IR 05000424/2016002
| ML16215A106 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 07/29/2016 |
| From: | Shane Sandal NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB2 |
| To: | Taber K Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
| References | |
| IR 2016002 | |
| Download: ML16215A106 (24) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION uly 29, 2016
SUBJECT:
VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000424/2016002 AND 05000425/2016002
Dear Mr. Taber:
On June 30, 2016, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2. On July 14, 2016, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Darin Myers and other members of your staff.
Inspectors documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report.
NRC inspectors documented one finding of very low safety significance (Green) in this report which involved a violation of NRC requirements. The NRC is treating this violation as a noncited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy. If you contest the violation or significance of this NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC resident inspector at Vogtle.
If you disagree with the cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC resident inspector at Vogtle. In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding, of the NRC's Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Shane Sandal, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-424, 50-425 License Nos.: NPF-68 and NPF-81
Enclosures:
IR 05000424/2016002; 05000425/2016002 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
REGION II==
Docket Nos.: 50-424, 50-425 License Nos.: NPF-68, NFP-81 Report No.: 05000424/2016002; and 05000425/2016002 Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Facility: Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2 Location: Waynesboro, GA 30830 Dates: April 1, 2016 through June 30, 2016 Inspectors: T. Stephen, Senior Resident Inspector (Acting)
W. Deschaine, Senior Resident Inspector (Acting)
A. Alen, Resident Inspector Approved by: Shane Sandal, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000424/2016002; and 05000425/2016002, April 1, 2016, through June 30, 2016; Vogtle
Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2, Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion The report covered a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors. One self-revealing non-cited violation was identified. The significance of inspection findings are indicated by their color (i.e., greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow, Red) and determined using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP) dated April 29, 2015.
The cross-cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0310, Aspects within the Cross-Cutting Areas dated December 4, 2014. All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy dated February 4, 2015. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operations of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 5. Documents reviewed by the inspectors which are not identified in the Report Details are identified in the List of Documents Reviewed section of the Attachment.
Cornerstone: Initiating Events
- (Green) A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specifications (TS) 5.4.1.a,
Procedures, was identified for the licensees failure to properly implement procedure 24750-2, Steam Generator Level (Narrow Range) Protection Channel II 2L-519 Channel Operational Test and Channel Calibration. During testing of Unit 2 loop 1 steam generator (S/G) narrow range channel 2L-519 the channel was not removed from scan resulting in a reactor trip. The licensees immediate corrective actions were to remove the technicians performing the calibration from maintenance duties for formal remediation. The licensee documented this condition in CR 10230073.
The performance deficiency (PD) was more than minor because it adversely affected the Initiating Events cornerstone objective in that the failure to properly remove channel 2L-519 from scan resulted in a reactor trip. The finding was determined to be Green because the PD did not result in a loss of mitigation equipment used to transition the reactor to a stable shutdown condition. The finding was assigned a cross cutting aspect of Avoid Complacency because maintenance technicians failed to implement appropriate error reduction tools to verify that the correct channel was removed from scan for testing. (H.12) (4OA3)
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Unit 1 operated at or near full rated thermal power (RTP) for the entire inspection period.
Unit 2 began the report period at full RTP. The unit experienced an unplanned automatic trip on May 25, 2016 due to a low loop 1 steam generator water level (SGWL) condition. The unit returned full power on May 27, 2016, and operated at or near full RTP for the remainder of the inspection period.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
a. Inspection Scope
Summer Readiness of Offsite and Alternate AC Power System: The inspectors reviewed the licensees procedures for operation and continued availability of offsite and onsite alternate AC power systems. The inspectors also reviewed the communications protocols between the transmission system operator and the licensee to verify that the appropriate information is exchanged when issues arise that could affect the offsite power system.
The inspectors reviewed the material condition of offsite and onsite alternate AC power systems (including switchyard and transformers) by performing a walkdown of the switchyard. The inspectors reviewed outstanding work orders and assessed corrective actions for degraded conditions that impacted plant risk or required compensatory actions.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment
a. Inspection Scope
Partial Walkdown: The inspectors verified that critical portions of the following systems were correctly aligned by performing partial walkdowns. The inspectors determined the correct system lineup by reviewing plant procedures and drawings listed in the
.
- Unit 2, chemical volume control system (CVCS) centrifugal charging pump (CCP) A train standby readiness alignment following restoration from planned maintenance
- Unit 1, essential chiller water system B train while the A train was out of service (OOS) for planned maintenance
- Diesel driven fire pumps following planned maintenance outage Complete Walkdown: The inspectors verified the alignment of the Unit 2 residual heat removal (RHR) system by reviewing plant procedures, drawings, the updated final safety analysis report, and other documents. The inspectors also reviewed records related to the system outstanding design issues, maintenance work requests, and deficiencies.
The inspectors reviewed corrective action documents, including condition reports and outstanding work orders, to verify the licensee was identifying and resolving equipment alignment discrepancies. The inspectors also reviewed periodic reports containing information on the status of risk-significant systems, including maintenance rule reports and system health reports.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
Quarterly Inspection: The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of fire plans by comparing the fire plans to the defined hazards and defense-in-depth features specified in the fire protection program the following fire areas.
- Unit 1, control building level A east and west penetration rooms, fire zones 89, 90, 159, 87, 88, 93, 102, and 158
- Unit 2, component cooling water (CCW) pump rooms, fire zones 36 and 37
- Unit 2, containment spray and RHR pump rooms, fire zones 4, 5, 9, and 10
- Main control room and technical support center, including battery room, fire zones 105, 106, 183A, 601, 602, 603, 604, and 605
- Spent fuel pool floor, fire zone 139 The inspectors assessed the following:
- control of transient combustibles and ignition sources
- fire detection systems
- water-based fire suppression systems
- gaseous fire suppression systems
- manual firefighting equipment and capability
- passive fire protection features
- compensatory measures and fire watches
- issues related to fire protection contained in the licensees corrective action program
- material condition and operational status of fire protection equipment Fire Drill Observation: The inspectors observed the licensees fire brigade performance during a fire drill on April 25, 2016 and assessed the brigades capability to meet fire protection licensing basis requirements. The inspectors observed the following aspects of fire brigade performance:
- capability of fire brigade members
- leadership ability of the brigade leader
- proper use of turnout gear and fire-fighting equipment
- team effectiveness
- compliance with site procedures The inspectors also assessed the ability of control room operators to combat potential fires including identifying the location of the fire, dispatching the fire brigade, and sounding alarms.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
a. Inspection Scope
Resident Inspector Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Requalification: The inspectors observed training simulator scenario, V-RQ-SE-14203, administered to a licensed operating crew, on May 4, 2016, in accordance with the licensees accredited requalification training program. The inspectors assessed the following attributes:
- licensed operator performance
- the ability of the licensee to administer the scenario and evaluate the operators
- the quality of the post-scenario critique
- simulator performance Resident Inspector Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Performance: The inspectors observed licensed operator performance in the main control room during the May 26, 2016 restart of Unit 2 following an unplanned reactor trip. The inspectors assessed the following:
- use of plant procedures
- control board manipulations
- communications between crew members
- use and interpretation of instruments, indications, and alarms
- use of human error prevention techniques
- documentation of activities
- management and supervision
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
Regular Maintenance Effectiveness: The inspectors assessed the licensees change from a biennial assessment to an ongoing assessment of their maintenance rule program. The maintenance rule program assessment is required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(3). The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of the change and their assessment tools. The inspectors reviewed the licensees assessment of several systems covered by the maintenance rule. The inspectors interviewed the maintenance rule coordinator to review the programs adherence to the guidance in NUMARC 93-01 Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants, Rev. 4A for an ongoing assessment.
Quality Control Maintenance Effectiveness: The inspectors reviewed the licensees control of quality in accordance with their Quality Assurance Program during work on several maintenance rule scoped components. The following work packages were reviewed for proper quality controls:
- SNC 777525, Unit 2 loop 1 atmospheric relief valve actuator repair
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the maintenance activities listed below to verify that the licensee assessed and managed plant risk as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and licensee procedures. The inspectors assessed the adequacy of the licensees risk assessments and implementation of risk management actions. The inspectors also verified that the licensee was identifying and resolving problems with assessing and managing maintenance-related risk using the corrective action program. Additionally, for maintenance resulting from unforeseen situations, the inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees planning and control of emergent work activities.
- Unit 1, May 2, 2016, GREEN equipment out of service (EOOS) risk profile following the failure of station air compressor no. 1 in conjunction with degraded conditions on air compressors no. 2 and no. 4
- Unit 2, week of May 2, 2016, GREEN EOOS risk profile due to nuclear service cooling water (NSCW) pump no. 1 being out of service (OOS) for planned maintenance along with service testing of A and C trains battery charges
- Unit 2, May 17, 2016, GREEN EOOS risk profile due to B train NSCW pump no. 2 and B train emergency safety features (ESF) chiller OOS
- Unit 2, May 24, 2016, GREEN EOOS risk profile due to B train NSCW cooling tower cleaning causing fouling of the B train emergency diesel generator (EDG)jacket water heat exchanger and containment coolers no. 7 and 8
- Unit 2, May 27, 2016, GREEN EOOS risk profile due to unplanned maintenance on the 6A feedwater heater
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors selected the operability determinations or functionality evaluations listed below for review based on the risk-significance of the associated components and systems. The inspectors reviewed the technical adequacy of the determinations to ensure that technical specification operability was properly justified and the components or systems remained capable of performing their design functions. To verify whether components or systems were operable, the inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the technical specification and updated final safety analysis report to the licensees evaluations. Where compensatory measures were required to maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures in place would function as intended and were properly controlled. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of corrective action documents to verify the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with operability evaluations.
- Functionality assessment (FA) for a non-functional engine block heater on the diesel fire pump no. 1, condition report (CR) 10229293 (FA #1-15-001)
- Unit 1, immediate determination of operability (IDO) for missing hold down bolts on the ventilation cooling air supply ducts access covers of the A train EDG building, CR10206003
- Unit 2, A train EDG control power A failure, CR10229803
- Unit 2, IDO for blocking open temperature control valve, 2TV-11675, which controls NSCW flow to the chiller condenser of the B train essential chilled water system, CR10224020
- Unit 2, IDO for low flow conditions in the B train of the NSCW, CR10227263
- Unit 2, prompt determination of operability (PDO) for oil content increase in the jacket water subsystem of the B train EDG, CR10207224 (PDO #2-16-002)
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R18 Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed licensing document change request (LDCR), i.e. Plant modification, No. 2013017, VEGP TR 13.13.1 Functionality Temperature Guidance, version 1.0, which changed the technical support center heating, ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC) cooling function requirements. The inspectors assessed the following:
- verified that the modifications did not affect the safety functions of important safety systems
- confirmed the modifications did not degrade the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of risk significant structures, systems and components
- evaluated whether system operability and availability, configuration control, post-installation test activities, and changes to documents, such as drawings, procedures, and operator training materials, complied with licensee standards and NRC requirements
- reviewed a sample of related corrective action documents to verify the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with modifications
b. Findings
No additional findings were identified. Findings and associated enforcement aspects of this plant modification review were documented in inspection report 05000424, 425/2016502 (Section 1EP4).
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors either observed post-maintenance testing or reviewed the test results for the maintenance activities listed below to verify the work performed was completed correctly and the test activities were adequate to verify system operability and functional capability.
- SNC539528, S/G 1 main feedwater regulating valve air operated valve maintenance, March 13, 2016
- SNC396950, Check valve from reactor makeup water to boric acid blend, March 16, 2016
- SNC777525, Unit 2 loop 1 atmospheric relief valve Actuator repair, April 3, 2016
- SNC779920, 1N41 power range instrument J352 connector repair, April 5, 2016
- SNC 480312, Nitrogen charging and air pump regulator adjustment of main feed isolation valve, 1HV-5228, May 6, 2016
- SNC 541720, 36-Month NSCW-ESF water chiller flow channel, 2F-1803, May 17, 2016 The inspectors evaluated these activities for the following:
- Acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated operational readiness
- Effects of testing on the plant were adequately addressed
- Test instrumentation was appropriate
- Tests were performed in accordance with approved procedures
- Equipment was returned to its operational status following testing
- Test documentation was properly evaluated Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of corrective action documents to verify the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with post-maintenance testing.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the surveillance tests listed below. The surveillance test was either observed directly or test results were reviewed to verify testing activities and results provide objective evidence that the affected equipment remain capable of performing their intended safety functions and maintain their operational readiness consistent with the facilitys current licensing basis. The inspectors evaluated the test activities to assess for:
- preconditioning of equipment,
- appropriate acceptance criteria,
- calibration and appropriateness of measuring and test equipment,
- procedure adherence, and
- equipment alignment following completion of the surveillance Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of significant surveillance testing problems documented in the licensees corrective action program to verify the licensee was identifying and correcting any testing problems associated with surveillance testing.
Routine Surveillance Tests
- 14460-2, Emergency Core Cooling System Flow Path Verification, version 38.1
- 14951-C, Fire Suppression System Operability Tests (Section 1.3 - Diesel Fire Pump #2 C-2301-P4-003) Monthly Test, version 32
- 14825-2, Quarterly In-service Valve Test, version 94.2 (procedure section for steam generator no. 2 atmospheric relief valve PV-3010)
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed training evolution V-RQ-SE-16202, designated as an emergency preparedness performance indicator data collection exercise (i.e. DEP and ERO), conducted on May 9, 2016. The inspectors observed licensee activities in the simulator to evaluate implementation of the emergency plan, including event classification and notification. The inspectors evaluated the licensees performance against criteria established in the licensees procedures. Additionally, the inspectors attended the post-exercise critique to assess the licensees effectiveness in identifying emergency preparedness weaknesses and verified the identified weaknesses were entered in the corrective action program.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors verified that the PI data complied with guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, and licensee procedures. The inspectors verified the accuracy of reported data that were used to calculate the value of each PI.
Cornerstone: Barrier Integrity
- reactor coolant system leak rate (both units)
- reactor coolant system specific activity (both units)
The inspectors reviewed a sample of the performance indicator (PI) data, submitted by the licensee, for these PIs. The inspectors reviewed plant records compiled between April 2015 and March 2016 to verify the accuracy and completeness of the data reported for the station. In addition, the inspectors reviewed a sample of related corrective action documents to verify the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with PI data.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
.1 Routine Review
The inspectors screened items entered into the licensees corrective action program in order to identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up. The inspectors reviewed condition reports, attended screening meetings, or accessed the licensees computerized corrective action database.
.2 Semi-Annual Trend Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed issues entered in the licensees corrective action program and associated documents to identify trends that could indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The inspectors focused their review on the increasing trends of oil/grease in the jacket water system of the Unit 2 B train EDG, but also considered the results of inspector daily condition report screenings, licensee trending efforts, and licensee human performance results. The review nominally considered the 6-month period of either January 2016 through June 2016, although some examples extended beyond those dates when the scope of the trend warranted. The inspectors compared their results with the licensees analysis of trends. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the adequacy of corrective actions associated with a sample of the issues identified in the licensees trend reports. The inspectors also reviewed corrective action documents that were processed by the licensee to identify potential adverse trends in the condition of structures, systems, and/or components as evidenced by acceptance of long-standing non-conforming or degraded conditions.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings were identified.
.3 Annual Follow-Up of Selected Issues
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted a detailed review of corrective action report (CAR)264166,Improper Steam Dump Operation during the Unit 2 startup on March 28, 2016.
The inspectors evaluated the following attributes of the licensees actions:
- complete and accurate identification of the problem in a timely manner
- evaluation and disposition of operability and reportability issues
- consideration of extent of condition, generic implications, common cause, and previous occurrences
- classification and prioritization of the problem
- identification of root and contributing causes of the problem
- identification of any additional condition reports
- completion of corrective actions in a timely manner
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA3 Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
Unit 2 Automatic Reactor Trip
a. Inspection Scope
The licensee experienced an unplanned automatic reactor trip of Unit 2 on May 25, 2016. The automatic reactor trip was caused by low water level condition on the loop 1 S/G. The inspectors verified the licensees trip response actions were in accordance with procedures. The inspectors reviewed the units response to the low water level condition to verify it was consistent to that described in the licensees safety analysis.
The inspectors attended the licensees restart Plant Review Board that was conducted to verify the unit would be allowed to be restarted in accordance with procedures. The inspectors reviewed the licensees Human Performance Review Board results and the Reactor Trip Review report.
b. Findings
Introduction:
A Green self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) of TS 5.4.1.a, Procedures, was identified for the licensees failure to properly implement procedure 24750-2, Steam Generator Level (Narrow Range) Protection Channel II 2L-519 Channel Operational Test and Channel Calibration, Ver. 23, during testing of the Unit 2 loop 1 S/G narrow range channel 2L-519.
Description:
The licensee was performing a planned Unit 2 Loop 1 S/G narrow range protection channel operational test and calibration using procedure 24750-2 Steam Generator Level (Narrow Range) Protection Channel II 2L-519 Channel Operational test and Channel Calibration, Ver. 23. The channel being tested would be removed from scan which locked the steam generator water level at the current water level value regardless of the test or actual input. However, the averaging circuit was removed from scan instead of the channel being tested. This error locked in a S/G water level that was above the program level causing a reduction in main feedwater flow to the S/G. S/G water level decreased until it reached the low water level reactor trip setpoint. The licensee responded per their reactor trip procedures and stabilized the plant.
Analysis:
The failure to properly implement procedure 24750-2 as required by TS 5.4.1.a. is a performance deficiency (PD). The performance deficiency was more than minor because it adversely affected the Initiating Events cornerstone objective in that failure to properly remove channel 2L-519 resulted in a reactor trip. The finding was screened using IMC 0609, Appendix A, dated June 19, 2012. The finding was determined to be Green using Exhibit 1, Initiating Events, Transient Initiators, because the PD did not result in a loss of mitigation equipment used to transition the reactor to a stable shutdown condition. The finding was assigned a cross cutting aspect of Avoid Complacency because maintenance technicians failed to implement appropriate error reduction tools to verify that the correct channel was removed from scan for testing.
(H.12)
Enforcement:
Technical Specification 5.4.1.a required, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulation Guide 1.33, Rev. 2, Appendix A, February 1978.
Regulation Guide 1.33, Appendix A, Section 9.a. recommended written procedures for performing maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment.
Procedure 24750-2 Steam Generator Level (Narrow Range) Protection Channel II 2L-519 Channel Operational test and Channel Calibration for the testing of the Unit 2 Loop 1 Steam Generator (S/G) narrow range channel 2L-519 required, in part, that point LY-519 be removed from scan. Contrary to the above, on May 25, 2016, licensee removed the Unit 2 Loop 1 averaging circuit from scan instead of channel 2L-519, resulting in a reactor trip. The licensees immediate corrective actions were to remove the technicians performing the calibration from maintenance duties for formal remediation. The licensee documented this condition and the corrective actions in CR 10230073. This violation is being treated as an NCV in accordance with section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement policy:
NCV 05000425/2016002-01, Failure to properly implement a maintenance procedure caused a reactor trip.
4OA5 Other Activities
Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) (60855.1)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a walkdown of the onsite ISFSI. The inspectors reviewed surveillance records to verify that daily surveillance requirements were performed as required by technical specifications.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
On July 14, 2016, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Darin Myers and other members of the licensees staff. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection period.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee personnel
- T. Baker, Security Manager
- S. Briggs, Operations Director
- J. Crites, Maintenance Rule Coordinator
- J. Dixon, Radiation Protection Manager
- T. Fowler, Chemistry Manager
- G. Gunn, Licensing Manager
- S. Harris, Operations Manager
- D. Komm, Work Management Director
- D. Myers, Plant Manager
- D. Stiles, Training Director
- T. Baker, Security Manager
- J. Summy, Engineering Director
- D. Myers, Plant Manager
- K. Taber, Site Vice-President
- K. Walden, Licensing Engineer
- I. White, Licensing Engineer
LIST OF REPORT ITEMS
Opened and Closed
- 05000425/2016002-01 Failure to properly implement a maintenance procedure caused a Reactor Trip (Section 4OA3)