IR 05000440/1981017

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IE Insp Repts 50-440/81-17 & 50-441/81-17 on 811118-20 & 1130-1202.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Possible Weld Defects Found in Unit 2 Box Beam Girders, Welding on Containment Dome & Penetrations
ML20050B281
Person / Time
Site: Perry  FirstEnergy icon.png
Issue date: 01/07/1982
From: Danielson D, Erb C, Phillip G
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20050B270 List:
References
50-440-81-17, 50-441-81-17, NUDOCS 8204050165
Download: ML20050B281 (6)


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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-440/81-17; 50-441/81-17 Docket No. 50-440; 50-441 License No. CPPR-148; CPPR-149 Licensee:

Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company P. O. Box 5000 Cleveland, OH 44101 Facility Name: Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Perry Site, Perry, Ohio Inspection Conducted: November 18-20 and November 30 - December 2, 1981

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Inspectors:

j G. A. Phillip 8/c!1

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Accompanied By:

E. H. Nightingale (Training)

'h < }l1eb: >v Approved By:

D. II,. Danibison, Chief

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/^' Materials and Processes Section

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Inspection Summary Inspection on November 18-20 and November 30 - December 2, 1981 (Report No. 50-440/81-17; 50-441/81-17)

Areas Inspected:

Containment steel weld defects found in suppression pool floor plate (50.55(e) item); possible weld defects found in Unit 2 hox beam girders (50.55(e) item); welding on containment dome, penetrations, and components. This inspection involved a total of 37 inspector-hours on site by two NRC inspectors accompanied by an inspector in training.

Results:

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

8204050165 820319 PDR ADOCK 05000440 G

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DETAI,LS Persons Contacted

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Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (CEI)

  • Murray Edelman, Manager, Nuclear Engineering
  • R.

L. Farrell, Manager, Quality Assurance

  • B.

D. Walrath, Supervisor, Quality Engineering

  • S.

P. Tulk, Supervisor, CQE Alternate

  • T.

Keaveney, Senior Structural Engineer

  • J.

Eppich, Senior Engineer

  • C. Ilubbuch, Quality Engineer
  • R. Jadgchew, Contracts Manager
  • K. Combs, Senior Engineering Aide J. Gilstrap, Quality Engineering Other Personnel

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  • J. W. Mehaffey, QA Program Manager, Gilbert Associates, Inc.
  • J.

S. Kerr, Supervisor, CQSS, Kaiser Engineers, Inc.

  • P. L. Gibson, Project QA Manager, Kaiser Engineers, Inc.

D. R. Buhanaa, Shop Superintendent, Pullman Power Products

J. Steele, QC Supervisor, Pullman Power Products T. Bond, Field Quality Manager, Newport News Industrial Corp.

W. Newell, Supervisory Weld Engineer, Newport News Industrial Corp.

    • G.

A. Phillip, NRC Investigator

Licensee Action on 50.55(e) Items Background and General Information This inspection principally addresses the actions taken by the licensee in response to the identification of deficient welding on containment components and allegations that a welding supervisor had ordered that the welding deficiencies be covered up.

The Newport News Industrial Corp. (NNIC) QA management were informed by welders that their supervisor had requested that they cover up deficient welds. Specifically they were asked to weld over defects in existing welds.

In several instances this had been done.

The NNIC QA manager immediately notified the licensee of this deficient welding and stopped work (welding) in the affected area (work area #6).

It was subsequently determined that six welders under one supervisor were asked to cover up deficient welds.

Several of the welders admitted that

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they had in fact covered up deficient welds. The other welders under this supervisor stated that they refused to cover up bad welds.

The supervisor responsible for this order was immediately fired. His general foreman, who apparently was not aware of the weld coverup order, was removed from the job site.

As a result of this finding by the licensee all welds made under this supervisor and his crew were reinspected and examined by ultrasonic testing and repaired as necessary. Where the welds were covered by the subsequently installed leak-chase channel, the leak-chase was removed for test and repair of the suspect weld.

Our review of the licensee's investigation and rework re-order indicates that their effort was fully comprehensive. The licensee took immediate and effective corrective action.

The stop-work associated with the licensee activities extended for approximately four weeks.

The details of the NRC review are as follows:

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1.

Box Beam Girder Welds in Unit 2 Polar Crane Open Item (50-440/81-17-01): Newport News Industrial Corp. (NNIC)

drawing 249761 describes the parts which support the polar crane rails.

and are attached to the containment wall. Welds made in a subsidiary shop for NNIC were found to contain defects after receipt at the Perry site. The welds were made using a semi-automatic process (M.I.G.) and the Shielded Metal Arc process. The defects, lack of fusion, and porosity arose because low heat was used to minimize distortion and winds caused loss of gas protection on the weld puddle.

NNIC has initiated ultrasonic testing of these welds, which indicate defects are present. No repair has been started as of November 20.

Loads on these girders are under reevaluation. This item remains open.

2.

Possible Weld Defects in Unit 1 Suppression Pool Floor NCR17-316 was issued and work stopped on welding of stainless steel clad floor plates in the suppression pool.

It was discovered that a supervisor had advised some welders to weld over and conceal defective

welds. This information was originally reported to NNIC QA Personnel by the welders involved.

It was subsequently confirmed by the licensee and NNIC. Most of the defects were made when using the semi-automatic (M.I.G.) process.

Certain personnel including the supervisor were terminated, while others were demoted to grinders. A training session has been held for all welders in the Area 6 portion of the job.

In the meantime, the welding procedures are being evaluated and no work is being performed in questionable quality areas. A few of the ques-

tionable quality welds are covered with le ik chase channels, which require removal to properly evaluate and reiair the weld underneath.

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J As of November 20, 1981, the only welding being performed is where no

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i prior welding had been performed or where no questionable quality welds existed.

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On December 1, 1981, the NNIC site manager and the field quality i

manager, major project,provided the followir. ; information concerning i

the work assignments at the Perry site of the welder foreman who had instructed welders under his supervision to mask indications from detection. He was employed as a welder on January 24, 1977 and became a welder foreman on December 16, 1977. As a foreman, he had the following assignwents:

Dates Work Assignments Type of Inspection 12/16/77 -

Unit I containment shell i

1/16/80 Welding shell plates 100% RT

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Shell attachment plates 100% MT Final Shell stiffener rings, 100% MT, UT, or RT penetrations 100% RT Shell attachments (fillet welds)

MT, some PT (Concurrent with the above, for about nine months welding clips to support beams on 599' elevation platform.)

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Unit 1 polar crane girders 100% MT, RT or UT 4/9/80 repair of shop welds Layer MT 4/16/80 -

Unit I dome prefabrication 100% RT 10/15/80 Unit 1 dome attachments 100% MT Final

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(fillet welds)

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10/22/80 -

Unit 2 polar crane girders 100% MT, RT 1/14/81 installation and shop weld or UT repairs Layer HT 1/14/81 -

Unit I containment stiffener 3/25/81 rings NA Drilling holes for rebar in annulus area NA 4/1/81 -

Support work (putting up 4/30/81 clips for scaffolds, etc.)

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5/6/81 -

Installation of Unit 2 6/10/81 containment dome 100% RT i

6/17/81 -

Area 6 floor plates in 100% MT suppression pool 100% PT stain. clad 100% vacuum box

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j 100% press. leak i

Test not yet performed.

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The field quality manager advised that all welding for which the foreman was responsible prior to the suppression pool work was manual welding.

Ife indicated the type of welding done under the foreman's supervision was not susceptible to masking or covering over voids or other defects which would not be detected by NDE.

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During an interview, the foreman stated to NNIC management personnel that prior to the suppression pool work he had never attempted to mask defects nor had he instructed other welders to do so.

The foreman stated his motivation for giving the improper instruction was that he was in competition with other foremen, he wanted recognition, and he wanted credit for being ahead of schedule.

The NNIC sice management indicated that based upon the foreman's state-ments and a review of his work assignments as outlined above, together with the required NDE, they had concluded the previous welding performed under the foreman's supervision was not a matter of concern. The inspector has no further questions regarding this matter.

Functional or Program Areas Inspected 1.

Containment Dome Welding - Unit 2 The top most portion of the dome was being welded in place. Steel 1 1/2" thick to Specification SA516, Grade 70, wat used for both Unit 1 and Unit 2 Containments. The lower portion of the containment wall which sees water is constructed of 1 1/2" carbon steel clad with

~ stainless steel to Specification SA-264.

Semi-automatic welding using a flux cored E70-T1 electrode is used after the root has been placed by Shielded Metal Arc (SMAW) welding.

Wold No. S33-1 (2-8) process sheet was examined. The weld was 100%

radiographically inspected to Procedure RT-465-NC-N-002, Revision C.

A visual inspection to Procedure VT701-N-N003PA is made after back gouge of the root and completion of the weld.

c The ANI representative of the liartford Steam Boiler and Insurance Company checks NDE results on Containment. With no cover on Unit 2 Containment, it will be difficult to keep suppression pool floor plates

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water-free, which will be necessary to guarantee no pitting in the stainless surface of the plates.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

2.

Containment Penetrations, Unit 1 and Unit 2 Many of the smaller penetrations to Category MC of the ASME Section III i

Code are fabricated on site by Pullman Power Products Co. (PPP). Weld No. 2-G41-G-FC-21-RB which is a weld in the Fuel Pool Clean-up System, was observed in the fabrication shop. This 4" weld was in schedule 10

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stainless steel pipe and was made to procedure WPS29 and involved an

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open butt weld using the GTAW process. Control of welding procedure and electrode disposal appeared to be handled in an acceptable manner

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to procedure requirements. Outside storage of several large penetra-tions for Unit 2 was checked. These items were covered with canvas

and then had an inner wrap of clear plastic. They appeared to be on dunnage which would keep them out of surface water. However, they had been stored outside for over two years.

It was recommended that j

they be unccvered and examined to determine if the protection were sufficient.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

3.

Safety Related Component Weld Weld FWO2 to a Borg Warner 4" valve was examined and found to be acceptable. These welds were Class 2 and were ground.

Several Dragon stainless steel valves being welded in the Fabrication Shop into the Control Rod Drive System were properly controlled.

Openings were capped and electrode stubs collected in scrap containers.

Oxygen analyzers were in use where purge gas analysis was required.

Observation of seven completed welds in System 54, which is a Class 2 system, indicated that five of the welds had been ground flush and two had not been ground.

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No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Persons Contacted) on November 18-20, 1981. The inspector summarized the scope

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and findings of the inspection, which were acknowledged by the licensee.

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