IR 05000409/1981011
| ML20009H524 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png |
| Issue date: | 07/20/1981 |
| From: | Gregor L, Paul R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20009H519 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-409-81-11, NUDOCS 8108100209 | |
| Download: ML20009H524 (6) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Report No. 50-409/81-11 Docket No. 50-409 License No. DPR-45 Licensee: Dairyland Power Cooperative 2615 East Avenue - South Lacrosse, WI 54601 Facility Name: Lacrosse Boiling Water Reactor Inspection ' t: Lacrosse Boiling Water Reactor Site, Genoa, WI Inspection Conducted: June 15-18, 1981
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Inspector:
R. A.
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Approved By:
L. R. Greger, Acting Chief Facilities Radiation Protection Section Inspection Summary:
Inspection on June 15-18, 1981 (Report No. 50-409/81-11)
Areas Inspected: Routine unannounced inspection of inplant iodine instrmnen-tation and licensee actions taken in response to Health Physics Appraisal findings and items of noncompliance. The inspection involved 29 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspector.
Results: Of the two areas inspected, two apparent items of noncompliance were found in one area (Severity Level 5 violation - failure to follow radiation protection procedures - Section 6; Sevarity Level 6 violation - failure to submit effluent reports within prescribed time limit - Section 8).
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PDR ADOCK 05000409 G
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted G. Joseph, Security Director
- J. Parkyn, Assistant Plant Superintendent
- P. Shafer, Radiation Protection Engineer
- R. Shimshak, Plant Superintendent
- B. Ziebung, Health and Safety Supervisor
- M. Branch, NRC Resident Inspector
- W. Forney, NRC Senior Resident Inspector The inspector also contacted other licensee employees including members of the technical and engineering staffs.
- Denotes those attending the exit meeting.
2.
General This inspection, which began at 11:30 a.m. on June 15, 1981, was con-ducted to examine the licensee's actions in response to Health Physics Appraisal findings. The inspection also included a plant tour and visual observations of facilities and equipment, posting, labeling, and access controls.
General plant housekeeping was adequate, however, some areas which needed improvement were pointed out to the licensee for correction.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Noncompliance Item (50-409/80-10):
Inadequate evaluation of radiation fields for compliance with 10 CFR 20.203(b). This matter was reviewed by appropriate management personnel; subsequent training has been conducted.
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(0 pen) Noncompliance Item (50-409/80-10): Several instances o'
failure to meet Technical Specification 3.8.1 and 3.11, adherence to.adiation protection procedure requirements. Some corrective acti ns nad been completed at the time of this inspection, those that were not were in the process of being completed.
(0 pen) Noncompliance Item (50-409/80-10): Failure to report radioactive effluent data within prescribed time limit. This matter had not been corrected.
A similar item of noncompliance was found during this inspection.
(Closed) Noncompliance Item (50-409/80-15): Failure to monitor a venti-lation releare path.
Installation of a manual shutoff valve in the vacuum pump loop seal drain line and the development of written procedures for start up of the pump has been accomplished.
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(Closed) Noncompliance Item (50-409/80-15):
Inadequate evaluation of radiation fields for compliance with 10 CFR 20.203(b). This matter was reviewed by licensee management; subsequent training has been conducted.
This was a repeat item of noncompliance noted in inspection report (50-409/80-10).
(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-409/80-15): Licensee evaluation of potential radioactivity sources to the oil storage room has been accomplished.
4.
Monitoring The Health Physics Appraisal noted specific technical problems concerning the licensee's high range noble gas monitoring system, stack monitor charcoal analyses, and isokinetic stack sampling. The licensee has im-proved their stack monitoring program by installing an Eberline extended range particulate iodine and noble gas monitoring system (SPING-4).
Silver zeolite cartridges are available for use in the system for emer-gency conoitions. The licensee has calculated the SPING-4 alarm set points based on their technical specifications and instructed most health physics technicians and some reactor operators in the use of the system.
When all training is accomplished, it appears the licensee will have achieved an acceptable program. The technical problems concerning stack monitor charcoal analyses and isokinetic stack sampling will be reviewed at a future inspection.
5.
Health Physics Workload, Staffing, and Expertise The Health Physics Appraisal noted that the licensee's health and safety workload appeared excessive.
The licensee has promoted a health physics technician into the position of Health and Safety Supervisor (HSS). This position was filled within a few months after it was vacated and after concern was expressed by Region III. The person filling this position should lend technical and administrative strength to the program.
During the Health Physics Appraisal, it was noted that organizational and managerial improvements are needed to resolve problems regarding health physics technical expertise, supervisory personnel workload, and staffing.
To increase technical expertise, the licensee; (1) has scheduled health physics technicians for technical training at offsite training schools, (2) is developing a Health Physics Technician Training Manual for techni-cian study, and (3) is planning to increase on-the-job and advanced training. At the time of the inspection, no offsite training had been given. The training manual had not been completed, and most of the advanced training was not accomplished. These matters will be reviewed further during a future inspection.
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The licensee estimates it will take approximately one year to reallocate l
the supervisory workload to allow more time for the HSS to perform l
supervisory functions and for the Radiation Protection Engineer (RPE) to
perform more administrative duties. The hiring of a Radiation Protection Engineering Assistant (RPEA) to assist in the areas of training, procedure reviews, and administrative and technical support is still being contem-plated. Until the supervisor workload is reallocated and the position of RPEA is created and filled, it appears the supervisory workload will remain excessive. This matter was discuss 1J at the exit interview.
The current health physics staffing level of seven technicians is the same as during the Health Physics Appraisal. Since then, the licensee has hired a health physics technician to replace the technician who was promoted to the HSS. Although the licensee had contemplated hiring an additional health physics technician to increase the staff to eight, there are no current plans to create that position. The licensee believes the hiring of an RPEA, which would increase the entire health physics staff to ten persons, would alleviate the strain on the health physics technicians during periods of heavy workload such as outages or extended absenteeism. However, until that position is created and filled, it appears that the licensee's health physics technician staff will be under the same constraints to improve personnel effectiveness as noted during the Health Physics Appraisal.
6.
Au tho ri ty/ Communi ca tion s / Pe rfo rma nce The Health Physics Appraisal noted that greater health physics technician inquisitiveness and responsibility appeared to be needed.
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the licensee has changed its policy to include more health physics techni-cian involvement in the health physics decision making process and has encouraged the staff to be more observant, inquisitive, and aware of anomalous situations.
During this inspection, the licensee presented the inspector with a list of technician suggestions and recommendations to correct problems identified by the technicians. The licensee feels these examples are indicative of their policy change, which encourages and promotes technician responsibility and involvement.
The Health Physics Appraisal identified the need for cnger management
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control over the plant radiation protection prograe part of this control, the Appraisal Team recommended the licens
. sider use of a radiation occurrence record system to identify proble, concerning radia-tion protection practices. As a result, the licensee has emphasized to all station workers the need for cooperation in enforcing the radiation protection program. This was accomplished by dis isions with the workers stressing the importance of adhering to the plant procedures and by emphasizing the positive benefits of following the procedures. This approach for strengthening the enforcement of the radiation protection program was used in lieu of adopting the radiation occurrence report system. This matter was discussed further at the exit interview.
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Based on observations during the inspection, discussions with the NRC Resident Inspectors and plant employees, and occurrence of an incident during the decontamination of a fuel cask in May 1981, it appears to the inspector that enforcement of the radiation protection program still needs to be strengthened.
As an example, during this inspection, an individual was observed placing potentially contaminated gloves into the pockets of his lab coat when leaving a radiologically controlled area (sub-basement)
instead of disposing of them. On another occasion, three plant workers received considerable hand contamination during the decontamination of a fuel cask because they chose not to wear the rubber gloves required by the Special Work Permit issued for this job. As a result, extensive hand. decontamination and skin dose evaluation was necessary. The dose evaluation was reviewed and appeared to be adequate. No regulatory limits were exceeded.
Failure to adhere to the requirements of the Special Work Permit represents noncompliance with LACBWR Health Physics Procedure, Section 6.5.
The need for adherence to proper frisking practices was evidenced by shoe contamination experienced by the inspector and a resident inspector during a routine plant tour. The general lack of reported shoe contam-ination by workers and observations by inspectors appear to indicate a need for additional licensee efforts to ensure that workers adhere to proper frisking techniques.
The above problems were discussed at the exit interview.
7.
Health Physics Technician Training Since the Health Physics Appraisal, the licensee has been preparing formal Heal Physics Technician on-the-job training procedures and checklists sich establish documentation in the areas of Radiological and Radio-Analytical Chemistry. These procedures will be incorporated into the licensee's Health and Safety Procedures. Currently, one health physics technician trainee is involved in this program.
In addition, the licensee plans to have the trainee attend certain plant systems training sessions. At the time of this inspection, the other health physics technicians had not received plant systems training.
Although health physics technicians have been trained in inplant airborne sample collection and analyses, not all have been trained in calculations of off-site exposures during accidents, and emergency environmental sampling and analyses. These matters will be reviawed at a future inspection.
8.
Effluent Reports During the Health Physics Appraisal, it was noted that the licensee's major corporate involvenent appeared to be the completion of the semi-annual radioactive effluent report. The licensee was found to be in-5-
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noncompliance for not submitting several of these reports within 60 days after January 1 and July 1 of each year. The licensee did not submit the required report for the period ending December 31, 1980, antil Jarch 31, 1981. Failure to submit this report within the 60-day time period represents noncompliance with Technical Specification 6.9.3(a).
This is a repeat item of noncompliance.
9.
Improved Inplant Iodine Instrumentation under Accident Conditions Licensee actions in response to NUREG-0737, Item III, D.3.3 were reviewed.
Multi-channel analyzers located in the Turbine Building Hot Lab and the Security Building Environmental Lab will be used to analyze the inplant iodine sample silver zeolite and charcoal filters. As a backup to the counting systems, the licensee has a single channel analyzer with an Eberline Model MS-1 miniscaler, an SPA-3 detector, and a lead shield, in the Control Room.
Aa emergency sampling procedure (EPP-6) has been developed and imple-mented. The procedure will be revised to incorporate the use of silver zeolite cartridges instead of the charcoal cartridges. Training will be given in the revised procedures. This matter will be reviewed during a future inspection.
10.
Posting and Control In response to Region III's request that the licensee clarify their procedures and practices to clearly delineate the " restricted area" (10 CFR 20), over which access is controlled for radiation protection purposes, the licensee issued a Health and Safety Memorandum redefining the " restricted area" on December 11, 1980. The " restricted area" is now defined as the area located within the plant security protected area fence; it is the area to which access shall be controlled because of radiaticn and radioactive materials. All personnel are required to be appropriately trained and monitored for radiation exposore before entry into the " restricted area."
11.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Section 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on June 18, 1981.
The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.
In response to certain items discussed by the inspector, the licensee:
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Acknowledged the inspector's remarks concerning the noncompli-ance (Sections 6 and 8).
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Agreed that the enforcement of the radiation protection program
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required strengthening, and stated that a radiation occurrence report system will be developed /Section 6).
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Stated that the position of the h.EA will be created and filled l
in the near future (Section 5).
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