IR 05000397/1991001
| ML17286A649 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 02/19/1991 |
| From: | Huey F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17286A647 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-91-01, 50-397-91-1, NUDOCS 9103190043 | |
| Download: ML17286A649 (10) | |
Text
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION V
Report No.:
50-397/91-01 Docket No.:
50-397 Licensee:
Washington Public Power Supply System P. 0.
Box 968 Richland, Washington 99352 Facility Name:
Washington Nuclear Project No.
2 (WNP-2)
Inspection at:
MNP-2 Site near Richland, Washington Inspection Conducted:
January 22-25, 1991 Inspectors:
F.
R. Huey, Chief, Engineering Section W. J.
Wagner, Reactor Inspector P
Approved by:
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F. R. Huey, Chief Engineering Section
~Sunmar:
Da e S gned Ins ection Durin the Period of Januar 22-25 1991 Re ort No. 50-397/91-01
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inspectors of the licensee's non-licensed staff training and design modification activities.
Inspection Procedures 37700 and 41400 were used as guidance during this inspection.
Results:
General Conclusions on Stren ths and Weaknesses Areas of Stren ths The Plant Technical Staff training program appeared to be satisfactory, although only in the initial stages of development.
Design and System eagineers had a satisfactory knowledge and understanding of the Control Rod Drive (CRD) system.
Areas of Weaknesses System Engineers were not significantly involved in the technical engineering review of design change '89-0200 to the CRD system.
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9l02X9 PDR ADOCK 05000397 Q
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Scram accumulator system check valve and leak test acceptance
'riteria had riot been defined in the applicable check valve leak test procedure.,
No specific operability criteria were defined for the Hydraulic Control Unit (HCU).
No Problem Evaluation Report or Nonconformance Report had been written to evaluate or correct long term deficiencies involving CRD/HCU system leakage.
Si nificant Safet Matters:
'None Summar of Violation and Deviati'ons:
One violation was -identified concerning as ure to prov>
e appropr>ate quantitative acceptance criteria - paragraph 2.
0 en Items Summar One new item was opene DETAILS Persons Contacted
- A. Oxsen, Deputy Managing Director
- J. Baker, Plant Manager
+* L. Harrold, Assistant Plant Manager
'
J. Peters, Administrative Manager,
- J.
Harmon, Maintenance Manager
~ R. Mebring, Plant Technical Manager
- R. Koenigs, Generation Engineering Manager
- A. Hosier, WNP-2 Licensing Manager
- J.
Vause, Technical Assessment Manager
- J. Arbuck1e, Compliance Engineer M. Shaeffer, Assistant Operations Manager M. Waddel, Planning and Scheduling Manager S. Washingtzm,
'comp1iance Supervisor P. McBurney, guality Assurance Engineer G. Gelhaus, Plant Technical Assistant Manager L. Sharp, Principle Mechanical/Nuclear Engineer The inspectors also interviewed other licensee employees during the course of the inspection including two system engineers and one design engineer.
- Denotes those attending the Exit Meeting on January 25, 1991.
+
Participated in telephone discussion on February 19, 1991.
Desi n Chan es and Modifications (37700 The inspectors focused their inspection effort on Plant Design Change (PDC) 89-0200, to determine licensee conformance with NRC requirements.
PDC 89-0200 was part of the corrective action taken to resolve Plant'perations Committee Action Item 88-22-01 to evaluate WNP-2 for unmonitored release paths.
The design change included the installation of two check valves (CRD-V-524 5 525),
one globe valve (CRD-V-526) and
vent valves.
The check valves perform the safety-related function of preventing unmonitored bypass leakage from the reactor vessel to the area outside of the reactor building during post-LOCA conditions.
The administrative procedure applicable to all modifications or design changes is Plant Procedures Manual (PPM) Procedure No. 1.4.1, entitled
"Plant Modifications," Revision ll.
This procedure defines the reviews and approvals needed from conception to initiation of the final design.
This procedure also addresses implementation requirements for the change including testing, procedure updating and training.
The administrative aspects of PDC 89-0200 were in accordance with PPM No.
1.4.1.
and had received the necessary reviews and approvals.
The inspectors also verified that the following documents were revised,
P
updated, or initiated to reflect changes related to the design change/modi ficati on:
PPM 2. 1.1, "Control Rod Drive System,"
Revision 9, dated February 18, 1990:
The CRD valve list was revised to include CRD-Y-526.
PPM 1.3.29,
"Locked Valve Checklist," Revision 16, dated September 27, 1990:
CRD-V-526 was incorporated with the required v'alve condition as locked open.
PPM 8.3.157,
"CRD-V-524 and 525.Leakage Test," Revision 1, dated October 20, 1989:
This procedure was initiated to provide direction specifically for liquid leakage testing of check valves CRD-V-524 and 525.
Drawing M 528, "Flow Diagram Control Rod Drive System," Revision 55, dated August 31, 1990:
Revision 51 dated September 7,
1989 incorporated the modifications of PDC 89-0220.
The inspectors questioned why the check valves were not part of the Inservice Testing (IST) program.
The reason given was that the IST program is a
ASME Section XI requirement for pumps and valves installed in systems ori'ginally built to ASME Section III requirements.
The check valves were installed in a system built to ANSI 831.1,
"Power Piping,"
requirements and, therefore, are not subject to ASME Section XI IST requirements.
However, the check valves are on the Scheduled Maintenance System for periodic testing on a 24 month frequency.
The initial leakage test was performed on June 22, 1989.
The inspectors questioned the leak rate and pressure test requirements specified for the check valves.
The test requirements were bounded by the system operating pressure and ASME Section XI leakage criteria.
The values specified were found to be acceptable and within the design basis analysis.
The inspectors considered that, in establishing the leakage rate acceptance criteria, the licensee's engineering staff had appropriately considered all potential liquid bypass leakage paths from the CRD system.
The inspectors'eview of PDC 89-0200 included discussions with the responsible design and system engineers to evaluate their knowledge of the CRD system and understanding of the design change.
The design engineers were not only knowledgeable of the CRDS system and the design.
but were also able to address the purpose of specific components within the system.
The system engineers also had a good working knowledge of the system; however, they had not been significantly involved in the design=-change review.
Consequently, they were not knowledgeable of the design change specifics.
The inspectors identified a concern separate from the design change, but within the CRD system.
The CRD-Hydraulic Control Unit (HCU) accumulator check valves were noted to have a long history of leakage problems.
.
These check valves are required to maintain accumulator pressure above the low pressure alarm point of 940 psig upon the loss of both CRD hydraulic pumps.
There have been approximately 440 trouble alarms in the control room, since May 1990, associated with the HCUs.
Also, numerous
18 month Technical Specification (TS) surveillance tests indicated that pressure was retained for only 2 to 3 minutes during testing of the accumulator check valves.
These leakage problems have, been in various stages of evaluation since early 1989 but do not appear to have received proper management attention. 'he inspectors'oncern was that scram accumulator leak testing problems should have been elevated to an appropriate review process in order to receive a proper engineering evaluation in a timely manner.
No Problem Evaluation Report (PER) or Nonconformance (NCR) were generated to evaluate the problem.
TS Section 4.1.3.5'.b.2 requires individual accumulator check valve performance to be measured and recorded for up to 10 minutes with both CRD pumps off.
No minimum retention time at the accumulator pressure was specified by the TS.
Instructions provided to perform these TS required tests are addressed in Surveillance Procedure (SP)
No. 7.4.1.3.5.3, Revision 3, dated December 29, 1987, entitled "Control Rod Scram Accumulator Check Valve Operability Check."
This procedure describes nine steps which must be performed to properly test the check valves.
.
Section 7.4.1.3.5.3.8 of the SP defines the acceptance criteria as the
"Successful performance of the above steps."
No specific quantitative acceptance cr iter ia were included in this SP to assure that an appropriate pressure is maintained for an appropriate time in order to demonstrate that the check valves are operable, as required by TS 4.1.3.5-2.
The failure to provide appropriate quantitative acceptance criteria for
,performing the operability check of the control rod scram accumulator check valves is an apparent violation (50-397/91-01-01).
Non-Licensed Staff Trainin (41400 The inspectors reviewed the training program developed for the Technical Support Staff and Managers (TSSM).
A description of the courses provided is contained in the TSSM Training Program Course Catalog which was approved by the licensee Training Manager on August 6, 1990.
The TSSM training program, accredited by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), is divided into General Training, Professional Training, and other Job Specific Training.
The General Training course offerings are'.
General Employee training, Nuclear Power Plant Fundamentals, BMR Introductory Systems, Basic Plant Operation, and Management and Personnel Developaent.
The Professional Training course addresses, among others, Industry Events Training.
Job Specific Training includes courses such as 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluations, Design Basis Training, Technical Specifications, Plant Problem Reports, and Plant Modification Requests.
Selected exempt employees subject to the TSSM training program are from the following departments:
Operations, Plant Technical, Maintenance, Health Physics, Chemistry, Planning and Scheduling, Radiological Programs, and Emergency Plannin C~
The Plant Technical staff. training program is expected to be fully implemented by December, 1992.
The inspectors concluded that the training program was ambitious and the training schedule and selection of topics appeared appropr iate for the needs of the Plant Technical staff to better perform their tasks.
The training program provided for the Generation Engineering staff was not as formalized as that developed for the TSSM, nor had the program received INPO accreditation.
However, training is provided on Engineering Changes,
CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluations,
CFR
.50 Appendix R
Separation Criteria, and Simulator Training.
No violations or deviations were identified.
~tit II tt The inspectors met with the licensee management representatives denoted in paragraph 1 on January 25, 1991.
The scope of the inspection and the findsngs as described in this report were discussed.
Also, on February 19, 1991, a telephone conversation was held between Region V and licensee personnel (denoted in paragraph 1) to discuss the apparent violation described in paragraph j 0