IR 05000413/2019003
| ML19311C629 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 11/07/2019 |
| From: | Frank Ehrhardt Division Reactor Projects II |
| To: | Simril T Duke Energy Progress |
| Reeder D | |
| References | |
| IR 2019003 | |
| Download: ML19311C629 (32) | |
Text
November 7, 2019
SUBJECT:
CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000413/2019003 AND 05000414/2019003
Dear Mr. Simril:
On September 30, 2019, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2. On October 23, 2019, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Three findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. Three of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements; one was determined to be Severity Level IV. We are treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Catawba.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Catawba. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Frank J. Ehrhardt, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos. 05000413 and 05000414 License Nos. NPF-35 and NPF-52
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000413/2019003 and 05000414/2019-003
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000413 and 05000414
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000413/2019003 and 05000414/2019003
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2019-003-0016
Licensee:
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
Facility:
Catawba Nuclear Station
Location:
York, South Carolina
Inspection Dates:
July 01, 2019 to September 30, 2019
Inspectors:
J. Austin, Senior Resident Inspector
C. Scott, Resident Inspector
A. Butcavage, Reactor Inspector
S. Downey, Senior Reactor Inspector
C. Dykes, Health Physicist
W. Loo, Senior Health Physicist
M. Magyar, Reactor Inspector
A. Nielsen, Senior Health Physicist
J. Rivera, Health Physicist
Approved By:
Frank J. Ehrhardt, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 1
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Catawba Nuclear Station in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Declare Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Inoperable When Technical Specification Support System was Out Of Service Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000413/2019003-01 Open/Closed
[H.14] -
Conservative Bias 71111.06 Introduction: The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.5, Auxiliary Feedwater System, for the failure to declare the Unit 1 motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps (MDAFW) pumps inoperable and comply with the associated action statements when a necessary support system was not available to perform its safety function.
Failure to Comply with Selected Licensee Commitment (SLC) 16.6-5 Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000413,05000414/2019003-02 Open/Closed
[H.8] -
Procedure Adherence 71111.15 The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated NCV of TS 5.4.1, Procedures, for Units 1 and 2 when the licensee failed to comply with SLC 16.6-5, Residual Heat Removal/
Containment Spray Sump Pump (ND/NS) Interlock. Specifically, on February 4, 2019, the licensee failed to enter Condition A when the ND/NS sump pump interlock was not functional and take the required action to implement alternate means of fulfilling the interlock function.
Failure to take Technical Specification Actions with Two Trains of Component Cooling Inoperable and Failure to Submit an Associated 8-hour NRC Report Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green Severity Level IV NCV 05000414/2019003-03 Open/Closed
[H.14] -
Conservative Bias 71111.15 Introduction: The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Severity Level IV NCV of TS 3.7.7 Component Cooling Water System (KC) for failure to take TS actions for two inoperable trains of KC and of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A, B, and D) for the failure to notify the NRC within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> of an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status URI 05000413/2019002-03 Unresolved Item (URI) MSPI Data associated with failure of the 1A emergency diesel generator (EDG) not reported 71151 Closed NOV 05000413/2019002-04 Failure to Provide Complete and Accurate Information in Licensee Event Report (LER)71152 Closed NOV 05000413,05000414/2019 002-01 Failure to Report the Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability of the Technical Support Center Within Eight Hours 71152 Closed
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 operated at or near 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP) for the entire inspection period.
Unit 2 began the inspection at 100 percent RTP. On September 14, 2019, Unit 2 began shutdown for refueling outage 2CR23 and remained shut down through the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515 Appendix D, Plant Status and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Summer Readiness (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated summer readiness of offsite and alternate alternating current (AC) power systems.
Impending Severe Weather (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for impending adverse weather conditions for hurricane Dorian on September 5, 2019
71111.04Q - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Unit 1 and Unit 2 vital battery charger area on July 31, 2019
- (2) Unit 1 A and B starting air system on August 7, 2019
- (3) Unit 2 A train component cooling (KC) on September 20, 2019
71111.05Q - Fire Protection
Quarterly Inspection (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected areas:
- (1) Unit 2 B train essential switchgear room, elevation 560, fire zone 7 on September 11, 2019
- (2) Unit 1 B train essential switchgear room, elevation 560, fire zone 8 on September 11, 2019
- (3) Unit 2 turbine building, elevation 564, fire zone TB2 on September 11, 2019
- (4) Unit 1 and Unit 2 control room, elevation 594, fire zone 21 on September 14, 2019
71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures
Inspection Activities - Internal Flooding (IP Section 02.02a.) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in:
- (1) Condition Report (CR) 2275149, Evaluation of liquid waste and sump pumps of CA operability
===71111.07T - Heat Sink Performance
Triennial Review (IP Section 02.02)===
The inspectors evaluated heat exchanger/sink performance on the following:
- (1) Heat exchangers cooled by service water, IP Section 02.02b
- Component cooling water heat exchanger KC-1B
- Component cooling water heat exchanger KC-2A
- (2) Closed loop heat exchanger, IP Section Section 02.02c
- Motor cooler for 1NV-MR-ACC
- (3) Heat sink, IP Section 02.02d,
- Service water pump train "A" performance
- Service water pump train "B" performance
- Service water intake structure and buried piping walk-down
- CR 02278842, Pipe sleeve clearances downstream of 1RN11A not adequate
71111.08P - Inservice Inspection Activities (PWR) PWR Inservice Inspection Activities (IP Section 03.01)
(1)
PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated pressurized water reactor non-destructive testing by reviewing the following examinations from September 23 - 27, 2019:
1. Ultrasonic Examination (UT)
a. Reactor vessel outlet nozzle-to-safe-end dissimilar metal welds (N22),
ASME Class 1, automated UT (observed)b. Reactor vessel outlet nozzle-to-safe-end dissimilar metal welds (N202), ASME Class 1, automated UT (observed)
2. Penetrant Testing (PT)
a. Base metal repairs on valve body 2CF040, SG B containment isolation inlet check valve, ASME Class 2 (reviewed)
3. Visual Examination (VE)
a. Reactor vessel closure head outer surface, ASME Class 1, Bare metal visual exam (observed) b. Visual examination of SG 2D Hot Leg Cladding Anomaly
4. Eddy Current Testing (ET)
a. SG 2A - ET for tube R31C33, ASME Class 1 b. SG 2B - ET for tube R26C68, ASME Class 1 c. SG 2C - ET for tubes R38C99, R44C81, ASME Class 1 d. SG 2D - ET for tube R36C16, ASME Class 1
The inspectors evaluated the licensees boric acid corrosion control program performance.
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during Unit 2 shutdown for refueling outage on September 14, 2019.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated just in time training for turbine heat up and placing turbine online for Unit 2 startup on September 5, 2019.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Routine Maintenance Effectiveness Inspection (IP Section 02.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of routine maintenance activities associated with the following equipment and/or safety significant functions:
- (1) CR 2280631, 2A1 KC pump discharge check valve on July 9, 2019
- (2) CR 2285715, 2NW-185A (seal water supply isolation valve) loss of indication on August 7, 2019
- (3) A(1) action plan for liquid waste system on September 22, 2019
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities:
- (1) Unit 2 orange risk while in single train KC on July 6, 2019
- (2) Unit 1 and Unit 2 motor driven auxiliary feedwater (CA) complex activity plan on July 17, 2019
- (3) Unit 2 Catawba outage 23 schedule risk review on August 29, 2019
- (4) Unit 2 yellow risk during plant shutdown for refueling outage on September 14, 2019
- (5) Unit 2 yellow risk for decay heat removal on September 18-19, 2019
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 02.02) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) CR 2275467, All four residual heat removal containment spray (ND/NS) sump pumps removed from service in February, 2019
- (2) CR 2280660, Evaluate component cooling (KC) heat exchanger (HX) cleaning interlock defeats for operable train on July 7, 2019
- (3) CR 2294178, 2B ND Pump 1.47 and 4KV essential power indication on July 29, 2019
- (4) CR 2286336, Hanger for 1A NS pump pulled away from wall on August 10, 2019
- (5) CR 2288731, Operability and functional requirements on August 26, 2019
- (6) Engineering Change (EC) 94585, 2A DG voltage regulator modification on September 27, 2019
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
- (1) EC 45036, Containment pressure setpoint changes on September 23, 2019
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
Post-Maintenance Test (IP Section 03.01) (7 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance tests:
- (1) Work Order (WO) 20259380, Functional testing of the 1EIA vital inverter following the diode replacement on July 22, 2019
- (2) WO 20109953, Functional testing of the 2A EDG following preventive maintenance on July 24, 2019
- (3) WO 20330410, Functional testing following repair of the 1NW-61B, 1B containment penetration valve injection surge chamber service water supply on July 25, 2019
- (4) WO 20309801-04, Post maintenance testing following replacement of the 1RN38B, RN pump 1B discharge isolation on July 29, 2019
- (5) CR 2287483, Repair erratic indication on standby nuclear service water pump (SNSWP) level indicator on August 17, 2019
- (6) CR 2288168, Acceptance criteria not met for standby shutdown facility (SSF) EDG diodes on August 22, 2019
- (7) CR 2290112, Instrument air dryer could not be placed inservice after post-maintenance testing on September 4, 2019
71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Refueling/Other Outage (IP Section 03.01) (1 Partial)
(1)
(Partial) The inspectors evaluated items during refueling outage 2CR23 which began on September 14, 2019 and ran through the inspection period.
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) PT/2/A/4350/015A Diesel Generator (DG) 2A Periodic Test on July 12, 2019
- (2) PT/0/A/4200/017A SSF Diesel Test on August 21, 2019
- (3) PT/2/A/4200/09 Engineered Safety Features Activation Periodic Test on September 16, 2019
- (4) PT/2/A/4700/13 Auxiliary Shutdown Panel A Functional Test on September 17,
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls
Radiological Hazard Assessment (IP Section 02.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated radiological hazards assessments and controls.
- (1) The inspectors reviewed the following:
Radiological Surveys
- CNS-M-20190922-7, U2 TSRs\\TSR 203B 2NC29, September 22, 2019
- CNS-M-20190922-7, U2 TSRs\\TSR 203B 2NC29, September 15, 2019
- CNS-M-20190924-14, C2R23 SG Shiftly Routine, September 24, 2019
- CNS-M-20190925-10, C2R23 SG Shiftly Routine, September 25, 2019
- CNS-M-20190915-38, B SG Bowl Survey, September 23, 2019
- CNS-M-20191001-17, B SG Bowl Survey, October 1, 2019
- CNS-M-20190915-39, C SG Bowl Survey, September 23, 2019
- CNS-M-20191001-18, C SG Bowl Survey, October 1, 2019 Air Sample Survey Records
- CN19092300049, C Cold Leg:inside SG Bowl, September 23, 2019
- CN19092300021, B SG remove diaphragms, September 23, 2019
- CN19092300048, C SG Nozzle DAM install Platform, September 23, 2019
- CN19092300051, C SG; install Nozzle DAM, September 23, 2019
Instructions to Workers (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated instructions to workers including, labels, radiation work permits and electronic dosimeter alarm setpoints used to access high radiation areas.
- (1) The inspectors reviewed the following:
Radiation Work Permits (RWP)
- RWP #2810, SG Remove Diaphragms (LC/UC/AUX/OS), Revision 30
- RWP #2117, Mechanical Valves (Lower Containment), Revision 21
Electronic Alarming Dosimeter Alarms
- September 14, 2019, 11.3 mrem/hr alarm/10 mrem/hr setpoint
- September 19, 2019, 29 mrem alarm/ 25 mrem setpoint
Labeling of Containers
- Waste Shipping area
- Low Level Waste Storage
Contamination and Radioactive Material Control (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated licensee processes for monitoring and controlling contamination and radioactive material. The inspectors verified transactions of nationally tracked sources had been reported.
- (1) The inspectors verified the following sealed sources are accounted for and are intact:
- CHP-S-0486
- CHP-S-0520
- CHP-S-0527
- CHP-S-0024
Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage (IP Section 02.04) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated in-plant radiological conditions during facility walkdowns and observation of radiological work activities.
- (1) The inspectors also reviewed the following radiological work package for areas with airborne radioactivity:
- Inservice inspection of reactor vessel upper head penetrations
- Steam generator platform eddy current inspection work
- Drain down High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls (IP Section 02.05) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated risk-significant high radiation area and very high radiation area controls, including postings and physical controls.
Radiation Worker Performance and Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency (IP Section 02.06) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated radiation worker awareness and performance and radiation protection technician proficiency.
71124.06 - Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment
Inspectors evaluated licensee performance in ensuring gaseous and liquid effluent processing systems are maintained to properly mitigate, monitor and evaluate radiological discharges to the public. Inspectors reviewed compensatory measures for out-of-service effluent monitors.
Walk Downs and Observations (IP Section 02.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors walked down the following gaseous and liquid radioactive effluent monitoring and filtered ventilation systems to assess the material condition and verify proper alignment according to plant design:
- OEMF-49 Waste Liquid Discharge Monitor
- 2EMF-35 Unit Vent Particulate Monitor
- 2EMF-36 Unit Vent Gas and Particulate Monitor
Calibration and Testing Program (Process & Effluent Monitors) (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors reviewed gaseous and liquid effluent monitor instrument calibrations or tests by reviewing information not limited to but including alarm set points, periodicity, and National Institute of Standards and Traceability for sources used for the following sample set of monitors:
- OEMF-49 Waste Liquid Discharge Monitor, July 2017 and February 2019
- 2EMF-36 Unit Vent Gas Monitor (Low Range), February 2017 and August 2018
Sampling and Analysis (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)
The inspectors reviewed the following radioactive effluent sampling and analysis activities:
- The inspectors observed Unit 2 Containment Air sampling, analysis, and batch release permit preparation on August 1, 2019
- No additional sampling and analysis activities were available for observation during this inspection
Effluent discharges with inoperable monitors:
- None were available for review during this inspection
Instrumentation and Equipment (IP Section 02.04) (1 Sample)
The inspectors reviewed flow rates for effluent stack and related vent flow and surveillances. Inspectors also reviewed maintenance and methodologies for one high-range effluent monitor relied on in emergency operating procedures for decision making. Records reviewed were:
- Unit 1A Auxiliary Building Filtered Exhaust Filter Train Performance Test, August 2018
- Unit 2B Auxiliary Building Filtered Exhaust Filter Train Performance Test, March 2018
- 2EMF-36 Unit Vent Gas Monitor (High Range), February 2017 and
- August 2018
Dose Calculations (IP Section 02.05) (1 Sample)
The inspectors reviewed required annual reports for changes, release permits and the offsite dose calculation manual for changes and results. Some documents reviewed include the following:
- Gaseous Waste Release Permit Report No. 2019042, Unit 2 Containment Air Release and Addition, May 9, 2019
- Gaseous Waste Release Permit Report No. 2019068, Unit 2 Containment Air Batch Release, August 1, 2019
- Liquid Waste Release Permit Report No. 2019018, Auxiliary Monitor Tank "A",
June 26, 2019
Abnormal gaseous or liquid tank discharges:
- None were available for review during this inspection period
71124.07 - Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP)
Site Inspection (IP Section 02.01) (1 Sample)
Inspectors evaluated licensee performance in ensuring REMP is implemented in accordance with licensing documentation and REMP is validating doses are within the legal dose limits. Inspectors also reviewed the licensees effort to continue to implement the NEI/Industry Groundwater Protection Initiative.
The inspectors performed walkdowns of sampling stations, thermoluminescent locations and meteorological instrumentation. Inspectors also performed observations of preparation and collections of different environmental sample types. Inspectors reviewed sampling results and maintenance, calibration, quality control and ground water records. Records reviewed, and samples observed included but were not limited to the following:
Walkdowns, Calibrations, and Maintenance Record Review
- Site No. 200, Site Boundary, Air Sampler No. 09099, Last Calibration Date: June 14, 2019
- Site No. 201, Site Boundary, Air Sampler No. 09094, Last Calibration Date: June 27, 2019
- Site No. 208, Discharge Canal, Air Sampler No. 09097, Last Calibration Date: May 16, 2019
- Site No. 212, Tega Cay, Air Sampler No. 09048, Last Calibration Date:
April 29, 2019
- Site No. 208H, Discharge Canal (House), Water Sampler No. 00305, Last Calibration Date: July 23, 2019
- Site No. 211, Lake Wylie Dam, Water Sampler No. 00274, Last Calibration Date: June 22, 2019
- Site No. 214, Rock Hill, Water Sampler No. 02945, Last Calibration Date: September 11, 2018
- Site No. 218, Belmont, Water Sampler No. 09260, Last Calibration Date: October 09, 2018
- Site No. 214, Liberty Hill Sheriffs Boathouse, Water Sampler No. 09385, Last Calibration Date: October 09, 2018
Environmental Sample Collections and Preparation Observation
- Site No. 200, Site Boundary, Air Sampler No. 09099
- Site No. 201, Site Boundary, Air Sampler No. 09094
- Site No. 208, Discharge Canal, Air Sampler No. 09097
- Site No. 212, Tega Cay, Air Sampler No. 09048
Licensee Actions in Response to Missed Sample, Inoperable Sampler, Lost TLD or Anomalous Measurement
Sampling Program for the Potential of Licensed Material Entering Groundwater
- Monitor Tank Building Sump
- Radwaste Facility Building Sump
- Units 1 and 2 Spent Fuel Pools
- Waste Evaporator Feed Tank Sumps
Groundwater Protection Initiative (GPI) Implementation (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees continuing implementation of the voluntary Nuclear Energy Institute Ground Water Protection Initiative.
71124.08 - Radioactive Solid Waste Processing and Radioactive Material Handling, Storage,
and Transportation
Radioactive Material Storage (IP Section 02.01)
The inspectors evaluated radioactive material storage areas for compliance with requirements for posting, labeling, and physical controls during plant walk downs. Inspectors also evaluated the material condition of several containers of radioactive materials (at least five) for signs of degradation.
- Dry Active Waste (DAW) Storage Building areas
- Auxiliary Building areas
Radioactive Waste System Walkdown (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated liquid and solid radioactive waste processing systems during plant walkdowns for alignment with licensing descriptions, material condition, administrative and physical controls. Inspectors also evaluated changes to the systems, waste stream mixing methodologies and process control program descriptions.
- Waste solidification building systems
- Monitor tank building systems
Waste Characterization and Classification (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the radioactive waste characterization and classification for the following waste streams:
- 2018 DAW
- 2019 Resin Batching Tank
Shipment Preparation (IP Section 02.04) (1 Sample)
The inspectors observed preparation activities for the following radioactive waste shipment.
Shipping Records (IP Section 02.05) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following non-excepted package shipment records:
- 19-16, LSA, Resin
- 19-14, Type B, Resin
- 18-02, Type B, Resin
- 17-25, Type B, Filters
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
IE03: Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.02) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 submittals listed for the period from July 1, 2018 through June 30, 2019
- (2) Unit 2 submittals listed for the period from July 1, 2018 through June 30, 2019
MS09: Residual Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.08)===
- (1) Unit 1 submittals listed for the period from July 1, 2018 through June 30, 2019
- (2) Unit 2 submittals listed for the period from July 1, 2018 through June 30, 2019
OR01: Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness Sample (IP Section 02.15) (1 Sample)
- (1) Submittals listed for the period from April 1, 2018 to June 30, 2019
PR01: Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Radiological Effluent Occurrences (RETS/ODCM) Radiological Effluent Occurrences Sample.
(IP Section 02.16) (1 Sample)
- (1) Submittals listed for the period from April 1, 2018 to June 30, 2019
71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution
Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) Closed: NOV 05000413/414/2019002-01 "Failure to Report the Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability of the Technical Support Center within Eight Hours"
- (2) Closed: NOV 05000413/2019002-04 "Failure to Provide Complete and Accurate Information in LER"
71153 - Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):
- (1) LER 2019-002-00 for Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications due to Auxiliary Feedwater Sump Pump Conditions (ADAMS accession: ML19161A254). The circumstances surrounding this LER are documented as NOV 05000413/2019002-04 in Inspection Report 05000413/2019002, 05000414/2019002, 07200045/2019002 Section 71153 (ADAMS accession: ML19226A096).
- (2) LER 2019-002-01 for Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications due to Auxiliary Feedwater Sump Pump Conditions.
(ADAMS accession: ML19254F558). The circumstances surrounding this LER are documented as NCV 05000413/2019003-01 in the table below.
- (3) LER 2019-003-00 for Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 2, Component Cooling Water System Alignment led to Both Trains of Component Cooling Water Inoperable (ADAMS accession: ML19247D814). The circumstances surrounding this LER are documented as NCV 05000414/2019003-03 in the table below.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Declare Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Inoperable When Technical Specification Support System was Out Of Service Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems
Green NCV 05000413/2019003-01 Open/Closed
[H.14] -
Conservative Bias 71111.06
Introduction:
The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated NCV of TS 3.7.5, Auxiliary Feedwater System, for the failure to declare the Unit 1 motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps (MDAFW) pumps inoperable and comply with the associated action statements when a necessary support system was not available to perform its safety function.
Description:
On April 11, 2019, with Unit 1 at 100 percent power, the sump pump for the 1B MDAFW pump failed to start in manual. The licensee initiated Work Request (WR) 20139666 to investigate and repair the sump pump. On April 24, 2019, inspectors noted that the 1B MDAFW sump pump remained out of service and the associated 1B MDAFW pump was not declared inoperable. Based on a review of the UFSAR and LER 2008-001, the inspectors questioned whether the unavailability of the sump pump could affect the operability of the MDAFW pumps. Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Section 11.2.2.2.5.7 states, each auxiliary feedwater pump (AFW) is mounted in a separate pit to meet NPSH requirements, so each pit has a sump and safety related sump pump of corresponding channel to prevent flooding of the AFW pumps, assuming a 50 gpm leak. Additionally, Licensee Event Report (LER) 2008-001 documented that the AFW systems for both units were declared inoperable after it was discovered that flow restrictor cover plates for the interior doghouse drains were not installed and a feedwater line break in that area, coincident with a loss of off-site power, could flood the AFW pump area. The 2008 LER said that flow restrictors were installed in the drains to ensure the safety related AFW sump pumps could protect the AFW system after a feedwater pipe break in the doghouses. The inspectors discussed this information with the licensee, and the licensee stated that the MDAFW sump pumps were not required for operability per the design basis document (DBD). On April 30, 2019, the licensee entered this issue in the corrective action program to address the discrepancy between the UFSAR and DBD descriptions of the MDAFW sump pumps. The 1B MDAFW sump pump was repaired and returned to service on May 1, 2019.
On May 30, 2019, the licensee completed an evaluation of the issue and confirmed that the MDAFW sump pumps are required to be functional to support operability of their associated MDAFW pumps. The inspectors concluded that there was sufficient information in the UFSAR and LER 2008-001 to recognize the safety function of the MDAFW sump pumps and their impact on the operability of the MDAFW pumps. License Event Report 2019-002-00 was submitted on June 10, 2019, and documented that there were several instances when Unit 1 MDAFW pumps should have been declared inoperable for the corresponding times that the associated sump pumps were nonfunctional.
Corrective Actions: The 1B MDAFW sump pumps were repaired and returned to service on May 1, 2019.
Corrective Action References: CR 2270638, CR 2271394 and CR 2275149
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the failure to declare the MDAFW pumps inoperable when a necessary support system was not available to perform its related support function was a performance deficiency and violation of TS 3.7.5.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the Unit 1 MDAFW pumps were inoperable at different times when their associated MDAFW sump pumps were not capable of performing their safety related function to prevent flooding of the MDAFW pumps. The 1B MDAFW pump was inoperable for a period longer than the allowed 72-hour completion time from April 11-May 1, 2019. There were two instances when two trains of AFW were inoperable longer than the allowed 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> completion time of TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.5 Condition C. On April 11, 2019, both 1A and 1B MDAFW sumps pumps were out of service (OOS) simultaneously. The 1A MDAFW sump was returned to service April 12, 2019. On April 17th, the 1B MDAFW sump pump was OOS at the same time as the 1A MDAFW was OOS. The 1A MDAFW pump was returned to service on April 18th, 2019. The 1A and 1B MDAFW sumps were also OOS at the same time on January 19, 2019 for a few hours.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors determined that the issue required a detailed risk evaluation because the finding represents an actual loss of function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time. A detailed risk evaluation was performed by a regional senior reactor analyst in accordance with IMC 0609 Appendix A using the SAPHIRE Version 8.2.0 and Catawba SPAR model Version 8.57. The major analysis assumptions included: auxiliary feedwater flooding would be associated with a loss of main feedwater, that the non-safety-related floor drain sump pumps would not be available, and no credit for recovery of the auxiliary feedwater sump pumps. The dominant sequence involved a loss of main feedwater event that involved flooding of the auxiliary feedwater pump area(s) with a loss of the motor-driven auxiliary feedwater system due to the performance deficiency and a failure to establish feed bleed conditions for heat removal. The risk was mitigated by the relatively short exposure periods of the condition. The analysis determined that the performance deficiency resulted in an increase in core damage frequency of <1 E-6/year, a GREEN finding of very low safety significance.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.14 - Conservative Bias: Individuals use decision making-practices that emphasize prudent choices over those that are simply allowable. A proposed action is determined to be safe in order to proceed, rather than unsafe in order to stop. The inspectors determined this performance deficiency had a cross-cutting aspect in the conservative bias component of the human performance area, because the licensee did not use conservative assumptions to identify the required support function of the MDAFW sump pumps and their impact on the operability of the MDAFW pumps.
Enforcement:
Violation: Technical Specification 3.7.5, Auxiliary Feedwater System, requires in part three AFW trains to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3. With one of the required AFW trains (pump or flow path) inoperable in MODES 1, 2, or 3 for reasons other than Condition A, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Condition C states that when two AFW trains are inoperable in MODES 1, 2, or 3, the unit must be in MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. Contrary to the above, on January 19, April 11, and April 19, 2019, the 1A and 1B MDAFW pumps were rendered inoperable at different times because its associated sump pumps were nonfunctional and operators did not comply with the applicable technical specification action statements.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Comply with Selected Licensee Commitment (SLC) 16.6-5 Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems
Green NCV 05000413,05000414/2019003-02 Open/Closed
[H.8] -
Procedure Adherence 71111.15
Introduction:
The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated NCV of TS 5.4.1, Procedures, for Units 1 and 2 when the licensee failed to comply with Selected Licensee Commitment (SLC) 16.6-5, Residual Heat Removal/ Containment Spray Sump Pump (ND/NS) Interlock. Specifically, on February 4, 2019, the licensee failed to enter Condition A when the ND/NS sump pump interlock was not functional and take the required action to implement alternate means of fulfilling the interlock function.
Description:
On February 4, 2019, with both Units at 100 percent power, the licensee removed power from the four ND/NS sump pump motor breakers to prevent operation during cleaning of the ND/NS sump area. With power removed from the sump pump motors, the corresponding level switches and alarms were nonfunctional. Selected Licensee Commitment 16.6-5 requires that the ND/NS sump pump interlock be functional in MODES 1-
4. If the commitment is not met, then the required action is to immediately implement an
alternate means of satisfying the interlock function. The function of the ND/NS interlock is to alert the control room operator of a potential emergency core cooling system (ECCS) leak in the ND/NS pump area. During a review of the maintenance history of the ND/NS sump pumps, inspectors identified that operators failed to comply with SLC 16.6-5 during cleaning of the sumps on February 4, 2019. As a result, operators were unable to monitor for ECCS leakage in ND/NS area from the level switches in the control room. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program and completed a cause evaluation for the issue. The licensee concluded that the SLC should have been entered and compensatory actions were required to monitor the ND/NS ump area for leakage during the maintenance activity.
Corrective Actions: The licensee took corrective actions to restore the power to the ND/NS sump pumps following the sump cleaning and implemented standing instructions to aid in functionality determinations.
Corrective Action References: CR 2275467, CR 2283390
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the failure to comply with SLC 16.6-5, Residual Heat Removal/Containment Spray Sump Pump Interlock was a performance deficiency and a violation of TS 5.4.1.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Configuration Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Because of the licensees failure to comply with SLC 16.6-5, operators were unable to monitor the ND/NS pump area for ECCS leakage from the control room.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent an actual loss of function of one or more non-tech spec trains of equipment designated as high safety-significant in accordance with the licensees maintenance rule program for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.8 - Procedure Adherence: Individuals follow processes, procedures, and work instructions. The inspectors identified a cross-cutting aspect of procedures in the area of human performance because the operators failed to comply with the SLC when the ND/NS sump pumps were removed from service.
Enforcement:
Violation: Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, requires that the licensee implement the commitments contained in UFSAR Chapter 16. The Selected Licensee Commitment (SLC) Manual is designated as Chapter 16 of the UFSAR. Selected Licensee Commitment 16.6-5 requires that the ND/NS sump pump interlock be functional in Modes 1-4 and if the commitment is not met, then the required action is to immediately implement an alternate means of satisfying the interlock function. Contrary to the above, on February 4, 2019, the licensee failed to comply with SLC 16.6-5 during maintenance of the ND/NS sump. As a result, operators were unable to monitor the ND/NS pump area for ECCS leakage from the control room while the ND/NS interlock was nonfunctional.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to take Technical Specification Actions with Two Trains of Component Cooling Inoperable and Failure to Submit an Associated 8-hour NRC Report Cornerstone Significance/Severity Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems
Green Severity Level IV NCV 05000414/2019003-03 Open/Closed
[H.14] -
Conservative Bias 71111.15
Introduction:
The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Severity Level IV NCV of TS 3.7.7 Component Cooling Water System (KC), for a failure to take TS actions for two inoperable trains of KC and of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A, B, and D) for the failure to notify the NRC within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> of an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function.
Description:
On July 5, 2019, the licensee made an unplanned entry into TS 3.7.7 Component Cooling Water System (KC), Condition A, when the 2A1 KC pump discharge check valve 2KC-5 failed to close when the 2A1 KC pump was secured. Operations declared the 2A train of KC inoperable. On July 6, 2019, during corrective maintenance on 2KC-5, operations used a procedure that defeated the interlocks that cause the non-essential reactor building supply and return header valves for both trains of KC to close on an engineered safeguards actuation signal (ESFAS). While Unit 2 was in this alignment (approximately 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> and eleven minutes), the inspectors questioned whether the licensee could satisfy TS Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.7.7.2, which requires each automatic valve in the flow path servicing safety-related equipment to be tested to ensure the equipment actuates to its correct position on an actual or simulated signal. Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Section 9.2.2.3.5 states that electric motor operated valves are provided on all headers to non-essential equipment to isolate and separate the two component cooling trains and the valves automatically close on an engineered safeguards actuation signal. Additionally, SR 3.0.1 states that failure to meet a surveillance, whether such failure is experienced during performance of the surveillance or between performances, shall be failure to meet the LCO. The inspectors concluded that the licensee should have declared the B train of KC inoperable and complied with the TS 3.7.7 Required Action A when TS SR 3.7.7.2 could not be performed with the interlocks defeated on July 6, 2019.
Corrective Actions: The licensee returned the 2A train to operable on July 6, 2019. The licensee subsequently submitted License Event Report 2019-003 on September 4, 2019. On September 19, 2019, the licensee made a non-emergency event report for an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function.
Corrective Action References: CR 2280660
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensees failure to take TS actions for both trains of the component cooling water system being inoperable as required by TS 3.7.7 and subsequently notify the NRC within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A, B, and D) was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensees failure to recognize that both trains of component cooling water were inoperable and perform actions required by TS 3.7.7 extended the amount of time that they operated in Mode 1 with an inoperable safety related system.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors determined that the issue required a detailed risk evaluation because the finding represents an actual loss of function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time. A detailed risk evaluation was performed by a regional senior reactor analyst using SAPHIRE Version 8.2.0 and NRC SPAR model Version 8.57. The analysis assumed a complete loss of CCW heat exchanger functionality given an engineered safeguards actuation signal coincident with low refueling water storage tank level. The dominant sequence involved random unavailability of a CCW train with a failure to manually close the crosstie valves following a stuck-open pressurizer relief valve initiating event. The risk was mitigated by the short 14-hour exposure period of the condition. The analysis determined that the performance deficiency resulted in an increase in core damage frequency of <1E-6/year, a GREEN finding of very low safety significance.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.14 - Conservative Bias: Individuals use decision making-practices that emphasize prudent choices over those that are simply allowable. A proposed action is determined to be safe in order to proceed, rather than unsafe in order to stop. The inspectors determined this performance deficiency had a cross-cutting aspect in the conservative bias component of the human performance area, because the licensee did not use conservative assumptions to determine operability of the B train of component cooling water when inspectors questioned whether the licensee could perform the TS surveillance with the ESFAS signals defeated.
Enforcement:
The ROPs significance determination process does not specifically consider the regulatory process impact in its assessment of licensee performance. Therefore, it is necessary to address this violation which impedes the NRCs ability to regulate using traditional enforcement to adequately deter non-compliance.
Severity: Based on the examples provided in Section 6.9 of the Enforcement Policy, dated May 28, 2019 Inaccurate and Incomplete Information of Failure to Make a Required Report, the performance deficiency was determined to be a SL IV violation. Specifically, Example d.9 states that a SL IV violation involves a failure to make a report the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72.
Violation: Technical Specification 3.7.7 governs the component cooling water system (KC). Limiting Condition for Operation 3.7.7 requires two KC trains to be operable in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4. Limiting Condition for Operation 3.7.7 Required Action A states with one train inoperable, restore KC train to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Limiting Condition for Operation 3.7.7 Required Action B states if the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A is not met, the plant must be in Mode 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and Mode 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. Title 10 CFR 50.72 states that the licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all cases within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> of the occurrence of any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function
Contrary to the above, on July 6, 2019 from 0156 until 1545 (14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> and eleven minutes),both trains of KC were inoperable, and the licensee failed to complete the required TS actions. Contrary to the above, from July 6, 2019 until September 19, 2019, the licensee failed to notify the NRC within eight hours of an event that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function when both trains of KC were inoperable.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Unresolved Item (Closed)
Unresolved Item (URI) MSPI Data associated with failure of the 1A emergency diesel generator (EDG) not reported URI 05000413/2019002-03 71151
Description:
This item was opened to review the mitigating system performance indicator (MSPI) data for Unit 1 Emergency AC system reported in the 2nd quarter for the failure of the 1A EDG on March 21, 2019. The MSPI unavailability was associated with an EDG heat exchanger cooling water valve 1RN-P09 found broken and in the closed position during a surveillance test. Catawba engineering reported approximately 17 hours1.967593e-4 days <br />0.00472 hours <br />2.810847e-5 weeks <br />6.4685e-6 months <br /> of unavailability instead of the 268 hours0.0031 days <br />0.0744 hours <br />4.431217e-4 weeks <br />1.01974e-4 months <br /> that the EDG was inoperable. The inspectors had internal discussions with members of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation staff to evaluate the licensees justification for not reporting the total number of unavailability hours associated with the EDG failure.
Closure Basis: The inspectors determined that the hours reported in the 2nd quarter for the failure of the 1A EDG were appropriate and did not identify a performance deficiency. This URI is closed.
Corrective Action Reference(s): CR 2275533
Observation: Closure of NOV 05000413/414/2019002-01 "Failure to Report the Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability of the Technical Support Center within Eight Hours" 71152 The inspectors reviewed the licensees response to NOV 05000413/414/2019002-01 Failure to Report the Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability of the Technical Support Center within Eight Hours, and determined that the reason, corrective actions taken and planned to address recurrence, and the date when full compliance was achieved for this violation is adequately addressed and captured on the docket (ML19255K404). This item is closed.
Observation: Closure of NOV 05000413/2019002-04 Failure to Provide Complete and Accurate Information in Licensee Event Report (LER)71152 The inspectors reviewed the licensees response to NOV 05000413/2019002-04 Failure to Provide Complete and Accurate Information in Licensee Event Report (LER), and determined that the reason, corrective actions taken and planned to address recurrence, and the date when full compliance was achieved for this violation is adequately addressed and captured on the docket (ML19255K405). This item is closed.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On October 23, 2019, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Tom Simril and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
CR 01453587
Interior doghouse floor drains do not match WL flow diagram
CR 02270638
Discrepancies on CA sump pump support function
CR 02271394
On 4/11/19, 1B CA sump pump did not start in manual PRR
275661, PT/1/A/4700/020, Rev. 18
CR 02275149
Evaluation of WL sump pumps support of CA operability
Engineering
Changes
CD501674, add restriction/cover plates at drains in interior
doghouse
Miscellaneous
CNC-1206.03-00-
0001
Flood levels for structures outside the reactor building
CNC-1223.15-00-
22, Rev. 0
Orifice sizing for doghouse drains Catawba UFSAR,
(Chapter 11)
CNC-1223.15-00-
0049
Analysis of the liquid radwaste C & D floor drain and
auxiliary feedwater sump pump system
CNC01223.42-00-
0089
Evaluation of doghouse flood on motor driven CA operability
CNS-1565.WL-00-
0001
Design basis documentation for the liquid waste system
CNS-1581.WZ-00-
0001
Groundwater drainage system (WZ) design basis
specification
CNS-1592.CA-00-
0091
Auxiliary feedwater system (CA) design basis specification
Procedures
PT/1/A/4700/020
WL/WN sump pumps and check valves inservice test, Rev.
018
PT/1/A/4700/020
WL/WN sump pumps and check valves inservice test, Rev.
015
Work Orders
WP 20322343
WL PU BMS: investigate CA sump pump not starting
1B CA sump pump would not start when taken to manual
71111.07T Calculations
CNC-1150.01-00-
0001
SNSWP Thermal Analysis During One Unit LOCA and One
Unit Shutdown
5/12/16
CNC-1206.02-84-
2032, Rev. 9
Rigorous Stress Analysis for Problem 10RN, Evaluation of
Sleeve Clearance Issue Documented in NCR 2278842
7/1/2019
CNC-1223.24-00-
Nuclear Service Water System Test Criteria
10/14/2015
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
0011
CNC-1223.24-00-
0041
Design Basis Heat Load and Flow Demands on the Stand-
by Nuclear Service Water Pond (SNSWP)
11/14/2012
CNC=1223.24-00-
0018
Acceptable RN Flow and Fouling Factor in the KC Heat
Exchangers
Rev. 4
Corrective Action
Documents
Pipe Sleeve Clearances Downstream of 2RN11A Not
Adequate
6/24/2019
VZ Damper B4A Failed in Open Position
8/14/19
PT/0/A4400/022 A, Steps 11.1 and 11.2, Acceptance
Criteria Clarification
8/15/2019
PT/0/A4400/022 B, Steps 11.1 and 11.2, Acceptance
Criteria Clarification
8/15/2019
EAR 02280363
Engineering Assignment Request, for AR 02280363, Create
EC to add support to piping downstream of 2RN11A
7/3/19
PDO 2278842
CR 2278842, Prompt Determination of Operability
7/2/2019
Drawings
CN-1345-01
Nuclear Service Water & Standby Nuclear Service Water
Intake and Discharge Pipe Layout
Rev 34
CN-1345-02
Nuclear Service Water & Standby Nuclear Service Water
Intake and Discharge Pipe Layout, Details and Sections
Rev. 38
CN-1573-01.00
Flow Diagram of Component Cooling System (KC)
Rev. 30
CN-1573-2.1
Flow Diagram of Component Cooling System (KC)
Rev. 9
CN-1573-2.2
Flow Diagram of Component Cooling System (KC)
Rev. 7
CN-1573-2.3
Flow Diagram of Component Cooling System (KC)
Rev. 4
CN-1574-01.00
Flow Diagram of Nuclear Service Water System (RN)
Rev. 56
CN-1574-01.01
Flow Diagram of Nuclear Service Water System (RN)
Rev. 63
CN-1574-01.02
Flow Diagram of Nuclear Service Water System (RN)
Rev. 56
CN-2574-02.01
Flow Diagram of Nuclear Service Water System (RN)
Rev. 48
Miscellaneous
Section 9.2
Catawba Nuclear Station, Updated Final Safety Analysis
Report
4/14/2018
Catawba Units 1 &
Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond (SNSWP)
Amendment
Nos.263/259
CNS-1150.04-00-
0001
Design Basis Specification for the Nuclear Service Water
Pump Structure
Rev. 8
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
CNS-1574.RN-00-
0001
Nuclear Service Water System (RN) Design Basis
Specification
Rev. 65
Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 - Transmittal of
Dam Inspection Report
9/4/2019
NSM CN-50391
Design Engineering Department Scope Document, Catawba
Nuclear Station, Unit 1 & 2 Shared. Relocate RN Lines
Supplying Cooling Flow to the RN Pump Motor Lower
Bearing Coolers
10/7/1988
Q1-2019, CNS
Unit 2
Nuclear Service Water System Health Report
First Quarter
2019
Q4-2018, CNS
Unit 1 & 2
Component Cooling System Health Report
Fourth
Quarter 2018
Criteria and Design Features for Inspection of Water Control
Structures Associated with Nuclear Power Plants
Rev. 2
CNS-1573.KC-00-
0001
Component Cooling System (KC) Design Basis
Specification
Rev. 45
Procedures
AP/0/A/5500/020
Loss of Nuclear Service Water
Rev. 46
MP/0/A/7650/088
A
Controlling Procedure For Systems Pressure Testing of ISI
Applications For ASME Section XI Duke Class A, B And C
Systems And Components
Rev, 7
PT/0/A/4200/013
Service Water (RN) Shared Valves In-service Test (QU),
Reference Work Order 203322467-01, Stroke Time Testing
7/12/2019
PT/0/A/4400/008
A
RN Flow Balance Train A
7/18/19
PT/0/A/4400/008
B
RN Flow Balance Train B
5/28/19
PT/0/A/4400/022
A
Nuclear Service Water Pump Train A Performance Test
5/15/2019
PT/0/A/4400/022
B
Nuclear Service Water Pump Train B Performance Test
7/1/2019
PT/1/A/4400/006
KC Heat Exchanger 1A Heat Capacity
11/17/18
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
C
PT/1/A/4400/006
D
KC Heat Exchanger 1B Heat Capacity Test
4/29/2017
PT/2/A/4400/003
Component Cooling (KC) System Essential Header Flow
Balance,
2/12/2019
PT/2/A/4400/006
C
KC Heat Exchanger 2A Heat Capacity Test
9/11/2016
PT/2/A/4400/006
D
KC Heat Exchanger 2B Heat Capacity Test
3/17/18
Work Orders
2109615-01
1NV-MR-ACC-Perform PM on Motor Air Cooler
5/18/2014
20092419-45
A Train Pump-house Structure Inspection in accordance
with Work Order 20193638-07 Instructions
11/25/2018
20168750-01
1RN PP SYS: Zone 1RN-0012L-C, ISI Pressure Test
Inspections
1/9/2018
20189529 06
Component Cooling Heat Exchanger, IKC HX A:
TEST/CLEAN TUBES
2/08/2018
20189529 06
1KC HX A, Test Clean Tubes
2/8/2018
276396
EC 406529, 1A/2A RN, Diesel Generator Pond Return Pipe
Inspection
3/18/2019
276397
EC 406529, 1B/2B RN Diesel Generator Pond Return Pipe
Inspection
5/23/2019
60168747-01
1RN PP SYS: Zone 1RN-0011L-C, ISI Pressure Test
Inspections
1/9/2018
71111.08P Calibration
Records
Calibration Certification for MiZ-80 (iD) Eddy Current
Tester, Serial Number 654402
01/28/2019
Corrective Action
Documents
269511,
288325,
288327,
2063763,
293665,
293548,
294385
Drawings
10020859
EXP/Spiral Groove Combo Standard
01/20/2006
Miscellaneous
Certificate of Conformance for 610XP Test Probe, Serial
06/29/19
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Number 773924
Catawba Unit 2 Secondary Side Integrity Plan
Revision 4
Visual Examination Visual Test Chart Certification
09/04/2013
Catawba Unit 2 R22 Steam Generator Skip Inspection
Assessment
Revision 0
Catawba 2EOC23 Steam Generator Degredation
Assessment
Revision 0
0197-AST-100879
Final Condition Monitoring and Operational Assessment for
Catawba 2EOC21 Outage
Revision 0
274-PLAN-
103186
Catawba C2R23 - RSG ECT Inspection Plan
Revision 0
13B01WLU
Krautkramer Transducer Certification
09/22/2019
13B01WM3
Krautkramer Transducer Certification
09/22/2019
6018
CNS Unit 2 Reactor Vessel Head Deposit Samples
09/26/2019
C. Wyffels
Wesdyne Certificate of Qualification: UT-III (PDI)
01/15/2019
C. Wyffels
Vision Acuity Examination Record
2/31/2018
M. Hill
NDE Examiner Certification: VT-2, II-N
08/22/2019
M. Hill
SSI Vision Acuity Record
2/03/2018
R. Healey
NDE Examiner Certification: VT-2, III-N
08/22/2019
R. Healey
SSI Vision Acuity Record
04/10/2019
S. Sabo
SSI Certificate of Qualification: UT-III (PDI)
08/22/2019
S. Sabo
SSI Vision Acuity Record
08/01/2019
NDE Reports
21ASE
Outlet Nozzle DM Weld 22
09/26/2019
21DSE
Outlet Nozzle DM Weld 202
09/26/2019
VT-19-126
Visual Examination for Boric Acid Detection
09/27/2019
Procedures
NDE-NE-ALL-
202
Visual Examination of PWR Reactor Pressure Vessel Upper
Head Penetrations
Revision 3
NDE-NE-CNS-
21
Eddy Current Guidelines for Duke Energy's D5 Steam
Generators
Revision 2
NDE-NE-CNS-
22
Site Technique Validation for Catawba Nuclear Station Unit
Revision 3
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
NS-WKI-000006
Mechanical Tube Plug & Stabilizer Installation for RSGs
Revision 10
PDI-ISI-254-SE-
NB
Remote In Service Examination of Reactor Vessel Nozzle to
Safe End, Nozzle to Pipe, and Safe End to Pipe Welds
Using the Nozzle Scanner
Revision 3
Work Orders
20034175-10
Calculations
CNC-1503.13-00-
0382
USQ evaluation of procedure change for KC cross train
alignment to maintain ECCS/CA pumps available
Corrective Action
Documents
280660
Evaluation KC HX cleaning interlocks defeats for operable
train
AR 2A1 KC pump
discharge check
valve failed to
close
Miscellaneous
Critical Evolution
Plan
KC HX tube cleaning
Engineering Spec
CNS-1573.KC-00-
0001
UFSAR Chapter
9.2.2
Procedures
OP/2/A/6400/005,
enclosure 4.9.1
Protected equipment posting for KC HX 2A inoperability
PT/1/A/4200/021
A
KC valve inservice test
PT/2/A/4200/009
Engineered safety features actuation periodic test
PT/2/A/4400/003G KC System crossover valves SP/SS with low FWST signal
defeat for KC HX 2A & 2B cleaning
Corrective Action
Documents
292682,
212419
Procedures
AD-RP-ALL-0002
Radiation and Contamination Survey
Revision 2
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
NRC comments on ambiguity of SLC requirements for
returning a certain effluent monitor back to service in a
timely manner
09/23/2019
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Miscellaneous
Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2, Offsite Dose
Calculation Manual (ODCM)
Rev. 62
LCOTR #
T11801456
1EMF45B nonfunctional
08/21/2018
Procedures
HP/0/B/1000/010
Determination of Radiation Monitor Setpoints
Rev. 68
HP/0/B/1004/004
Radioactive Liquid Waste Release
Rev. 46
HP/0/B/1004/005
Radioactive Gaseous Waste Release - VQ & VP System
Rev. 60
Corrective Action
Documents
282886
Meteorological Tower Upper Wind Speed Failed
07/21/2019
284712
Meteorological Instrumentation Procedure Revision
07/31/2019
Procedures
AD-CP-ALL-0015
Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program Data
Evaluation,
Rev. 3
AD-CP-ALL-0017
Radiological Groundwater Protection
Rev. 3
IP/0/B/3343/001
Meterological Monitoring System Check
Rev. Nos.
064 and 065
Procedure 721
EnRad Laboratories, Airborne Radioiodine and Airborne
Particulate Sampling at Catawba Nuclear Station
Rev. 14
Procedures
AD-RP-ALL-5000
Preparation and Shipment of Radioactive Material and
Radioactive Waste
Rev. 3
AD-RP-ALL-5002
CFR 61 Radioactive Waste Classification
Rev. 1
71151
Calculations
CNC-1206.03-00-
0001
Corrective Action
Documents
CR 2275467 and
CR 2283390
Miscellaneous
Liquid and Gaseous Release and Dose Summary Reports
06/01/2019
UFSAR Section
6.3.2, Section
9.3.3 and Section
11.2.2
Procedures
AD-RP-ALL-1101
Performance Indicators (PI) for the Occupational and Public
Radiation Safety Cornerstones
Rev. 0
Work Orders