IR 05000397/1979007
| ML17272A519 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 05/08/1979 |
| From: | Bishop T, Eckhardt J, Eckhardt J, Haynes R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17272A518 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-79-07, 50-397-79-7, NUDOCS 7907110634 | |
| Download: ML17272A519 (7) | |
Text
50-397/79-07 U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT REGION. V Do c k et No.
50- 397 License No.
CPPR-93
~
Safeguards Group Washington Public Power Supply System P. 0.
Box 968 Richland, Washington 99352 Facility Name:
Washin ton Nuclear Pro'ect No.
WNP-2 Investigation at:
- WNP-2 r
Investigation c
ducted:
Apr'i-1 2-4 1979
/
Inspectors:
-
I. >g, l
'r. Bisho Reacto Inspector ii~)
~
J ~Eckha Reac r Inspector I.Q.
(
0.
C.
hackleton, Investigator Approved
. By:
R.
C.
Hay s,'. Chief, Projects Section, Reactor Construction: and Engineering Support Branch Surrmary:
5'
Date Signed; s Aho Date Signed.'
eh>
Date Signed P/T p'ate Signed s
Investi ation on A ril 2-4 1979 Re ort No. 50-397 79-07 I
A~Ii d:
U di i
i by i
b di p t d
1nvestigator of four allegations concerning site work by the Waldinger Corporation (heating, ventilation'nd air conditioning contractor).
It was alleged that the contractor did not use pr'oper welding procedures; improperly'downgraded the safety classification of four reactor building ventilation system isolation valves, did not perform the reviews of nonconformance reports required by the quality assurance program, and the contractor's onsite gA/QC organization did not have sufficient independence of action Zo.-identify quality problems.
The investigat'ion involved 39 hours4.513889e-4 days <br />0.0108 hours <br />6.448413e-5 weeks <br />1.48395e-5 months <br /> onsi te by two NRC inspectors and one NRC investigator.
Results:
The allegations were not substanti ated.
No items of noncompliance
~or ev>ations were IdentIfIed.
RV Form 219 (2')
I I
j, I
gl, III C
DETAILS l.
Individuals Contacted a.
Mashin ton Public Power Su
S stem WPPSS
- R. S. Sallee, Senior Quality Assurance Engineer S.
C. Young, Senior Quality Assurance Engineer b.
Burns
Roe AE c ~
- H. Pairse, Deputy Project Quality Assurance Manager
- H. Tuthill, Senior Quality Assurance Engineer R. Bahl, Cognizant Engineer R. Masey; Head Quality Assurance Mechanical The Waldin er Cor oration TWC E. T. Barber, Chief, Project t1anager
.
S. Loeffler, Quality Assurance Supervisor L. Dodson, Quality Assurance Engineer'.
A. Fisher, Lead Quality Control Engineer D. L. Dempster, Subcontractor Surveillance Quality Control T. M. Haleki, Quality Control Inspector The inspectors also interviewed. seven other Waldinger employees and two Burns
Roe employees during the course of the investigation.
They in-cluded three welders, one welding foreman, one welding engineer, two QC inspectors>
and two QC engineers.
- Denotes those present at exit interview.
2.
Investi ation of Alle ations a.
~Suamar On March 27, 1978, the NRC RY received four allegations concerning activities of the Waldinger Corporation (TWC) at Washington Nuclear Project No.
(WNP-2).
TMC is the prime contractor at WNP-2 for
...... the installation of heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems (Contract No. 2808-216).
The individual providing the alle-gations, a former TMC employee, alleged that TWC:
performed welding on safety related systems without appropriate procedures; improperly downgraded the safety classification of four valves; did not perform required reviews of nonconformance reports; and that the onsite TWC QA/QC organization did not have sufficient independence of action to identify quality problem NRC regional investigation and inspection. personnel were dispatched to the WNP-2 site on April 2, 1979, to perform an unannounced investi-gation.
The investigation included examination of pertinent proce-dures and quality records, observations of work in progress, and interviews with personnel involved with the work being questioned.
The allegations as understood by the NRC and the findings of the NRC investigation of each allegation are presented in this report.
None of the allegations were substantiated.
The results of the investigation were discussed with licensee and Burns E
Roe personnel on April 4, 1979.
b.
Investi ation Results (1)
Alle ation as Understood b
the NRC
"Welding has been'performed on safety-related ventilation systems or components without:appropriate procedures covering the work being performed.
In some cases, procedures had not been written and in other cases, the written procedures did not meet the stand-ards specified in design documents."
NRC Findin s:
The allegation was not substantiated..
The examination of proce ures disclosed that TWC has an adequate scope of welding procedures to cover each type of welding process in use.
The inspector reviewed two welding procedures currently in use (WPS-15 and WPS-15, Addenda 1) and found them to comply with ASI1E Sec-tion III and the contract specification requirements (Contract No. 2808-216, Section-17A,
"Supplementary Requirements for Weld-
'ng and NDE").
In addition, the inspector observed welding in progress (weld ROA-W2) on reactor building ventilation system isolation valve ROA-V-1; Welding was found to be in compliance with the applicable welding.procedures (WPS-15 and WPS-15, Addenda 1).
(2)
Alle ation as Understood b
the NRC
"The requirements for four 72-inch, Schedule-80, carbon steel valves were down-graded from ASHE Section III and welding on these valves was performed by Waldinger welders who were not qualified to perform the welds."
NRC Findin s:
The allegation was not substantiated.
Investigation snto thss a
egation disclosed that TWC is not installing four 72-inch diameter valves; rather, TWC is installing two 72-inch ventilation inlet isolation valves and two 84-inch ventilation outlet isolation valves.
These valves are designed to function as dampers on the inlet and outlet ventilation ducts to the reactor building, and as such, are required to maintain the minus 0.25 inch w.g. pressure of the reactor building when closed.
The
-3-inspector found that the contract specification was consistent with the FSAR and required that these valves be purchased to ASME Section III requirements.
(The inspector noted that the valves were scheduled to be used as ventilation system dampers which is less vigorous service than that for power piping systems.)
Inspection of the valves, and accompanying records established that they were designed and manufactured to ASME Section III require-ments.
In addition, examination of qualification records for welders who had or ivere currently installing these valves estab-lished that the welders were qualified to ASME Section IX require-ments, which is consistent with FSAR and contract spec'ification requirements.
As noted previously, the inspector observed the inprocess welding of one valve installation (No. ROA-V-1) and found activities to be incompliance with all procedural require-ments.
Alle ation as Understood b
NRC
"Identification and disposition of nonconforming work-in-safety-related ventilation systems is not being accomplished in accordance with the QA program;.- Specificall'y, even though ventilation system
.
installation is approximately 65 percent complete and-inspections have identified nonconformances, not one nonconformance report has been received-'by Waldinger's Material Review Board for evaluation and disposition."
NRC Findin s
The investigator and inspector examined the a
anger Quality Assurance Manual; as approved by the licensee, and determined that there is no requirement for a Waldinger Material Review Board. to evaluate nonconformance repor ts from the WNP-2 project.
- Waldinger nonconformance reports are con---
trolled and dispositioned. in accordance with procedure FQCP-15.0, which has been approved by the licensee and is consistent with the PSAR and Waldinger Quality Assurance Manual requirements.
The procedure was examined for compliance to 10 CFR 50, Appen-dix B, requirements and found satisfactory.
It=-was noted that-the procedure allows for a Nonconformance Review Board, made up of licensee and Burns
& Roe personnel, to disposition noncon-formance reports.
The inspector selected six nonconformance reports at random and verified that each had been properly dis-positioned in accordance with the approved procedure.
Alle ation as Understood b
the NRC
"The Waldinger onsite QA/QC organization does not have the required independence in that the President of Waldinger issued a memorandum recently which requires the site QA/QC organiza-tion to report to the Waldinger Site Project Manager rather than directly to the Corporate QA Manager."
4-
~NRCFidi:
il iig i
i ii tied. ii iii in question, which was issued by Maldinger's President on December 28,'978, was examined and reviewed with Maldinger's QA, QC, and project personnel.
The letter does not indicate any loss of QA/QC independence nor has it been so interpreted by onsite personnel.
The thrust of the letter was to assure adequate communication between the onsite organizations.
The inspector and investigator reviewed the onsite organizational=
relationships as designated in the Maldinger Quality Assurance Manual and found the organizational structure to be in compli-ance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B requirements.
Interviews with responsible management personnel indicated that activities were conducted in accordance with the lines of responsibility indi-cated in the QA Yianual.
In addition, interviews were conducted with four quality assurance inspectors and a quality assurance engineer.
Each of the individuals was questioned regarding QA/QC independence and pressure from project management.
There was
..
'othing identified during the interviews which would indicate any lack of QA/QC independence or undue pressure from project management.
I Exit Interview At the conclusion of the investigation, a meeting was held with licensee and Burns
Roe representatives denoted in Paragraph 1.
The activities covered during the investigation and the observations and findings of the investigator and inspectors were discusse ~
a
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