampling processes and compensatory samples:
- (1) Iodine and particulate samples collected from the wide range gaseous monitor system
- (2) Noble gas samples collected from the condenser air removal and steam packing exhauster
- (3) Noble gas samples collected from the wide range gaseous monitor system
Dose Calculations (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following dose calculations:
- (1) Dose calculations for batch release from waste test tank, permit 25-272
- (2) Dose calculations for release from steam generator blowdown flash tank, permit 25-285
Abnormal Discharges (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following abnormal discharges:
- (1) There were no abnormal discharges for evaluation during the inspection.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS08: Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.07)===
- (1) For the period July 1, 2024 through June 30, 2025
MS09: Residual Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.08) (1 Sample)
- (1) For the period July 1, 2024 through June 30, 2025
MS10: Cooling Water Support Systems (IP Section 02.09) (1 Sample)
- (1) For the period July 1, 2024 through June 30, 2025
EP01: Drill/Exercise Performance Sample (IP Section 02.12) (1 Sample)
- (1) For the period January 1, 2024 through June 30, 2025
EP02: Emergency Response Organization Drill Participation (IP Section 02.13) (1 Sample)
- (1) For the period January 1, 2024 through June 30, 2025
EP04: Emergency Response Facility and Equipment Readiness (IP Section 02.14) (1 Sample)
This is a new NRC performance indicator, introduced in Nuclear Energy Institute 99-02, Revision 8 (ML24331A114). Licensees began collecting data for this performance indicator on January 1, 2025.
- (1) For the period January 1, 2025 through June 30,
INSPECTION RESULTS
Inadequate Operability Determination of Nuclear Instrumentation Drift Resulted in a Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems
Green NCV 05000443/2025003-01 Open/Closed
[P.2] -
Evaluation 71111.15 The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation of Seabrook Station Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation when the station performed an inadequate operability determination of nuclear instrumentation drift which resulted in a failure to comply with a technical specification action statement for an inoperable overtemperature delta-temperature (delta-T) function on one channel.
Description:
On May 31, 2025, the control room received an upper detector flux deviation alarm on the main control board. Seabrook station's review of the condition identified that power range channel NI-N-41 upper detector was operating erratically. Operations declared the channel inoperable and entered Technical Specification 3.3.1, action statement 6A, for a failed nuclear instrument channel. Review of available indications determined that output isolation amplifier NI-NM-41-C, in power range channel 1, was drifting. Workers exercised the potentiometers on the isolation amplifier, and the drifting was no longer present. The channel was returned to operable condition on June 1, 2025.
On June 6, 2025, the control room noted that the output from the isolation amplifier was drifting again. A prompt operability determination was conducted under Action Request 02517017 that determined the channel was operable and fully qualified. Seabrook Station made the assumption that there was no impact on safety-related functions since the output of the module only drove non-safety-related indication. The isolation amplifier module was replaced on June 13, 2025, and the associated flux indications returned to normal.
On June 19, 2025, the control room received upper detector flux deviation alarm again. The prompt operability determination was revised and again determined that the channel was operable and fully qualified with the recurring drift. Inspectors challenged engineering on the effects on the safety-related aspects of the channel based on available test data from Work Order 41022135. The data showed elevated voltage at a test point in the cabinet of the channel which led to the known isolation amplifier driving indications, but also a second isolation amplifier in the circuit that provides voltage input to the delta-T protection system and related trip setpoints.
Seabrook Station contacted the vendor for assistance on the channel drift. On July 10, 2025, the vendor sent an evaluation based on the data and determined that the erratic upper flux signal directly affected the overtemperature delta-T protection setpoints and when upper detector flux deviation was in alarm, this exceeded the upper flux signal allowable drift contained in the uncertainty calculation by orders of magnitude and the reactor coolant loop 1 overtemperature delta-T function was inoperable.
Seabrook Station performed troubleshooting as recommended by the vendor which included exercising all potentiometers associated with the nuclear instrument and ensuring their respective locknut was adequately tightened to prevent inadvertent movement. During troubleshooting, several of the locknuts were identified to be loose which likely contributed to the flux drift. On July 15, 2025, troubleshooting efforts were completed and all locknuts tightened. No further instrument drift was observed.
Seabrook Station's procedure for operability determinations, EN-AA-203-1001, gives guidance on completing prompt operability determinations in attachment 5. Specifically, the guidance says to evaluate effects of condition, including potential failure modes, on the ability of the component to perform its specified safety function and related support functions, and to include the basis for determining that any specified safety function is or is not affected by the condition by identifying, evaluating, and dispositioning all field input information. The operability determinations performed did not evaluate the impact of the condition on the delta-T protection inputs and did not evaluate or disposition all test data collected. Guidance available in the vendor's technical manual provided adequate discussion of the circuit operation with respect to the delta-T protection and voltage driven and current driven aspects of the channel. Indication output is driven by circuit current while delta-T inputs are derived from circuit voltage.
Corrective Actions: Corrective actions included retraction of the prompt operability determination, Action Request 02519719, Seabrook Station performed troubleshooting as recommended by the vendor which included exercising all potentiometers associated with the nuclear instrument and ensuring their respective locknut was adequately tightened. An evaluation of the vendor guidance and maintenance practices was assigned to further investigate the cause of the drift.
Corrective Action References: Action request 02519719
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that not evaluating the impact of the instrument drift on the delta-T protection system was a performance deficiency and was reasonably within Seabrook Station's ability to foresee and correct and should have been prevented. Specifically, Seabrook Station failed to follow guidance from procedure EN-AA-203-1001 to evaluate effects of a condition on the ability of the component to perform its specified safety function and related support function(s) based on the field input information.
Data had been obtained during troubleshooting that indicated voltage drift on the safety-related inputs to the delta-T protection system but was not adequately dispositioned.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power.
This issue screened to very low safety significance (Green) by answering No to the question; Did the finding affect a single reactor protection system trip signal to initiate a reactor scram AND the function of other redundant trips or diverse methods of reactor shutdown (e.g., other automatic reactor protection system trips, alternate rod insertion, or manual reactor trip capacity)? Specifically, this performance deficiency impacted only one of the four channels of delta-T protection and the low pressurizer pressure trip remained unaffected and provided redundant protection.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: P.2 - Evaluation: The organization thoroughly evaluates issues to ensure that resolutions address causes and extent of conditions commensurate with their safety significance. Specifically, the station failed to investigate the issue commensurate with the safety significance which resulted in an inadequate operability determination.
Enforcement:
Violation: Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation, requires, in part, that as a minimum, the reactor trip system instrumentation channels and interlocks of table 3.3-1 shall be operable. Technical Specification Table 3.3-1, Functional Unit 7 Overtemperature Delta-T, action statement 6A, with the number of operable channels one less than total number of channels (four), start-up or power operation may continue provided that the inoperable channel is placed in the trip condition within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, and the minimum channels operable (three) requirement is met. Contrary to the above, between the periods of May 31, 2025 through July 15, 2025, the channel was not placed in the trip condition within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> but power operation continued; therefore, the requirements of action statement 6A of table 3.3-1 of the technical specifications were not met.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On August 21, 2025, the inspectors presented the emergency preparedness program inspection results to Terry Brandt, Maintenance Director, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On September 18, 2025, the inspectors presented the radiation protection program, radiological effluents technical specification program, and radiation safety program inspection results to Eric Mallet, Assistant Operations Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On December 3, 2025, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to David Sluszka, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Drawings
1-DG-B20459
Diesel Generator Fuel Oil System Train 'A' Detail
Revision 18
1-DG-B20464
Diesel Generator Fuel Oil System Train 'B' Detail
Revision 20
1-FW-B20688
Emergency Feedwater System Details
Revision 21
1-MS-B20582
Main Steam Emergency Feedwater Pump Supply
Revision 21
Miscellaneous
DBD-EFW-01
Design Basis Document Emergency Feedwater System
Revision 10
Procedures
OX1426.33
Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps Flow Verification
Month Surveillance
Revision 8
Work Orders
40997669
Procedures
Fire Response
Revision 3
OS1200.00
Response to Fire or Fire Alarm Actuation
Revision 28
71111.11Q Corrective Action
Documents
2522951
Corrective Action
Documents
2464979
2488759
2495914
2511926
2513810
2519107
2522955
2523227
2523228
2523326
2523328
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
2520042
Miscellaneous
SBK-PRAE-15-
003
SEAM Rule PRA Risk Ranking
Revision 3
SMPM
Structures Monitoring Program Manual
Revision 18
Procedures
Maintenance Rule Program Administration
Revision 16
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Maintenance Rule Program Administration
Revision 16
ER-AA-100-2002-
1000
Maintenance Rule Activity Guidance
Revision 5
SMP5.1
Equipment Impacted by Structural Deformation Monitoring
Walkdowns, Data Collection, and Evaluation
Revision 4
Procedures
Guarded Equipment
Revision 46
OX1426.33
Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps Flow Verification
Month Surveillance
Revision 8
Work Orders
40737107
40894235
40996264
40996362
40997669
Corrective Action
Documents
2493093
2515825
2516542
2517017
2519719
2519880
2522300
2522311
Procedures
IX1656.942
NI-N-42 Power Range NI Operational Test
Revision 24
Work Orders
41020388
41020964
41028751
Corrective Action
Documents
2520414
2520689
2521819
2522392
40819063
Procedures
IX1656.932
NI-N-42 Power Range Calibration
Revision 21
LS0569.20
Lubrication Pm and Starter Inspection for Motor Operated
Valves
Revision 15
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
OX1413.03
B Train RHR Quarterly Flow and Valve Stroke Surveillance
Revision 25
OX1416.03
Monthly Cooling Tower Fan operability test
Revision 11
OX1426.01
DG 1A Monthly Operability Surveillance
Revision 56
OX1426.33
Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps Flow Verification
Month Surveillance
Revision 8
OX1430.04
Main Steam System Valve Operability Tests
Revision 18
OX1436.02
Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump Quarterly And
Monthly Valve Alignment
Revision 37
OX1456.81
Operability Testing of IST Valves
Revision 47
OX1456.86
Operability Testing of IST Pumps
Revision 31
OX1461.05
SEPS Annual Availability Surveillance
Revision 14
Work Orders
40894206
40995319
40996273
40996836
40996838
40997194
40997669
41009908
41012145
41026629
276704
277345
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
2521867
Miscellaneous
Design Report
NextEra Energy Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant Alert
and Notification System Design Report
09/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
2521923
2522002
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
2521952
Miscellaneous
Seabrook Station Radiological Emergency Plan
Revision 82