IR 05000400/1991300
| ML18010A376 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 08/09/1991 |
| From: | Casto C, Curtis Rapp NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18010A375 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-91-300, NUDOCS 9109100133 | |
| Download: ML18010A376 (8) | |
Text
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e UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 ENCLOSURE
EXAMINATION REPORT NO. 50-400/91-300 Facility Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Facility Name:
Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant Facility Docket No.: 50-400 Facility License No.: NPF-63 Examinations were administered at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant near New Hill, North Carolina.
Chief Examiner:
C r Rapp
D te Signed Approved By:
Charles A. Casto, ief Operator Licensing Section
Division of Reactor Safety 8-9 9r Date Signed SUMMARY Examinations were administered to 12 Senior Reactor Operators (SROs)
and eight Reactor Operators (ROs) during the weeks of July 15 and 22, 1991.
All operators passed these examinations.
Six crew simulator examinations were administered; all crews were rated as satisfactory.
Based on these results, 20 of 20 (100 percent)
licensed operators passed these examinations.
'7109100133 910812 PDR ADOCN, 05000400 V
REPORT DETAILS 1.
Facilit Em lo ees Attendin Exit Interview C. Hinnant, General Manager J. Collins, Operations Manager L. Hartin, Nuclear Training Manager W. Powell, Harris Training Unit Manager J.
Boska, License Training Manager J.
Bryan, Simulator Manager R. Smith, Harris Training Unit Senior Specialist L. Smith, Operations Senior Control Operator 2.
Examiners
- C. Rapp, Region II, NRC T. Reidinger, Region III, NRC T. Guilfoil, Sonalyst
- Chief Examiner Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are defined in Paragraph 4.
3.
Exit Interview At the conclusion of the site visit, the examiners met with facility representatives to discuss the results of the examinations.
The following observations were discussed during this meeting.
a.
Communications during the crew simulator examinations were judged to be very weak.
b.
Criteria for determining a loss of pressure control, as used in the EAL classification flowchart, needs to be more definitive.
c.
The operators manually initiated SI before ensuring the reactor was shutdown.
de The facility evaluators displayed many weaknesses during administration of JPHs.
e.
Written examination development was impared by a lack of adequate Part A and Part B examination bank questions.
Further details concerning these observations are provided in Enclosure 2.
The cooperation given to the examiners was also noted and appreciated.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the examiner Enclosure I 4.
Acron ms and Initialisms ATWS Anticipated Transient Without Scram BOP Balance of Plant Operator EAL Emergency Action Level FWI Feedwater Isolation JPH Job Performance Measure LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident RCP Reactor Coolant Pump RCS Reactor Coolant System RO Reactor Operator RVLIS Reactor Vessel Level Indication System SCO
, Senior Control Operator SI Safety Injection STA Shift Technical Advisor
Enclosure
RE UALIFICATION PROGRAM EVALUATION REPORT Re uglification Pro ram Evaluation Based on examination results and the following evaluation, the Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant requalification program meets the evaluation criteria of NUREG-1021 and is rated as satisfactory.
The simulator scenarios used for these examinations were judged adequate for normal and abnormal evolutions; however there needs to be a wider selection of emergency evolutions.
During the crew simulator examinations, the following observations were made.
l.
All crews manually initiated SI before ensuring the reactor was shutdown.
Since the SI causes an FWI, this has the potential to result in an ATWS with inadequate heat removal.
2.
Communications were inaccurate causing confusion and delays in implementing required actions.
The use of slang terms or obscure replies to requests for precise information and failure to respond to requests were observed.
Specific examples of these communication weaknesses follow.
This weakness is viewed as significant because it occurred with all crews.
a.
When the SCO asked for RCS pressure, the RO responded by stating it was
",way high."
This response did not supply current RCS pressure value to the SCO.=
b.
When the SCO asked the STA how to calculate cooldown values, the STA replied they would have "to use Mexican."
This was interpreted by the NRC examiners to infer a manual calculation was required.
c.
During a steam line break, the BOP reported steam flow was "coming up royal."
d.
During an ATWS event, the SCO asked the RO if the "boration valves" were shut.
It was unclear if the SCO was referring to the emergency boration valve, the normal boration valve, or both.
Also, the RO did not respond to this question.
3.
The guidance on how to interpret a loss of pressure control when classifying an event using the EAL classification flowchart was unclear.
The current guidance allows the operator to take whatever action is necessary to control pressure including reduction or termination of SI flow.
With this guidance, it would appear there is no possible condition that would be determined to be a loss of pressure control.
This will be addressed during future NRC inspection Enclosure
Facilit Generated Reference Material The reference material supplied by the facility was reviewed to determine its adequacy for examination development and administration.
The facility supplied an adequate number of open reference questions and static simulator scenarios for development of the written examinations.
The JPHs and dynamic simulator scenarios provided for,development of the operating examinations were acceptable.
A sufficient amount of additional reference material was provided to the examination team.
NRC examiners met with members of the facility training and operations staff the week of June 3, 1991 for the purpose of examination construction.
The examiners used the licensee generated sample plan to develop these examina-tions.
The sample plan adequately identified applicable examination topics and served as the test outline.
The scope and content of the written examinations were satisfactory.
Some deficiencies in test item construction were identified and corrected.
Specific lessons learned from this portion of the examination process include:
1.
Written Examination The proposed examinations required extensive modification because the questions did not test comprehension or analytical skills, did not contain plausible distractors, or were placed in the wrong part of the examination.
ES-602, Requalification Written Examinations, states the purpose is to test the operators'bility to obtain and apply information to operational situations.
Hany questions required significant modification to further address system or plant response.
Additionally, several questions had to be developed or added by NRC examiners to meet examination time requirements.
A number of procedure-related questions were incorrectly placed in the Part A examination bank.
This resulted in replacing these questions with questions outside the sample plan.
These replacement questions did not, exceed the 20 percent allowed by NUREG-1021.
2.
JPHs Performance time limits were excessively long.
The performance time limit should be representative of how long it would normally take an operator to perform the task.
ES-603 states the facility's expectations for task performance shall be incorporated when performance time limits are established.
The JPNs did not contain a sufficient number of cues or the cues were inadequate.
Cues should be given for each action performed and provide the individual with adequate information about the action performe Enclosure
Several JPMs had verification steps identified as critical when the component was in the expected position.
Verification is critical only when component alignment will not allow the JPM to be successfully completed.
The JPH bank needs to be expanded to include more tasks having off-normal responses.
JPH follow-up questions need significant improvement.
The questions need to be more specific, have only one correct answer, and should probe beyond asking for setpoints or actuation signals.
ES-603 states JPM questions shall be such that 'the answer cannot be determined by a simple lookup.
3.
Simulator Examinations The ISCT methodology in ES-604, Requalification Simulator Examinations, needs to be followed more closely.
Safety significance should be considered within the scope of the scenario and not generically.
Additionally, successful completion criteria needs to be included to ensure consistent evaluation.
The examination bank needs to be more diverse.
Scenarios involving off-normal situations with related failures must be included.
4.
Examination Administration The facility's examination schedule was determined to be extremely resource intensive.
The schedule required the development of four additional simulator scenarios, resulted in the loss of a half-day each week, and extended the walkthrough.examinations beyond ten hours each week.
5.
Facilit Evaluator Evaluation An evaluation of the facility's evaluators was conducted.
Due to the inexperience of the evaluators, several significant weaknesses were observed.
Details of these weaknesses are given below.
The NRC determined all facility evaluators were satisfactory.
a.
The evaluators were not prepared to give cues when the operator took an unexpected action or requested additional information.
This resulted in the NRC examiner having to supply the necessary information.
b.
Additional probing was seldom conducted when an incomplete or vague answer was given to a JPH follow-up question.
When additional probing was conducted, the evaluators failed to document the question and response,
Enclosure
c.
Cuing during JPHs was inconsistent or inaccurate.
This caused
'
evaluations to be dependent on the evaluators'udgement instead of demonstrated operator performance.
d.
The evaluators relied on NRC examiners to approve any additional information given or questions asked during the conduct of the JPH ENCLOSURE 3 SIMULATOR FACILITY FIDELITY REPORT Facility Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company Facility Docket No.:
50-400 Operating Tests Administered On:
July 16, 17, 23, and 24, 1991 This form is to be used only to report observations.
These observations do not constitute, in and of themselves, audit or inspection findings and are not, without further verification or review, indic'ative of noncompliance with
CFR 55.45(b).
These observations do not'ffect NRC certification for approval of the simulation facility other than to provide information which may be used
.in future evaluations.
No licensee action is required solely in response to these observations.
During loss of heat sink and certain LOCA conditions, core exit thermocouple temperatures either decreased or remained stable when inadequate core cooling conditions existed.
Pumps do not exhibit indications of cavitation when a suction source is not available.
During a slow RCS depressurization with RCPs running, RVLIS indicated vessel level, at 298 percent.