IR 05000397/1979008
| ML17272A540 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 05/25/1979 |
| From: | Bishop T, Haynes R, Narbut P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17272A539 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-79-08, 50-397-79-8, NUDOCS 7907260557 | |
| Download: ML17272A540 (11) | |
Text
Report No.
50"397/79"08 Docket No.
U ~ S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION V
License No.
CPPR
Safeguards Group i'Jashington Public Power Supply System P. 0.
Box 968 Richland, Washington 99352 Facility Name:
Washin ton Nuclear Pro ect No.
PJNP-,2 Inspection at:
t'JNP-2 site, Benton County, t'Jashington Inspection c
ducted:
i1,23-26,
'l979 Inspectors:
Da e Sig ed P.
P. Narbut, Reactor Inspector Date Signed Approved By:
Summary:
R.
C. Haynes, Chief, Projects Section, Reactor Construction and Engineering Support Branch Date Sign d
~ 2.s-.7Z D te Signed Ins ection on A ril 23-26, 1979 Re ort No. 50-397/79-08
~Ad:
R
.
dd g
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inspectors of construction activities including:
observations-of safety-related piping work and review. of. quality. records; reactor re-circulation nozzle modifications - review of quality implementing procedures, observations of work activities, review of quality records; reactor vessel protection and preservatirn - review of quality pro-cedures, observations of work, and review of quality records; and followup on previous inspection findings.
The inspection involved 54 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC inspectors.
Results:
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
RV Form 719 (2)
DETAILS Persons Contacted Washin ton Public Power Su
S stem WPPSS
+*D. L. Renberger, Assistant Directior, Technology
+~A.
D. Kohler, WNP-2 Project Manager
+"J. Janus, Construction Manager
+M. E. Witherspoon, Division Manager, Quality Assurance
+"A. M. Sastry, WNP-2 Project Quality Assurance Manager
- C. R.
Edwards, Hanager, Vendors/Audits
- J. H. Steidl, Sr. Quality Assurance Engineer D.
C. Timmons, Project Engineer, WNP-2 F.
R.
Ozment, Sr. Maintenance Engineer G. I. Wells, Construction Specialist
- M. F. Sullivan, Sr. Quality Assurance Engineer Burns 5 Roe, Inc.
R
- W. P.
Rausch, Quality Assurance Director
- R.
C. Root, Deputy Project Manager
- G. T. Harper, Jr.,
Manager, Technical Support
- H. J. Parise, Deputy Project Quality Assurance Manager P.
Hassman, Sr. Quality Assurance Engineer, Electrical Fischback/Lord J. Collins, Quality Assurance Manager WSH Boecon Bovee and Crail GERI L. Ramsett, Corporate Quality Assurance Hanager A. Larson, Quality Assurance Manager L. Buckner, Quality Control Supervisor P.
Young, Quality Control Inspection Supervisor R. Taron, Quality Control Inspection Supervisor General Electric Installation and Service.
En ineerin GE IPSE V. Lesiuk, Site Manager W. Pappin, QC Supervisor
+Denotes those present at management meeting on April 24, 1979.
- Denotes those present at exit interview on April 26, 197.
Construction Status Licensee representatives reported that the construction of WNP-2 was 66% complete as of April 20, 1979.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Ins ection Findin s
a 4 b.
A (Open)
Noncompliance (50-397/79-01/Ol):
Piping system clean-liness was not maintained.
The licensee's response to the item of noncompliance was su~earized in WPPSS letter No. G02-79-28 of February 22, 1979.
With the exception of the revision to Work Procedure No. 59, all actions identified in the letter were verified during a
previous inspection.
Work Procedure No. 59, Revision 6, entitled "Cleanliness Program and Control Procedure" and its implementation were examined during the current inspection.
The inspection of six partially welded joints and three capped pipes revealed that, in general, cleanliness is being controlled in accordance with WP-59.
It was noted, however, that some of the. requirements of WP-59 for controlling material which is temporarily left inside equipment have not been fully imple-mented.
The inspector observed a tag indicating temporary material was inside the pipe, yet this condition was not noted on the appropriate weld record form as required by the procedure.
In addition, the procedure refers to the use of a "Temporary Material Log."
Contractor representatives stated that it was their understanding that the requirement for the log had been deleted, accordingly no such log had been developed for piping inside the containment.
Licensee representatives stat'ed that the control of temporary material. would be reviewed and appro-priate action taken.
This item will remain open pending full implementation of WP-59 and will be re-examined during a
subsequent inspection.
{Open) Followup item {50-397/78-10/07):
Equipment maintenance inspection record forms are inconsistent with corresponding procedures.
The licensee has implemented the revised equipment maintenance inspection program defined in Work Procedure No. WP-106.
The programmatic aspects of the revised'rogram were examined during a previous inspection and were found satisfactory.
Implementation of the program was examined. during the current inspection.
A sample of five recently inspected pumps and the associated inspection records were examined.
It was noted that two of the pumps (reactor recirculation pumps RRC-P-lA
,and lB) had not yet been incorporated into the WP-106 program.
The pumps were being inspected under the old maintenance program.
Licensee representatives stated that the WNP-2 plant
equipment list would be compared to the HP-106 equipment maintenance list to assure all equipment is incorporated into the new maintenance program.
Inspection of the five pumps selected identified that the protective covers of the two RRC pumps had been tom and debris had accumulated on the pumps.
The remaining three pumps were found to be in a satisfactory condition.
Hhile the damaged RRC pump covers were replaced prior to the end of the current inspection, it is noted that ad'ditional efforts are required to assure all critical com-ponents are included in the maintenance program and components are maintained in a clean and protected fashion as required by the maintenance program.
This item will be further examined during a subsequent inspection.
(Closed)
Followup item (50-397/78-10/08):
Possible concrete voids in the sacrificial shield wall.
The licensee has approved a project change notice (PCN 6641)
which provides for the investigation of the sacrificial shield wall for voids.
The. approval (provided in HPPSS letter HPBR-.79-165 of April 13, 1979) states that the primary approach in investigating for voids in concrete will consist of exam-ination during startup and/or operation, using. the reactor core as a neutron and gamma source.
This investigation will be carried out in two stages, as follows:
(1)
Initially, neutron detection devices will be placed at selected locations in the drywell to detect possible neutron streaming near vulnerable safety-related equip-ment, and to measure general neutron flux levels during operation.
These devices will be retrieved and examined when the reactqr is shut, down.
and an evaluation then made regarding whether or not excessive voids exist. If it is determined that excessive voids exist, gamma detectors will be used with the'ission products in the core as a
source to pinpoint the location of the voids.
Corrective measures will then be taken.
All this will take place.
when the reactor is shut down.
(2)
The licensee has directed the AE to evaluate whether or not it is possible for permissible radiation dose rates for safety-related equipment to be exceeded during a
single refueling cycle (assuming worst-case voids were.
present).
If so, then an examination will be made prior to startup of those areas where void formation is likely, and where adjacent safety-related vulnerable equipment is located.
Such examination, if required, would most likely consist of drilling or cutting through the skin plat ~It appears that the action being taken by the licensee is sufficient to identify and correct any excessive voids in.
the sacrificial shield wall.
The inspector has no further questions on this matter at this time.
(Closed)
Followup item (50-397/79-04/06):
Electrical contractor's calibration procedure did not clearly specify evaluation or documentation requirements for equipment found out of calibration.
The contractor has consolidated procedures CP-801 and gAP-801 into CP/gCP-801, Revision OA, entitled "Calibration and Certifi-cation of Tools, Inspection and Test Equipment."
The new procedure was examined and found to be consistent with PSAR, specification, and
CFR 50 Appendix B requirements.
The procedure requires the issuence,of an inspection report (IR)
or a nonconformance report (NCR) if equipment is received for calibration in an out-of-tolerance condition.
An evaluation of the previous use of the equipment is to be made and docu-mented in the IR/NCR.
The inspector examined recent calibration data and verified that appropriate, evaluations and documentation had been made.
This item is closed.
(Open)
Followup item (50-397/79-04/09):
Inadequate hydraulic cable crimping tool calibration procedure and documentation.
The THB-15 hydraulic crimping tool calibration procedure has been recently revised by the tool manufacturer.
The manufacturer's recommendations have incorporated into a revision of the electrical contractors Calibration Procedure No. TI-2.
The revised procedure was in the review circuit at the time of the current inspection.
This item will remain open pending issuance and verification of implementation of the revised procedure.
(Closed)
Unresolved item (50-397/79-04/10):
480 Volt circuit breakers. of different quality classes may be interchangeable.
Licensee investigation has established that all flestinghouse 480 volt circuit breakers were designed, fabricated, and tested to seismic and quality class I requirements, although their service at l<NP-2 may be either quality class I or c1ass II..
However, since breakers of different quality classes may be subjected to different handling requirements over the 40-
'ear life 'of the plant, the licensee has initiat'ed action to modify those breakers which perform quality class I service.
The modification, which will be accomplished in accordance with engineering directive PED-H218-E-1457, will change an interference bracket i
.
to preclude interchangeability of breakers of different quality classes.
The inspector reviewed the results of the licensee's investigation and the engi neering directive.
The action taken by the licensee was found to be-consistent with PSAR and specification requirements.
The.
inspector has no further questions on this ite I 4.
Reactor Pressure Boundar and Other Safet -Related Pi in
'IJeldin a.
Observations of Work and Work Activities The inspector examined inprocess and completed work associated with 22 weld joints.
The welds and associated activities were examined for compliance to the requirements of the applicable welding procedure specification,Section III of the ASHE code, and the PSAR.
Of the 22 welds. examined, 3 were 26" mainsteam-piping (HS-530-1.3 series),
3 were 12" reactor feedwater.
piping RFW-419-8.9 Pi2, 2A, 3),
2 were reactor water cleanup piping (RWCU-818-5.7 88A, RWCU-818-3.4, b2),
and 14 were 1" reactor core isolatioh cooling piping (RCIC-665-4.9 series).
The welding activities were examined for weld fit-up and cleanliness (where accessible),
identification, location, size, appearance, interpass temperature control, WPS compliance, use of specified filler metals and evidence of gC verifications.
The welding activities. were found to be properly controlled and in compliance with all requirements.
No items of non-compliance or deviations were identified.
b.
Review of ualit Records The inspector examined inprocess records associated with the above welds.
The records included.
WPS qualification records, weld'er qualification records, material certifications and test reports, weld inspection records, weld filler material with-drawal slips, and NDE records.
(<o items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
5.
Reactor Recirculation Inlet Nozzle Safe End Re lacement In order to improve plant reliability, the licensee has initiated action to replace the existing Inconel recirculation inlet nozzle safe ends.
The current design of the safe ends creates a crevice condition at the thermal sleeve attachment.
The replacement safe ends will be of 316L material and a "tuning fork" design.
The new design is intended to preclude the intergranular stress corrosion cracking phenomenon associated with Inconel and a crevice geometry.
a.
Review of ualit Assurance I'm lementin Procedures The inspector examined the specifications and licensee im-plementing procedures for the reactor recirculation inlet nozzle safe end replacement program to determine compliance to the requirements of the ASJ<E BEPV Code and Regu'1atory Guide 1.44,Control of the Use of Sensitized Stee The following procedures were examined:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
,(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(1 1 )
(12)
GE Specification 22A6643AD, Revision 0, February 27, 1979, Reactor Vessel Recirculation Inlet Nozzle GE Specification 21A2039, Revision 1, January 10, 1974, Weld Metal Interfaced Location GE Specification 21A2040, Revision 0, January ll, 1974, Cleaning and Cleanliness Control for. Field Modifications of Vessel Components GE Field Disposition Instruction 61/113050, Revision
March 9, 1979, RPV Recirculation Nozzles WPPSS Procedure SEN-1 Recirculation Safe End Modifications, Revision 0, March 8, 1979 WPPSS Procedure SEH-2 Installation of Temporary Supports/
Restraints on Recirculation System, Revision 0, March 6, 1979 WPPSS Procedure SEN-3, Revision 0, Installation of Temporary Restraints for Jet Pump Risers, March 29, 1979 WPPSS Procedure SEN-4, Revision 0, Machining Sequence for Disassembly of Recirculation Hozzles, March 7, 1979 WPPSS Procedure SEN-5, Revision 0, Position Monitoring of Recirculation Piping System and Jet Pump Risers, March 29, 1979 WPPSS Procedure SEH-6 Installation of Replacement Com-ponents and Closure Spools, April 16, 1979 Power Cutting Inc Procedure PCI-1 Machining Procedure for Removal of Closure Spools Power Cutting Inc Procedure PCI-2 Machining Procedure for External Weld Preparations, Revision 0 (13)
(14)
Power Cutting Inc Procedure PCI-3 Machining Procedure for Removing Safe End Extension from Closure Spools, Revision WPPSS ISI/NDE Instruction QCS&I-077, Revision 0, February 1979, Instruction fot Ultrasonic Thickness Measurement and Weld Location 20,
-7-While no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified, the following items were noted:
The specification instructions (FDI 61/113060)
require that the recirculation pump discharge line be blocked when performing the cut on th'e vertical recirculation riser to prevent machining chips from falling in the pump discharge line.
The licensee's implementing procedure (SEN-4, Disassembly Sequence)
does not require blocking, the discharge line but instead requires the final parting to be done by grinder which precludes chips but does not preclude grinding dust and grinder particles.
The licensee representatives stated that they would evaluate the use of a single wheel pipe cutter or similar device to pre-clude the entry of grinding particles.
(2)
Because of the sensitivity of safe ends to chemical con-taminants, the specifications for safe end replacement have specific recommen'ded controls on cleaning and the
.control of the chemical content of miscellaneous materials sucIi as tape, grinding wheels, penetrants, etc.
The licensee's local implementing procedures, however, provide nondefinitive instructions such as "clean" (after machining the weld bevel preparation)
and do not invoke special contaminant controls.
Licensee representatives stated that the procedures for cutting and preparation for welding would be revised to be specific in regards-to cleaning methods.
Additionally, licensee representatives stated that action would be taken to resolve the method of control of miscellaneous materials.
(3)
(4)
The procedure for reassembly of the safe ends (SEN-6)
requires quality control per'sonnel to check the fitup of the thermal sleeve to ensure it is parallel and concentric to the safe end.
No quantitative values are given for parallelism or concentricity.
Licensee representatives stated that the procedure would be revised to provide quantitative values.
The reassembly procedure (SEM-6) uses a pipe dam for cleanliness control during pipe weld bevel preparation.,
'.
After dam removal the procedure requires that quality control personnel verify cleanliness.
- The method and scope of the cleanliness verification was not clearly identified in the procedure.
Licensee representatives stated that the procedure would be revised to require an inspection of the piping in the horizontal run below the vertical recirculation risers by use of a borescope or
.some other remote visual means to provide greater assurance of cleanliness of the system prior to closur b.
Observation of Work and Work Activities The inspector examined the preparations for cutting of the recirculation inlet piping.
The obser vations included in-spection of the bracing installed on both the inside and the outside of the reactor vessel, and the cutting machine set-up.
The inspector also reviewed precutting activities with cognizant licensee and contractor representatives.
The activities were examined for compliance to the approved procedures identified in Paragraph 5.a.
While no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified the following items were noted:
(1)
The licensee procedure for locating weld center lines (SEM-1) required chemical etching of the reactor vessel nozzle welds to establish the Inconel to carbon steel interfaces as reference points for cutting locations.
Licensee representatives stated that the etching had not been done on all nozzles because the interface between the carbon steel and Inconel was visually apparent without etching.
While this action is technically acceptable, there was no documentation issued which formally approved the deletion of the etching require-ment.
The inspector expressed concern regarding the deviation from procedures without written authorization.
Licensee representatives stated that action would be taken to-make sure that cognizant personnel understand the necessity for strict compliance with all requirements of the procedures.
(2)
The cutting machine to be used for cutting through the safe end and thermal sleeve
>>as installed on a safe end in preparation for cutting.
The machine was observed to be installed such that the axis of the machine was at about
of misalignment with the axis of the safe end.
This was apparently due to the safe end and safe end extension having different outer diameters whereas the machine is designed to be installed on a single diameter pipe spool.
The cutting mechanic intended to resolve the problem by moving the machine back to the smaller diameter pipe and cutting a groove in the larger diameter safe end to provide a track for the cutting machine front roller wheels, then moving the machine forward so that the front'et of roller wheels would ride in the track.
The track was intended to be deep enough to bring the axis of the cutting machine into alignment with the axis of the safe end.
The cutting procedure SEN-4 did not recognize these additional procedural steps.
Licensee representatives stated that the procedure would be revised, prior to commencing cutting, to recognize the additional cutting step II i f
1~iR d
The inspector examined quality record associated with nozzle thickness testing (for conformance to procedure gCSEI-077)
and completed data sheets for reactor recirculation piping posi-tioning (for conformance to the requirements of procedure SEN-5).
'llhile no items of noncompliance or deviations wer e identified, the following items were noted:
(1)
The inspector observed that on eight of the ten nozzles, the wall thickness measurement data sheets did not show the ultrasonic instrument serial number, tranducer serial number and calibration block serial number as required by the procedure.
This was not considered an item of non-compliance since the procedure was an informational type and had no safety significance.
Licensee repre-sentatives stated however that the UT instrumentation data would bl, obtained and documented.
(2)
The safe and replacement specifications require Nuclear Steam Systems Supplier (GE) approval for any cutting fluids used.
The licensee is intending to use "Cimperial 10" cutting fluid.
Records approving the use of this fluid were not available at the HNP-2 site.
Licensee representatives stated that written GE approval would be obtained.
The licensee's actions to resolve the procedure concerns noted in Paragraoh 5.a and b, and assure that personnel are aware of procedure compliance responsibilities will be examined during a subsequent inspection (50-397/79-OS/01).
6.
Reactor Yessel Internals a.
Review of ualit Assurance Im l,ementin Procedure The quality assurance implementing procedure relating to the protection and cleanliness preservation of reactor vessel internals was reviewed.
The procedure (GE/IPSE No. IY-E-201, Revision 2, entitled
"RPY Access and Cleanliness Procedure.")
was found to be in compliance with PSAR and contract specification requirements.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
b.
Observations of 'llork and llork Activities The protection and cleanliness preservation of the installed reactor vessel internals were examined.
The examination included observations of access control, physical protection and blanking of vessel openings, equipment protection and
-10-C.
Mana cleanliness control related to work activities within the vessel, and compliance to procedure IV-E-201.
Ho items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
Review of ualit Records The inspector examined records of access control and system cleanliness surveillances.
Ho items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
ement Meetin s
General Evaluation of Recent Construction Activities A meeting was held on April 24, 1979 with licensee repre-sentatives denoted in Paragraph 1.
The inspector presented a
general evaluation of recent construction activities at the MHP-2 site.
The inspector expressed concern that some indi-vidual contractors'ctivities are not proceeding, in a smooth and effective manner at this advanced state of construction.
Specific areas which require immediate improvement were reviewed.
These were:
excessive time required to correct identified deficiencies; control of work activities of contractors having known quality problems; control of quality records at the contractors level; and large inspection backlogs.
The inspector discussed the need to adequately preplan quality class I work activities and assure first line personnel are aware of their responsibility and accountability for strict plan and procedure compliance.
Licensee representatives were responsive and stated that immediate actions would be initiated to address the concerns identified.
The licensee stated that their actions will be summarized in the response to the HRC's letter to the Washington Public Power Supply System, dated April 17, 1979.
b.
Exit Interview At the conclusion of the inspection a meeting was held with licensee and Burns 5 Roe representatives denoted in Paragraph l.
The activities covered during the inspection and observations and findings of the inspectors were discussed.
The inspectors reiterated the need to assure strict procedure compliance on the reactor recirculation nozzle safe end replacement job and other safety-related work activities at the site.
Licensee
.
representatives stated immediate actions are being taken to "
address this and the other items identified during the current inspection.