IR 05000424/2016004
| ML17038A033 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 02/07/2017 |
| From: | Shane Sandal NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB2 |
| To: | Taber B Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
| References | |
| IR 2016004 | |
| Download: ML17038A033 (26) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ary 7, 2017
SUBJECT:
VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000424/2016004 AND 05000425/2016004 AND FOLLOWUP ASSESSMENT LETTER
Dear Mr. Taber:
On December 31, 2016, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2. On February 2, 2017, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. Inspectors documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report.
NRC inspectors documented one finding of very low safety significance (Green) in this report, which was also a violation of regulatory requirements. The NRC is treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy. If you contest the violation or significance of this NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC resident inspector at Vogtle.
If you disagree with the cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC resident inspector at the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant.
After reviewing Vogtle Units 1 and 2 performance in addressing a greater-than-green finding, the NRC concluded your actions met the objectives of Inspection Procedure 95001, Supplemental Inspection Response to Action Matrix Column 2 Inputs, (reference ADAMS Accession number ML16178A018). Therefore, in accordance with the guidance in Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0305, Operating Reactor Assessment Program, this greater-than-green finding was only considered in assessing plant performance for a total of four quarters. As a result, the NRC determined the performance at Vogtle Units 1 and 2 to be in the Licensee Response Column of the ROP Action Matrix as of January 1, 2017. In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding, of the NRC's Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Shane R. Sandal, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-424, 50-425 License Nos.: NPF-68 and NPF-81
Enclosures:
IR 05000424/2016004; 05000425/2016004 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
REGION II==
Docket Nos.: 50-424, 50-425 License Nos.: NPF-68, NPF-81 Report No.: 05000424/2016004; and 05000425/2016004 Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Facility: Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2 Location: Waynesboro, GA 30830 Dates: October 01, 2016 through December 31, 2016 Inspectors: E. Coffman, Senior Resident Inspector (Acting)
A. Alen, Resident Inspector B. Caballero, Senior Operations Engineer (1R11)
W. Pursley, Health Physicist Inspector (2RS5)
Approved by: Shane R. Sandal, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY
IR 05000424/2016004; and 05000425/2016004, 10/01/2016, through 12/31/2016; Vogtle
Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2, Maintenance Effectiveness; Quarterly Integrated Inspection Report The report covered a 3-month period of inspection by resident and regional inspectors. One self-revealing violation is documented in this report. The significance of inspection findings are indicated by their color (i.e., greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow, Red) and determined using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP)dated April 29, 2015. The cross-cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0310, Aspects within the Cross-Cutting Areas dated December 4, 2014. All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy dated November 1, 2016.
The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operations of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 6. Documents reviewed by the inspectors, not identified in the Report Details, are identified in the List of Documents Reviewed section of the Attachment.
Cornerstone: Initiating Events
- (Green). A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specifications (TS) 5.4.1.a,
Procedures, was identified for the licensees failure to properly install shims when assembling electrical connectors on Unit 2 main steam isolation valve (MSIV) HV-3026B, in accordance with maintenance procedure 25709-C, Instructions for EGS Grayboot Connection Kit Installation, Ver. 21.1. The licensee replaced the affected connectors and entered the issue in their corrective action program under condition reports (CR) 10279411, and 10268507, and technical evaluations (TE) 970299, 968149, and 970300, to evaluate and develop additional training for maintenance technicians, enhance the maintenance procedure, and conduct extent of condition.
The performance deficiency (PD) was more-than-minor, because it adversely effected the Initiating Events cornerstone objective when Unit 2 received an automatic reactor trip and safety injection on March 14, 2015. Also, if left uncorrected, the PD would result in moisture intrusion and degradation of MSIV connectors and potentially lead to a more significant safety concern. The finding was determined to be Green, because the PD did not result in a loss of mitigation equipment used to transition the reactor to a stable shutdown condition.
The finding was assigned a cross cutting aspect of Procedure Adherence, because maintenance technicians failed to adhere to procedural guidance in Attachment 1 of 25709-C for installing the connector shims. (H.8) (1R12)
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Unit 1 operated at or near full rated thermal power (RTP) for the entire inspection period.
Unit 2 began the report period at full RTP. On October 8, 2016, operators briefly reduced power to approximately 70-percent RTP to support grid stability due to grid impacts from Hurricane Matthew. Unit 2 remained at or near full RTP for the remainder of the inspection period.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
a. Inspection Scope
Seasonal Extreme Weather Conditions: The inspectors conducted a detailed review of the stations adverse weather procedures for extreme low temperatures. The inspectors verified that weather-related equipment deficiencies identified during the previous year had been placed into the work control process and/or corrected before the onset of seasonal extremes. The inspectors evaluated the licensees implementation of adverse weather preparation procedures and compensatory measures before the onset of and during seasonal extreme weather conditions. The inspectors evaluated the following risk-significant systems:
- Units 1 and 2 refueling water storage tanks (RWST)
- Unit 2 nuclear service water system (NSCW)
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment
a. Inspection Scope
Partial Walkdown: The inspectors verified that critical portions of the following two systems were correctly aligned by performing partial walkdowns. The inspectors determined the correct system lineup by reviewing plant procedures and drawings.
- Unit 1, A train of the safety injection (SI) system while the B train was out of service (OOS) for planned maintenance.
- Unit 2, A train NSCW system transfer pump while the B train transfer pump was OOS for planned maintenance.
Complete Walkdown: The inspectors verified the alignment of the Unit 2 B train NSCW system by reviewing plant procedures, drawings, the updated final safety analysis report, and other documents. The inspectors also reviewed records related to the system outstanding design issues, maintenance work requests, and deficiencies.
The inspectors reviewed corrective action documents, including condition reports and outstanding work orders, to verify the licensee was identifying and resolving equipment alignment discrepancies. The inspectors also reviewed periodic reports containing information on the status of risk-significant systems, including maintenance rule reports and system health reports.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
Quarterly Inspection: The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of fire plans by comparing the fire plans to the defined hazards and defense-in-depth features specified in the fire protection program for the following four fire areas.
- Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump house, fire zones 155, 156, 157A, and 157B
- Unit 1, level B east and west penetration areas, fire zones 60, 61, 64, 62, 63, and
- Unit 1, auxiliary building (AB) B level penetration area and trains A and B of the auxiliary component cooling water (ACCW) and safety injection (SI) pump rooms, fire zones 26B, 30, 31, 32, and 33
- Unit 2, trains A and B auxiliary component cooling water (ACCW) heat exchanger rooms, fire zones 49, and 52 The inspectors assessed the following:
- control of transient combustibles and ignition sources
- fire detection systems
- water-based fire suppression systems
- gaseous fire suppression systems
- manual firefighting equipment and capability
- passive fire protection features
- compensatory measures and fire watches
- issues related to fire protection contained in the licensees corrective action program
- material condition and operational status of fire protection equipment
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R06 Flood Protection Measures
a. Inspection Scope
Internal Flooding: The inspectors reviewed related flood analysis documents and walked down the area(s) listed below containing risk-significant structures, systems, and components susceptible to flooding. The inspectors verified that plant design features and plant procedures for flood mitigation were consistent with design requirements and internal flooding analysis assumptions. The inspectors also assessed the condition of flood protection barriers and drain systems. In addition, the inspectors verified the licensee was identifying and properly addressing issues using the corrective action program.
- Unit 2, A and B component cooling water (CCW) pump rooms
- Unit 2, A and B centrifugal charging (CCP) pump rooms
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
a. Inspection Scope
Annual Review of Licensee Requalification Examination Results: On August 22, 2016, the licensee completed the annual requalification operating examinations, and on November 17, 2016, the licensee completed the comprehensive biennial requalification written examinations, which are required to be administered to all licensed operators in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 55.59(a)(2), Requalification Requirements, of the NRCs Operators Licenses. The inspectors performed an in-office review of the overall pass/fail results of the individual operating examinations and the crew simulator operating examinations in accordance with Inspection Procedure (IP)71111.11, Licensed Operator Requalification Program. These results were compared to the thresholds established in Section 3.02, Requalification Examination Results, of IP 71111.11.
Resident Inspector Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Requalification: The inspectors observed an evaluated simulator scenario, V-RQ-SE-16601 (Ver. 1.1),administered to an operating crew, on November 7, 2016, conducted in accordance with the licensees accredited requalification training program. The inspectors assessed the following:
- licensed operator performance
- the ability of the licensee to administer the scenario and evaluate the operators
- the quality of the post-scenario critique
- simulator performance Resident Inspector Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Performance: The inspectors observed licensed operator performance in the main control room during Unit 2 A solid state protection system (SSPS) testing.
The inspectors assessed the following:
- use of plant procedures
- control board manipulations
- communications between crew members
- use and interpretation of instruments, indications, and alarms
- use of human error prevention techniques
- documentation of activities
- management and supervision
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors assessed the licensees treatment of the three issues listed below to verify the licensee appropriately addressed equipment problems within the scope of the maintenance rule (10 CFR 50.65, Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants). The inspectors reviewed procedures and records to evaluate the licensees identification, assessment, and characterization of the problems as well as their corrective actions for returning the equipment to a satisfactory condition. The inspectors also interviewed system engineers to assess the accuracy of performance deficiencies and extent of condition.
- Unit 2, B reactor vessel level indicating system (RVLIS) loss of indication.
b. Findings
Introduction:
A Green self-revealing NCV of TS 5.4.1.a, Procedures, was identified for the licensees failure to properly install shims, when assembling electrical connectors on Unit 2 MSIV HV-3026B, in accordance with maintenance procedure 25709-C, Instructions for EGS Grayboot Connection Kit Installation, Ver. 21.1.
Description:
On March 25, 2016, as part of maintenance work order SNC 409970, Clean/Inspect Hydraulic System and Air Filter, Unit 2 MSIV HV-3026B hydraulic actuator failed the 10-percent exercise stroke test when solenoid valve (SOV) 131A did not energize. While troubleshooting, it was also identified that SOV 130B cycled (energize and de-energize) with jarring of the SOV wires and electrical connectors. SOV 130B is energized during normal power operations to support actuator hydraulic pressure buildup required to maintain the valve open. SOV 130B is de-energized on a MSIV close signal (i.e. steam line isolation signal) to close the MSIV. SOV 130B was last replaced on March 15, 2015, (work order SNC645129) after it was determined to have caused the failure of MSIV HV-3026B which resulted in a Unit 2 reactor trip and safety injection (SI) signal. Subsequent failure analysis of the SOV did not identify any deficiencies with the valve and the event was determined to be a random failure of the SOV. The electrical connectors were not included in the failure analysis.
Following the March 2016 test failure, the licensee replaced all four electrical connectors (i.e. pin and socket type connector) for 131A and 130B SOVs and sent them to an independent laboratory for failure analysis and a separate vendor investigation. The failure analysis (documented in CR10268117) identified corrosion degradation on the spring tines in three of the connector sockets. The corrosion caused high temperature across the connectors and subsequent increase in electrical resistance. Inspection of the SOV side of the connector identified the improper installation of shims. A shim was required to increase the outer diameter of the SOV wire insulation for an appropriate, environmentally qualified, sealed fit of the connector. Attachment 1 of procedure 25709-C, required
- (1) the application of heat to the shim until the appearance of the melted sealant around the entire circumference of the shim tubing was visible and
- (2) the shim be placed no more than 0.25-inches from the crimped end of the pin. Inspection of the shims (installed under work order SNC645129) found that sufficient heat was not applied to fully melt the sealant and shim placement was outside the distance requirement.
Over time, these deficiencies resulted in moisture intrusion as evidenced by the corrosion noted in the connector sockets. SOV 131B was last replaced in March 2015 along with the pin side of the connector. The socket side connector was not replaced at that time. The socket side of the connector was not normally replaced during routine seven-year actuator refurbish PM outages; therefore this socket side connector was in service when MSIV HV-3026B closed in March 2015. Given the nonconforming installation of connector shims that allowed corrosion to occur, the inspectors determined the licensees failure to properly install the connector shims most likely caused MSIV HV-3026B to close and resultant reactor trip and SI on March 15, 2015.
The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program to evaluate and develop additional training for maintenance technicians (CR10268507), enhance instructions in the procedure 25709-C (TE970299) and conduct an extent of condition review (CR10279411, TE968149, and TE970300).
Analysis:
The failure to install electrical connector shims in accordance with maintenance procedure 25709-C was a performance deficiency (PD). The PD was more-than-minor, because it adversely effected the Initiating Events cornerstone objective when Unit 2 received an automatic reactor trip and SI, on March 14, 2015.
Also, if left uncorrected, the PD would result in moisture intrusion and degradation of MSIV connectors and potentially lead to a more significant safety concern. The finding was screened using IMC 0609, Appendix A, dated June 19, 2012, and determined to be Green using Exhibit 1, Initiating Events, Transient Initiators, because the PD did not result in a loss of mitigation equipment used to transition the reactor to a stable shutdown condition. The finding was assigned a cross cutting aspect of Procedure Adherence, because maintenance technicians failed to adhere to procedural guidance in Attachment 1 of 25709-C for installing the connector shims. (H.8)
Enforcement:
Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, required, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Appendix A to Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33, Quality Assurance Program Requirements, of February 1978. RG 1.33, Appendix A, Item 9 recommended, in part, that maintenance activities that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment be covered by written procedures. Maintenance procedure 25709-C provided specific instructional steps to properly install shims for safety-related electrical connectors. Contrary to the above, the licensee did not implement safety-related maintenance procedure 25709-C for installing shims on SOV electrical connectors. This violation is being treated as an NCV consistent with the Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000425/2016004-01, Failure to Implement Maintenance Procedure for SOV Electrical Connectors. This violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 10268117.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the two maintenance activities listed below to verify that the licensee assessed and managed plant risk as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and licensee procedures. The inspectors assessed the adequacy of the licensees risk assessments and implementation of risk management actions. The inspectors also verified that the licensee was identifying and resolving problems with assessing and managing maintenance-related risk using the corrective action program. Additionally, for maintenance resulting from unforeseen situations, the inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees planning and control of emergent work activities.
- Unit 2, November 21, 2016, GREEN risk profile and risk management actions associated with extended outage of the B train NSCW transfer pump.
- Unit 2, December 20, 2016, projected YELLOW risk profile due to unplanned maintenance on A train NSCW transfer pump and A train emergency diesel generator (EDG).
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
a. Inspection Scope
Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments Review: The inspectors selected the operability determinations or functionality evaluations listed below for review based on the risk-significance of the associated components and systems. The inspectors reviewed the technical adequacy of the determinations to ensure that technical specification operability was properly justified and the components or systems remained capable of performing their design functions. To verify whether components or systems were operable, the inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the technical specification and updated final safety analysis report to the licensees evaluations. Where compensatory measures were required to maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures in place would function as intended and were properly controlled. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of corrective action documents to verify the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with operability evaluations.
- Units 1 and 2, prompt determination of operability (PDO) for turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps ability to deliver the required flow and head for all accident conditions, CR10293456
- Units 1 and 2, PDO for motor-driven AFW pumps ability to deliver the required flow and head for all accident conditions, CR10294168
- Unit 1, immediate determination of operability (IDO) for AFW to condensate storage tank (CST) supply to AFW pump #2 exceeds seismic torque limit after including EDG voltage and frequency variations, CR10285154
- Unit 2, operability determination of A train EDG with ventilation damper, TV-12097, stuck close, CR10286734 Operator Workaround Review: The inspectors performed a detailed review of the licensees operator workaround, operator burden, and/or control room deficiency listed below. The inspectors verified the licensee identified operator workarounds and/or burdens at an appropriate threshold and entered them in the corrective action program.
The inspectors verified that the licensee identified the full extent of issues, performed appropriate evaluations, and planned appropriate corrective actions. The inspectors also reviewed compensatory actions and their cumulative effects on plant operation.
Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
- Unit 1, train B plant safety monitoring system (PSMS) plasma display workaround in the event of a fire in area 1CBLCB, CR10282562
b. Findings
No findings were identified
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors either observed post-maintenance testing or reviewed the test results for the maintenance activities listed below to verify the work performed was completed correctly and the test activities were adequate to verify system operability and functional capability.
- SNC819393, Unit 2 B train NSCW fan no. 1 gearbox replacement, 10/6/16
- SNC563943-50, Unit 2 A train NSCW fan no. 4 driveshaft assembly replacement, 10/18/16
- SNC822805, Unit 1 loop 1 upstream MSIV repair hydraulic leak
- SNC822133, Unit 1 A EDG west fuel oil filter replacement, 11/14/16
- SNC801219, Unit 2 A EDG operability test following troubleshooting of control air subsystem leaks, 12/19/16 The inspectors evaluated these activities for the following:
- Acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated operational readiness.
- Effects of testing on the plant were adequately addressed.
- Test instrumentation was appropriate.
- Tests were performed in accordance with approved procedures.
- Equipment was returned to its operational status following testing.
- Test documentation was properly evaluated.
Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of corrective action documents to verify the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with post-maintenance testing.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the two surveillance tests listed below. The surveillance test was either observed directly or test results were reviewed to verify testing activities and results provide objective evidence that the affected equipment remain capable of performing their intended safety functions and maintain their operational readiness consistent with the facilitys current licensing basis. The inspectors evaluated the test activities to assess for:
- preconditioning of equipment,
- appropriate acceptance criteria,
- calibration and appropriateness of measuring and test equipment,
- procedure adherence, and
- equipment alignment following completion of the surveillance.
Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of significant surveillance testing problems documented in the licensees corrective action program to verify the licensee was identifying and correcting any testing problems associated with surveillance testing.
Routine Surveillance Tests
- 14150-C, Wet Bulb Temperature Determination with Psychrometer, version 3 In-Service Tests (IST)
- 14803A-1, Train A Component Cooling Water Pumps and Check Valve IST and Response Time Tests (Sections 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3), version 7
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
RADIATION SAFETY
Cornerstones: Public Radiation Safety and Occupational Radiation Safety
2RS5 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees radiation monitoring instrumentation programs to verify the accuracy and operability of radiation monitoring instruments used to monitor areas, materials, and workers to ensure a radiologically safe work environment during normal operations and under postulated accident conditions.
Walkdowns and Observations: During tours of the site areas, the inspectors observed installed radiation detection equipment including the following instrument types: area radiation monitors (ARMs), continuous air monitors (CAMs), personnel contamination monitors (PCMs), small article monitors (SAMs), and portal monitors (PMs). The inspectors observed the calibration status, physical location, material condition and compared technical specifications for this equipment with Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) requirements. In addition, the inspectors observed the calibration status and functional checks of selected in-service portable instruments and discussed the bases for established frequencies and source ranges with RP staff personnel. The inspectors reviewed periodic source check records for compliance with plant procedures and manufacturers recommendation for selected instruments and observed the material condition of sources used.
Calibration and Testing Program: The inspectors reviewed calibration data for selected ARMs, PCMs, PMs, SAMs, and laboratory instruments as well as the last calibration and methodology for the whole body counter. The inspectors reviewed calibration data, methodology used and the source certification for the A train of the unit one containment high range monitors. The current output values for the portable instrument calibrator and the instrument certifications used to develop them were reviewed by the inspectors.
The inspectors reviewed the licensees process for investigating instruments that are removed from service for calibration or response check failures and discussed specific instrument failures with plant staff. In addition, the inspectors reviewed 10CFR-61 data to determine if sources used in the maintenance of the licensees radiation detection instrumentation were representative of radiation hazards in the plant and scaled appropriately for hard to detect nuclides.
Problem Identification and Resolution: The inspectors reviewed and discussed selected Corrective Action Program (CAP) documents associated with radiological instrumentation including licensee sponsored assessments. The inspectors evaluated the licensees ability to identify and resolve issues Inspection Criteria: Operability and reliability of selected radiation detection instruments were reviewed against details documented in the following: 10 CFR Part 20; NUREG-0737, Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements; UFSAR Chapters 11 and 12 and applicable licensee procedures. Documents reviewed are listed in the report
.
b. Findings
No findings were identified
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed a sample of the performance indicator (PI) data, submitted by the licensee, for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 PIs listed below. The inspectors verified that the PI data complied with guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, and licensee procedures.
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
- safety system functional failures (Units 1 and 2)
- emergency AC power system (Units 1 and 2)
- cooling water system (Units 1 and 2)
The inspectors reviewed plant records compiled October 1, 2015, and September 30, 2016 to verify the accuracy and completeness of the data reported for the station. The inspectors verified the accuracy of reported data that were used to calculate the value of each PI. In addition, the inspectors reviewed a sample of related corrective action documents to verify the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with PI data.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
.1 Routine Review
The inspectors screened items entered into the licensees corrective action program in order to identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up. The inspectors reviewed condition reports, attended screening meetings, or accessed the licensees computerized corrective action database.
.2 Semi-Annual Trend Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed issues entered in the licensees corrective action program and associated documents to identify trends that could indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The inspectors focused their review on repetitive malfunctions of Unit 2 MSIV (HV-3026B) actuator SOVs, but also considered the results of inspector daily condition report screenings, licensee trending efforts, and licensee human performance results. The review nominally considered the 6-month period of July 2016 thru December 2016 although some examples extended beyond those dates when the scope of the trend warranted. The inspectors compared their results with the licensees analysis of trends. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the adequacy of corrective actions associated with a sample of the issues identified in the licensees trend reports.
The inspectors also reviewed corrective action documents that were processed by the licensee to identify potential adverse trends in the condition of structures, systems, and/or components as evidenced by acceptance of long-standing non-conforming or degraded conditions.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings were identified.
.3 Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted a detailed review of corrective action reports (CARs) 266163 and 267331, associated with the failure of the Unit 2 B train NSCW fan no. 3 driveshaft to gearbox coupling.
The inspectors evaluated the following attributes of the licensees actions:
- complete and accurate identification of the problem in a timely manner
- evaluation and disposition of operability and reportability issues
- consideration of extent of condition, generic implications, common cause, and previous occurrences
- classification and prioritization of the problem
- identification of root and contributing causes of the problem
- identification of any additional condition reports
- completion of corrective actions in a timely manner
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA5 Other Activities
.1 Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Report Review
In accordance with Executive Director of Operations Procedure 0220, Coordination with the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, the inspectors reviewed the most recent INPO evaluation and accreditation reports to determine if they identified safety or training issues not previously identified by NRC evaluations. The report contained no safety issues that were not already known by the NRC.
.2 Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) (60855.1)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a walkdown of the onsite ISFSI and monitored the activities associated with the dry fuel storage campaign completed on November 19, 2016. The inspectors reviewed changes made to the ISFSI programs and procedures, including associated 10 CFR 72.48, Changes, Tests, and Experiments, screens and evaluations to verify that changes made were consistent with the license or certificate of compliance.
The inspectors reviewed records and observed the loading activities to verify that the licensee recorded and maintained the location of each fuel assembly placed in the ISFSI. The inspectors also reviewed surveillance records to verify that daily surveillance requirements were performed as required by technical specifications.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
On February 2, 2017, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. B. Keith Taber and other members of the licensees staff. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information provided or examined during the inspection period was properly controlled.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee personnel
- T. Baker, Security Manager
- D. Komm, Operations Director
- J. Dixon, Radiation Protection Manager
- T. Fowler, Chemistry Manager
- D. Sutton, Regulatory Affairs Director
- S. Harris, Operations Manager
- D. Myers, Plant Manager
- K. Taber, Site Vice-President
- I. White, Licensing Supervisor
- K. Walden, Licensing Engineer
- L. Beasley, Chemistry Supervisor
- M. Williams, RP Superintendent
NRC personnel
Shane Sandal, Chief, Region II Reactor Projects Branch 2
Matthew Endress, Vogtle Senior Resident Inspector
LIST OF REPORT ITEMS
Opened and Closed
- 05000425/2016004-01, Failure to Implement Maintenance Procedure for Electrical Grayboot Connectors (1R12)