IR 05000409/1981010
| ML20009G305 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png |
| Issue date: | 07/20/1981 |
| From: | Branch M, Forney W, Warnick R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20009G299 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-409-81-10, NUDOCS 8108040109 | |
| Download: ML20009G305 (7) | |
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i U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF. INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
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Report No. 50-409/81-10 Docket No. 50-409 License No. DPR-45 Licensee: Dairyland Power Cooperative 2615 East Avenue, South La Crosse, WI 54601 Facility Name:
La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor Inspection'At: La Crosse Site, Genoa, WI
Inspection Conducted: June 1-30, 1981 fell'8 Inspectors:
W. L. Fo ney 7 /EC /8/
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M. W. Branch 7/20/6/
fWElt h-W Approved By: R.F.Wahnick, Chief 7/40/8/
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j Projects Section 2B t
Inspection Summary Inspection on June 1-30, 1981 (Report No. 50-409/81-10)
Areas Inspected: Routine residenc inspection of Licensee's Operational Safety, 3urveillance Testing, Maintenance Activities, Licensee Event Report i
Followup, Three Year Review of Licensee's Test and Experiment Program, Follow-
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up on Plant Trips and Followup on Open Inspection Items. The inspection
involved a total of 312 inspector-hours on site by two NRC inspectors in-l cluding 24 inspector-hours onsite during offshifts.
Results: Of the seven items inspected, no items of noncompliance were noted
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j in six of the areas. One item of noncompliance was noted in the area of l
Licensee's Test and Experiment Program (failure to report, in the annual report to the commission, all special tests conducted during the years of i
1979 and 1980).
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8108040109 810721 PDR ADOCK 05000409 G
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- R. Shimshak, Plant Superintendent
- J. Parkyn, Assistant Plant Superintendent
- G. Boyd, Operations Supervisor
- L. Goodman, Operations Engineer
- H. Towsley, Quality Assurance Supervisor
- S. Rafferty, Reactor Engineer W. Angle, Process Engineer M. Polsean, Shift Supervisor W. Nowicki, Supervisor, Instrument and Electric R. Wery, QA Specialist
- G. Joseph, Security and Fire Protection Supervisor
- L. Kelley, Assistant Operations Supervisor
- P.
Shafer, Radiation Protection Engineer
- B. Zibung, Health and Safety Supervisor
- Denotes those present at exit interview.
In addition, the inspector observed and held discussions with other engineers, plant equipment operators, reactor operators, assistants, and plant attendants.
2.
General During the month of June, 1981, LACBWR completed the return of all eight spent fuel assemblies from the storage facility at GE-Morris, Illinois.
During transportation of the spent fuel cask between GE-Morris and LACBWR, it was notgd that surface contamination levels above DOT limits of 22,000 dpm/100 cm werediscovereduponreceipgofthecaskeventhoughthecask was decontaminated to 22,000 dpm'100 cm prior to each shipment. USNRC Region III is investigating possible causes and final resolution to this problem.
On the night of June 26, 1981, the Resident Inspector was requested by Plant Management to witness the effect of the "May-Fly" hatches. The
"May-Fly" hatches produce enormous swarms of insects which disrupt security lighting, observation and area surveillance. The Resident Inspector witnessed and photographed the effects and after discussion with USNRC Region III Staff will forward the photographs to Region III personnel for evaluation.
3.
Operational Safety Verification The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the month of June, 1981. The inspector verified the operability of selected-2-
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emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the reactor building and turbine building were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify thet maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. The inspector by observation and direct inter-view verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. During the month of June, 1981, the inspector walked down ti.o accessible portions of the Nuclear Instrumentation and the Boron Injection systems to verify operability. The inspector also witnessed portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with radwaste shipments and barreling.
These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under Technical Specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures.
The inspectors noted that on June 22, 1981, several Plant Staff personnel failed to indicate, on the job site Copy of Special Work Permit (81-115),
there entry into and exit from the work site. This item was identified to the Plants Radiation Protection Engineer and to the Health Physics Section of USNRC Region III for resolution.
The plant is in the process of developing a Radiological Occurrence Report Systeu which will be used as the vehicle for identifying, evaluating and correcting items of this nature in the future. This item is considered unresolved item Number 81-10-01.
The inspectors also noted that the security guard force may not have provided sufficient compensatory measure for a security equipment malfunction. This item was identified to the Plant's Security Director and to the Security Section of USNRC Region III for resolution. This item is considered unresolved item Number 81-10-02.
On June 20, 1981, during a routine primary plant cooldown, reactor water level droppad to -12 taches causing the initiation of both High Pressure l
Core Spray Pumps, containment isolation and the start of both Emergency Diesel Generators. The low water level was caused by operator error, in l
that the Decay Heat System was being filled and the operator was not paying close attention to his water level indication. This item was discussed with LACBWR management and the operar.or involved and the plant initiated an Incident Report to document, evaluate and recommend permanent corrective action.
No items of noncompliance were noted.
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4.
Monthly Maintenance Observation Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with Technical Specifications.
The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by quali-fied personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and, fire prevention controls were implemented.
Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.
The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:
a.
Repairs to Power Range Nuclear Instrument Channel No. 8.
b.
Repairs to excessive leakage on Control Rod Drive No. 20 upper unit seals.
c.
Repairs to excessive Hydraulic Oil leakage on Control Rod Drive No. 20 lower unit seals.
Following completion of maintenance on the Power Range Nuclear Instrument Channel No. 8 and Control Rod Drive No. 20, the inspector verified that these systems had been returned to service properly.
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No items of noncompliance were noted.
5.
Monthly Surveillance Observation The inspector observed technical specifications required surveillance testing on the Nuclear Instrument Power Range Channels No. 5, 6, 7 and 8 and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instxuaentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with Technical Specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed l
by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any l
deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
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The inspector also reviewed portions of the following test activities:
Bi-weekly Test of Radiation detection equipment, the No. 1A and IB Emergency Diesel Generator monthly test and the No. 1A r.nd 1B High Pressure Service Water Emergency Diesel Pumps-Monthly Test.
No items of noncompliance were noted.
6.
Licensee Event Reports Followup Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event repacts were reviewed to deter-mine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate correc-tive action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications.
LER 81-05 - During operations, Technical Specification limits for Reactor Power / Force Circulation flow was exceeded on numerous occasions since 1973.
LER 81-06 - Unauthorized modification to Reactor Containment Pressure Transmitter System.
LER 81-07 - Failure of Emergency Service Water Supply System to supply the required flow rate.
LER's 81-05 and 81-06 were reviewed prior to this report period, and items of noncompliance were issued in Inspection Report No. 50-409/81-09.
7.
Test and Experiment Program The inspector verified that a formal method has been established by the licensee to handle all requests or proposals for conducting plant tests and experiments involving safety related components, systems or structures including any changes in the modes of operation described in LACBWR's Safeguards Report.
The inspector selected the following special test, as categorized by licensee, utilizing their Administrative Control Procedure (ACP)
12.1, and verified that the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59 were being implemented. The licensee has not conducted any experiments during 1979 and 1980.
a.
STP - 79-01 (ISI 10 year system test procedure)
b.
STP - 75-01 (High Pressure Service Water Pump performance test)
c.
STP - B0C-6 (Procedures for certain tests required during the first startup and power escalation after the 1979 Refueling Outage)
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d.
STP - 40-01 (Determination of Shutdown Margin as required by IE Bulletin No. 79-26)
e.
STP - 37-01 (Signal Analysis of Containment Pressure Monitor 37-35-301)
Special test STP - 75-01, conducted in 1979 and special test STP - 37-01, conducted in 1980 were not reported to the commission in the 1979 or 1980 Annual Report as required by Paragraph (b) of 10 CFR 50.59 and Paragraph 5.2.5 of ACP 12.1.
Per discussion with plant staff, it appears that index of Special Test Procedures is not reviewed prior to compiling the Annual Report to the Commission.
This is considered to be an item of noncompliance.
8.
Plant Scrams Following the plant scrams on June 14, 1981 and June 15, 1981, caused by erroneous power spikes on Nuclear Instrumentation Channel No. 8 and plant scram on June 19, 1981, caused by loss of power to the Reactor Building motor control center No. IA, the inspector ascertained the status of the reactor and safety systems by observation of control room indicators and discussions with licensee personnel concerning plant parameters, emergency system status and reactor coolant chemistry.
The inspector verified the establishment of proper communications and reviewed the corrective actions taken by the licensee.
All systems responded as expected, and the plant was returned to operation on June 16, 1981 and again on June 19, 1981.
No items of noncompliance were noted.
9.
Followup on Open Inspection Items (OII)
a.
(Closed)
(Noncompliance 81-06-1)1/ Operator error, improper switching. Plant has indicated in LAC 7433 dated March 22, 1981 and LAC 7584 dated June 8, 1981 that plant personnel have been reinstructed in the areas of compliance with procedures and correct manipulations of controls.
10.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations. Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraph 3.
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IE Inspection Report No. 50-409/81-06-6-
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11.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities.
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