IR 05000412/1985024
| ML20138H260 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 12/02/1985 |
| From: | Kamal Manoly, Wiggins J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20138H241 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-412-85-24, IEB-79-02, IEB-79-2, NUDOCS 8512170124 | |
| Download: ML20138H260 (13) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.
50-412/85-24 Docket No.
50-412 License No.
CPPR-105 Priority Category A
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Licensee:
Duquesne Light Company Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15205 Facility Name: Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit #2 Inspection At: Shippingport, Pennsylvania Inspection Conducted: October 21-25, 1985 Inspectors:
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K.@._Manoly, Reacto ngineer
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' Approved by:
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J. gggins, Ch/p{
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date Mat 4#ial and Pfocesses Section, EB, DRS Inspection Summary:
Inspection on October 21-25, 1985 (Report No. 50-412/85-24)
. Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced inspection by.a region-based inspector to
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followup on licensee actions relating to several open items in~the area of structural, piping and electrical supports. The inspection involved 35 hours4.050926e-4 days <br />0.00972 hours <br />5.787037e-5 weeks <br />1.33175e-5 months <br /> of direct inspection time on site.
Results: No violations were identified.
8512170124eg2M12 PDR ADOCK 0 PDR G
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DETAILS 1.0, Persons Contacted Duquesne Light Company (DLC)
- R. Coupland, Director QC
- D. Denning, Assistant Director, QC
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- C. Majumdar, Assistant' Director, QC
- L. Arch, Sr. Project Engineer E. Horvath, Sr. Project Engineer
- J.
Hultz, Construction Liaison Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation (SWEC)
V. Pizzi, Lead Electrical Engineer
- R. Wittschen, -Licensing Engineer C. Richardson, Project Engineer A. Wong,' Lead Structural Engineer
- R. Faust, Principal Structural Engineer.
- D. Estelionis, Assistant Superintendent Engineering
.S. Martinez, Structural Engineer US NRC
- G. Walton, Senior Resident Inspector
- L. Prividy, Resident Inspector
'* Denotes persons present during the exit meeting on October 25, 1985.
2.0 Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings 2.1 (Closed) Unresolved item (412/85-10-01)
This item is related to the identification of oversized housing for valve actuators (2FWE*HCV100A, B, C, D, E & F) on three inch piping for the Emergency Feedwater (FWE) system in the Safeguards Building.
A concern was identified regarding the impact of the heavier valve actuator components on the seismic qualification of the piping system.
The response from SWEC's engineering indicated that the piping quali-fication was based on standard data and dimensions for Fisher Control
. Valves. Subsequent to the installation of the piping in the area of valves 2 FWE*HCV100A&B, the purchase order was cancelled because environmental qualification of certain components could not be achieved. A new purchase specification was issued to obtain the necessary valves and actuators from the Copes Vulcan Company.
Pre-liminary evaluation of the FWE piping and supports for the increased m
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L valve actuator weights indicated that the original design was ade-quate.
Interface problems.which arose during the installation of the replacement of valve actuators were addressed in E&DCR 2PQ-1230.
The inspector reviewed the specification for piping design (2BVS-939)
p which addresses the revised valves and the stress analysis data package No. SI-RM-45B-1 which identifies the applicable SWEC's drawing file No. 2007-630-209-093E. The drawing providas details of the new valve's assembly including weight and centers of gravity. The l
revised valve weight..is 490 lbs vs. the 336 lbs. which was used in
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original piping analysis.
The inspector also reviewed the procedure for piping stress reconciliation (2BVM-156) which requires engineering to incorporate-the revised piping system information from specification 2BVS-939 into the stress reconciliation effort for piping.
b SWEC indicated that the final stress reconciliation for this system I
was not performed yet, and that an interim seismic evaluation for f
this case was unnecessary.
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The licensee's response to this item was found to be adequate. This L
item is closed.
2.2 (Closed) Violation (412/83-07-01) and Significant Deficiency Report (412/33-00-08)
The above violat' ion and Construction Deficiency Report were related to findings of over-thickness in pipe fittings and their effect on the qualification of piping for dead weight, seismic and thermal loads. The initial findings which triggered the violation were
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identified during the review of the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG)
exhaust piping systems EDG-038-14-3 and EDG-038-3-3.
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This item was addressed in subsection 2.6 of NRC. inspection report (412/85-11) where'the licensee addressed the generic evaluation of over-thickness in pipe fittings.
Subsequent to the above NRC h.
inspection, a Safety Evaluation (SE) was provided by the Mechanical
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Engineering Branch of NRR regarding this topic as it relates to Beaver Valley Unit #2. The (SE) report indicated that the licensee's
. generic evaluation (S&W report No. Bw-12241-65) was acceptable and that the licensee's specific evaluation of overthickness -in pipe fittings (S&W report No. 82-12241-142) has provided an adequate basis to conclude that for a thermally susceptible piping system typically found on BVPS Unit 2, the increase in thermal stresses for the
. piping, pipe supports and equipment nozzle loads, caused by the over-thickness of the pipe fittings, is reasonably low and is not likely to result in a safety concern.
The inspector reviewed the revised analysis for the EDG exhaust piping (Calculation No. 12241-NP(T)-X60K).
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The analysis was performed for one piping system since both EDG
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required changes and modifications to the piping system-supports to reduce piping stresses and support and nozzle loads as a result of increased fitting thicknesses.
The inspector also performed a sampling inspection of the EDG exhaust
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. piping supports. -The drawings used in performing this inspection are l
listed in Attachment 1 to this report. Some of the inspected restraints had rigid ~ sway struts which were not locked as required by the manu-facturer's ordering catalog and quality control procedure IP-7.3.1.
i These comp ~nents, however, had~not received final QC inspection.
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o Additionally, the. concern of-unlocked sway struts has been already
. addressed under unresolved item 412/85-13-03.
The EDG exhaust piping analysis and support m.odifications were found
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2.3 (Closed) Unresolved Item (412/85-03-01)
This item is related to the possible overload of the annulus pipe rack support No. PSR-737 of the Component Cooling Water (CCW) piping i
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system No. 2-CCP-018-031-3..The identified support is the first piping restraint after the piping enters the containment building through penetration No. X-2 at elevation 732'-6".
The piping instal-lation specification (2BVS-920) requires contact between the piping and the first dead' weight restraint after a penetration or an equip-ment nozzle.
The specification also allows a tolerance of 1 inch-during piping installation and a combined total clearance (between 1/16" to 1/4") at the top and bottom of dead weight and seismic re-straints.
Since the system restraints were installed after erecticn of the piping line, the possibility exits that the first restraint after the penetration could be subjected to higher dead weight loads than those considered in the design.
SWEC performed a study to determine the magnitude of overload on the pipe rack considering that the piping was installed within the 1" tolerance. The study indicated that only the 'econd support (PSR-742)
s could not have been active in providing a dead weight restraint in order to limit the piping deflection to the specified tolerance of 1.0 inch.
The increased dead weight on the first restraint was then computed assuming that the second support was removed. The additional load was conservatively estimated as 5.0 kips.
Since the structural beam supporting the (CCW) piping support is supporting other piping systems, and is rigidly connected to other structural members, a simplified analysis was performed for a simply supported beam subject-ed to all concurrent piping support loads.
Evaluation of the result-ing beam stresses was found to be within allowable design limits.
Further study of the available margin in design of the supporting beam, indicated that an increase in support (DSR-737) load of
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I 20-KIPS is. required in order to reach the maximum bending. capacity of the beam. This increase is considerably higher than that determined above as a result of removing the next support (PSR 742).
The licensee's evaluation was determined to be adequate to close this item.
2.4 (Closed) Unresolve'd Item (412/84-16-03)
This-item was related to the lack of specified torque on unistrut spring nuts us_ed-in TJ-Cope cable tray hold down clamp assemblies.
The non-conformance was identified in SWEC's Engineering and Design Coordination Report (E&DCR) No. 2PS-3270B and later in DLC's signi-ficant deficiency.
Random Sampling by the licensee's QC of 50 installed 1/2" diameter bolts, identified that thirty percent of the bolts were torqued to-less than the manufacturer's and SWEC guide-lines of 50 ft-lbs.~ This item was reevaluated in the NRC inspection report No. (412/85-16)~and it was noted that th.e specification for the torquing requirement had been incorporated in the Field Construction Procedure (FCP-419) and in the Quality Control Inspection Procedure (IP-8.1.8).
It was also reported that the
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licensee had completed the retorquing of 13,000 spring nuts and had
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' planned to continue a systematic program of retorquing the spring nuts on a back shift basis.
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The inspector reviewed a progress report regarding the status of the backfit retorquing of spring nuts as of October 27, 1985.
Retorquing was completed on cable tray clamp assemblies in twenty-two (22) out
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of forty-seven (47) identified seismic areas.
Further, the inspector
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reviewed the QC procedure (IP-8.1.8) for " Torquing Of Unistrut Spring f.
Nuts" and a sample of QC inspection reports (Attachment 2).
It was also' apparent that the licensee plans to meet the commitment of-o complete retorquing of spring nuts'in addition to performing the QC
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l surveillance in all identified seismic areas as evidenced from review
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of memorandum DLC-SQCL #12888 from the Director of QC.
The licensee's corrective action, and commitment to complete the retorquing and QC surveillance of spring nuts provide adequate basis for the closeout of this item.
i 2.5 (Open) Unresolved Item (412/83-12-03
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This item is related to findings of unsupported length of cable l
between raceways which could impact on raceway loading capacity.
NRC Inspection Report No (412/84-11) provided a followup to this item
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the inspection:
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Changing specification requirements and engineering dispositions
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for maximum unsupported length of cables exiting a tray.
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Cables from wall sleeve #2WL342W01 to horizontal conduit
- 2CL936WA, which terminate inside a pullbox located at elevation 740'-0", were deformed at the location where they rest on the collar due to the pressure created by the weight of unsupported-cables.
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Unsupported vertical cables on vertical tray #2TC326P between elevation 745 and 765 were looped over the top rung of the tray which experienced a visible deflection due to the weight of cables being supported.
With regard to the first finding, the inspector reviewed SWEC's disposition of maximum unsupported cable length provided in E&DCR No.
2P-44918 which~was issued on November 21, 1984. The E&DCR limits the length of cable exiting a tray from a tray rung to 4'-6" for
"K", "C"
& "X" trays and to 3'-0" for "H" & "L" trays. This E&DCR was sub-sequently incorporated into the specification for Electrical Installation (2BVS-931). NRC Inspection Report No. (412/85-15)
addressed the same concern and verified that the revised electrical installation has been translated in the QC Inspection Procedure IP-10-2.3.
The licensee's resolution of this concern was found to
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adequate.
Concerning the second finding, the inspector reviewed SWEC's response (2DLS-24422 dated February 15,1985) and Nonconformance and Disposition Report N&D No. 15538. A modification was per-formed by providing an additional support to-the cables exiting the conduit inside the pull box. The inspector reviewed the modification and determined that it was adequate for resolving the finding.
The third findings was also addressed in the above response from SWEC (2DLS-24422).
Though SWEC's report had concluded that the structural integrity of the installed tray system was main-tained, the inspector identified that the top rung of the vertical tray which had experienced visible deformation, was removed and replaced by another rung which is welded to the side railing at a lower elevation. The modified configuration of the tray installation appears to provide a distribution of the vertical cable weight between the last rung in the horizontal tray and the relocated top rung in the vertical tray.
Upon discussion with SWEC and the licensee of the generic concern related to unsupported vertical cable length, the licensee indicated that all identified nonconformances related to vertical cable runs, exceeding the tolerance specified in Section 6 of Specification 2BVS-931, will be evaluated by engineering for disposition. Where modifications are deemed L
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necessary, some positive mechanical supporting system will be provided near the' top of the riser of the vertical tray.
Consideeration-of existing tie-raps to provide some vertical restraint to the cables will not be utilized in the required modifications. The inspector reviewed the updated status of electrical cable tray installation inspection regarding unsupported cable length. As of October 22, 1985, approximately 100% of the required inspection was completed. This item will remain open pending NRC review of dispositioned nonconformances (UCR's) and inspection of-resulting modifications.
2.6 (0 pen) Significant Deficiency Report (SDR) (412/85-00-04)
This item is related to the identification of loads which exceed the axial frictional capacity of the T. J. Cope cable tray hold down clamps located at the level of the system's longitudinal brace connections. The increased loads were identified during the raceway seismic qualification which is being performed on 100% of the installations. The qualification of raceway installations was partially necessitated by the increased design loads from the original design basis'of 38 lbs/ft. to 65 lbs/ft.
i The inspector performed a review of various procedures related l
to the seismic design and qualification of raceway and conduit systems (Attachment 3). Discussions with SWEC's engineering and licensee personnel indicated that approximately 49% of the raceway seismic verification has been completed.
Installation modifications as a result of the qualification effort were estimated at 5%. The number of modifications involving the hold down clamps at the longitudinal brace connections is estimated
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to be 700 clamps.
The inspector reviewed the proposed details in E&DCR No. 2P-4740 for the replacement hold down clamps identified as RE-34HP, detail GA and alternate details GB and GC.
The new clamps are qualified for an ' axial loading of 1550 lbs. vs. a frictional capacity of 250 lbs. provided by existing clamp connections.
None of the proposed replacement clamps were installed yet.
Further discussion with SWEC's engineering concerning the seismic qualification of raceway installations in the axial direction (parallel to the raceways)
indicated that the hold down clamp capacity could possibly be exceeded at locations other than those originally identified in the SDR. Thus, further modification might be required at those connections.
This item will remain open pending the replacement of hold down
. clamps at identified locations and further determination of the requirement for clamp modifications at other connections.
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2.7 (Open) Unresolved Item (412/83-02-04)
This item is related to the shimming requirement for electrical support baseplate installations. The concern was originally
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identified in cable tray support installations in the Service Building. Numerous nonconformances were identified as a result
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.of QC inspections in several other building. Gaps between concrete surfaces and bolted baseplates were limited by the specification for electrical installation (2BVS-931) to 1/16" for plates 1/2" thick and to 1/8" for thicker plates.
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This item was addressed in several NRC reports.
The remaining issues of concern are:
Changing the specification requirements for acceptance of l
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gaps up to 1/8" between concrete wall (or embedment plates)
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and support base plates 1/2" thick and larger.
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Status of QC inspection program of' electrical support
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installation.
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.The inspector performed a review of various procedures governing I
anchor bolt and baseplate design and installation. in addition to'QC reports related to the status of electrical inspection l
(Attachment 3).
At the present time, the final QC status report on electrical-support baseplate shimming inspection in (9) nine buildings indicates that further QC inspection would be required in all-areas. Recommended action was provided for each building either by increasing the sample size or by performing a '100% reinspec-tion. The QC recommendations were based on a two phase sampling inspection which had been completed.
Discussions with SWEC and DLC engineering and QC organizations about~the above identified concerns resulted in the following commitments from the licensee:
Engineering Evaluation for the generic qualification of
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gaps up to 1/8" on 1/2" thick baseplate installations will be performed by SWEC. Enveloping analyses of baseplates, with assumed gaps of 1/8" at center of plate and around anchor bolt locations, will be performed to determine the maximum anticipated anchor bolt load increase.
This
. increase is not expected to exceed the conservative built-in margin in Hilti anchor bolt design for electrical support installations. The present minimum factor of safety in the design of Hilti anchors is 5.0 in tension and shear which exceeds the requirements in IE Bulletin 79-02 of 4.0.
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Upon completion of the engineering evaluation and the
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revision of the. specification, QC will perform a revised sampling plan in those areas which have not been accepted under-previous sampling plans.
Pending the results of the revised plan, QC will either accept those areas or' perform 100% verification of baseplate installations for shimming requirements.
This item will remain open pending the completion of SWCE's engineering evaluation and the NRC review of the revised QC-sampling plan and its implementation.
2.8 (0 pen) Unresolved Item (412/83-05-06)
This. item was related to the lack of a formal procedure for control and documentation of retorquing of Hilti expansion anchors as a result of loosening or removing of bolt nuts or baseplates during construction. This item was addressed in several NRC inspection reports. One concern which remained unresolved was related to the status of QC inspection of Hilti retorquing in various buildings where the two phase sampling program had ii.dicated the need for expanding the sample size or performing a 100% reinspection. The sampling program was based on dividing the various buildings into discrete areas and
randomly selecting two bolts per support per area for inspection. A review of the rejected samples indicated that the majority of rejections were identified in bolts where the nuts were turned at less than their test torque value, but that these bolts reached installation torque within one-360 degree turn.
Rejected samples in this category were evaluated by SWEC's engineering and were subsequently accepted by revision of the procedure for installation of concrete expansion anchor bolts (FCP-103) and the QC inspection plan (IP-9.6).
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Discussions with the licensee regarding the action required to resolve the concern of Hilti anchor retorque resulted in a following commitment from the licensee:
continue retorque verification of Hilti bolts in those
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areas that have so far failed the sample program
'QC will either conduct a revised sampling inspection or it
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will_ form a combined construction /QC team and continue survetilance during the retorquing activity.
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This item will remain open pending NRC review of the licensee's implementation of the above commitmen.
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Exit Meeting An exit meeting was held on October 25, 1985, with members of the licensee staff and contractors as denoted in Section 1 of this report. The inspector discussed the scope and findings of the inspection. At no time during this inspection was written material provided to the licensee by the inspector.
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EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR EXHAUST PIPING & SUPPORT DRAWINGS REVIEWED Piping Isometric No. 106022-0C Support Drawing No. 82-60A-69-0D (Supports No. 2EDG-PSSP 037A&B)
-Support. Drawing No. 82-6CA-90-0A (Supports No. 2EDG-PSSH038)
Support Drawing No. 82-60A-68-0C (Supports No. 2EDG-PSR036Y)
Support-Drawing No.~B2-60A-69-0D (Supports No. 2EDG-PSSH031Y)
Support Drawing No.-82-60A-66-0C (Supports No. 2EDG-PSR034Y)
Support Drawing No. 82-60A-67-0D (Supports No. 2EDG-PSSP035A&B)
Support Dr' awing No. B2-60A-91-0A (Supports No. 2EDG-PSSH039)
Support Drawing No.'B2-60A-64-0D (Supports No. 2EDG-PSSP42A&B)
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Support Drawing No. 82-60A-69-0D (Supports No. 2EDG-PSSP 037A&B)
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ATTACHMENT 2 r
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lQC - SURVEILLANCE REPORTS OF SPRING NUT TORQUING REVIEW Inspection Report No.
Building Elevation Installation Attribute i
TQS-5089 Reactor 767'-6" E1640 Calibration Sticker
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.E1642 Torque Setting E1644 In Process T6rquing E1646 Torqued Spring Nuts TQS-5069 Reactor 767'-10" Same as above Same as above TQS-5075-Service Bldg 760'-6" Same as above Same as above
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Auxiliary Bldg 773'-6"
.Same as above Same as above TQS-5083 Control Bldg 707'-6" Same as above Same as above
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DOCUMENTS REVIEWED 1.
Specification For Electrical Installations (2BVS-931)
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Specification For Exparision Type Concrete Anchors (2BVS-970)
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Field Construction Procedure For Installation of Concrete Anchor Bolts (FCP-103)
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Retorquing Of Hilti Concrete Expansion Anchors-Electrical (FCP-103.2)
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Backfit Inspection Program-Unsupported Cable Length (IP-10.2.3)
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Seismic Electrical Raceway Qualification (2BVM-174)
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Memorandum No. DLC-SQCL-0087-K (July 23,1985): Backfit Inspections, NRC Items 83-02-04 (Use of Shims), and 83-05-06 (Hilti Retorque)
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Memorandum No. DLC-SQCL-0887-M (August 28,1985)
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Memorandum No. DLC-SQCL-0997N (September 25,1985): Electrical Backfit i
Inspection, NRC Unresolved Items 83-02-04 & 83-05-06, Final Status and j
Recommendations.
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Seismic Raceway Supports Inspection Procedure (IP-8.1.4)
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Seismic Design Procedures For Cable Tray Systems (EMTG-4-A)
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Seismic Design Procedure For Conduit Systems (EMTG-3-A)
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