IR 05000423/1985052

Insp Rept 50-423/85-52 on 850813-0923.No Violation Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Main Condenser Structural Repairs, Diesel Generator Reliability Review,Tmi Items,Potentially Significant Deficiencies & SER Items

ML20136D890
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	11/14/1985
From:	Casella F, Finkel A, Mccabe E, Rebelowski T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20136D843	List: IR 05000423/1985052 ML20136D837
References
TASK-1.A.2.1, TASK-1.C.1, TASK-1.C.5, TASK-2.B.4, TASK-TM 50-423-85-52, NUDOCS 8511210386
Download: ML20136D890 (18)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report N /85-52 Docket N License N CPPR-113 Category _B Licensee: Northeast Nuclear Energy Company P. O. Box 270 Hartford, CT 06101 Facility Name: Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3 Inspection at: Waterford CT Inspection Conducted: August 13- September 23, 1985 Inspectors:

& k% , k is lt4{U T. A. Rebelowski, Senior Resident Inspector date signed 6 kb, k si li4lPT F. A. Casella, Resident Inspector date signed

$.fh ll//yfff A. Finkel, Reactor Inspector dath s'igned Approved by:

PJL. & Ode iiIavier E. C. McCabe, Chief, Reactor Projects date signed Section 3B Inspection Summary: Inspection 50-423/85-52 (August 13-September 23, 1985)

Routine resident (222 hours0.00257 days <br />0.0617 hours <br />3.670635e-4 weeks <br />8.4471e-5 months <br />) and region-based (16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />) inspection included main condenser structural repairs, diesel generator reliability review, Three Mile Island items, main steam indication cable repair, Safety Evaluation Report items, prevention of cable damage, potentially significant deficiencies, and previously identified item In addition, Engineered Safeguards Features (ESF)

and other preoperational tests were witnesse No unacceptable conditions were identifie PDR ADOCK 05000423 O PDR I

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Table of Contents Detail # Details Title Page N Persons Contacted 3 2 Plant Status Summary 3 '

-3 Previously Identified Items 3 4 Construction Deficiency Reports 4 5 TMI-Related Item Severed Cable Between Buildings 10 7 Emergency Diesel Generators 11 8 Safety Evaluation Report Item Inspection 14 9 Main Condenser Bracing 16 10 Preoperational Test Witnessing 16 11 Plant Tours 18 12 Management Meetings 18 i

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< 3 DETAILS Persons Contacted Numerous members of Northeast Utilities and Stone and Webster (S&W)

Corporation including engineers, technicians, craftsmen, and members of staff management were contacte(., including:

J. Crockett, Unit Superintencent D. Miller, Startup Manager L. Nadeau, Project Enginee- Plant Status Summary Plant construction is ar. proximately 98.5% complete according to NUSC Four buildings and one system remain to be turned over. Contractor staffing has decreased to about 990 craftsmen and 1300 engineering and support personnel. The licensee is preparing for Integrated Hot Func-tional Testing, which is expected to start September 25, 198 .' Previously Identified Items (OPEN) Inspection Follow Item 84-04-01, tracking Project Change Requests,

, was erroneously listed as closed in Inspection Report 85-24, item Item 84-04-13 was actually closed.

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(CLOSED) Violation 84-04-13, equipment to piping flange alignment, closed in Inspection Report 85-24, was erroneously listed as 84-04-01.

! (CLOSED) Construction Deficiency 84-00-15, Recirculation Spray Pump motor bearing, closed in Inspection Report 85-05 under item 8d, was incorrectly identified as 84-00-1 (CLOSED) Construction Deficiency 83-00-14, auto test reset for Emergency Diesel Generators, closed in Inspection Report 85-28 under item 3.1, was erroneously listed as 84-00-1 (OPEN) Construction Deficiency 84-00-14, replacement of wear rings on Bingham-Willamette auxiliary feedwater pumps, was erroneously closed in Inspection Reports 85-05 and 85-28. This item remains ope (CLOSED) Construction Deft:iency 82-00-10, failure of Robert Shaw Thermostatic Valve, closed in Inspection Report 85-05 under section 2, was erroneously listed as 84-00-10. Item 84-00-10 was correctly closed in j Inspection Report 85-0 .

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(OPEN) Unresolved Item 82-13-03, qualification data for hardware used to clamp cable trays to supports. Inspection Report 83-09, section 3 erroneously closed this item. Unresolved item 82-13-04 was actually reviewed and closed and remains so. Inspection Report 83-11 identified 82-13-03 as open item 82-13-0 Item 82-13-03 remains open pending review of the seismic qualification data for Engineering and Design Change Report P-E 296 (CLOSED) IFI 84-10-05, cable surveillanc The inspector had questioned whether work and security controls were sufficient to prevent cable cutting / damage. Access control security provisions have been implemente Licensee work order controls did identify an instance of cable cutting, and testing has found no instances of cable damage which affected equipment performance. The inspector concluded that special additional cable surveillance measures are not neede (CLOSED) Unresolved Item 85-35-03, fill cap for fuel oil storage tanks

"A" and "B". The licensee has replaced the fill caps for fuel oil storage tanks "A" and "B" with tamper proof, lockable caps. This safe-guards against the introduction of foreign materia (OPEN) IE Bulletin 79-13, cracking in feedwater system piping; the inspection requirements of this bulletin cannot be completed until completion of hot functional testing. The procedure which will govern this examination is Procedure QAD-9.41ML, Radiographic Examinations, General Requirement This bulletin remains open until the results of this piping inspection are reviewed and evaluate (CLOSED) IE Bulletin 79-14, seismic analysis for as-built safety-related piping. On-site review and discussions with regional inspectors show that, based on NRC review of the licensee's ASME Section III N-5 Certification Program (Inspection Report 85-46) and the NRC

"As-Built" team inspection (Inspection Report 85-54), the provisions of this bulletin have been adequately met by the license (CLOSED) IE Bulletin 79-16, Vital Area Access Controls; on-site review and i discussions with regional inspectors determined that, based on a review of j the bulletin and NRC review of the licensee's security program at the Millstone site (Units 1, 2 and 3),the provisions of this bulletin are me . Construction Deficiency Reports Items where licensee action remains outstanding:

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(1) G.E. Type PVD21 Differential Relays Cause Bus Trip on mechanical impact (S0-86) 85-00-19 On August 8, 1985, the licensee reported a potentially signi-ficant deficiency involving G.E. Type PVD21 Differential Relay During impact load tests on the 4160 volt Emergency Switchgear, the subject relays operated to cause a bus trip when loads were dropped close to them (within inches). The tests were being performed as follow up to two separate incidents of trippings of

.the 4160 Emergency Bus due to blows to the top of the switchgear relay section by workmen. The' licensee is continuing to investigate the seismic qualification of the PVD21 Relay (2) Nonessential loads start through Diesel Generator Load Sequencers when Containment Depressurization Signal is reset. (50-87) 85-00-20 On August 16, 1985, the licensee reported a potentially signifi-cant deficiency involving the Emergency Diesel Load Sequence During a Containment Depressurization Actuation (CDA) with a Loss of Offsite Power (LOP), the Reactor Plant Component Cooling Water (RPCCW) Pumps and Containment Air Recirculation (CAR) fans automatically start through the load sequencer when the CDA

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signal is reset prior to resetting the LOP signal. The licensee is generating an engineering design package to correct this problem. This item will remain open pending completion of corrective actio Items where licensee has determined corrective action:

(1) Construction Deficiency Report (SD-69) 85-00-09 (CLOSED) The Westinghouse series 7300 Process Control Cabinets are connected to control grade cables without proper isolatio The 118 Volts AC safety related instrument bus which supplies power to the 7300 series Process Control Cabinets also provides inputs to relays in Auxiliary Relay Rack (ARR) No. 3. The cable which provides 118 Volts AC to the relays in ARR No. 3 is a black, control grade cable. Each cable beirig fed over to the Auxiliary Relay Rack No. 3 from its respective protection rack is provided with a 3 amp. fuse and a 15 amp. circuit breaker in series. This configuration provides protection to the two parallel 15 amp. circuit breakers that provide 118 Volt AC safety-related power to the 24 Volt D.C. and 26 Volt D.C. power supplie .

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The 118 Volt AC power being supplied to the Protection Set No. 2 is provided from a safety-related distribution panel. Within this panel a 20 amp branch fuse is used for overcurrent protection. The feeder cable from the inverter is provided with a main 150 amp. fuse ard provides power to all loads associated with the distribution pane Since the control grade cable b.s a 3 amp. fuse and a 15 am circuit breaker in series, the 118 volt AC supply is electri-cally protected from faults being generated within the control cable of the 118 Volt AC distribtufon syste The inspector verified that the system is designed as described abov (2) Construction Deficiency Report (50-79) 85-00-12 (CLOSED) Interconnection cabling for the 24VDC power supply system between the 7300 protection rack sets was installed as non-safety-related cable when it should have been installed as

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rafety-relate The drawings have been changed to reflect a safety related cable change and the safety-related installation has been completed and inspected. A review of the quality control records verify that all QC criteria have been met. No outstanding items were identified. This item is close (3) Construction Deficiency Report (S0-83) 85-00-16 (Closed) The licensee reported potential improper installation of upper reactor internal thermocouple compression fitting During cold hydrostatic testing, one incore thermocouple compression fitting had leakage. The licensee conducted a 100% inspection and completed corrective actions by replacement of all bent compression fittings, makeup of fittings to required 1 1/4 turn manufacturer's recommendations and the use of Neolube per Westinghouse procedure The inspector has no further questions in this are This item is close (4) Construction Deficiency Report (S0-88) 85-00-21 (Closed) The rod supporting the DC field excitation brushes of the 'B' Emergency Diesel Generator (EOG) underwent fatigue failure while the generator was operating, dropping the brushes into the rotor and causing the unit to trip on loss of fiel The failure occurred on August 14, 1985. On September 5, 1985, ,

the licensee reported this as a potentially significant defic-ienc .

Analysis by the licensee showed that fatigue failure occurred at the point of change of cross section in the threaded extension of a hexagonal nut that attaches the brush support rod to a cross brace. Fatigue failure potential was increased by the fact that the nut was low grade carbon steel, and that the tapped hole in the nut which accepted the brush support rod extended well beyond its required dept Licensee corrective action was originated by Stone and Webster Engineering and Design Coordination Report (E & DCR) T-J-0696 The brush support rod was redesigned to a single piece with improved geometry. The new design eliminated the stress concentration and specifies high strength carbon steel (ASME SA668 C1.M) with favorable ductibility characteristic Fabrication was completed on sit The modified assembly has been installed and operationally tested in both EDGs. The EDG's have completed satisfactory 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> test runs. The inspector has no further questions on this ite . TMI Related Items Item I.A.2.1.4 Training for Mitigating Core Damage (CLOSED) Item II. Criteria for Mitigating Core Damage Training Programs (CLOSED)

These closely related items established a requirement for licensees to assure that all operators have received training in identifying and mitigating core damage and establish standards for such trainin The inspector reviewed the licensee's lesson plan 3052, " Mitigating Core Damage", prepared by Westinghouse Nuclear Service Integration l Division. The course provides for 28 lecture hours and 12 supervised problem analysis and quiz hours. The inspector reviewed the lesson j plan in detail and found that the Learning Objectives and Enabling Objectives closely matched the requirements of item I.A.2.1.4. as

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detailed in NUREG-0737.

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! The inspector reviewed the training records of all Senior Reactor Operator and Reactor Operator license candidates and noted that completion of the training in " Mitigating Core Damage" was documented for all candidates. A total of 44 records was reviewe Based on the above, both items II.B.4 and I.A.2.1.4 are close (85-TM-25,85-TM-26) _ -

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8 I.C.1 Short Term Accident and Procedures Review (Closed)

This item required licensees to conduct a short, immediate review of emergency procedures addressing Sma11 Break Loss of Coolant Accidents and, subsequently, to review all emergency procedure Emergency procedures at Millstone Unit 3 were initially prepared long after the Three Mile Island accident and have been prepared in accordance with Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) Emergency Response Guides (ERGS).

The NRC approved the ERGS for implementation in Generic Letter 83-22 dated June 3, 1983. The inspector reviewed a sample of Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) and Emergency Contingency Actions (ECA)

and confirmed that the E0Ps and ECAs were consistent with the ERG The inspector found the procedures to be reasonably assembled to permit smooth transitions to successive procedures according to symptoms present. The inspector also reviewed the training records of all Senior Reactor Operator and Reactor Operator license candi-dates and holders for initial plant operations. Training in Emer-gency Preparedness and in the Emergency Operating Procedures wa, documented in each training folder. A total of 44 records were re-viewed. This item is closed. (85-TH-27) (Review of this item to current standards is conducted pursuant to routine review for issu-ance of an operating license and during examinations of operators for NRC licenses.) I.C.5 - Feedback of Operating Experience (Closed)

This item requires licensees to establish an organization to be responsible for obtaining, analyzing, and disseminating industry operating information. The intent of the requirement is to present operators with timely information germane to their situation but to not overwhelm them with masses of ur! processed data. Two programs address this requirement. The licepsee has established an Independent Safety Engineering Group (ISEG) for Millstone Station consisting of seven analysts supervised by a Registered Professional Engineer with extensive on-site experience for a total of 8 person The inspector interviewed the members of the ISEG, observed samples of completed analyses, and reviewed the implementing procedure NE02.06 " Operating Experience Assessment and Utilization." The inspector concluded that this program is of sufficient depth and vigor to meet the requirements of item I. The second method of assuring feedback of information concerning operating events as well as design changes and procedure changes is the " Document Acknowledgement System" described in Administrative Control Procedure ACP8.09. Items to be made " required reading" are screened by the Operations Supervisor. The plant staff has access to important recent operating experience without being distracted by unimportant information. This item is closed. (85-TM-28) ,

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e. TMI Items to be followed-up further include:

TMI TASK N DESCRIPTION OUTSTANDING ITJM I.A. Shift Technical Advisor 85-TM-01 I.A. Shift Supervisor Admin. Duties 85-TM-02 I.A. Shift Manning 85-TM-03 I.A. Upgrading of R0 & SR0 Training 85-TM-04 I.A. Training Programs for Licensed 85-TM-05 Operators I.B. Evaluation of Organization and 85-TM-06 Management Improvements I. Shift Relief & Turnover 85-TM-07 I. Shift Supervisor Responsibilities 85-TM-08 I. Control Room Access 85-TM-09 I. Performance of Operating 85-TM-10 Activities I. NSSS Vendor Review of Low Power 85-TM-11 Test Procedures I. Control Room Design 85-TM-12 II. Relief & Safety Valves 85-TM-13 II. Relief & Safety Valve Indication 85-TM-14 II.E. Aux. Feed Initiation & Indication 85-TM-15 II.E. Containment Oedicated H2 85-TM-16 Penetrations II. Accident Monitoring 85-TM-17 Instrumentation II. Core Cooling Instruments 85-TM-18 II. Power Supplies from Emergency 85-TM-19 Busses

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TMI TASK N DESCRIPTION OUTSTANDING ITEM II. IE Bulletins on Measures to 85-TM-20 Mitigate SBLOCAs and Loss of FW Accidents II. Task Force Recommendations 85-TM-21 III.A. Emergency Preparedness, Short 85-TM-22 Term III.A. Upgrade Emergency Support' 85-TM-23 Facilities III.D. Inplant Radiation Monitoring 85-TM-24 Additional items required for start-up and power ascension will be reviewed in a subsequent repor . Severed Cable Between Buildings The Inspection and Enforcement Construction Activity Team (CAT) had iden-tified a concern that the shake space specified to allow free movement between buildings during seismic vibration was not maintained during construction. Excess concrete was found between the Auxiliary Building and the Main Steam Valve Building, filling the two-inch shake spac To remove the concrete, the licensee employed a contractor who utilized a continuous diamond impregnated rope saw to slice through debris in the shake spaces. During the cutting process, 3 ducts containing fourteen cables were inadvertently cut through. The reason for this error has been identified as an improper review of interferences and a failure to identify the location of the duct Cables and ducts affected were as follows:

DUCT CABLE SERVICE DESCRIPTION 3DX150813 3 MSS 3BX800 3 MSS *PT526 STEAM PRES TRANSMITTER LOOP-21 3 MSS 3BX801 3 MSS *PT536 STEAM PRES TRANSMITTER LOOP-31 3DX150Y03 3 MSS 4YX800 3 MSS *PT516 STEAM PRESS.

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3 MSS 4YX801 3 MSS *PT546 STEAM PRESS.

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DUCT CABLE SERVICE DESCRIPTION

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3DX150131 3MSSC0X800 3 MSS *CTV27C SOL 27C4A MSIV 'C'

SOLEN 0ID POSIT. IN MSSC0X801 3 MSS *CTV27C "

SOL 27C3A 3MSSC0X802 3 MSS *CTV27C "

SOL 27C2A 3MSSC0X803 "

3 MSS *CTV27C SOL 27 CIA 3MSSC0X804 3 MSS *CTV27C MSIV 'C' 100%

POSITION IN MSSC0X805 3 MSS *CTV27C MSIV 'C' 90%

POSITION IN MSSC0X806 3 MSS *CTV27C MSIV 'C' 0's POSITION IN !

3MSSD0X804 3 MSS *CTV27D MSIV 'D' 100% POSITION IN MSS 00X805 3 MSS *CTV27D MSIV 'O' 90%

POSITION IN MSSDOX806 3 MSS *CTV270 MSIV 'D' 0% POSITION IN * Transmitters provide inputs to Solid-State Pratection System for low Steam Pressure Reactor Trip and Steam line Isolatior along with High Rate of Pressure Decrease Steam line Isolatio All cables were repaired by splicing and ther retested. The inspector reviewed the post-repair testing and calibration data sheets for the MSIV position indication circuits. The work orders for the pressure detector cable continuity and transmitter loop operability checks were also review All corrective action and retesting has been completed. The inspector had no_further questions in this are . Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) Review Scope The inspector reviewed the operating and failure history of the emergency diesel generators to assess tteir reliability and the effectiveness of the licensee's corrective actions. Documents reviewed included Phase Two start-up tesc logs, Plant Operating Review Committee (PORC) and Joint Test Group (JTG) meeting minutes,.

deficiency reports and construction work orders, maintenance depart-ment memoranda, corporate and independent laboratory test reports, and machinery history printouts. In addition, various members of the start-up and maintenance organizations were interviewed and direct observations of diesel performance were mad ,

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12 Findings  !

l Significant problems recurred in the fuel oil and lube oil system '

Past problems such as the field brush support failure and two rocker arm failures were assessed as corrected failures that should not affect future reliability. A difficulty with the voltage regulator adjustor /

follower feature not accurately tracking the automatic system to permit rapid transfer without matching voltages still exits. That is  !

not considered a safety ' problem because the EDG design basis does not require paralleling the diesels to an energized bu ,

(1) Fuel Oil System Documentation shows that the diesels had 3 fuel injector failures each prior to April of 1985. A complete inspection of the injector pumps and nozzles on both engines was performed by the licensee in early April 1985. This resulted in replacement of 3 pumps and 5 nozzles in EDG-A and 4 pumps and 5 nozzles in EDG- ,

The injector pumps were rejected due to excessive plunger and barrel scoring. In addition, some accepted pumps had minor '

scoring. The licensee's report on this noted a general presence  :

of black gritty 'psrticulates in the fuel system. The vendor stated that a 30 micron particle could be responsible for pump component scorin The licensee cleaned the fuel system and attempted to isolate the source. Fuel oil storage tanks and day tanks were drained, inspected and cleaned. No significant quantities of foreign material were discovered. (The unit 3 storage tanks have an epoxy coating.) As a precautionary measure, a filter i was installed at the discharge of the fuel transfer pump, and a stub tube was added to the day tank to raise the suction level

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about 1" above the tank bottom. (Because the day tank capacity far exceeds the required capacity, the stub tube installation does not affect design basis diesel performance.)

Interior coatings and transfer pipe material were checked to assure they did not contain copper or zinc alloys that could behave as catalysts in the formation of gels, or unfilterable resins that could cause gelling under the higher temperatures in the injector (2) Laboratory Analysis and Fuel Quality Review One outside laboratory analysis for particles in the fuel oil system on EDG-B showed 480 particles per 100 mi in the 26-50 micron range upstream of the fuel filters and 123 particles per 100 ml in that range downstream of the filters. The vendor had stated that a 30 micron particle could cause the type of injector i

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failure being experienced. The filter mesh is designed to remove particles greater than 5 microns. Fouling of the downstream portions of the system was initially attributed to weld heat distortion of the filter seating surfaces allowing contaminated oil to bypass the filters, with the origin of the gritty material being either casting sand (due to poor vender quality control)

or site san The inspector reviewed a corporate laboratory failure analysis report, dated June 26, 1985, which concluded that 1) the cause of wear damage was sand in the fuel injection system, 2) the source of the sand was probably contamination at the Millstone site, and 3) the 5 micron filter precluded the sand from having passed through the filter. The licensee concluded that most of the downstream contamination is attributable to improperly cleaned castings, evidenced by adherent molding sand, and has performed ultrasonic cleaning of removable components to eliminate the sourc The licensee's corrective action has included inspection and cleaning of fuel tanks, cleaning of castings, repair of the filter housings, system flushes, and thorough inspections of the entire system. Although there were injector failures on both engines subsequent to performance of these corrective actions, none have occurred in the last 126 hours0.00146 days <br />0.035 hours <br />2.083333e-4 weeks <br />4.7943e-5 months <br /> of operation on EDG-A or 137 hours0.00159 days <br />0.0381 hours <br />2.265212e-4 weeks <br />5.21285e-5 months <br /> of operation of EDG-B. It therefore appears that the contamination problem has been correcte (3) Lubrication Oil System The extensive Simplex 011 strainer configuration necessitates engine shutdown for strainer changeout. During two separate 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> test runs, EDG-A has had excessive oil strainer differential pressures which required shutdown and termination of the test One was identified as unresolved item 423/85-06-02. -The second occurred during ESF testing. (Recent 24 hr engine runs during ESF testing and Hurricane Gloria did not result in excessive oil strainer differential pressures-both engines were able to operate for the full period required.) The licensee committed to modify the lube oil system to a duplex stra' ar arrangement and to raise the pump suction level in the pump. The latter change attempts to reduce the strainer fouling frequency. These modifications are currently in the design stage with no installation date fixe Unresolved item 423/85-06-02 therefore remains open.

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(4) Licensee Actions

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The licensee retained an engineering consulting firm to perform an independent analysis to assess diesel generator reliablity and performance history. In a preliminary report, the consultants indicated that the engines suffered from design inadequacies (simplex oil strainer, questionable fuel oil filter location and a lack of quality control), They noted that the vendor had licensed the engine design from Pielstick, that the engines at Millstone 3 were manufactured early in the U.S. produciton history, and that there may have been some difficulty in adapting a European design to U.S. manufacturing processes. (These engin n were built between 1975 and 1977, tested in 1978, and stored until 1980 when installation began at the site.)

The licensee is currently addressing the recommendations made by their consultants. In addition, they have retained a consultant

who has communication links to Pielstick and L' Orange (the injector pump manufacturer). That consultant is currently

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analyzing fuel oil filters and fluid for contaminant source Conclusion

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Individual EDG failures have been addressed and corrected. Corrective

! action for fuel system problems have been implemented. Further, the licensee has instituted a program for more detailed analysis of the l

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fuel system problem in a further attempt to define the root caus A modification to correct the lubrication oil system problem is in the design and procurement stage. The fuel oil filter location con-cern is under licensee evaluation. The inspector will continue to follow diesel performance trends, licensee and consultant reviews and further corrective actions under Unresolved Item 423/85-06-02.

! 8. Safety Evaluation Report (SER) Item Inspection l

l Selected SER items have been inspected as follows:

l l SER Section 2.4.2.2. - Installation of Protective Curbing at the j Auxiliary Building Door.

l l The inspector verified by direct observation that curbing was in l place as documented in E&DCR PS-07341. This item is closed. (85-SE-02)

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!- SER Section 2.4.2.2. - Installation of water-tight seal on roof hatc a A roof seal was installed but did not completely mate with the roof hatch. This item is presently under licensee material revie This item is open.(85-SE-01)

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15 SER Section 7.3.3.2. - Test of Engineered Safeguards and P-4 Interlock By letter dated September 11, 1984, the applicant committed to incor-porate the test feature recommended by the staff by incorporating voltmeters in cabinets 3RPS*RAKLOGA (Orange safety channel) and 3RPS*RAKLOGB (Purple safety channel) which display voltage across the

<P-4 contacts in their respective channels. The staff has found this to be acceptable. The inspector confirmed the installation of both voltmeters by physical inspection. The applicant has placed placards near each meter to inform personnel that-the zero voltage condition

' indicates that the P-4 interlock is in effect. The feature has been acceptably tested by the licensee. The inspector found evidence of

. Quality Assurance inspection'of the installation documents in Automated Work Orders M3-84-08597 and M3-84-10366. The licensee's~

committment to install these meters has been accomplishe This item is closed. (85-SE-14) SER Section 7.4.2.4 - Test for Remote Shutdown Operatio During the staff's review of remote shutdown capability, the applicant committed to establish emergency procedures for remote shutdown and to test the remote shutdown capability. NRR has_ reviewed the test description and found it to be acceptabl The inspector observed that two procedures, Emergency Operating 4- Procedure (EOP) 3503 " Shutdown Outside Control Room" Revision 1 and E0P 3504 "Cooldown Outside Control Room" Revision I have been placed in effect during late August. These procedures provide detailed step-wise instructions for the designated evolution '

The inspector observed that two procedures, 3-INT-3000 Appendix 3104

" Remote Shutdown with Cooldown" and 3-INT-8000 Appendix 8023, " Reactor Trip Shutdown Outside Control Room." These procedures have been approved by the Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) and are incorporated in Phase III " Pre Core Hot Functional" and Phase VIII

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" Power Ascention Test" programs, respectively. This item remains open pending successful completion of these tests. (85-SE-05) Additional Follow-Up Items That Remain Open Are:

SER Section Subject Ou standing Items

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2.4. Online Failed Fuel Rod Monitor 85-SE-03 6. Protective. Coating System 85-SE-04 8.3. .C. Monitoring

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85-SE-06 8.3. Generic Letter 81-04 85-SE-07 9.3. Post- Accident Sampling 85-SE-08

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SER Section Subject Outstanding Items

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9. EDG Low Room Temperature Alarm 85-SE-10 10. Mechanical Vacuum Pump Exhaust 85-SE-11 10. Emergency Procedure for 85-SE-12

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!. 15.9.11 Report on Outages of ECCS 85-SE-13

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9.5. Concrete Dust Control 85-SE-09

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The above items were discussed with the licensee and will be addressed l in a subsequent inspection.

l Main Condenser Bracing During Turbine Building Hot functional testing, the inlet shroud from the turbine exhaust to the condenser appeared to be " panting". Licensee follow-up found that other such condensors have experienced the same

" panting" conditions and that some of these have been modified to add internal bracing, i

The licensee added additional supports as documented in N-ME 00419 and l N-ME 00392. The material used was 3/4 inch ASTM A-36 plate and ASTM A500 tube steel. Staging was used in the condenser above the tube sheets to j aid in protection of tubes, limit entrance of debris, and establish a working platfor I The resident inspector followed structural steel installation, including '

visual examination of welding in progress and installation of shim plates

! along with review of resolution of interference Subsequent to condenser closecut, the licensee performed a long term

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hotwell feed and bleed to reduce contaminant levels and went on short i cycle recirculation through the demineralizers for final cleanu i The inspector had no further questions in this area. '

1 Preoperational Test Witnessing Throughout the inspection period, the inspector witnessed portions of Integrated Engineered Safety Features tests and various Phase 2 Preoperational tests, Steam Generator Chemical Feed The inspector observed Phase II startup testing of the Steam Generator

! Chemical Feed Syste Procedure 3339BP was being followed adequately.

j All deviations were being approved. Pipe configuration problems and

pipe supports on pump discharges were documented for rework.

Discharge accumulators are on order to overcome loss of suction L

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problems. Containment isolation valves SGF-A0V-24-A,-B,-C, and -D were observed to operate and operating logic was verified by pulling leads in the Feedwater Isolation circuit to simulate loss of power to relays which deenergize the air solenoids. The observa-

.tions were made at the control board for "A" train valves "A" and "C"

'and locally for "B" train. valves "B" and "0". Proper use of work orders and lifted lead logs was observed. Logic and valve operations were satisfactory, Containment' Recirculating Spray System The inspector observed Section 7.4 of T3306-P, Containment Recircula-ting Spray System cross-connect valve logic test. The test was per-formed and recorded in accordance with the procedure, and the valves operated properl Engineered Safety Features Loss of Power The inspector observed control room activities during performance of 3-INT-2004 (ESF with LOP) Section 7.8 (preparation for test 3 SIS / LOP on Purple [P] bus). To be included in Section 7.9 was T3306P-Cold Leg Recirculatio This test called for a manual safety injection signal followed by a loss of power. The "A" train was completely deenergized so that only

"B" train component operation and sequencing could be observed. "A" train AC and DC buses were to be monitored to verify they remained deenergize Following stabilization of safety injection, train "B" components were to be shifted to Cold Leg recirculatio The inspector observed compliance with test procedures and proper change implementation. The pre-test briefing was thorough and explicit. Hazards, potential damage, and flooding concerns were carefully explained. Adequate communication during testing was observed. Testing was controlled by the Senior Control Room Operator (SCO). Valid backup input was provided by the off going SCO. The test. coordinator was knowledgeabl In all cases, during ESF testing, the inspector observed NNEC0 QC and NUSCO QA personnel performing independent assessments of operations performanc No inadequacies were observed in personnel performance.

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1 Plant Tours During this report period, periodic plant tours were performed to observe general material conditions, housekeeping and fire protection. Ongoing work was periodically spot checked for use of proper procedures, calibrated / qualified tools, knowledgeable personnel, and overall good practices. The areas toured were: portions of the Turbine Building, Mainsteam Valve Building, Service, Control and ESF Buildino. all levels and accessible compartments of the Auxiliary Building; and c!1 levels of Containment including steam generator / reactor coolant pump bays.,pressur-izer space, accumulator spaces, incore instrument areas, and portions of the accessible compartment. No unacceptable conditions were identifie . Management Meetings At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were held with senior plant management to discuss the scope and findings of l this inspection. No proprietary information was identified as being in l the inspection coverage.

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