IR 05000414/1985067

Insp Rept 50-414/85-67 on 851210-23.No Violation or Deviation Identified.Major Areas Inspected:Preoperational Test Procedure Review,Witnessing & Results Review & NRC Info Notice Followup

ML20151R817
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	01/22/1986
From:	Jape F, Sasser M, Matt Thomas NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20151R810	List: IR 05000414/1985067 ML20151R806
References
50-414-85-67, IEIN-85-084, IEIN-85-84, NUDOCS 8602060253
Download: ML20151R817 (6)

Text

UNITED STATES

• [ p tECoq'o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMisslON

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REGION 11 h

', ',s 101 MARlETTA STREET, .. - ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323

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Report No.: 50-414/85-67 Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Docket No.: 50-414 License No.: CPPR-117 Facility Name: Catawba Unit 2 Inspection Conducted: December 10-23, 1985 Inspectors: Mckwk //22/%

Date Signed M. Thomas d

$C$stesd- llA2 l84 hM.K.Sasser# 'Date' Signed Approved by: / [ we,V .

F.' Jape,"Section Chief /

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[ Tate Signed Test Programs Section, Edgineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY Scope: This routine, announced inspection involved 140 inspector-hours on site in the areas of preoperational test procedure review, preoperational test wit-nessing, preoperational test results review, and NRC Information Notice followu Results: No violations or deviations were identified.

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I 8602060253 860130 4 PDR ADOCK 0500 i

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REPORT DETAILS Persons. Contacted Licensee Employees

1. J. W. Hampton, Station Manager

• H. B. Barron, Operations Superintendent

1. • W. F. Beaver, Performance Engineer

1. B. Caldwell, Administrative Services Superintendent

1. R. N. Casler, Assistant Operations Engineer

• J. W. Cox, Technical Services Superintendent

1. C. L. Hartzell, Compliance Engineer

• R. A. Jones, Performance Test Engineer J. A. Kammer, ESF Test Coordinator P. G. LeRoy, Licensing Engineer

• C. Muse, Unit 2 Operations Engineer

1. • F. P. Schiffley, II, Licensing Engineer

1. • D. Tower, Shift Operations Engineer Other licensee employees contacted included test coordinators, engineers, technicians, operators, security force members, and office personne NRC Resident Inspectors

1. P. H. Skinner, Senior Resident Inspector - Operations

• P. K. VanDoorn, Senior Resident Inspector - Construction

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• Attended exit interview December 19, 1985 i

1. Attended exit interview December 23, 1985 Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on December 19 and 23,

! 1985, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspectors l- described the areas inspected and discussed the inspection finding No i dissenting comments were received from the licensee. Two new items identi-l fied during this inspection are listed below.

i L - Unresolved Item 414/85-67-01, Verify proper position of solid state l p'otection r system (SSPS) circuits - paragraph Inspector Followup Item 414/85-67-02, Response times specified in the ESF test procedure for certain nuclear service water system valves differ from Technical Specifications response time - paragraph 6.

l The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided l to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.

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3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters l This subject was not addressed in the inspection.

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4. Unresolved Items i

Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to

determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or devia-i tions. One new unresolved item identified during this inspection is dis-

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cussed in paragraph 7.

1 5. IEN 85-84, Inadequate Inservice Testing of MSIV j The inspectors discussed IE Information Notice No. 85-84, Inadequate In-service Testing of Main Steam Isolation Valves, with licensee personne The licensee stated that they have reviewed the subject information notice and determined that the. problems concerning the possible failure of the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) to close under low steam flow conditions in the event of loss of the instrument air system and the testing of these

valves with nonsafety-related instrument air do not apply to Catawba. The

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Catawba MSIVs are held open against springs by instrument air applied to the

bottom of the actuator piston. Loss of instrument air allows the springs to 1 force the MSIVs closed. In addition to the valve design being different

, from that described in the Information Notice, the MSIVs have been tested satisfactorily several times during preoperational testing. The tests have

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Verifying that each valve closed within the required time under steam flow conditions at normal operating temperature and pressure during hot

! functional testin 'V erifying that each valve failed closed on loss of instrument air

! testin Verifying that each valve closed within the required time during engineered safety features (ESF) testing.

! Within the areas examined, no violations or deviations were identifie . Preoperational Test Procedure Review (70300, 70304, 70305, 70306)

l The inspectors reviewed the preoperational (preop) test procedures listed i below to verify that they were consistent with applicable portions of FSAR Chapters 6, 7, 8, 10, and 14; Technical Specifications; Safety Evaluation -

Report and its supplements; Regulatory Guides 1.41, 1.68, and 1.108. The following procedures were reviewed:

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TP/2/A/1100/02A, Diesel Generator 2A Preoperational Functional Test

- TP/2/A/1100/02B, Diesel Generator 2B Preoperational Functional Test I

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- TP/2/A/1200/03A, Engineered' Safeguards Features Functional Test

- TP/2/A/1350/09A, Diesel Generator 2A Load Sequencer Preoperational Test

- TP/2/A/1350/098, Diesel Generator 2B Load Sequencer Preoper Kional Test

- TP/2/A/1350/25A, Diesel Generator 2A Blackout and Load Rejection Preoperational Test

- TP/2/A/1350/25B, Diesel Generator 2B Blackout and load Rejection Preoperational Test

- IP/2/A/3200/03, Reactor Protection / Engineered Safeguards Features Response Time Testing The procedures were reviewed for conformance to administrative control This included verifying that pertinent prerequisites were identified, initial test conditions and system status were specified, acceptance crite-ria specified, the required reviews were performed, and management approval was indicate In reviewing procedure TP/2/A/1200/03A, the inspectors noted that the response times for certain nuclear service water (RN) system valves were greater than the response times specified for the RN system in the Catawba Technical Specifications. In discussing this matter, licensee personnel stated that 'the times had been changed in the procedure for the valves in question when design re-evaluated the response time requirements after the Unit 1 ESF test. The licensee's resolution of the difference between the ESF test procedure and Technical Specifications will be tracked as inspector followup item 413/85-67-02, Response times specified in ESF test procedure for certain nuclear service water system valves differ from the Technical Specifications response time No violations or deviations were identified in the areas inspected.

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7. Preoperational Test Witnessing (70312, 70315, 70316)

The inspectors witnessed the conduct of portions of preop test TP/2/A/

1200/03A, Engineered Safeguards Features (ESF) Functional Test. This

' included attendance at coo dination meetings, discussions with the perfor-mance test engineer and ESF test ccordinator, general observations of

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testing and operations in the control room, and witnessing of the test sections discussed below. The test was witnessed to verify that:

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- Appropriate revisions of the procedure were available and in use by test personne Test prerequisites were me Personnel involved in the tests were briefed prior to beginning the test.

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Proper plant systems were in servic The tests were performed in accordance with requirement Adequate coordination among the personnel involved in the test Test data were collected and recorded in the proper manne Problems encountered during testing were properly identified and documented for evaluatio The following sections of the test were observed:

- Section 12.1 - This section verified correct operation and response times of valves and HVAC equipment following ESF actuation with normal power availabl l - Sections.12.6 and 12.7 - These sections demonstrated proper response of

the plant to a LOCA with normal power available. The LOCA signal was a simulated containment Hi Hi pressure. Train A and B load groups were

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verified to meet the load sequencing requirement Sections 12.8 and 12.9 - These sections demonstrated full stroke il capability of the ECCS check valves (pump check valves only) and were conducted in parallel with 12.6 and 1 !

During the initial testing of Section 12.1 on Friday, December 13,1985, when the manual Safety Injection (SI) pushbutton for train A, was pushed, the train A actuation of ESF components did not occur as required by the

test procedure. This prevented all train A components from going to their

ESF position. Subsequent troubleshooting by the licensee determined the

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problem to be an open sliding link, preventing a complete circuit to the

solid state protection system (SSPS) cabinet, which provides the SI actua-tion signal. During a limited review of the associated drawings and discus-sions with the test coordinator, it was~ determined that the sliding link is j in the circuit between the manual SI pushbutton and the SSPS cabinet.

!' Contacts for the computer, the events recorder, and annunciator are on the pushbutton, explaining the reaeon why all these indicated that train A SI actuation had occurred during de test when it actually had no Section 12.1 was repeated on December 17, 1985, and train A SI actuation occurred when the manual SI pushbutton was pressed.

The inspectors reviewed the surveillance procedure on the SSPS system,

IP/0/A/320002. It appears that this sliding link is not verified in its correct pcsition during this surveillanc Several questions were raised

which remain to be resolve Most importantly is how and when this circuit

) will be verified operable for future operations of the plant. Additionally, was this covered under an existing procedure which had been completed prior to the ESF test. Until the inspectors can ascertain these answers this item j will be identified as Unresolved Item, 50-414/85-6/-01, Verify proper

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position of SSPS circuit ,

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No violations'or deviations were identified in the areas inspecte . Preoperational Test Results Review (70400, 70325)

The inspectors reviewed the completed test data packages for preop tests TP/2/A/1600/03, Solid State Protection System Functional Test; and IP/0/A/3121/13, Pressurizer Safety Relief Valve Acoustic Monitoring Device Functional Test and Calibration. The test data packages were reviewed to verify that:

- Test changes were approved in accordance with administrative procedure The changes did not change the basic objectives of the test Actions required by the changes had been complete Test deficiencies had been resolved including retesting, where require Individual test steps and data sheets were completed properl Test data were within acceptance criteria specifie Evaluation and approval of test results had been completed by appropri-ate engineering and management personne No violations or deviations were identified in the areas inspecte .

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