IR 05000443/2025301

Initial Operator Licensing Examination Report 05000443/2025301

ML25336A047
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	12/02/2025
From:	Sarah Elkhiamy NRC/RGN-I/DORS/OB
To:	Coffey B NextEra Energy
References
50-443/25-301
Download: ML25336A047 (0)

Text

December 2, 2025

SUBJECT:

SEABROOK STATION, UNIT 1 - INITIAL OPERATOR LICENSING EXAMINATION REPORT 05000443/2025301

Dear Bob Coffey:

On October 23, 2025, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an examination at Seabrook Station, Unit 1. The enclosed examination report documents the examination results, which were discussed on November 19, 2025, with Chris Robinson, Seabrook Operations Director, and other members of your staff.

The examination included the evaluation of four applicants for reactor operator licenses, six applicants for instant senior reactor operator licenses, and two applicants for upgrade senior reactor operator licenses. The written and operating examinations were developed using NUREG-1021, Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors, Revision 12.

The license examiners determined that all 12 applicants satisfied the requirements of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 55, and the appropriate licenses were issued on November 19, 2025.

During the administration of the operating exam, a compromise of exam material occurred that affected the equitable and consistent administration of the examination. Specifically, a printer that provides alarm and malfunction response data (VPRO) was not cleared of its memory after a crew dynamic scenario run and as a result later produced the alarms and malfunctions during a print job in the next scenario run. The alarms and malfunctions that the printer produced included events not seen yet by the crew and therefore informed them of the details of their exam.

The printouts were seen by a license candidate and immediately brought to the attention of the Chief Examiner. NextEra determined that the issue was an inadvertent mistake by the cleanup crew and that there was no indication of willfulness. The issue caused the exam to be delayed while NextEra completed their immediate corrective actions, which included making a change to the post-scenario cleanup checklist to include checking and clearing the printer queue. After corrective actions were put into place, the operating exam resumed, and the candidates were later administered the spare scenario.

The NRC has completed its review of this exam security issue. One Severity Level IV violation without an associated Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) finding is identified in this report. The NRC is treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy. The details of the NCV are in the enclosure of this report. We have determined that additional follow-up inspection for this NCV is not warranted because the cause of the NCV is clearly understood by NextEra, and corrective actions have been taken to address the cause.

If you contest the violation or the severity of the violation documented in this examination report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this examination report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Senior Resident Inspector at Seabrook Station, Unit 1.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely, Sarah Elkhiamy, Chief Operations Branch Division of Operating Reactor Safety

Docket Nos. 05000443 License Nos. NPF-86

Enclosure:

As stated

cc w/ encl: Distribution via LISTSERV

SARAH ELKHIAMY Digitally signed by SARAH ELKHIAMY Date: 2025.12.02 13:57:28 -05'00'

SUMMARY

ER 05000443/2025301; 10/20/2025 - 10/29/2025; Seabrook Station, Unit 1; Initial Operator

Licensing Examination Report.

Four NRC examiners evaluated the competency of four applicants for reactor operator licenses, six applicants for instant senior reactor operator licenses, and two applicants for upgrade senior reactor operator licenses. The NRC developed the examinations using NUREG-1021, Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors, Revision 12.

The written examination was administered by the facility on October 29, 2025. NRC examiners administered the operating tests on October 20-23, 2025. The NRC examiners determined that all 12 applicants satisfied the requirements of 10 CFR 55, and the appropriate licenses have been issued.

List of Findings and Violations

Violation of NRC Examination Security as Required by 10 CFR 55.49 Cornerstone Severity Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Not Applicable Severity Level IV NCV 05000443/2025301-

Open/Closed Not Applicable 4OA5.5 Other Activities Initial Operator License Examination / Examination Security A self-revealing, Severity Level IV, non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 55.49, Integrity of Examinations and Tests, was identified for NextEras failure to prevent the compromise of exam materials by allowing exam related material to be inadvertently discovered by operators during an initial license operator exam scenario. Specifically, a printer that provides alarm and malfunction response data (VPRO) was not cleared of its memory after a crew dynamic scenario run and as a result later produced the alarms and malfunctions during a print job in the next scenario run. The alarms and malfunctions that the printer produced included events not seen yet by the crew and therefore informed them of the details of their exam. NextEra entered this issue into the corrective action program (AR 02528683).

REPORT DETAILS

4OA5 Other Activities Initial Operator License Examination

.1 License Applications

a. Scope

The examiners reviewed all license applications submitted by the licensee to ensure the applications reflected that each applicant satisfied relevant license eligibility requirements. The applications were submitted on NRC Form 398, Personal Qualification Statement, and NRC Form 396, Certification of Medical Examination by Facility Licensee. The examiners also audited 10 percent of the license applications in detail to confirm that they accurately reflected the subject applicants qualifications. This audit focused on the applicants experience and on-the-job training, including control manipulations that provided significant reactivity changes.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Operator Knowledge and Performance

a. Examination Scope

On October 29, 2025, the licensee proctored the administration of the written examinations to all applicants. The licensee staff graded the written examinations, analyzed the results, and presented their analysis to the NRC on November 3, 2025.

The NRC examination team administered the various portions of the operating examination to all applicants on October 20-23, 2025. The applicants for reactor operator licenses participated in at least two dynamic simulator scenarios, a control room and facilities walkthrough test consisting of 11 system tasks, and an administrative test consisting of four administrative tasks. The applicants seeking an instant senior reactor operator license participated in at least two dynamic simulator scenarios, a control room and facilities walkthrough test consisting of 10 system tasks, and an administrative test consisting of five administrative tasks. The applicants seeking an upgrade senior reactor operator license participated in at least one dynamic simulator scenario, a control room and facilities walkthrough test consisting of five system tasks, and an administrative test consisting of five administrative tasks.

b. Findings

All 12 applicants passed all parts of the operating test and the written examination. For the written examinations, the reactor operator applicants average score was 89.6 percent and the senior reactor operator applicants average score was 89.6 percent.

The text of the examination questions may be accessed in the Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) system under the accession numbers noted in the Attachment. In accordance with current NRC policy, the release of this written examination in ADAMS to the public will be delayed for two years.

Chapter ES-4.4 of NUREG 1021 requires the licensee to analyze the validity of any written examination questions that were missed by half or more of the applicants.

Licensee training staff performed this analysis and forwarded it to the Chief Examiner.

There were no post-examination comments provided by the licensee.

.3 Initial Licensing Examination Development

a. Examination Scope

The NRC developed the examinations in accordance with NUREG-1021, Revision 12.

All licensee facility training and operations staff involved in examination preparation and validation were listed on a security agreement. The NRC developed the written exam outline and provided it to the licensee on February 10, 2025. The licensee submitted the operating examination outline on May 23, 2025. The licensee submitted the draft examination package on August 6, 2025. The Chief Examiner reviewed the draft examination package against the requirements of NUREG-1021 and provided comments to the exam authors. The NRC conducted an onsite validation of the operating examinations and provided further comments during the week of September 22, 2025.

b. Findings

The examiners determined that the written and operating examinations were within the range of acceptability expected for a proposed examination.

No findings were identified.

.4 Simulation Facility Performance

a. Examination Scope

The examiners observed simulator performance with regard to plant fidelity during the examination validation and administration.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

One issue was identified by the examiners regarding unlabeled Solid State Protection System (SSPS) relay cabinets in the simulator. The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program (AR 02528848) and applied the appropriate labels. The examiners determined that this was a fidelity issue that based on the available information at the time did not rise to the level of a performance deficiency but will be further inspected on the next biennial requalification inspection scheduled for December 2025.

.5 Examination Security

a. Examination Scope

The examiners reviewed examination security for examination development and during both the onsite preparation week and examination administration week for compliance with NUREG-1021, Revision 12, requirements. Plans for simulator security and applicant control were reviewed and discussed with licensee personnel.

b. Findings

One self-revealing, Severity Level IV NCV was identified.

Violation of NRC Examination Security as Required by 10 CFR 55.49 Cornerstone Severity Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Not Applicable Severity Level IV NCV 05000443/2025301-01 Open/Closed

Not Applicable 4OA5.5 Other Activities Initial Operator License Examination /

Examination Security A self-revealing, Severity Level IV, non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 55.49, Integrity of Examinations and Tests, was identified for NextEras failure to prevent the compromise of exam materials by allowing exam related material to be inadvertently discovered by operators during an initial license operator exam scenario. Specifically, a printer that provides alarm and malfunction response data (VPRO) was not cleared of its memory after a crew dynamic scenario run and as a result later produced the alarms and malfunctions during a print job in the next scenario run. The alarms and malfunctions that the printer produced included events not seen yet by the crew and therefore informed them of the details of their exam.

Description:

On October 20, 2025, the NRC was scheduled to administer three runs of Crew Dynamic Scenario 1. After the first scenario run, NextEra performed a cleanup of exam materials and then brought in the next crew to take the exam. During Event 3, the Balance of Plant (BOP) operator went to the VPRO printer to retrieve a hard copy of the alarms that had annunciated. The printer had run out of paper and after it was refilled it produced the printouts. The BOP operator notified the Chief Examiner that the printer had produced alarm printouts that did not pertain to the event and provided them for review. The Chief Examiner reviewed the printouts and determined that they included alarms and malfunctions for events later in the scenario.

The Chief Examiner reviewed the printouts with the exam team and NextEra and determined that they revealed specific details of the exam scenario that the crew was about to be tested on. As a result, the Chief Examiner determined that the exam material had been compromised. NextEra determined that the issue was an inadvertent mistake by the cleanup crew; in that, the printer queue had not been cleared and had stored print jobs from the earlier scenario run. The printer had run out of paper in the earlier run, and when it was filled with paper it produced the backlog of printouts during the next scenario. The NRC determined that there was no indication of willfulness. After corrective actions were put into place, the NRC administered the spare scenario to the crew later in the week.

Corrective Actions: NextEra added the review and clearing of the printer queue to their scenario cleanup checklist and added another independent check of the cleanup for the remainder of the exam.

Corrective Action References: AR 02528683

Performance Assessment:

The Examiners determined that the licensees failure to prevent the compromise of exam materials during an initial license operator exam scenario was a performance deficiency. The Examiners determined that this performance deficiency was reasonably within NextEras ability to foresee and correct and should have been prevented.

The Examiners determined that Traditional Enforcement applied because this issue had the potential to impact the regulatory process. Specifically, the revealing of exam materials to license candidates could cause the NRC to make an incorrect licensing decision by granting an individual a reactor operator or senior operator license for which they are not minimally competent to hold. The ROPs significance determination process does not specifically consider regulatory process impact in its assessment of licensee performance. Therefore, it is necessary to address this violation which had the potential to impede the NRCs ability to regulate using Traditional Enforcement to adequately deter non-compliance. There was no indication of willfulness associated with this issue. Because the underlying performance deficiency was minor, no associated ROP finding was identified.

Enforcement:

The Examiners screened the performance deficiency for significance in accordance with Section 6.4.d of the NRC Enforcement Policy and determined that it was similar to the Severity Level IV example 6.4.d.1. Specifically, this was an example of a nonwillful compromise of exam materials required by 10 CFR Part 55 that did not contribute to the NRC making an incorrect regulatory decision. Traditional Enforcement violations are not assessed for cross-cutting aspects.

Violation: 10 CFR 55.49 states that applicants, licensees, and facility licensees shall not engage in any activity that compromises the integrity of any application, test, or examination required by this part. The integrity of a test or examination is considered compromised if any activity, regardless of intent, affected, or, but for detection, would have affected the equitable and consistent administration of the test or examination. This includes activities related to the preparation and certification of license applications and all activities related to the preparation, administration, and grading of the tests and examinations required by this part.

Contrary to the above, on October 20, 2025, during the initial license operator exam administration, NextEra personnel inadvertently and mistakenly engaged in an activity that compromised the integrity of the exam. Specifically, NextEra personnel failed to ensure the VPRO printer queue had been cleared of all stored print jobs from the earlier scenario run, and as a result the next crew discovered the exam material during their exam. Therefore, this activity directly affected the equitable and consistent administration of the operating examination.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

The Chief Examiner presented the examination results to Chris Robinson, Seabrook Operations Director, and other members of the licensee's staff on November 19, 2025.

The licensee acknowledged the observations and non-cited violation presented.

The licensee did not identify any information or materials used during the examination as proprietary.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

Josh Reuer, Corporate Training Director

Tim Farrell, Corporate Training Manager

Tim Gabosch, Corporate Training Supervisor

Jesse Seymour, Corporate Training Supervisor

Chris Robinson, Seabrook Operations Director

Eric Mallett, Seabrook Assistant Operations Manager (AOM) Support

Andrew Ferraioli, Seabrook AOM Training

Mike Magri, Seabrook Training Manager

Chris Stienecker, Seabrook Initial Training Supervisor

JD Fecteau, Seabrook Initial Training Lead

Andrew Goss, Seabrook Exam Writer

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Open/Closed

05000443/2025301-01 NCV Violation of NRC Examination Security as Required by 10 CFR 55.49 (Section 4OA5.5)