IR 05000409/1981022
| ML20038C946 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png |
| Issue date: | 12/04/1981 |
| From: | Axelson W, Grant W, Januska A, Paperiello C, Psomas P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20038C938 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-409-81-22, NUDOCS 8112140286 | |
| Download: ML20038C946 (18) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
l Report No. 50-409/81-22 Docket No. 50-409 License No. DPR-45 Licensee: Dairyland Power Cooperative 2615 East Avenue - South Lacrosse, wI 54601 Facility Name: Lacrosse Boiling Water Reactor Inspection At:
LACBWR Site, Genoa, WI Inspection Conducted: October 20-22, 1981 17-4'-6[
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Approved By:
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Emergenc Preparedness Section J
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Emergency Preparedness and Program Support Branch Inspection Summary Inspection on October 20-22, 1981 (Report No. 50-409/81-22)
Areas Inspected: Routine announced inspection of the Lacrosse Boiling Water Reactor emergency exercise involving observation of key functions and locations during the exercise.
The inspection involved 105 inspector-hours onsite by six NRC inspectors and their consultants.
Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified. Adequate functioning of the Emergency Operations Facility was not demonstrated. This necessitates holding a small drill to retest this facility.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted NRC Observers and Areas Observed C. J. Paperiello, Chief, Emergency Preparedness and Program Support Branch, Region III, Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
M. Branch, Resident Inspector, Control Room W. Grant, Radiation Specialist, Region III, Technical Support Center (TSC)
A. G. Januska, Radiation Specialist, Region III, Technical Support Center (TSC)
G. Carbough, NRC Consultant, Operation Support Center-(OSC) and Offsite Monitoring Team P. Psomas, Emergency Preparedness Analyst, Headquarters, Inplant Health Physics Team and Hospital M. Smith, NRC Consultant, (OSC) and Offsite Monitoring Team M. Lindell, NRC Consultant, Hospital R. Marabito, Public Affairs Officer, Region III, Joint Press Information Center (JPIC)
Dairyland Power D. Rybarek, LACBWR, Exercise Controller, Control Room R. Shimshak, Plant Superintendent, TSC and EOF P. Shafer, Radiation Protection Engineer, EOF B. Zibung, Health and Safety Supervisor, TSC J. Parkyn, Assistant Plant Superintendent, TSC L. Goodman, Operations Engineer, TSC R. Morose, Public Information Director, DPC, JPIC The above personnel attended the exit interview on October 21, 1981.
2.
General An exercise of the Licensee's Radiological Emergency Response Plan was conducted on October 21, 1981, testing the intergrated response of the licensee, State, and Local organization to a simulated emergency. The exercise tested the licensees response to a loss of coolant accident and an offsite release combined with rescue and removal of an injured contaminated person.
Attachment 1 describes the scenario. The exercise was integrated with a test of the Vernon County, Wisconsin, the Houston County, Minnesota and the State of Minnesota's emergency plans, with a limited participation of the State of Wisconsin.
3.
General Observations a.
Procedures This exercise was conducted in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix E requirements using the LACBWR Emergency Plan, and the Emergency Plan Procedures (EPPs) used by the plant.
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b.
Coordination The response of the licensee's organization was acceptable.
If the event had been real the actions of the licensee would have been sufficient to permit the State and local authorities to takr appropriate protective actions. The operation of the licensee's Emergency Operations Facility must be improved.
c.
Obse rvers The licensee had a observer / controller in the control room.
There were nine NRC and approximately 20 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) observers. FEMA observers will report on the responses of the State and local governments.
d.
Critique The licensee held a critique immediately following the exercise on October 21, 1981.
NRC and the licensee identified the defi-ciencies as discussed in the exit interview.
4.
Specific Deficiencies Noted Problems identified by the NRC observers during the exit interview included:
(1) inadequate communications between the TSC and the E0F; (2) inadequate training of Health physics monitoring teams covering emergency survey techniques; (3) insufficient training of Hospital Emergency Room personnel in contamination control; (4) inadequate staffing of the EOF (3 people) to a point that did not allow adequate functioning. Many of the tasks normally performed by the EOF were done at the TSC.
It is unlikely that during a real accident the TSC could have handled both its tasks and those requested by the EOF.
5.
Specific Observation a.
Control Room The operators responded well to cues and made proper notifica-tions. The events were correctly assessed and response was proper and timely. The exercise scenario tested the operator's ability to correct plant malfunctions, and provided a good technical test of operations personnel who performed well.
Initial logs kept by the control room were sketchy and did not contain certain details of plant and emergency status.
b.
Technical Support Center (TSC)
Activation of the TSC was orderly and timely. The TSC performed well in command and control functions. No specific technical in-formation was requested of the TSC staff from the Control Room but they did make recommendations based on current plant status.
On request f rom the EOF, the TSC staf f performed functions that should have properly been performed by the EOF.
If technical assistance to the control room had been required, these functions would have-3-
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had to be performed by the EOF. On a number of occasions a member-l of the TSC staff was performing multiple tasks which may have
diluted the overall effort and resulted in processing and reporting information in an untimely manner. There were no displays of status in the TSC; however, a complete record log of events was maintained.
c.
. Joint Public Information Center (JPIC)-
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The JPIC was located in the gymnasium of the Stoddard Elementary School, Stoddard, Wisconsin, about eight miles from the plant i
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site. This area was manned in a timely manner and with sufficient
security to prevent intrusion by unauthorized personnel. The
entire gymnasium would have been utilized had there been a real
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incident..Since this was an exercise, only one quarter of the gym was used as a JPIC and, as a result, considerable discomfort was-noted among media representatives.
Eight telephone lines were available to the press and government representatives. An additional 15 lines are contemplated by the
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licensee if this facility is designated as the permanent JPIC.
t Overall, the operation of the JPIC was adequate. Criticisms include
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the need for more briefings of the media by both the licensee and state officials.
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d.
Operation Support Center (OSC)
l The OSC is the assembly area for the health physics and main-tenance emergency teams.
It is also the site evacuation assembly point, and is located in Genoa Unit 1.
This area was manned in a timely manner and radiation monitoring was performed. Actual
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issuance of high range pocket dosimeters contained in assembly point supply kits were simulated.
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Health Physics Teams
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E The offsite monitoring teams were assembled and dispatched from i
the OSC in a timely manner. Communication equipment and instru-l mentation were checked. All samples and field measurements were i
taken in a timely manner.
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Neither monitoring team took protective clothing or respirators l
with them into the field. Subsequent conversation with an HP l
Technician indicated that in a real incident, this would have been i
done with the clothing donned at the assembly point before leaving and a self-contained breathing apparatus also worn.
hrotective clothing should probably be included in the field kits during exercises.
Extra batteries for survey instruments were not included in the field kits.
Dose rate instruments were not read or used in transit to field i
sample / monitoring locations. They remained in the field kit duffle i,
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bags in the back of the trucks until arrival at field sample points.
They were replaced in the du:!fle bag after measurements were made.
The HP Technicians did not realize the need to make in-transit measurements for plume monitoring until this was identified by the observers. This is contrary to Section 5.11 of EPP-8 "Offsite Radiological Survey".
Set-up and operation of portable air samplers was good. Samplers were operated off the truck battery while the truck was left run-ning, and they functioned well.
Gamma dose-rate measurements were only taken in the field.
In-struments (Eberline R0-3 CP) were used only in the window closed position, so a true whole-body dose rate was not determined because the beta contribution was not evaluated. The need for both window open and window closed measurements was not apparent to the tech-nicians during the exercise. A potential impact of this situation would be an inability to determine whether the sampling point was in or below the plume.
Air sample cartridges were not field checked to determine dose rate or cpm reading after sampling.
In addition, the field monitoring teams had neither equipment nor procedures to deyer-mine in-field concentrations of radioiodine exceeding 1x10 uCi/cc as required per NUREG-0654 Revision 1,Section I, Criterion 9.
Instrumentation has been ordered to perform these field determination.
No determination or assessment of personnel or equipment con-tamination (frisking) was performed when the teams returned from tae field. This could have resulted in contamination and loss of use of the environmental lab.
In addition, there was no pre-determined level for assigning sample counting to the hot lab instead of the environmental lab.
Field teams did not show evidence of reading personal dosimeters periodically. The HP Technicians indicated in a real accident, this would have been performed.
Direct communication to the TSC was lost periodically when links through the licensee's microwave repeater to the TSC telephone could not be completed.
Communication was then established by radio to the control room, with instructions verbally communicated between the control room and the TSC.
The inplant health physics teams were dispatched from the OSC.
Radiation monitoring was performed for direct and surface con-tamination in a timely manner.
Difficulty was observed in changing from normal to emergency sampling and monitoring techniques required for contamination control and personal dose assessment. These difficulties were attributable in part to general problems involved in realistically simulating accident-5-
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conditions for an emergency exercise. These general problems can be solved through additional-training in survey and sampling techniques.
f.
Ambulance and Hospital TRI-State Ambul'ance ' Service responded to this mock injury in a timely manner.. However, additional training in the techniques of handling a contaminated / injured patient should to given to hospital and ambulance personnel to correct the following deficiencies:
No paper walkway was laid down from ambulance to treatment room.
.Possibly contaminated ambulance was not surveyed nor cordoned off.
Ambulance driver carried possibly contaminated glove through front door of Emergency Room.
Hospital personnel were unclear about the severity of the contamina-tion (2,000,000 dpm).
g.
Emergency Operations Facility (E0F)
The near-site Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).is a required emergency response facility located near the reactor site to provide continous coordination and evaluation of licensee activities during an emergency having or potentially having environmental consequences.
At 10:14 the Plant Superintendent and LACBWR Radiation Protection Engineer activated the EOF. At 10:32 a representative of corporate management arrived at the EOF to find it activated. He had not been informed that it had been activated or that the accident had become a Site Area Emergency.
The NRC observer noted that there were plant area maps and plant layout diagrams on the walls and two chalk boards. Four tele-phones, two being speaker phones, were in the room. There were no preprinted message forms, no preoutlined status boards nor dedicated telephone communicators, items normally utilized in emergency response facilities. Preprinted signs identifying the emergency catagory were used. One open line was being maintained between the EOF and the plant. At times the voice of the person at the plant would fade out.
At about 11:07 the scenario esculated with a loss of containment and a release of radioactivity. At this point the criteria for a General Emergency was reached. The EOF did not declare a General Emergency until about 11:19. This was due in large part because both the Emergency Control Director (ECD) and Radiation Safety Engineer spent much time answering telephones and reviewing actions to stop the release. At 11:20 Vernon County called the EOF and stated that they had heard that a General Emergency has been called. Later it was determined that an engineer at the plant had notified the Vernon County Sheriff of a Ger. tral Emergency a few minutes before it was declared by the EOF. At 11:22 the ECD told the TSC to notify JPIC-6-
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of the General Emergency. At about 11:07 when the simulated release started, the Environmental Coordinator came to the EOF.
He started calculating of fsite doses using LACBWR Emergency Plan Procedure EPP-5.
At 11:25 the Radiation Protection Engineer started to help with these calculations.
By 12:12 after a number of discussions between the plant and the EOF over the dose projections, the ECD decided to re-commend evacuation out to 1.25 miles on a projected child thyroid dose in excess of 5 rads.
These recommendations were made to the Vernon County Operations Center at 12:17 at which time the licensee's management and the EOF were informed that the State of Wisconsin had recommended an evacuation at 11:20 out to five miles.
During this time interval and on several occasions both the ECD and Radiation Protection Engineer were answering more than one telephone at the same time.
At 12:15 two speaker phones were in service at the same time.
Most information was not being recorded and information relative to plant status recorded on the chalk board was being erased as new information was available so that data to determine trends was not available.
Offsite survey data was not recorded on the available maps and at no time was the direction and magnitude of the radioactive plume
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shown on the map.
By about 12:32 the release was terminated and at about 12:53 the ECD told the TSC to give the revised plant status information to JPIC. At about 1:10 de-escalation of the event was discussed and plant personnel were told to preserve records of the emergency and at about 1:20 the TSC was told to inform IMPO and Vernon County Operations Support Center that the emergency had been changed to an Alert and the EOF was being deactivated. The EOF however had very few records to preserve.
If the event had been of a long duration individuals relieving the original staff in the EOF would have had little background information available.
Functional Criteria for the EOF are found in NUREG-0696.
These criteria were used to evaluate emergency plans and their imple-mentation. LACBWR Emergency Procedure EPP-2 describes in part duties of the EOF staff. The NRC observer concluded that the licensee failed to demonstrate that the functions to be performed by the EOF could and would be performed during an actual emergency.
In this exercise most of these essential functions were performed by the LACBWR plant staff. Under actual emergency conditions the work load at the plant would likely be too heavy to permit the plant to manage offsite consequences of the accident and still work to bring the plant under control.
The licensee did not and probably could not have managed the response to the emergency from the EOF.
This was primarily due to poor communications and the management of the communications available and the information received.
The ECD subsequent to the exercise stated that he had a hard time following what was happening at the plant.
There was no direct communication to the TSC.
Coordination between corporate management and the JPIC and the State and local response was not demonstrated. The ability-7-
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to calculate the offsite doses resulting from the release in a reasonable time was not demonstrated. The ability of the EOF to perform its management function must be demonstrated in a limited drill in the next several months.
6.
Exit Interview The inspectors held an exit interview at the conclusion of the exercise with representatives denoted in Paragraph 1.
The licensee agreed with the need to improve the operation of the Emergency Operation Facility and confirmed this agreement in a Confirmation of Action Letter dated October 2, 1981. The licensee also agreed to address the other concerns stated in Paragraph 4.
Attachment: Exercise Scenairo-8-
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ATTACHMENT 1
CONFICENTIAL COPY T0:
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
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DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE FINAL RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN DRILL SCENARIO FOR THE OCTOBER 21, 1981, JOINT AGENCY EMERGENCY EXERCISE 7:30 AM The Emergency Drill Scenario Begins The Reactor is operating normally at 40 MWe (85% power) and power is going to the DPC grid. The reactor pressure is 1240 psig, the temperature is 560 F.
The SPING-4 stack effluent monitor is reading 2.5 x 10- D pCi/cc (low range noble gas) and the Tracer Lab stack gas monitor is reading 1,500 cpm. The containment building Tracer Lab immediate particulate air monitor is reading 1,000 cpm and the gaseous monitor is reading 4,000 cpm. All area radiation monitors in the plant are on-scale and normal. The windspeed is 5.0 mph, the wind direction is from the SW and the AT is 1.0 F.
(Notify G-3, Lock and Dam #8 and Sheriff that a drill is to be conducted and the siren
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will be activated at about 9 :45 AM).
7:35 AM CARD NO. 12 Control Room Annunciator C10-1 (Reactor Narrow Range Pressure Alarm),
Annunciator C7-1 (Tracer Lab Containment Building Gas Monitor High Alana), Annunciator C11-1 (CB Dampers Closed), Annunciator Cl-2 (Reactor Water Level Low) all alann simultaneously.
a.
C10-1 readout indicates 1200 psig reactor pressure.
b.
The Tracer Lab Containment Building Gas Monitor readout indicates 20,000 cpm which corresponds about 1.0 x 10-3 ifi/cc noble gas activity inside containment.
c.
Two area radiation monitors alarm and indicate 50mR/hr.
d.
Cl-2 readout indicates -7 inches on reactor water level.
7:35 - 7:45 AM ( Operations and Health Physics staff shift change is occurring. At )
( 7:45 AM the first shift supervisor turns over the plant in the
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( unusual event condition to the second shift supervisor. The first )
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( shift HP Technician will turnover all pertinent monitoring
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I ( information to the H & S Supervisor who will direct his day shif t
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( HP Technician crew.
First shif t operators turnover plant status to )
( second shift operators. Maintenance and Administrative Personnel
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7:36 AM CARD NO. 2:
Control Room Annunciator D2-1 (Reactor Water Level High) and Cl-3 (Steam to Turbine Pressure Low).
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D2-1 readout indicates +20 inches on reactor water level.
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Cl-3 readout indicates 950 psig turbine steam pressure.
REACTOR SCRAMS - ALL RODS G0 IN.
7:37 AM CARD NO. 3:
Control Room Annunciator D3-1 (MSIV not full open) and C14-1 (C.B. Sump Level High D2-2 (Reactor Water Level Low) and 06-3 (ECCS pumps 1A/1B running).
a.
D3-1 readout indicates closed, b.
02-2 readout indicates -15 inches on reactor water level.
7:40 AM CARD N0. 4:
Reactor Water Level indicator steadies out at -10.
Containment Bldg. evacuated by Turbine Operator and rover checks CB light board and entry 109 Shift Supervisor (acting ECD) declares UNUSUAL EVENT.
Shift Supervisor notifies the STA, Plant Superintendent, and NRC via P,ed Phone. He will identify an unusual event exercise. He notifies the duty Health Physics Technician to tell him about monitor alarms.
7:55 AM Reactor water level begins decreasing slowly.
7:56 AM CARD N0. 5:
Reactor water level at -11 inches and decreasing slowly.
7:57 AM CARD NO. 62 Reactor water level at -12 inches and decreasing slowly.
All ARM's alarm and indicate between 500mR/hr and 1 R/hr.
SPING-4 trend alarms on Channel 5 indicating increase in noble gas relgase to the stack.
The reading on the SPING-4 reaches 5 x 10-'+ pCi/cc.
The Tracer Lab Containment Building immediate particulate monitor
pegs o cpm. The T. L. C. B. gas monitor increase from 2x10gtat1x10 cpm (1.0 x 10-3 pCi/cc) to 8 x 104 cpm (4.0 x 10-3 pCi/cc).
Both stack blowers (70,000 cfm or 3.3 x 107 cc/sec) are operational.
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8:00 AM Shift Supervisor (acting ECD) declares an ALERT, based on reactor water level decreasing while ECCS is operational. He notifies the STA, Plant Superintendent and NRC via red phone, Operators follow Operations Manual, Volume 1, Section 3.3.3.
3:05 AM STA notifies Vernon County Sheriff and Wisconsin Warning Center 1 that "LACBWR is having an exercise and an ALERT condition exists."
Shift Supervisor or delegate activates the T.S.C. and puts E0F (La Crosse Office) on standby.
Communications will be established.
8:07 AM H & S Supervisor has HP Technician calculate estimated off-site doses using EPP-5.
8:10 AM STA notifies INP0 that an ALERT exercise exists.
8:15 AM H & S Supervisor dispatches a HP Technician to site boundary near G-1 to check direct radiation levels.
HP Technician finds no apparent increase in background readings.
9 :15 AM CARD NO. 7:
Containment Building Tracer Lab Gas Monitor reaches 1 x 10 cpm (5x10-3 uCi/cc).
9 :40 AM CARD NO. 8:
Control Roma Annunciator C4-4 Alarms (CB Pressure High) Containment Building Pressure reaches 5 psig and appears to be increasing slowly.
SPING - 4 stack gas monitor { Channel 5) alert alarms and has an indicated reading of 5 x 10-uCi/cc, (Channel 7) reads 1.8 x 103 Beg /cc. Reactor water level indicator at -25 inches and slowly decreasing.
STA reviewing EPP-1 determines that a site area emergency should be declared.
9 :42 AM Shif t Supervisor declares SITE AREA EMERGENCY.
Shift Supervisor evaculates the site personnel to G-1 assembly area (Operational Support Area)* (NOTE: G-3 plant personnel will not actually evacuate, but will simulate evacuation).
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9 :45 AM Shift Supervisor or his delegate notifies the Vernon County Sheriff-and Warning Center 1 by NAWAS that a Site' Area Emergency has been declared based on containment pressure and possible. increase ;in release of radioactivity from the stack.
9 :50 AM Activate E0F (La Crosse Office). When personnel reach E0F they establish communications with the plant personnel and the Superintendent or delegate assumes the role of. ECD. The Plant Superintendent and the Radiation Protection Engineer shall man the EOF. The Assistant GM-Power and the Director of Environmental.
Affairs should be notified by the ECD to assist in.the E0F.
9 :50 AM The TSC will suppcrt the Shift Supervisor in conmunications and of f-site dose assessment until the EOF is manned. The Assistant Plant Superintendent, the Operations Engineer and the H & _S Supervisor should report to the TSC. Additional Engineers and support personnel will be called to the TSC.as needed.
10:00 AM CARD N0. 9 :
The TSC will activate the JPIC at Stoddard Elementary School and notify INP0 as time pennits. Shift Supervisor receives a "NOT ACCOUNTED FOR" call from the Security Sargent that one person is not accounted for.
10:05 AM Shift Supervisor is notified that an operator (Assistant Operations Supervisor) has sustained an injury to his right leg and is contaminated. Shift Supervisor notifies the TSC about contaminated and injured operator.
10:16 AM TSC calls the Tri-State Ambulance Service and the La Crosse Lutheran Hospital Emergency Medical and Trauma Staff about the injured operator.
10:17 to 10:25 AM CARD NO. 10 AND CARD NO 11:
The H & S Supervisor dispatches an HP Technician and an operator to stabilize the injured operator. The operator has a compound fracture of the left femur and a deep profusely bleeding wound on the right leg. His wound is contaminated to 2,000,000 dpm and his general body and clothes contamination level averages 200,000 dpm.
EPP-11 and 12 are followed.
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10:20 AM The H & S Supervisor notifies the Radiation Protection Engineer in the EOF to call an off-duty HP Technician to meet ambulance at Lutheran Hospital Emergency Entrance.
10:22 AM The Radiation Protection Engineer notifies the of f-duty HP Technician to go to Lutheran Hospital Emergency Entrance.
10:35 AM The Tri-State Ambulance arrives at LACBWR.
10:40 AM The Tri-State Ambulance leaves LACBWR.
10:55 AM HP Technician arrives at Lutheran Hospital. Radiation Protection Engineer confers with Dr. Ledbetter at Lutheran Hospital.
11:00 AM The Tri-State Ambulance arrives at Lutheran Hospital Emergency Entrance. Dr. Ledbetter and EM&T Staff will activate their Radiological Medical Emergency Procedures.
11:01 AM CARD NO. 12:
Reactor water level indication is at -30 inches and slowly decreasing.
Control Roca Annunciator El-1 (Reactor Aux. Device Trip) alarms.
ECCS pumps 1A and 18 trip due to electrical motor shorts.
Control Roon Annunciator D-6-3 (ECCS Pumps 1A/1B running) clears.
Control Roon Annunciator E/A-1 (Emergency Core Spray Flow Low)
Al a rms.
Core Spray Flow is decreasing rapidly.
11:05 AM CARD NO. 13:
Operators try to restart ECCS pumps but they will not start.
Primary coolant pressure is about 500 psig. Reactor water level drops rapidly to +10 inches on the wide range.
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Manual Depressurization Valves are opened and Alternate Core Spray System flow conmences.
11:06 AM CARD N0. 14:
Tracer Lab Containment Building Gas Monitor pegs out at 1 x 106 cpm.
Radiation Monitor reads 2.5 x 10gh Range Containment Building All ARM's peg out at 10R/hr. Hi R/hr. Estimated containment building atmosphere noble gas activity is 20 pCi/cc.
Wind speed is 5 mph, wind direction is fran the SW and the AT is 1.0 F.
SPING-4 high alarms on Channel 5 at full scale (10-1 pCi/cc) and 4 Beq/cc (0.76 pCi/cc). SPING alert alarms on Channel 7 at 2.81 x 10 Channel 3 (I-131) reaches 370 pCi per 10 minutes (approximately equal to 5.28 x 10-4 pCi/cc) discharges from thq stack. Both stack blowers are operational at 70,000 cfm (3.3 x 10' cc/sec).
11:07 AM CARD NO. 15:
Operator discovers that the shutdown condenser vent to off-gas valve is opened. He turns control switch to close and the valve indication remains opened.
11:10 AM TSC calculates estimated off-site dose. H & S Supervisor dispatches HP Technicians with emergency radiological monitoring equipment to Gianoli Farm Environmental Monituring Station (Follow EPP-8) a second HP Technician team will be dispatched to the Malin Environmental Monitoring Station.
11:15 AM ECD declares a GENERAL EMERGENCY exists because of loss of two fission product barriers (eg. the reactor and containment) and possible loss of the third barrier (eg. the fuel cladding).
ECD motifies the Vernon County Sheriff, the West Area Wisconsin DEG-1, the State of Wisconsin DEG (1-266-3232) via caamercial telephone.
NRC notified via Red Phone.
l 11:25 AM TSC reports to EOF (Radiation Protection Engineer) that off-site doses from I-131 may require sheltering or evacuation of children at 1.25 miles (Genoa, WI)
(State the of f-site I-131 dose estimates and concentrations based on EPP-5 calculations). Radiation Protection Engineer verifies off-site dose calculations using Model i n EPP-5.
11:30 AM ECD notifies Vernon County Sheriff and State of Wisconsin PEG at West Area in Tomah, WI of the estimated I-131 off-site concentrations and estimated child thyroid doses. Radiation Protection Engineer
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notifies the NRC via the HP hot line on radiological status of emergency. Radiation Protection Engineer notifies the State of Wisconsin REP team leader of radiological status.
12:25 PM CARD NO 16:
Shutdown condenser vent to off-gas isolation valve in the tunnel is closed.
12:30 PM CARD NO. 17:
Channel 7 Noble Gas activity is at 3.7 x 10 gale at 1 x 10-2 SPING - 4 Channel 5 Noble Gas activity on s uCi/cc.
Beq/cc. Channel 3 (I-131) is at 3.6 x 10-6 uCi/cc.
12:34 PM ECD determines that the General Emergency has de-escalated to a i
SITE AREA EMERGENCY.
12:35 PM ECD notifies the State of Wisconsin DEG at the West Area, the NRC, that a SITE AREA EMERGENCY exists.
13:00 PM CARD NO. 18:
Reactor water level reaches +50 inches on the wide range meter.
Containment Building water level reaches 330 inches. Alternate Core Spray pumps are secured.
i 13:05 PM CARD NO.19 :
SPING - 4 Channel 5 Noble Gas activity is 6 x 10-4 uCi/cc, and Channel 3 (I-131) is at 1.0 x 10-8 uCifcc. The Tracer Lab Stack Gas Monitor is back on scale at 3 x 10 cpm.
13:10 PM ECD determines that the emergency has de-escalated to an ALERT status.
13:15 PM ECD notifies the State of Wisconsin DEG, the Vernon County Sheriff, and the NRC that the emergency has been downgraded to ALERT.
13:15 - 13:45 PM Off-site HP Technicians continue to survey, take air samples, vegetation samples, etc.
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'-A 14:00 PM
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The H & S Supervisor recalls all HP Technician Teams.
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14:00 PM
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Deactivate JPIC, and EOF.
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14:30 PM
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Terminate Radiological Medical Emargency 'Crill at La Crosse Lutherari Hospital.
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I 15:00 PM
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Terminate Emergency Drilbat L CEWR.
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CONFIDENTIAL. COPY T0:
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE
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FINAL RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN DRILL SCENARIO
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FOR THE OCTOBER 21, 1981 JOINT AGENCY EMERGENCY EXERCISE TERMIN0 LOGY DEFINITIONS
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PAGE 1 (1) MWe -
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Megawatts Electric
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(2)
SPING - Specialized Particulate, Iodine-131, and Noble Gas Stack Effluent Radiological Monitor.
'(3) Ci - Curie, pCi - micro Curie (4) cpm -
counts per minute
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(5) AT -
Differential Temperature between 100 meters and 10 meters.
(6) mR/hr - milli Roentgens / hour (7)
C. B.
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Containment Building PAGE 2 (1) MSIV - Main Steam Isolation Valve (2) ECCS -
Emergency Core Cooling Systen (3)
ECD -
Emergency Control Director (Shift Supervision initially and Plant Superintendent or his designated alternate after Emergency Operations Facility is manned).
(4)
STA -
Shift Technical Advisor (5) NRC -
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (6) ARM - Area Radiation Monitor (7) R/hr - Roentgen / hour (8)
cfm -
cubic feet per minute-1-
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Terminology Definitions (Continued)
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PAGE 3
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Technical Support Center - located in the training room in (1)
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the LACBWR Auxiliary Building.
(2)
EPP-5 - Emergency Preparedness Procedure 5 - Offsite Dose Estimates (3)
INP0 -
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, Atlanta, Ga.
(4)
HP Technician -
Health Physics Technician (5)
G-1 -
Genoa 1,14 MWe, oil-fired power plant located North of LACBWR (6)
EPP-1 - Emergency Preparedness Procedure 1 - Emergency Classifications PAGE 4 (1) NAWAS -
National Alert Warning System (2)
E0F -
Emergency Operations Facility - located in the DPC main office building on 2nd floor in Conference Roon A, La Crosse, WI.
(3) Assistant GM - Assistant General Manager of DPC.
(4) JPIC - Joint Public Information Center located at the Stoddard Elementary School, Stoddard, WI.
PAGE 5 (1)
EM+T Staff Emergency Medical and Trauma Staff
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PAGE 6 (1) Beq/cc - Becquerel / cubic centimeter i 1 dps/cc or 2.7 x 10-5 p Ci.
(2) Wisconsin DEG -
State of Wisconsin Division of Emergency Government.
(3) Red Phone - Direct Communications between DPC and NRC.
l (4)
I-131 -
Iodi ne-131 PAGE 7 (1) HP Hot Line -
Direct coamunications between the HP staff of DPC with the HP staf f of NRC.
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State of Wisconsin Department of Public Health -
Radiological Team, i
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