IR 05000423/1986001

Insp Rept 50-423/86-01 on 860106-17.No Violation Identified. Major Areas Inspected:Startup Program review,post-core Hot Functional Testing Procedure Review,Surveillance Test Review & Witnessing

ML20137Z885
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	03/05/1986
From:	Eselgroth P, Hunter J, Oliveira W, Paulitz F, Prell J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20137Z884	List: IR 05000423/1986001 ML20137Z876
References
50-423-86-01, 50-423-86-1, NUDOCS 8603130205
Download: ML20137Z885 (17)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY. COMMISSION

REGION I

Report.N /86-01 Docket N License N NPF-44 Licensee: Northeast Nuclear Energy Company P.O. Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06 41 Facility Name: Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3 Inspection At: Waterford, Connecticut Inspection Conducted: January 6-17, 1986 Inspectors: a

r all',' Reactor Engineer Allf/f6

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4>&5/(& 2 J() Hunter,ReactorEngineer 2/n/m

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W. Oliveira, Reactordngineer d/Hhb

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date hl fc&

F. Paulit', ReactorGnginesr M dac/s2

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t'e Approved by:

P. Eselgrot , Chief, Test Program Section, '

N d' ate 08, DRS Inspection Summary: Routine unannounced inspection conducted on January 6-17, 1986 (Report No. 50-423/86-01).

Areas Inspected: Startup program review, post core hot functional testing procedure review; surveillance test review and witnessing; and review of licensee actions on previous findings. The inspection involved 181 hours0.00209 days <br />0.0503 hours <br />2.992725e-4 weeks <br />6.88705e-5 months <br /> on-site by 4 region based inspector R'e sul ts : No violations were identifie fDR Q

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DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted

• M. Brown, I&C Supervisor, NNECO K. Burton, Operational Supervisor, NNECO

• F. Comstock, Jr. , QA Specialist, NUSCO

• J. Crockett, MP-3 Unit Superintendent, NNECO

• E. Fries, Startup Engineer, NNECO J. Harris, Engineering Supervisor, NNECO

• Hess, Assistant Engineer Supervisor, NNECO

• T. Kulterman, Senior Engineer, NUSCO

• J. Lamarca, Nuclear Systems Engineer, SWEC J. Langon, Plant Engineer, NNECO E. Laware, QA Engineer, NUSCO C. Libby, Operations QA Supervisor, NUSCO R. Martin, Shift Supervisor D. Moore, Assistant Operational Supervisor, NNECO

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M. Pearson, Assistent Operational Supervisor, NNECO T. Rogers, I&C Planning Coordinator, NNECO D. Scace, Startup Test Engineer, NNECO A. Stengel, Startup Test Engineer, NNECO

• R. Young, Electrical Engineer, NUSCO U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission T. Rebelowski, Senior Resident Inspector

• Denotes those present at the exit meeting on January 17, 1986.

2.0 Licensee Action on previous Inspection Findings

-- (Closed) Construction Deficiency Report (50-423/85-00-08)

The licensee informed the NRC by letter (F0722A June 12,1985) that improper terminations had been found in the equipment supplied by CVI Corporation. The proposed corrective action was a one hundred per-cent reinspection with replacement of all rejected wire termination The subject terminations were associated with the following safety-related panels:

HVQ* ACUS 1A, 18, 2A,2B-Engineered Safety Features Building self contained air conditioning unit HVR*PNLFLT 1A,18-Auxiliary Building filtration unit HVR*PNLFLT 2A, 28-Fuel E;ilding filtration units.

, HVR*PNLFLT 3A, 3B-Supple.entary Leak Collection and Release System-filtration units.

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The licensee informed the NRC by letter (F0873A November 12,1985)

that the inspection and rework for the above equipment was complet This work was documented on AWO's 27542, 32341, 32337, 27810, 31977, 31979,.32978, 29508 and 27544. This inspection and wire termination rework is similar to that done on four other vendors' equipmen This activity was monitored and inspected by the quality control group which signed the completed work order. This equipment has

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been returned to service. This construction deficiency is' close (Closed). Construction Deficiency Report (50-423/85-00-17)

The licensee informed the NRC by letter (F0799A June 12,1985) that during a. Westinghouse seismic qualification test, a triax connector failed at low "G" levels. This type connector is used in the Kaman Radiation Monitoring Syste The subject connectors are associated with the following safety-related equipment: 3 MSS *RE75, 76, 77, 78, 79, and 3RMS*RE 04, 05, 41, 42, 5 The connector part number is Kaman 451081-00 The connector vendor (Amphenol) had previously seismically type tested this triax connector. They later modified the design without retest-ing or informing the user (Westinghouse and Kaman) of the design chang The licensee's corrective action was to replace the connector asso ~

ciated with the above equipment with a qualified connecto The licensee issued the following work orders to replace these con-nectors -M3-85-33426, 33427, 33428, 33429, 33431, 34748, 34749, 34750, 34751, 3475 The seismic test data for the new connector was reviewed by the inspector and found acceptable. This connector replacement was monitored and inspected by the quality control group which signed the completed work order. This equipment'has been returned to servic This construction deficiency is close (Closed) Non Conformance (50-423/84-23-01) Cables from vertical tray 3TC0010 to horizontal trays 3TC00020 and 3TC0030 were unsupported for a distance of 10 fee Cable vertical runs of 20 feet or more attached to unistrut supports by plastic (non-seismic) tie wraps, in the cable spreading room were not installed in cable tray enclosure Black cables entering electrical penetration No. F3V, located inside the contairment, were not marked, as required, to indi-cate division /cha nel orientatio .

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The above three examples of failure to follow Electrical Installation Procedure No. E-350 were in violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion The licensee's response to the violation (A04760 April 19, 1985)

stated that for items a and b, the procedure E-350 would be revised to clarify the 4.5 foot spacing requirement with respect to the secu-ring of cables versus the supporting of cables. The licensee res-ponse to item c was that this was an isolated case as determined by a followup inspection. These particular cables had the color type applied on the same day this violation was noted by the NRC inspecto Discussions between the NRC and the licensee in a telephone conver-sation of October 25, 1985 indicates the licensee has completed a hazard analysis for areas in which long lengths of cables are attached to vertical Unistrut supports and not enclosed in protective trays or raceways to assure that unprotected cables are not subject-to damage from hazards in the are In addition, the licensee indi-cated that unsupported cables and/or cable bundles in excess'of ft. would be analyzed on a case by case basis to 'ssure a technical adequacy at the installatio The inspector reviewed the licensee's hazard ana'ysis l and verified licensee action in. determining that the cable spreading room was a non-hazardous are Procedure No. E-350 has been modified to clarify the 4.5 ft. require-ment for unsupported cable lengt This item is close (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-423/85-01-01)

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(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-423/85-50-01) Construction Deficient Report 84-00-18 identified that Rosemount Transmitters were installed without a seal at the cable entry poin The licensee was to inspect and correct these conditions based upon a Test Engineering and Design Coordination Report (T-E&DCR). The report (no number identified) was reviewed by

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the NRC inspector and found acceptable. This construction

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deficiency was closed in Inspection Report No. 85-01 and the

, Unresolved Item 85-01-01 opened pending NRC review of the licen-l see corrective action.

! 1 l An allegation was identified.to the NRC in March, 1985 that the

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EA-180 limit switches on the RHR valves in containment had j missing hardware and that there were no quality control records for this installation. The allegation number was RI-85-004 Although this allegation was unfounded, as described in Inspec-

tion Report 85-01. the licensee notified to the NRC in letters dated March 1, 19E

, July 17, 1984, ard October 23, 1984, of

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potential missing pa.ts problems associated with the NAMCO model EA-180 limit switches. Missing parts on limit switches had not been identified by the QC inspectors because they were not in-cluded in the specific detailed inspection steps used for limit switche The licensee was to reinspect all safety related installed EA-180 limit switches. The NRC was to review the inspection plan and attributes for the installed safety-related limit switche The licensee expanded this to include required EQ attribute The licensee issued 16 E&DCR's for re-inspection and rework for items a and b above, including 172 work authorizations. These were reviewed by the inspector and found acceptable. The inspec-tor noted that the EQ work included the addition of qualified cable connectors to the process instrumentation and limit switch-es, and Grafoil tape. The inspector visually verified that the Grafoil tape had been applied to safety-related electrical com-

ponents within the main steam valve house, including the Litton Veam connector !

Both of the above unresolved items are close (Closed) Inspector Follow-up Item (423/85-05-10).

The accumulator discharge test data indicated out-of-tolerance i

results and a retest was planned. Also the recorder used in the initial test was rot calibrate The results of the accumulator retest were reviewed and accepted

by the insoector. The results were also reviewed by Westinghouse and accepted. The questionable recorder was calibrated for the retest and recalibrated after the retest.

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This item is close (Closed) Unresolved item (50-423/85-28-01).

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The inspector noted that the Litton Veam connector on two instru-

, ments had varying degrees of tightness between two parts of the connecto Since these connectors are the EQ boundary between the cable and the instrument the inspector questioned the EQ of the connector with respect to the noted movement. The licensee stated that EQ of these connectors was scheduled to be completed by September, 1985 and was not ready for review by the inspector.

ine licensee requested the vendor to visit the site and examine i the cable assemblies installed on Rosemount equipment located in containment. Tne visit is documented in the letter from Litton-Veam tc the licensee dated June 14, 1985. The vendor ;

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. 6 examined eight installed plug and receptacle assemblies. In all cases except one, the assembly of the plug was found to be proper. This.one was assembled improperly and needed to be replaced. The licensee took note of the location. The vendor stated that the " excessive play" of the backshell when moved is normal for that size connector. The backshell is very long compared to the plug shell and the depth of the penetration of the plug shell into the receptacle is shallow. Movement of the backshell compresses the wave washer located inside the coupling ring. The purpose of the wave washer is to provide thrust to keep the sealing 0-ring compressed. The movement does not distu-b the sea The inspector reviewed Qualification test reports Nos. 588-1657A (LOCA Simulation) and 558-16578 (HELB Simulation) for the Litton Veam Connectors (Aluminum /5tainless Steel) for Millstone Unit The stainless steel connectors are used in containment. The EQ testing was completed on October 7, 1985. The final draft report was received by the licensee on November 20, 1985. The draf t is pending first review / comments by NUSCO EEQ and is con-si.dered preliminary information until the final test report is signe The inspector reviewed and accepted the vendor comments that there can be movement between the connector parts and still maintain the EQ seal. The inspector reviewed the EQ test results and found them acceptabl The unresolved item is close (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-423/85-34-01)

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Specification 2472.800-943 states that all tubing installations which connect radiation monitors containing gaseous samples to their sample source and return points shall contain tuues bent with a minimum bend radius of nine tube diameters. Construction drawings EK-515006 and EK-515003 called for 90 degree Parker-Hannifin fitt/ngs instead of the nine tube diameters. QC Report QCIR No. 5A00:31 accepted the installation based upon compliance with the construction drawing Licensee memo, NED-85-041, f rom M.F. Samek to L.J. Nadeau J dated November 7, 1985, on the above subject stated that the nine tube diameter bends for the inlet to the radiation monitors was to help prevent particulates from impacting tubing at a bend and becoming " caught" on the tubing wal Ninety degree bends should not be used in this application. This requirement does not apply to tqe discharge side since the particulates are filtered out of the stream in the monitor for analysi The two noted construction drawings have been change _ _ _ _ . .__ . _ _ . ~ _ . _ _ ._

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. 7 The inspector reviewed drawing 12179-EK-515006, Revision 2, 3 CMS *RE22(ZP) Auxiliary Building and drawing 12179-EK-515003, Revision 2, sheets 1 through 3, 3HVR*RE 19A&B. There was no reference on these drawings for the.use of 90 degree fitting The, inspector did a visual inspection of the inlet tubing to'

the following radiation monitors:

3HVR-RI-Y-14A/B 3HVR-RI-Y-18A/B 3HVR-RI-Y-12A/B 3HVR-RI-Y-17A/B 3HVR-RI-Y-11A/B 3HVR-RI-Y-16A/B 3HVR-RI-Y-13A/B 3HVR-RI-Y-15A/B 3HVR*RE-10A&l0B 3HVR*RE-19A&l98 The Inspector noted that there were no ninety degree bends at the inlet tubing for the above radiatinn monitors. The 3/4 inch

, tubing had sweeping bends which in most cases exceeded the minimum bend radius of nine tube diameter :

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This unresolved item is' close (Closed) Open (50-423/85-55-09)

i The alarm response to "AFP Turbine Speed in. local control" annun-ciator alarm should be incorporated into OP3322, Auxiliary Feed-water System, and a change to the FSAR should be made deleting the vibration monitor alar The licensee does not provide alarm responses for all alarms appearing on the annunciator panel. Alarms whose response are self evident, i .e. , " Process Protection Set Door Open," or whose response has been covered in an operator's training and is a part of his license responsibilities, i.e. "High TAVG." or OPAT or OTAT are not addressed in the Operating Procedure. "AFP Turbine Speed in Local Control" alarm fits into this category.

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A review of the changes to the FSAR verified that a change has been submitted deleting the vibration monitor alarm from the FSA This item is close (Closed)_0 pen Item (50-423/85-71-11)

Inconsistencies exist between Surveillance Procedures and P&ID's with regard to locked valve I

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The licensee is not required to include locked valves on surveil-lance valve lineup sheets although they do appear in some instan-ces. As the surveillance tests are performed, the licensee reviews and updates the survel'ilance lineup sheet Locked valves that are not required in the surveillance are deleted from the survefilance lineup sheets. The inspector verified that locked valves have been deleted from procedures and that the licensee has a program to update Surveillance valve lineup sheets to accurately reflect valves required to be monitored by valve lineup surveillance This Item is Close (Closed) Open Item (50-423/85-71-18)

SP3622.4 has referenced certain Technical Specification require-ments incorrectly, locked valves are incorrectly included on Sur-veillance Procedure valve lineup sheets and a P&ID does not show valves as locked open as they should b The inspector reviewed SP3622.4 and verified that the Technical Specification references are now correct. Also previously iri-cluded locked valves (3F4A*V944, V945, V948, V949, V2, V10 and V30) were deleted from the surveillance valve lineup sheets per changes on December 23, 1985 and January 2,1986. The inspector verified that P&ID EM-130B-2 was updated to show the correct position of 3FWA"V2, V10, and V3 This item is close (Closed) Open Item (50-423/85-71-26)

Editorial cleanup'of draft copy Sp 36108.2, the inclusion of in-dependent position verification upon return to service, clarifi-cation of precautionary isolation steps and verification that the correct valve stroke time acceptance criteria is utilized is r e-quire The inspector reviewed SP36108.2, Revision 0 for adequacy and de-tail The editorial changes, provisions for independent verifi-cation upon return to service, and precautionary isolation steps for fewer than all four accumulator check valves being tested sequentially have been incorporated into SP36108.2, Revision The inspector verified that the acceptance criteria for valve stroke time, present in SP36108.2 does agree with that in ISI- The procedure appears to contain sufficient control and detai This item is close .

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(Closed) Unresolved (50-423/85-71-28)

Section 3.0, the Reference section, of draft procedure SP3440A-01, and the corresponding'SP data cover sheet reference only TS Table 4.3- The Technical Specifications actually addressed by the procedure were T.S.4.3.1.1.2.B. 4.3.1.1.5, 4.3.1.1.6, 4.3.1.1.15.a and 4.3.1.1.15.6: A review of the approved final procedure SP3440A.01 was made. Section 3.0 of SP3440A.01 references only TS Table 4.3- The corresponding SP data cover sheet, however, references the above technical specifications which are subsets of TS. Table 4.3- .The licensee agreed to change the references in the procedure to be consistent with the data sheet. In addition, three additional technical specifications were identified which this procedure satisfies. They are TS 4.3.1.1.21, 4.10.3.2 and 4.10. These TS would also be incorporated in the procedure and data shee Prior to leaving the site, the inspector verified that these changes had been PORC approve Draft SP 3440A.1, Steps 7.8, 7.28, and others, which required the restoration for various trip state conditions are not included in the data sheet: The licensee does not document step by step re-storation of switches, valves, etc., for those systems where status annunciators on the main control room board tell the ope-rator if the system has been properly restored or no Step by step restoration is included however in the S The order in which annunciator and light actuations and resets are verified in the procedure differs from the order provided in the data sheets: The order in which the status and annunciator light actuations and resets are verified is not importan The verification process is only used to prevent inadvertent reactor trip In fact, the licensee no longer lists the verification process in the data sheet The annunciator title nomenclature varied between the procedure and the data sheets for the same device, e.g. step 7.16.2: The nomenclature did not vary between the procedure and the data sheet, but was in a different orde In the final approved version of the SP this section was removed from the data shee The data step numbers do not follow in the same order with the SP steps: I- the approved SP there are no step mismatches be-tween the p ocedure and the data shee The SP does not have a separate restoration section providing for overall verification of return to service: The approved SP has a separate restoration section, Section 8.0, which provides overall verification of return to servic :

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, 10 The tolerance for the source range high flux trip setpoint appears to be greater than tolerances used in other applications for the same channel: The voltage tolerance setpoint was listed as 8.30VOC with a desired range of 8.20 to 8.50 VDC (-0.1, + 0.2 VDC). Techni-cal Specifications call for 105 cps setpoint with a maximum tolerance of 1.4 x 10' cp Converting this to VOC per the formula VDC=1.667 log cps shows a set point of 8.335 vdc with a maximum tolerance of 8.577 VDC. The licensee has chosen a more conservative setpoint and maximum toleranc Based upon the above findings this item is close .0 Startup Test program 3.1 Startup Test Procedure Review and Verification Scope The following approved test procedures were reviewed for technical and administrative adequacy and to verify that test planning satisfies re-gulatory guidance and licensee commitments:

3-INT-7000, Revision 0, Low Power Physics Testing 3-INT-7000 Appendix 7001, Revision 0, Hot Zero Power Range Determination 3-INT-7000 Appendix 7002, Revision 0, Reactivity Computer Checkout 3-INT-7000 Appendix 7003, Revision 0, Boron Endpoint Measurement The procedures were examined for: management review and approval; procedure format; clarity of stated test objectives; prerequisites; environmental conditions; acceptance criteria; source of acceptance criteria; references; initial conditions; attainment of test objec-tives; test performance documentation and verification; degree of detail for test instructions; restoration of system to normal after-testing; identification of test personnel; evaluation of test data; independent verification of critical steps or parameters and quality control and assurance involvemen In addition NNECO Drawing Number 26902 - P&lD Reactor Coolant System" was reviewed against 3-INT-5000 Appendix 5007, " Pressurizer Spray and Heater Capability Test" to verify proper valve lineup during the 5007 tes Findings The review indicated that the procedures are consistent with regu-latory requirements, guidance, and with the Licensee's commitment No discrepancies or unacceptable conditions were identified. The inspector had no further questions on these procedure (

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3.2 Startup Test Results Evaluation Scope The test results from startup test procedure 3-INT-5000 Appendix 5033,

"RGS Loop Stop Valve Interlocks and Pump Interlocks," was reviewed to verify that adequate testing had been accomplished. The results were also reviewed to verify if regulatory guidance and licensee commitments were satisfied and to ascertain whether uniform criteria were being applied in the evaluation of completed preoperational tests in order to assure their technical and administrative adequac Discussion The inspector reviewed the test results and verified the licensee's evaluation of test results by review of: test changes; test excep-tions; test deficiencies; "as-run" copy of test procedure; acceptance criteria; performance verification; recording of the conduct of tests; QA inspection records; restoration of system to normal after the test; independent verification of critical steps or parameters; identifica-tion of personnel conducting and evaluating test data; and approval of test result Findings During the tests, two UNSATS were identified, numbers 7378 and 741 This is an Inspector Followup Item awaiting satisfactory resolution by the licensee (50-423/86-01-01).

4.0 Surveillance Test program Scope The inspector reviewed the 25 Surveillance Test procedures listed in Appen-dix A which are required' prior to entering Modes 3 and 4 in order to verify their completion and compliance with administrative requirements. The in-

. spector also reviewed 37 completed surveillances listed in Appendix B for compliance with technical specification and other regulatory requirement In addition, two surveillance tests (denoted by W in Appendix 8) were wit-nessed to verify compliance to the procedure and technical specifications and knowledge and understanding of the tests by the operators / technicians performing the .

, 12 Discussion The licensee performed 3-INT-2007, ISI Stroke Time Testing, to collect data of valve stroke times for the Inservice Inspection Test Program in accordance with Technical Specification 4.0.5 and ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section XI, 1980 Edition, Winter 1981 Addenda. The completion dates of 3-INT-2007 tests established the time basis reference for deter-mining due dates for the surveillance testing program; The licensee also took credit for those surveillance tests which were satisfied by 3-INT-2007. The inspector made the following observations regarding this practic . Various surveillance test procedures require local indication to be verified at the valve and documented by initialing the data sheet Procedure 3-INT-2007 calls for dispatt.hing an operator to the valve for local valve travel monitoring and recording the results of local valve stem indication. It was not clear to the inspector that the local valve stem indication results were being recorded. The licen-see informed the inspector that the operator at the valve was in communication with the operator performing the timing of the valve stroke. If the local indication is adequate, as determined by the operator at the valve, the operator recording the stroke time will initial the data sheet for that valve. In cases where no local verification is possible, the stroke time is recorded and a note is made in tne remarks section that further observations must be mad Local verification is then achieved by noting a change in the system (pressure or flow charge) when the valve is operated. This obser-vation is then documented in the remarks section of the data shee The inspector verified the above method was being implemented by reviewing the 3-INT-2007 data sheet . When surveillance tests are performed, a surveillance cover sheet containing PORC number and approval, reference procedure and specification, authorization signature, test completed signature, Shift Supervisor acceptance signature, and Department Head approval signature must be complete For those surveillance tests which were being satisfied by 3-INT-2007, the surveillance test cover sheets did not contain the above signa-tures. The licensee informed the inspector that the surveillance cover sheets were not complete'y filled out because 3-INT-2007 was the procedure being utilized, not the surveillance test procedure The filed cover sheets, with attached resul ts from 3-INT-2007, were used to indicate which surveillance tests the licensee was taking credit for through 3-INT-2007. The 3-INT-2007 test data sheets require authorization signatures, test cnmpleted signatures, and Shift Supervisor signatures, as does the surveillance cover sheets, before being forwarded to the Inservice Inspection Coordinator. -The inspector notified the licensee that

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credit could not be taken for these surveillance tests until the final acceptance / approval of the 3-INT-2007 test results was performed. The acceptance of 3-INT-2007 must be signed off by the Startup Supervisor, JTG, Unit 3 PORC and Unit 3 Superintendent which is a more thorough final review than required by the Surveillance Test cover sheet (Department Head Approval). The licensee taok prompt corrective action regarding this matter and accepted the results of 3-INT-2007, with exceptions, prior to entering mode four. This action was acceptable to the inspecto Findings All surveillance procedures reviewed appropriately referenced the technical specifications; incorporated all setpoints, except where setpoints were to be established by the initial surveillance test or startup test; were approved and formated according to regulatory requests; and where applicable restored the system to initial condition For those surveillance tests witnessed the operator / technician were using controlled copies; had obtained appropriate approvals by the shift supervisor; displayed in-depth understanding and knowledge of the test; sought-out management direction when questions /discre-pancies arose; and were thorough and deliberate. Except as noted above, those surveillance tests reviewed were found to be in accord-ance with procedural and regulatory requirement .0 OA/QC Interface The inspector interviewed two NNECO test engineers that were certified Level II inspectors in accordance with ANSI N45.26-1978. The engineers were well versed in their casic responsibilities as applied to the startup test program. The inspector also interviewed a NUSCO QA engineer and a NNECO QA/QC technician. They also were well versed in their basic responsibilities as applied to the startup test program. At the time of this inspection, there were no QA Audits which specifically addressed the Startup Test Program. Site QA/QC conducts inspections and surveillances which may deal with areas common to startup, construction and noeration The inspector observed a NNECO QA surveillance conducted in accordance with'ACP-QA-401 Plant Housekeeping. The surveillance was ir preparation for containment closur The inspector also observed the following tests:

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The preparation for the conduct of the Post Accident Sampling System test in accordance with Emergency Plan Impler.entation Procedure (EPIP) 424, Reactor Coolant and Liquid Waste Post Accident Sampl '

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The test of the efficiency of the Gaseous Waste System compression pre filters 3GWS-FLTIA and 18. The test was conducted in accordance with paragraph 7.9.4.8 and Appendix A of procedure T3337P Radioactive Gaseous Wast .0 Independent Calculation SP3440A.1, " Plant Startup Surveillance Procedure," establishes a trip

.setpoint of 8.30VDC with a desired limit band of 8.20 to 8.50 VDC. Techn-ical Specifications establish an allowable trip setpoint value for the Source Range Neutron flux of less than or equal to 1.4 x 10 cps. (See TS Table 2.2-1). Using the formula 1.6667 log 3. cps =VDC The inspector

verified that the allowable range and setpoint established by SP 3440. was more conservative thac allowed by Technical Specification .0 Plant Tours The inspector made several tours of the facility during the course of the inspectio This included tours of the ESF building, auxiliary building, containment building, control building and control room. A review of the work in progress, security, cleanliness and housekeeping was mad .0 Exit Meeting An exit meeting was held on January 17, 1996 to discuss the inspection scope and findings, as detailed in this report (see paragraph 1.0 for attendees).

At no time was written material given to the license The inspector determined that no proprietary information was utilized during this inspectio .

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APPENDIX A Procedures Reviewed OP 32098, Shutdown Margin Revision 0 SP 3440A.1, Plant Startup Surveillance Procedure, Revision 0 SP 3446B11, Solid State Protective System (SSPS) Operational Test, Revision SP 3446F31, Refueling SSPS Tests, Revision 0 SP 3601D1, Reactor Coolant Pump Operability Check, Revision 0 SP 3601F.5, Reactor Coolant Valve Operability, Revision 0 SP 3601G.1, RCS Vent Fath Valve Operability Test, Revision 0 SP 3601G.2, RCS and Pressurizer Heatup and Cooldown Rate, Revision 0 SP 3603A.2, Testing of the New Fuel Handling Crane Limit Switches, Revision 0 SP 3604A.6, Charging /SI Puma Inoperability Verification, Revision 1 SP 3604F, Chemical and Volume Control System Valve Operability Test, Revision 0 SP 3606.5, Containment Recirculation Spray System Train A Valve Lineup Verification, Revision 0 SP 3606.8, Recirculation Spray Train A Valve Operability, Revision 0 SP 3606.9, Recirculation Spray Train B Valve Operability, Revision 0 SP 360 Safety Injection System Valve Operability Test, Revision 0 SP 3610A.7, Residual Heat Removal System "A" Train Valve Operability, Revision 0 SP 3610A.8, Residual Heat Removal-System "B" Train Valve Operability, Revision 0 SP 3610. RHR System Valve Lineup Verification, Revision 0

'SP 3623.2, Turbine Overspeed Protective System, Revision 0 SP 3670.1, Control Room Surveillances, Revision 1 SP 3673.5, Remote Shutdown Monitoring, Revision 0 SP 3673.6, Accident Monitoring Instrumentation, Revision 0 SP 3712 A Pressurizer Code Safety Valve Testing, Revision 1 SP 3712 B Pressurizer Heater Surveillance Testing, Revision 1 ACP QA-3.02 Administrative Control Procedures, Revision 33 3-INT-2007, ISI Valve Stroke Time Testing, Revision 0

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APPENDIX B Test Results Reviewed SP 3601F.4-9 Reactor Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valve Test October 31, 1985 SP 3601F.5-4 Biennial Position Indication Testing, November 22, 1985 SP 3601F.5-5 Quarterly Valve Stroke Testing, December 18, 1985 SP 3601G.1-1 RCS Vent Path Valve Position Indication Verification, November 22, 1985 SP 3601G.2-1 RCS Heatup and Cooldown Rate, November 2, 1985 SP 3603A.2-1 Testing of New Fuel Handling Crane Limit Switches, November 22, 1985 SP 36040-1 A Boric Acid Transfer Pump Operational Readiness Test, October 30, 1985 SP 3604F-1 Quarterly CVCS Stroke Testing, November 15, 1985 SP 3604F-2 Biennial CVCS Position Indication Verification November 15, 1985 SP 3604F-4 Refueling Overhaul CVCS Stroke Testing, December 5, 1985 SP 3606.5-1 RSS Train A VLV Lineup, January 1, 1986 SP 3606.8-2 Biennial RSS Valve Operability, November 15, 198 SP 3606.9-2 RSS Train B Position Indication Verification, December 11, 1985 SP 3608.6-2 Safety Injection Position Indication Verification, November 15, 1985 SP 3608.6-3 Cold Shutdown Safety Injection Stroke Testing, November 15, 1985 SP 3610A.1-1 RHR Pump 3RHS* PIA Operational Readiness Test, November 21, 1985 SP 3610A.7-1 Quarterly PPA Hot Leg Injection Valve Operability Test, November 16, 1985 SP 3610A.7-2 Cold Shutdown RHR VLV Operability Train "A",

November 15, 1985 SP 3610A.7-3 RHR VLV Operability Train "A", November 15, 1985 SP 3610A.8-1 Cold Shutdown RHR VLV Operability Train "B",

November 21, 1985 SP 3610A.8-2 Quarterly B Hot Leg Injection Valve Operability Test, November 21, 1985 SP 3610A.8-3 RHR VLV operability Train "B", November 15, 1985 3-INT-2007 ISI Valve Stroke Time Testing-Data Sheet 9.2-SIL Valves, November 22, 1985-Data Sheet 9.1-SSR Valves, November 21, 1985-Data Sheet 9.4-CHS Valves, December 5, 1985-Data Sheet 9.15-SSP Valves, December 9, 1985 SP-3446F31-1 Refueling SSPS Tests W SP-3446 Solid State Protection System (SSPS) Operational Test, Janua ry 14, 1986

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, Appendix B 2 W SP-3604A 6 Charging /SI Pump Inoperability Verification Janua ry 14, 1936 SP-3606.1-1 Containment Recirculation Pump 3RSS-PIA SP-3608.1-1 A Safety Injection Pump Operational Readiness Test (3SIH-PIA)

SP-36128.3-2 Personnel Access Lock SP-3616A.1-1 Monthly Main Steam Isolation Valve Partial Stroke Testing SP-3646A.8-1 Slave Relay Test Train A SP-3673.6-1 Accident Monitoring Instrumentation SP-3673.5-1 Remote Shutdown Monitoring Instrumentation

~W SP-3610A.3-2 RHR System Vent and Valve Lineup Verification January 15, 1936

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