IR 05000397/1979013
| ML17272A652 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 08/23/1979 |
| From: | Dodds R, Haist D, Vorderbrueggen NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17272A651 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-79-13, NUDOCS 7910030671 | |
| Download: ML17272A652 (19) | |
Text
Report No.
50 397/79
Docket No U ~
S ~ NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION V
CPPR-93 Safeguards Group Licensee Washington Public Power Supply System P. 0.
Box 968 Richland, Washington 99352 Facility Name:
Washington Nuclear Project No.
2 (WNP-2)
WNP-2 Site, Benton County, Washington Inspection conducted:
Inspectors:
.
YAW D. P. Hadst, Reactor Inspector L. E.
orderbruegg
, Reactor Inspector 23'9 D te Signed Dat Signed Approved By:
Summary:
R. T. Dodds, Chief, Reactor Engineering Support Section, Reactor Construction and Engineering Support Branch Dat Si ned f
ate igned Ins ection on Jul 17-20, 1979 Re ort No. 50-397/79-13 Areas Ins ected:
Nonroutine, unannounce snvestsgatson by regional ase inspectors of allegations concerning (1) the quality of work during fabrication of the sacrificial shield assembly, (2) practices associated with'he radiography of pipe welds, (3) the effectiveness of the contract 215 g.C. program, and (4) the effects on the containment structural steel of the differential thermal growth between the sacrificial shield wall and the containment wall during heatup.
Allegations (1)
above were a continuation of an investigation performed during June 26-29, 1979 and reported in IE Report No. 50-397/79-12.
Additionally. the inspectors reviewed action on items: remaining open from previous in-spections and examined progress on the recirculation nozzle safe-end modification project.
The investigation/inspection activities involved 50 inspector-hours by two NRC inspectors.
Results:
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
RQ F ~ pl9 (p)
vszooso 67(
J I'
DETAILS l.
Persons Contacted a 0 Washin ton Public Power Su
S stem WPPSS b.
Ci
"A. D. Kohler, WNP-2 Project Manager
- H. E. Witherspoon, Division Manager, guality Assurance
- K. D. Cowan, Project Engineering Manager
- J.
M. Steidl, Senior guality Assurance Engineer
- G. I. Wells, Construction Specialist
- B. A. Holmberg, Project Management Specialist
~J. J. Bufis, Startup, Test Group Supervisor
- M. F. Sullivan, Senior guality Assurance Engineer R. Spence, guality Assurance Engineer A. H. Sastry, Project guality Assurance Manager S.
R. Sallee, Senior guality Assurance Engineer Burns and Roe, Inc.
B R
"M. J. Parise, Deputy Project guality Assurance Manager
- H. R. Tuthill, Senior guality Assurance Engineer
~G. T. Harper, Jr., Technical Support Manager
- R. C. Bryden, Construction Manager (acting)
H. A. Lacey, Resident Project Engineer L. Good, Assistant Resident Project Engineer L. F. Akers, Senior Welding Engineer H. Giannini, Lead Civil Engineer WSH Boecon Bovee and Crail GERI Contract 215 d.
A. Larson, guality Assurance Manager T. Bennington, equality Assurance Supervisor L. Buckner. guality Control Supervisor H. Maier, guality Control Inspector
. L. Morris, Level III NDE
.
P.
Young, equality Control Supervisor G. Chancy, Level III NDE W. Morris, Engineering Manager NIX Testin T. Bolin, Site Manager T. Elhodge, guality Control Inspector Additional interviews regarding radiography practices were conducted with one foreman and three non-desto'ctive (RT)
examination personne t N
-2-e.
Johnson Controls, Inc R. Jones, equality Assurance l1anager GE-ISSE V. Lesiuk, Site Nanager H. Carter, equal ity Control Inspector
- Denotes those attending the exit interview on July 20, 1979.
2.
Construction Status As of July 18, 1979, the licensee considered the construction of HNP-2 project to be 73.ll complete.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Ins ection-Findin s
(Open) Unresolved Item (50-397/79-06/Ol ):
Undersize fillet weld attaching pipe whip restraint to sacrificial shield wall.
8/R had revised the drawing covering restraints PHS l-l and PWS 2-1 to increase the weld size to 1/2 inch in accordance with AISC Table 1.17.5.
They had not, however, reviewed the drawings for the other 43 pipe whip restraint attachment welds to see if any other welds deviated from the AISC size require-ments.
This item will remain open pending the results of the planned drawing review.
b.
co (Closed)
Unresolved Item (50-397/79-04/01):
Johnson Controls field change control procedures did not clearly establish responsibilities for identifying inspection requirements.
't To rectify this situation, Johnson Controls issued a
new pro-cedure, SP-601-H2, Procedure for Making Changes on Controlled Copies of I/F Packages, and revised the existing procedures relating to installation/fabrication planner package preparation
'nd change control to make all procedures compatible.
The new procedure, SP-601-H2, requires the preparation of a JFRN (Johnson Field Revision Notice) for field changes that are beyond the scope of work and inspection activities in previously approved I'/F packages.
JFRN's require the formal internal design review and approval process.
This item is considered to be under adequate control and is closed.
(Closed)
Unr esol ved Item (50-397/79-04/02):
Access control and control of materials after release in the warehouse was not firmly established by~Johnson Control ~,
-3-de Procedure SP-2005-K2, Fabrication and Installation, was revised to require requisitioned materials to be taken out of the warehouse storage area when issued for installation.
Also, the inspector observed that a 6-foot high wire fence was being erected to substitute for the rope which had separated the pipe storage rack from the fabrication work area.
This item is closed.
I (Open)
Fol lowup Item (50-397/79-12/02):
Investigation into allegations of poor quality work on the sacrificial shield.
On June 6.
1979, the HRC Region Y office received eight alle-gations concerning the quality of work on the sacrificial shield.
On June 8, 1979, the HRC Region V office received a
ninth allegation concerning the method used by the 215 con-tractor to perform magnetic particle examinations.
Of the original eight allegations, all but Nos.
6 and 7 were investi-gated during HRC Inspection 50-. 397/79-12.
During this inspection, allegations 6,
7 and 9 were investigated and the results are as follows:
'i Alle ation No. 6:
"Fabricator (Leckenby) could not obtain certifications for shield material.."
~Findin s:
The allegation was substantiated; however, the deficiency had previously been identified by the licensee's gA program and correct'ive action was
'in progress.
The inspector reviewed correspondence between the 215 contractor and the licensee addressing deficiencies in the sacrificial shield material certifications.
These deficiencies were identified initially during a licensee review of the Leckenby records.
The 215 contractor is now attempting to obtain missing and corrected material certifications from Leckenby.
The licensee has committed to direct the 215 contractor to perform by October 1, 1979, a 100/ review of sacrificial shield material certifications, by working from drawings showing piecemarks along with the Leckenby traceability log, to 'determine if corr'ect certifications exist.
The contractor's progress on this review will be examined during future, inspections.
Alle ation Ho. 7:
"Sections were fabricated without material avlng recelvlng inspection."
I I
~Findin s:
The al'legation was not substantiated.
The inspector examined the results of a receiving inspection documentation review performed by 2'l5 contractor gA personnel.
The review indicated that a receiving inspection program was maintained by Leckenby, as evidenced by the traceability log and Leckenby gC signoff on materia'l certifications.
The 215
-4-contractor's review indicates that gC field inspectors per-formed receiving inspection and issued receiving inspection reports and item status reports.
The effectiveness of the receiving inspection program is questionable however, based upon the deficiencies noted in allegation No.
6 above.
iThe record review by the 215 contractor was limited due to the absence of an adequate indexing system for Leckenby records.
The licensee has committed to direct the 215 contractor to perform a 1005 review of sacrificial shield receiving in-spection records, concurrent with the review of material certifications discussed above, to evaluate the quality of the material that was received.
The 215 contractor will.also be developing an indexing system to improve retrievability of Leckenby documents.
The contractor's progress in these regards will be examined during a future inspection.
Alle ation No. 9:
"Hagnetic particle inspection of structural steel by a Contract 215 subcontractor was changed from DC to AC which does not detect subsurface discontinuities and is contrary to AWS D.l.l."
Findin<is:
The investigation of this allegation has not been completed.
The inspector reviewed interoffice memoranda dated June
and June 12, 1979, from the 215 contractor's Level III examiner to NIN Testing concerning the use of the AC magnetic particle (HT) method.
The June 8 memo stated that all HT on structural steel was to be performed using the AC method.
The June
memo superseded the June 8 memo and limited the AC method to 5/16-inch fillet and partial penetration welds.
The 215 contractor stated that these changes had been discussed with MPPSS and B/R, although no review and approval documentation exists.
Also, the contractor's guality Control Procedure No.
gCP-2, Revision 6, does not reflect this new direction.
AMS D".1.1. references ASTH E-109 for HT procedure and techniques.
ASTH E-109 allows the use of alternating current when specified or specifically agreed upon,:but limits it to.defects extending to the outside surface of the part being examined.
The review and approval of the AC method will be reviewed further during a future inspection.
The subject of sacrificial shield allegations will remain open pending review and closure of all licensee actions resulting from this investigation.
(Open) Unresolved Item (50-397/79-12/05):
Use of procedure addenda system for controlling structural steel welding in the containment drywell (Procedure MP-84).
i
4.
Alle The licensee provided Project Engineering Directive (PED) 215-W-0602 which revises the direction previously provided by PED 215-W-0583 regarding document contro'l for the work procedure WP-84 contract.215 addenda system for structural steel"within the drywell.
The inspector reviewed the revised document control standard and addenda and identified the following concerns:
(1)
A note following Paragraph 4.7 of the document control standard retained the reference to changes affecting structural integrity.
The inspector reiterated the previously identified NRC concern that improperly re-viewed design changes could result from this note.
(2)
The document control standard does.not require review of addenda by civil engineering or the senior welding
. engineer.
(3) It is not clear whether or not references to WNP-2 g.A.
are references to B/R g.A.
This item is considered unresolved and will be examined during a future inspection.
ation:
Radio ra h
of Pi e Welds and Structural Steel Crack-215 Contract
'a ~
Back round On June 27, 1979, the NRC inspector received two allegations concerning practices associated with the radiography (RT) of pipe welds and structural steel welding on the main steam cage.
It was alleged that pipe welds were being radiographed more than once using different weld identifications.
It was also alleged that a weld on the main steam cage was determined to be cracked by HT examination but that the welding engineer had superseded the NT examiner's judgement and had the crack welded up; The NRC investigation of the allegations included review of the radiography practices and interfaces, interviews with quality assurance, craft, management and RT examination personnel, and review of weld record packages for the alleged cracked weld.
b.
Investi ation Results A~11 i:
"tOKh b
q d
dig ph>>id that have already been radiographed previously several times with a different weld number."
'l I
-6-
~Findin s:
The allegation was not substantiated.
lields have been RT'd more than once in cases of repair welds or in cases where the pipe contained water.
The re-shots were made using the same assigned weld number.
There have been cases of the weld number on the Request for Radiography not matching the weld numbers written on the identity tag (red flag) attached to the weld by the gC inspector.
Usually, these are honest mistakes involving number transpositions, and the RT examiners return the Request for Radiography for clarification when there is any doubt concerning the weld number.
The inspector randomly picked five radiography requests and compared them against the red flags attached to the piping.
No discrepancies were noted.
The inspector pointed out to the licensee and the 215 contractor the potential for weld identification mistakes if the red flag on the weld is moved.
This was a concern expressed by RT examiners.
The 215 contractor stated that NIX is supplied with a set of piping isometrics to resolve any doubts that they may have concerning weld identification.
The inspector pointed out that, based on the interviews with the NIX personnel, they appear to be unaware of the isometrics supplied for their use.
(22 A~11 1:
"TA
id, N
.
14AN 14AN
main steam cage - The 1 evel II said it was a crack; the welding engineer said it was not a crack and had it welded up."
~Findin s:
The allegation was not substantiated.
There is no weld No.
14AN.
The inspector reviewed the records
" of weld No.
14AS and found that cracks had been identified at the top and bottom of the weld, had been excavated, repaired, and MT accepted for the root pass, 50K fill and 100K fill.
5.
Alle ation:
Containment Structural Steel Platform Inade uac On July 16, 1979, Region V was notified by an inspector from Region IV of an anonymous allegation regarding an inadequate structural steel. platform at the 541-ft. elevation inside the WNP-2'ontainment vessel.
The individual stated that he had been involved with repair work on that structural steel platform during the winter of 1976-77 and that his conscience was bothering him about that structure.
The alleger claimed that he had calculated that
"the first thermal cycle of the containment" would produce a
differential height of 1/2-inch between the'acrificial shield wall and the containment vessel wall which would result in cracking of
.
all the cantilevered welds in the subject structural steel support platform.
He claimed further that he had given this information to the A/E and that no action was taken.
Also, he identified two A/E engineers who were allegedly fired because they suppor ted his positio N
~
H
The. allegations were reviewed with cognizant Burns
Roe site personnel.
They stated that design data pertaining to the differential thermal growth between the sacrificial shield and containment vessel would be obtained from their design office.
The data will relate to such considerations as when and by whom the calculations were made, what differential height values were calculated or assumed, and the resultant stress levels expected in the welds due to resultant cantilever moments applied to the platform steel.
The inspector inquired about the past employment status of the two engineers who were allegedIy fired. It was determined that neither had been fired and both were currently employed at the MNP-2 site.
One of the engineers was interviewed by the inspector.
He stated that he had no recollection of any individual ever expressing to him a concern about cantilever forces and resulting weld failure in the 541 platform.
This matter will remain open pending NRC review of the design in-formation being retrieved by Burns
& Roe.
(50-397/79-13/01)
Alle ation: Mechanical Contractor
.C. Pro ram Inade uac Region V was contacted on June 5, 1979, and again on July 3, 1979, by a pipe hanger inspector employed by the 215 contractor alleging poor quality control practices by his firm.
The individual was un-able to provide specific examples of pipe hangers which he found discrepant, and indicated that he would gather specifics for NRC review during the next inspection.
A meeting was held>>ith the alleger on July 18, 1979.
The individual was still unable to provide any specific examples of conditions which were contrary to program quality requirements.
He stated that he had been fired the previous day, supposedly for his inability to follow directions (this was reviewed with contractor management, who confirmed this explanation for the firing).
The individual felt that he had been fired for refusing to accept discrepant pipe support installations and expressed general dissatisfaction with the contractor's training program, communications, work accommodations, and superv'ision, although, again, he could not provide any specific information which violated requirements.
The inspectors explained that the contractor.'s quality related work activities are examined as a part of our routine inspection program, and that his general concerns will be considered during future inspections.
The individual was requested to notify the NRC of any specific deficiencies he may recall at a later date.
Ho further action, except as noted above, is planned regarding this allegatio Field Chan e
Re uests FCR's Issued b
215 Contractor During review of weld records for pipe whip support No. 27-9, the inspector examined five FCR's (Nos.
3416, 3413, 3255, 3246 and 3233) which address changes to such items as weld sizes, weld configuration, weld penetration and the addition of access holes (rat holes) in structural members to permit welding.
The generation and control of FCR,'s is governed by Work Procedure No. 107, Revision 1 for the FCR's referenced above.
Paragraph 2.1.3 of that procedure allows modifications to design drawings
{i.e., structural integrity, function or design of a member)
by FCR's.
Paragraph 2.4 states that Requests for Information (RFI's)
shall be used to request prior approval from B/R for major design changes that affect the contract specification; however, Paragraph 3.1.2 allows work to proceed after certain 215 contractor approvals, provided the FCR is transmitted to B/R within one (1) working day.
The inspector questioned the latitude that can be applied to the phrase
"major design changes" in the absence of a formal definition, and also the transfer of responsibility from B/R for determing what constitutes a design change and how it is dispositioned.
The inspector noted that two of the five FCR's reviewed did not indicate whether or not work was proceeding.
FCR No. 3246, dated March 14, 1979, indicated that work was proceeding but an RFI for B/R approval was not initiated until March 19, 1979 which appears to violate the requirements of WP-107, Paragraph 3.1.2.
The subject of FCR use by the 215 contractor is considered unresolved and will be examined further during a future inspection.
(50-397/79-13/02)
Reactor Vessel Safe End Modifications Work had progressed to the extent that all ten closure spools had
.
been removed, and eight thermal sleeves had been completely ex-tracted.
According to a licensee spokesman, the cutting equipment has worked well and no unexpected events have occurred.
The inspector observed final cutting operations on the thermal sleeve inside the N2-E (150
) nozzle.
The workmen appeared knowl-
.
edgeable in the procedures they were following, and the severed surfaces looked smooth and vertical.
Thy inspector also examined the completed weld prep on the N2-D (120
) manifold riser on which workmen were recording as-built dimensions in accordance with procedural requirements.
In addition.
dye penetrant examination of the finished weld prep surface of nozzle N2-B (60
) was observed.
The examination disclosed a cluster of linear, rounded indications in the vicinity of the 5-o clock position near the nozzle interior side of the weld prep.
The penetrant examiner followed the approved procedure and was verified as being properly qualified as a Level II examine j(
~
i
-9-The work "travelers" for nozzles H2-B and N2-E were examined.
All completed work activities were observed to be properly signed off.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
9.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is re-quired in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of'oncompliance or deviations.
Two unresolved items were identifie'd during this inspection and are discussed in Par'a-graph 3.(e)
and 7.
10.
Exit Interview The inspectors met with the licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph 1 at the conclusion of the inspection to summarize the scope and findings of the inspection.
The licensee stated that prompt consideration would be given. and appropriate action taken on the items which were called to their attentio,1