IR 05000424/1978008

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IE Inspec Repts 50-424/78-08 & 50-425/78-08 on 781018-20 During Which 1 Item of Noncompliance Was Noted:Failure to Follow Procedures for Segregation of Conforming Matl
ML19294A588
Person / Time
Site: Vogtle  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 11/09/1978
From: Ang W, Bryant J, Swan W
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML19294A579 List:
References
50-424-78-08, 50-424-78-8, 50-425-78-08, 50-425-78-8, NUDOCS 7812280080
Download: ML19294A588 (13)


Text

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Report Nos.. 50-424/78-8 and 50-425/78-8 Docket Nos.- 50-424 and 50-425 License Nos.- CPPR-108 and CPPR-109 Categories: A2 and A2 Licensee: Georgia Power Company 270 Peachtree Street, N.W.

Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Facility Nane: Alvin W. Vogtle, Units 1 and 2 Inspection at: Waynesboro, Georgia Inspection Conducted: October 18-20, 1978 Inspectors: W.

B. Swan W.

P. Ang ///Q/97 Reviewed by: . wa / ate ' ryasf7Eh'ief D . ' Engineering Support Section No. 1 Reactor Construction and Engineering Support Branch Inspection Summary inspection on October 1S-20, 1978 (Report Nos. 50-424/78-8 and 50-425/78-8) Areas Inspected: Category I concrete; changes to specifications and procedures; electrode protection; procedures for containment liner and safety-related structures; and warehousinr,. The inspec-tion involved 32 inspector-hours on site by two NRC inspectors.

Results: Of tne five areas inspected, no apparent itens of non-conpliance or deviations were identified in four areas; one apparent iten of noncompliance (deficiency - failure to follow procedures for segregation of nonconforming material - Details II, paracraph 'T was identified in one area.

7812280080

.

RII Rpt. Nos. 50-424/78-8 and 50-425/78-8-1- . , DETAILS 1 Prepared by: ,d7'<,_ ~~ _J ' ' W.

B. Swan, C1vil Engineer Date ~ Engineering Support section No. 1 Reactor Construction and Engineering Support Branch Dates of Inspection: October 18-20, 1978 A o _ Uf/6f7 j' Reviewed by: .M.

J. C. Bryant, Ch\\ef /. Date Engineering Support Section 3o. 1 Reactor Construction and Engineering Support Branch 1.

Persons Contacted Georgia Power Company (GPC) K. M. Gillespie, Project Construction Manager

  • L. L. Gray, Jr., Assistant Project Construction Manager
  • E. D. Groover, Site QA Supervisor
  • C. R. Miles, Quality Assurance Field Supervisor
  • D. M. Fiquett, Manager, Field Operations
  • J. E. Sanders, Acting Civil Project Section Supervisor L. D. Bryant, Civil Inspection Supervisor C. W. Hayes, Vogtle Project QA Manager C. Sarver, Senior QA Field Representative L. M. McCall, Concrete Placement Inspector W. L. Kent, Soils and Concrete Inspector, Laboratory L. James, Batch Plant Inspector D. Wallom, Civil Inspector
  • Denotes those present at the exit interview.

, 2.

Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Items There were no previous inspection findings involved in the scope ef this inspection.

3.

Unresolved items There were no unresolved items identified in the scope of these Details during this inspectio. . RII Rpt. Nos. 50-424/78-8 and 50-425/78-8-2-4.

Independent Inspection Effort Non-scheduled effort was expended in the following areas: A walk-through inspection was made of installed reinforcing a.

steel,embedments and forming for the four nuclear service water cooling towers.

Prepa ra t ions for concrete placement were nearing completion for tower I-B.

b.

Changes made since January 1978 to specifications and procedures pertaining to construction and quality control activities were reviewed.

The revised documents included those pertaining to concrete and earth work.

The NCR file was reviewed and a sampling was made of several c.

pertaining to Category I structural concrete.

Identification and analysis of each problem, disposition and follow-up correc-tive actions appeared to be adequate and timely.

d.

The licensee's field QA supervisor showed the inspector Edison Electrical Institute Task Force Report No. 24, September 1978.

A discussion of changes to the PSAR for the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station indicated that coated electrodes (E-7018 for carbon steels, and E-308 or E-309 for stainless steel) could be held by a welder without re-drying, for periods up to 12 hours without deleterious effect when used on " mild or stainless type" steels.

GPC and other licensees interpreted this as possibly an authorization to dispense with field drying ovens and heated caddies and to extend to 12 hours the period during which welders could retain coated rods after issue.

Inspector Swan pointed out that the word " mild" was probably intended to designate steels with low carbon content (such as type 204ELC,204LC or P-1), and that the use of E-7018 with a damp or wet coating on type P-2, P-3 or other steels of higher carbon content could result in hydrogen embrittlement and sub-bead cracking.

The ELC and stainless steels are not susceptible to this damage.

NRC Inspector Ang stated that, in any case, extension of the holding period beyond the 4 hour limit imposed for this site or failure to protect the coated electrodes from moisture would be cited as a noncompliance under presently controlling specifications and procedures for Vogtle.

By telephone, GPC had notified the NRC project inspector on e.

October 18, 1978, that initial examination after forms were removed, of concrete base mats for the reactor cavities in Units 1 and 2 and the common wall separating the containment

. . Rll Rpt. Nos. 50-424/78-8 and 50-425/78-8-3-from the auxiliary building had disclosed some spalling or tearing of the wall cover surface, some minor voids on the wall spaces, and one cavity extending from the surface to the rebar at a lower corner of a reactor cavity base.

In addition, there were intermittent shallow voids where the Category 1 concrete was placed on fill concrete. The licensee gave this preliminary telephone notice because the flaws might he assessed as having nuclear safety significance unless corrected.

On October 19, the inspector examined the affected structures.

The tears and corner spalling f rom form removal had been repaired and the corner void had been cleaned out and shown not to penetrate past the rebar.

The inspector examined the shallow intermittent voids at the base joint of the placements.

These were of the type which can be caused by small shallow mounds of sand at the base of a placement left by incomplete cleaning before the placement and not vibrated into the concrete during placement. The inspector judged that the type and extent of the flaws examined could have had no structural safety significance in these massive structures.

The licensee's architect engineer, Southern Services Company, is investigating further.

The licensee's interim report on the matter will be made to IE-Il by November 20, 1978.

f.

Housekeeping effectiveness in the areas examined by this inspector was apparent.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were ident2fied.

5.

Containment (Structural Concrete 1)-Observation of Work Activities Units 1 and 2 Basemats The inspector found that the first phase of the installation of the containment base mat for both Units had been completed.

That is, the reactor cavity base, consisting of some 500 cubic yards of concrete, had been cast separately f rom the future baseant between it and the containment wall base.

The completed placements were inspected and the installation of additional rebar was observed.

Repairs were in progress to surface defects and shallow intermittent cavities between the base mat and its supporting fill concrete were being dry packed.

Testing of concrete cylinders was observed.

Acceptance criteria for concrete activities are contained in PSAR Sections 3 and 17, and in construction specification No. X2AP01, Division C3, Sections C3.1, C3.z, C3.4, C3.5, C3.6 and C3.8.

These requirements are implemented through constraction procedures CD-T-02, " Concrete Quality Control", CP-C-6, CP-C-7, CP-C-8, CP-C-10 and pertinent Bechtel drawings.No noncompliances or deviations were identifie. RII Rpt. Nos. 50-424/78-8 and 50-425/78-8-4-6.

Containment (Structural Concrete I)-Review of Quality Records-Units 1 and 2 Basemats The quality assurance records required for concrete activities are described in procedure CD-T-02, " Concrete Quality Control", and 24 attached forms.

During this inspection, the inspector reviewed the Summary of Concrete Tests for placement of 307 cubic yards of concrete in the auxiliary building tendon gallery and 522 cubic yards in the Unit I reactor cavity-, pour numbers 1-0-10-01 and 1-0-01-013 placed on September 15, 1978.

Class D-1 mix was used.

Cylinders were cast for the first batch and for each 50 yards thereafter.

On October 13, 1978, eight 28 day cylinders were tested. These cylinders broke between 4,951 psi and 5,741 psi, averaging 5,231 psi, well above the 5000 psi strength required at 91 days.

Testing of the first batch at the laboratory yielded slump of 6.5 inches and entrained air of 9.0 percent, out of the acceptance limits of 6" maximum slump and air between 4 percent and 8 percent.

A second test at the point of placement yielded a slump of 4.25 inches and 2.0 percent entrained air.

At 28 days, cylinder No. 15-9-78049-C cast from this first batch yielded only 3,608 psi, below charted expectations.

Therefore, an NCR was written and another cylinder will be broken at 91 days to validate use of the batch in the placement.

On October 5, 1978, Pour No. 2-0-10-013 was placed for the Unit 2 reactor cavity.

The pour consisted of 556 cubic yards of Class D-2 mix.

Again, the first batch was out of nominal acceptance limit, having a slump of 5.75 inches versus a rejection limit of 5 inches.

The batch was placed, but NCR CD-161 was written to followup on test results of cylinders 5-10-78-013-C and 5-10-78-014-0, at 28 days and possibly 91 days (November 2, 1978 or January 4, 1979) as permitted by procedure.

Batch records and results of tests were available and reviewed during the inspection.

In review of the quality records, no noncompliances or deviations were identified.

7.

Containment (Structural Concrete II)-Observation of Work and Work Activities-Units 1 and 2-Wall The wall for these post stressed containments rests on a tendon gallery 10 feet by 10 feet with a thick base slab and incorporates buttresses for tightening horizontal tendons.

Part of the wall and

. RII Rpt. Nos. 50-424/78-8 and 50-425/78-8-5-the tendon gallery are shared by the auxiliary building and contain-ment.

Acceptance criteria and implementing controls for work activities are contained in the documents described in paragraph 5.

The inspector observed curing operations on sections of tendon gallery bases, installation of rebar and forms for a sectien of tendon gallery walls, installation of rebar and Cadwelding on auxiliary building walls, and nearly complete preparations for a large placement in the wall commen to the Unit I auxiliary building and containment.

For orientation on the work underway, the inspector referred to Bechtel drawing IX2D01A001, Rev. 2, " Containment - Concrete Forming and Placing - General Arrangement" and drawing 1X2D01A002, Rev.

2, " Containment - Concrete Forming and Placing - Plan and Section" A section shows the general wall thickness to be 3 feet 9 inches.

At the 60 degree buttresses, the thickness is 10 feet 6 and 7/16th inches.

At the concrete laboratory, the inenector observed concrete cylinders being tested for compressive strc_.th.

The Forney Tester No. 024010401, rated at 300,000 pounds ram pressure, had been calibrated on July 6, 1978, but the load speed application control malfunctioned, so testing was shifted to a tester with 250,000 pounds ram capacity.

In the work observed, no noncompliances or deviations were identified.

8.

Containment (Structural Concrete II)-Review of Quality Records-Unit 1-Wall Paragraph 6 describes the records review for the simultaneous placement of concrete in a section of the auxiliary building tendon gallery (lower part of the containment wall) and the reactor cavity base The records of batches, tests and cylinder breaks for both Pour No. 1-0-10-001 in the lower wall and No. 1-0-10-013 in the reactor cavity base are co-a~ngled and were reviewed together.

In this review of records, no noncompliances or deviations were identified.

9.

Maia;ement Int erview An exit interview was held with Mr. L. L. Gray, Jr., Assistant Project Construction Manager, and members of the site staff identi-fied in paragraph 1.

The inspector outlined the scope of his part of the inspection, involving concrete, changes to specifications and procedures, and discussion of electrode moisture protection.

He stated that in these areas, no noncompliances, deviations, or unresolved items had been identifie. . RII Rpt. Nos. 50-424/78-8 and 50-425/78-8 11-1 . r Prepared by: ]y }h n t s /, /f DETAILS 11 _ (. _ ,_ W. P.Ang,r[ec'hanicalEngineer 'Date Engineering Support Sebtion No. 1 Reactor Construction and Engineering Support Branch Dates of Inspection: October 18-20, 1978 Reviewed by: 7 ') t. _ (16!7E' c, ' D/te J. C. Bryant,) Chief j Engineering Support Section No. 1 Reactor Construction and Engineering Support Branch 1.

Persons Contacted Georgia Power Corporation a.

K. M. Gillespie, Project Construction Manager

  • L. L. Gray, Assistant Project Construction Manager

,

  • C.

R. Miles, Jr., QA Field Supervisor

  • E.

D. Groover, QA Site Supervisor

  • D. M. Figuett, Manager, Field Operations
  • J. E. Sanders, Acting Civil Project Section Supervisor
  • W. R. Evans, Assistant Mechanical Project Section Supervisor b.

Chicago Bridge and Iron D. Wilkerson, QA Supervisor

  • Denotes those present at the exit interview.

2.

Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Licensee actions on previous inspection findings were not reviewed during this inspection.

3.

Unresolved Items No unresolved items were identified during this inspection.

4.

Independent Inspection Effort A walk-through inspection of the reactor cavity base slab and tendon gallery base slab form work for Units 1 and 2 was performed by the inspector.

General work activities and workmanship were obs e rved. Hinor honeycombing in the concrete for the Unit 2 reactor cavity base

. RII Rpt. Nos. 50-424/78-8 and 50-425/78-8 II-2 slab was noted. The licensee informed the inspector that nonconformance report (NCR) No. CD-172 had previously identified the problem, and that they were in the process of evaluating the condition, and showed the NCR to the inspector.

A walk-through inspection of the concrete testing laboratory and the concrete batch plant was performed; work activities were observed and gauges and measuring devices were inspected for proper calibration dates.

A walk-through inspection of storage warehouses for safety-related equipment and components was also pe r f o rmed. General work activities and storage coaditions were observed.

The inspector noted that nonconforming materials and components were being stored in the same pallets and bins with those that were considered acceptable for use.

For example, non-conforming liquid penetrant dye was on the same pallet with acceptable liquid penetrant cleaner; Westinghouse supplied valves tagged as non-conforming material were in the same racks with valves that were conforming. Vogtle Preliminary Safety Analysis Report, paragraph 17.1.15, states in part that "These procedures will require that nonconforming items be identified and segregated, where practicable, from accepted items.". Vogtle procedure number MD-A-01 - Receipt and Storage of Mechanical Equipment, invokes ANSI 45.2.2 Sections 5 and 6.

ANSI 45.2.2 paragraph 5.3.2 states that " Items which do not conform to the specific requirements shall be identified as nonconfo rming in accordance with the system employed and when practical they shall be placed in a segregated storage area or removed from the project site to prevent inadvertent installation or use." Vogtle procedures GD-A-01 - " Warehouse-Receipt, Storage, and Material Issue", and GD-T-01 - "Nonconformance Control" do not require segregation.

It appeared that no consideration was being given to the practicality of segregating noncon f o rming items on site prior to this inspection. The above noted condition appears to be in non-compliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix "B", Criterion XV.

However, due to the current stage of construction, the inadvertent use of the above noted non-conforming material is remote and the possible consequential threat to the health and safety of the public is remote. The above noted condition is therefore being identified as a deficiency (50-424/78-8-01).

5.

Containment (Steel Structures and Supports) - Review of Quality Assurance implementing Procedures - Units 1 and_2 The Vogtle QA manual was reviewed to determine whether appropriate and adequate procedures are included for steel containment structures, liners, containment hatches and major equipment supports inside the containment to assure that receiving inspection, storage, installation and inspection are controlled and performed in accordance with NRC requirements and PSAR commitment RII Rpt. Nos. 50-424/78-8 and 50-425/78-8 II-3 QA manual procedures CD-A-01 Rev 3 and GD-A-01 Rev. I provide require-ments for receiving inspection and stcrage of steel containment structures.

An installation and inspection QA manual procedure for steel containment structures was being prepared but had not yet been issued.

These procedures were reviewed and appeared to be adequate except as noted in paragraph 4.

The containment liners are to be fabricated by Chicago Bridge and Iron.

Specific and complete QA manual procedures applicable to the containment liners were not yet available. GPC surveillance and inspection pro-cedures for the containment liners were also not yet available. QA manual procedures MD-A-01 Rev. 4 and GD-A-01 Rev. I provide requirements for receiving inspection and storage of containment hatches and major safety-related equipment supports located inside the containment. QA manual procedure MD-T-01 Rev. I provides procedures for controlling and inspecting installation of containment batches. These available procedures were reviewed and appeared to be adequate except as noted in paragraph 4.

Procedures for controlling and inspecting installation of major safety-related equipment upports inside the containment were not yet available.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

6.

Safety-Related Structures (Structural Steel and Supports) - Review of Quality Assurance Implementing Procedures - Units 1 and 2 The Vogtle QA manual was reviewed to determine whether appropriate and included for safety-related field f abricated adequate procedures are storage tanks, steel supports for major safety-related equipment located outside the containment, and for safety-related (Seismic Category 1) building structures to assure that receiving inspection, storage, instal-lation and inspection are controlled and performed in accordance with NRC requirements and PSAR commitments.

QA manual procedures CD-A-01 Rev. 3 and GD-A-01 Rev. 1 provide requirements for receiving inspection, storage, protection, issue, identification and records, for materials for safety-related seismic Category I structures. These procedures were reviewed and appeared to be adequate except as noted in paragraph 4.

A procedure for controlling and inspecting fabrication of safety-related (Seismic Category 1) structures was not yet available.

QA manual procedures MD-A-01 Rev. 4 and GD-A-01 Rev. I provide requirements for receiving inspection, storage, protection, issue, identification and records for material for field fabricated safety-related storage tanks and for major equipment steel supports located outside the containment. QA manual procedure MD-T-01 Rev.1 provides requirements for controlling and inspecting field fabricated safety- .

.... _. _.. _. . RII Rpt. Nos. 50-424/78-8 and 50-425/78-8 II-4 . related storage tanks. These procedures were reviewed and appeared to be adequate except as noted in paragraph 4.

Procedures for controlling and inspecting the installation of steel supports for major equipment located outside the containment were not yet available.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

7.

Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives at the conclusion of the inspection.

The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection of warehouse storage, concrete testing laboratory and batch plant, reactor cavity and tendon gallery base slab and form work, and procedures for containment steel structures and supports and procedures for safety-related steel structures and supports outside the containment.

The deficiency on segregation of non-conforming material noted in paragraph 4 was identified as an unresolved item during the exit, but was subsequently upgraded to a deficiency.

The licensee was called on November 7,1978, to inform him of the upgrading.

. _ _ _....

. . RII Rpt. Nos. 50-424/78-8 and 50-425/78-8 Il-1 . r' DETAILS 11 Prepared by: 2th a t d,h4 <, _ ,_ W'. P. Ang, yechanical Engineer 'Date Engineering Support Sebtion No. 1 Reactor Construction and Engineering Support Branch Dates of Inspection: October 18-20, 1978 - /T!7f Reviewedby:) l e, , c._ J. C. Bryant,[ Chief ' Dite Engineering Support Section No. 1 Reactor Construction and Engineering Support Branch 1.

Persons Contacted Georgia Power Corporation a.

K. M. Gillespie, Prcject Construction Manager

  • L. L. Gray, Assistant Project Construction Manager
  • C.

R. Miles, Jr., QA Field Supervisor

  • E.

D. Groover, QA Site Supervisor

  • D. M. Fiquett, Manager, Field Operations
  • J. E. Sanders, Acting Civil Project Section Supervisor
  • W. R. Evans, Assistant Mechanical Project Section Supervisor b.

Chicago Bridge and Iron D. Wilkerson, QA Supervisor

  • Denotes those present at the exit interview.

2.

Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Licensee actions on previous inspection findings were not reviewed during this inspection.

3.

Unresolved Items No unresolved items were identified during this inspection.

4.

Independent Inspection Effort A walk-through inspection of the reactor cavity base slab and tendon gallery base slab form work for Units 1 and 2 was performed by the inspector.

General work activities and workmanship were obse rved. Minor honeycombing in the concrete f or the Unit 2 reactor cavity base

, . RII Rpt. Nos. 50-424/78-8 and 50-425/78-8 11-2 slab was noted. The licensee inf ormed the inspector that nonc onf ormance report (NCR) No. CD-172 had previously identified the problem, and that they were in the process of evaluating the condition, and showed the NCE to the inspector.

A walk-through inspection of the concrete testing laboratory and the concrete batch plant was performed; work activities were observed and gauges and measuring devices were inspected for proper calibration dates.

A walk-through inspection of storage warehouses for safety-related equipment and components was also performed.

General work activities and storage conditions were observed. The inspector noted that nonconforming materials and components were being stored in the same pallets and bins with those that were considered acceptable for use.

For example, non-conforming liquid penetrant dye was on the same pallet with acceptable liquid penetrant cleaner; Westinghouse supplied valves tagged as non-conforming material were in the same racks with valves that were conforming. Vogtle Preliminary Safety Analysis Report, paragraph 17.1.15, states in part that "These procedures will require that nonconforming items be identified and segregated, where practicable, from accepted items." Vogtle procedure number MD-A-01 - Receipt and Storage of Mechanical Equipment, invokes ANSI 45.2.2 Sections 5 and 6.

ANSI 45.2.2 paragraph 5.3.2 states that " Items which do not conform to the specific requirements shall be identified as nonconforming in accordance with the system employed and when practical they shall be placed in a segregated storage area or removed from the project site to prevent inadvertent installation or use." Vogtle procedures GD-A-01 - " Warehouse-Receipt, Storage, and Material Issue", and GD-T-01 - "Nonconformance Control" do not require segregation.

It appeared that ro consideration was being given to the practicality of segregating nonconf orming items on site prior to this inspection. The above noted condition appears to be in non-compliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix "B", Criterion XV, However, due to the current stage of construction. the inadvertent use of the above noted non-conforming material is remote and the possible consequential threat to the health and safety of the public is remote. The above noted condition is therefore being identified as a deficiency (50-424/78-8-01).

5.

Containment (Steel Structures and Supports) _ Review of Quality Assurance Implementing Procedures - Units 1 and 2 _ The Vogtle QA manual was reviewed to determine whether appropriate and adequate procedures are included for steel containment structures, liners, containment hatches and major equipment supports inside the containment to assure that receiving inspection, storage, installation and inspection are controlled and per f o rmed in accordance with NRC requirements and PSAR commitment. RIl Rpt. Nos. 50-424/78-8 and 50-425/78-8 Il-3 QA manual procedures CD-A-01 Rev. 3 and GD-A-01 Rev. I provide require-ments for receiving inspection and storage of steel containment structures.

An installation and inspection QA manual procedure for steel containment structures was being prepared but had not yet been issued.

These procedures were reviewed and appeared to be adequate except as noted in paragraph 4.

The containment liners are to be fabricated by Chicago Bridge and Iron.

Specific and complete QA manual procedures applicable to the containment liners were not yet available.

GPC surveillance and inspection pro-cedures for the containment liners were also not yet available. QA manual procedures MD-A-01 Rev. 4 and GD-A-01 Rev. 1 provide requirements for receiving inspection and storage of containment batches and major safety-related equipment supports located inside +he containment.

QA manual procedure MD-T-01 Rev. I provides procedu-es for controlling and inspecting installation of containment batches. These available procedures. were reviewed and appeared to be adequate except as noted in paragraph 4.

Procedures for controlling and inspecting installation of major safety-telated equipment supports inside the containment were not yet available.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

6.

Safety-Related Structures (Structural Steel and Supports) - Review of Qtality Assurance Implementing Procedures - Units 1 and 2 The Vogtle QA manual was reviewed to determine whether appropriate and adequate procedures are included for safety-related field fabricated storage tanks, steel supports for major safety-related equipment located outside the containment, and for safety-related (Seismic Category 1) building structures to assure that receiving inspection, storage, instal-lation and inspection are controlled and performed in accordance with NRC requirements and PSAR commitments.

QA manual procedures CD-A-01 Rev. 3 and GD-A-01 Rev. I provide requirements for receiving inspection, storage, protection, issue, identification and records, for materials for safety-related seismic Category I structures.

These procedures were reviewed and appeared to be adequate except as noted in paragraph 4.

A procedure for controlling and inspecting fabrication of safety-related (Seismic Category 11 structures was not yet available.

QA manual procedures MD-A-01 Rev. 4 and GD-A-01 Rev. 1 provide requirements for receiving inspection, storage, protection, issue, identification and records for material for field fabricated safety-related storage tanks and for major equipment steel supports located outside the containment.

QA manual procedure MD-T-01 Rev. I provides requirements for controlling and inspecting field fabricated safety-

' , . RIl Rpt. Nos. 50-424/78-8 and 50-425/78-8 11-4 related storage tanks.

These procedures were reviewed and appeared to be adequate except as noted in paragraph 4.

Procedures for controlling and inspecting the installation of steel supports for major equipment located outside the containment were not yet available.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

7.

Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives at the conclusion of the inspection.

The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection of warehouse storage, concrete testing laboratory and batch plant, reactor cavity and tendon gallery base slab and f orm work, and procedures for containment steel structures and supports and procedures for saf ety-related steel st ructures and supports outside the containment. The deficiency on segregation of non-conforming material noted in paragraph 4 was identified as an unresolved item during the exit, but was subsequently upgraded to a deficiency.

The licensee was called on November 7,1978, to inform him of the upgrading. }}