IR 05000245/1986023
| ML20215E396 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 12/17/1986 |
| From: | Conklin C, Lazarus W, Thomas W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20215E386 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-245-86-23, 50-336-86-29, 50-423-86-36, NUDOCS 8612220257 | |
| Download: ML20215E396 (6) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.
50-245/86-23; 50-336/86-29; and 50-423/86-36 Docket No.
50-245; 50-336; and 50-423 License No. DPR-21; DPR-65; and NPF-49 Licensee: Northeast Nuclear Energy Company P. O. Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06141-0270 Facility Name: Millstone Nuclear Power Station Inspection At: Waterford, Connecticut Inspection Conducted-Noven)ber 18-21, }986 Inspectors:
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W. Thomas, Team Lhade'r, EPS', EP&RPB, DRSS
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J Shediosky, Senior Resident Inspector, MP3 T. Rebelowski, Senior Resident Inspector, MP1&2 F. Casella, Resident Inspector, MP3 J. Grant, Resident Inspector E. Conner, RI, DRP M. Kray, RI, DRP R. Traub, Batelle S. Mer in, B telle Approved by:
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7!E, V.J[J4zarg/ Chief,EPS,EP&RPB,DRSS date Inspection Summary:
Inspection on November 18-21, 1986 (Combined Report Nos. 50-245/86-23; 50-336/86-29; and 50-423/86-36)
Areas Inspected:
Routine announced emergency preparedness inspection and observation of the licensee's annual emergency exercise performed on November 19, 1986.
The licensee also participated in an ingestion pathway exercise performed on November 20, 1986. The inspection was performed by a team of ten NRC Region I and contractor personnel.
Results: No violations were identified.
Emergency response actions were adequate to provide protective measures for the health and safety of the public.
8612220257 861217 PDR ADOCK 0500024S O
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted The following licensee representatives attended the exit meeting held on November 21, 1986.
W. Buch, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator J. P. Kangley, Radiological Services Supervisor J. F. Opeka, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Engineering and Operations R. C. Rodgers, Manager Radiological Assessment C. F. Sears, Vice President, Nuclear and Environmental Engineering E. J. Molloy, Supervisor Emergency Preparedness E. D. Baston, Director, Nuclear Engineering and Operations W. D. Romberg, Station Superintendent E. J. Mroczka, Vice President, Nuclear Operations J. Jackson, J. I. Jackson, Inc.
P. Capello-Bandzes, EP Training E. C. Hill, NUSCO C. Borca, NUSCO T. Quattrochi, NUSCO T. Dembek, Emergency Planning R. Werner, Vice President, Generation Engineering and Construction J. L. Johnson, Director, Generation Engineering and Construction S. E. Scace, Unit 2 Superintendert J. J. Kelley, Station Services Superintendent J. Stetz, Unit 1 Superintendent The team observed and interviewed several licensee emergency response personnel, controllers, and observers as they performed their assigned functions during the exercise.
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Emergency Exercise The Millstone Nuclear Power Station full scale exercise was conducted on November 19, 1986 from 5:00 PM to 11:15 PM. The ingestion pathway exercise was conducted on November 20, 1986 from 10:00 AM to 1:30 PM.
2.1 Pre-exercise Activities Prior to the emergency exercise, NRC Region I representatives held meetings and had telephone discussions with licensee representatives to discuss objectives a1d scope and content of the exercise scenario.
As a result, changes were made in order to clarify certain objec-l tives, revise certain portions of the scenario and ensure that the scenario provided the opportunity for the licensee to adequately demonstrate their emergency response capability, including those areas previously identified by NRC as in need of corrective actio,
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NRC observers attended a licensee briefing on November 18, 1986, and participated in the discussion of emergency response actions expected during the various phases of the scenario. The licensee stated that controllers would intercede in exercise activities to prevent scenario deviation or disruption of normal plant operations.
The exercise scenario included the following events:
Fire in the Unit 1 Cable Vauit affecting Safety Systems;
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High flux reactor scram, pressure spike and subsequent water
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hammer;
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Small break LOCA;
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Containment failure due to a TORUS break;
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Release of activity through the plant stack;
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Declaration of Unusual Event, Alert and General Emergency
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Classifications; Calculation of offsite dose consequences; and
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Recommendation of protective actions to state officials.
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2.2 Activities Observed During the conduct of the licensee's exercise, ten NRC team members made detailed observations of the actisation and augmentation of the emergency organization, activation of emergency response facilities, and actions of emergency response personnel during the operation of the emergency response facilities.
The following activities were observed:
Detection, classification and assessment of scenario events;
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Direction and coordination of the emergency response;
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After hours augmentation of the emergency organization and
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response facility activation; Notification of licensee personnel and off site agencies of
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pertinent plant status information:
Communications /information flow, and recordkeeping;
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Assessment and projection of off-site radiological dose and
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consideration of protective actions;
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Provisions of in plant radiation protection;
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Performance of off-site and in plant radiological surveys;
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2.3 Ingestion Pathway Activities Observed The purpose of this exercise was to allow the participation of the State of Rhode Island to demonstrate the ability to activate and staff their emergency operations facilities. The State of Connecticut activated its facilities concerned with ingestion pathway communications and decision making. Northeast Utilities (NU) staffed its Corporate Emergency Operations Center for the purpose of communications with the State of Connecticut, which relayed information to the State of Rhode Island.
NU successfully demonstrated the ability to review and analyze the ingestion pathway radiological data and coordinated with the States of Connecticut and Rhode Island in protective action decision making for the ingestion pathway zone.
3.0 Exercise Observations The NRC team noted that the licensee's activation and augmentation of the emergency organization, activation of the emergency response facilities, and use of the facilities were generally consistent with their emergency response plan and implementing procedures. The team also noted the following actions that were indicative of their ability to cope with abnormal plant conditions:
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The Control Room staff response was prompt and conservative, they quickly recognized changing plant conditions and were able to anticipate possible corrective actions; The Technical Support Center (TSC) staff was knowledgeable and
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innovative. Their discussions were challenging and would have resulted in apparent solutions to the scenario problems; The Director of Site Emergency Operations (DSE0) conducted excellent
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staff briefings, both disseminating and soliciting information, k
Each key area manager in turn briefed their staff; The Manager of Radiological Dose Assessment and Manager of Radio-
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logical Consequence Assessment were very much aware of monitoring team members available dose and promptly processed dose upgrades when appropriate; Positive command and control of all emergency response facilities
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was demonstrated by the respective facility managers; and i
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Operations Support Center (OSC) briefings were clear, concise and
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readily understood by all players.
3.1 Areas Requiring Followup The NRC team identified the followirg areas which could have degraded the response and need to be evaluated by the licensee for corrective action. These items are tracked as Inspector Followup Items (IFI).
50-245/85-23-01, 50-336/86-29-01 and 50-423/86-36-01: Status
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boards in the TSC were isadequate and disorganized. There was no formal use of the boards, and three users were documenting different parameters.
50-245/86-23-02, 50-336/86-29-02 and 50-423/86-36-02:
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Station accountability was not demonstrated during this exc,rcise due to a security system hardware failure (Exercise Objective 13).
50-245/86-23-03, 50-336/86-29-03 and 50-423/86-36-03:
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The status board in the EOF for implemented protective actions contained both implemented and recommended protective actions.
This was not really apparent to the EOF staff and could result in confusion.
50-245/86-23-04, 50-336/86-29-04 and 50-423/86-36-04: The
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Corporate Emergency Operations Center (CE0C) was not fully aware of the location of offsite teams in relation to the plume.
For example, team #5 was dispatched to a location on the opposite side of the plume without directions, and was also dispatched back to the EOF without regard for possible contamination from the plume.
50-245/86-23-05, 50-336/86-29-05 and 50-423/86-36-05:
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Training on the use of instruments was weak as evidenced by the collection of an air sample under the hood of a vehicle (this would not have allowed for a representative sample) and the practice of dangling the instrument probe outside of the vehicle window (cold temperatures adversely affect ionization detectors).
50-245/86-23-06, 50-336/86-29-06 and 50-d23/86-36-06: The
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Nuclear Emergency Support System (NESS) did not operate properly throughout the exercise.
Initially one of the data control computers failed, and subsequently all hard copy capability failed (Exercise Objective 15). This resulted in a backlog (approximately 20 minutes) of plant data being passed to the other facilitie.
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50-245/86-23-07, 50-336/86-29-07 and 50-423/86-36-07: No
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announcements were made over the station paging system con-cerning plant conditions.
In addition, the station page in the TSC did not function throughout the exercise. This could have resulted in plant personnel not being notified in a timely manner of degrading conditions.
4.0 Licensee Actions on Previously Identified Inspection Findings The following item was identified during the previous exercise (Inspection Report No. 50-336/86-31). Based upon observations made by the NRC team during the exercise, the item was not repeated and is closed:
(CLOSED) 50-336/85-31-05 (IFI): The licensee should be sensitive to over-conservatism in classifying events because the resulting automatic protective actions may be premature.
5.0 Licensee Critique The NRC team attended the licensee's post-exercise critique on November 20, 1986, during which the key licensee controllers discussed observations of the exercise.
The critique appeared adequate in that licensee participants highlighted areas for improvement (which the licensee indicated would be evaluated and appropriate actions taken).
6.0 Exit Meetir.g and NRC Critique The NRC team met with the licensee representatives listed in Section 1 of this report at the end of the inspection.
The team leader summarized the observations made during the exercise.
The licensee was informed that previously identified items were adequately addressed and no violations were observed. Although there were. areas identified for corrective action, the NRC team determined that within the scope and limitations of the scenario, the licensee's performance demonstrated that they could implement their Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures in a manner which would adequately provide protective measures for the health and safety of the public.
Licensee management acknowledged the findings and indicated that appropriate action would be taken regarding the identified open items.
t At no time during this inspection did the inspectors provide any written information to the licensee.
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