IR 05000397/1979006
| ML17272A509 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 04/25/1979 |
| From: | Bishop T, Eckhardt J, Haynes R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17272A508 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-79-06, 50-397-79-6, NUDOCS 7907050392 | |
| Download: ML17272A509 (19) | |
Text
.Report'No.
50-397/79-06 U, S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION V
Docket No.
50-397 License No.
CPPR-93 Safeguards Group
.,Licensee:
Washin ton Public Power Supply System P.O.
Box 968 Richland Washin ton 99352
,Facility Name: Washin Inspection at:
'WNP-2 ton Nuclear Project No.'
(WNP-2)
site,,Benton County, Washington
'Inspection conducted:
A ril 2-5, 1979 Xnspectors:
T.
W. Bis op; eactor nspec or D te Signed Approved Hy:
Summary:
J.
H.
Ec ar t, eac or nspec or R.
C, Hayn~
ef Projects Section, Reactor Constructi.on and Engineering Support Branch.
Date Signed Date Signed Date Signed Ins ecti,on on A ril 2-..5 1979 (Re ort 50-.397 79-'06)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by regional. based inspectors of construction actiyities including; observations of safety related piping work and review of quality records;;
review of safety related component gA implementing procedures, work observati'ons, and review of quali,ty records; followup on IE Circulars, 50,55(e)
items, and previous inspection findings, The inspection 'involved 28 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC inspectors.
Results:
No items of noncompliance or deviations
<>ere identified.
90V050 3qp RV Form 219(2)
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Washin ton Public Power Su
S stem WPPSS
- A. D. Kohler, WNP-2 Project Manager
- J. Janus, Construction Manager
- A. H. Sastry, WNP-2 Project Quality Assurance Manager
- K. D.
Cowan, Project Engineering Manager
- G.
K. Afflerbach, Supervising Te'st Engineer
- J. H. Steidl, Sr. Quality Assurance Engineer D.
C. Timmons, Project Engineer, WNP-2
- F.
R; Ozment, Sr. Maintenance Engineer Burns 5 Roe, Inc.
(B/R)
- R. Root, Deputy Project Manager
- H. J. Parise, Deputy Project Quality Assurance Manager
- H. A. Lacey, Resident Project Engineer
- H. Tuthill, Sr. Project Quality Assurance Engineer G. Hudak, Lead Quality Assurance Engineer, Civil The Waldin er Cor oration TWC G. Barber, Chief Project Engineer S. Loeffler, Site QA Supervisor L. Dodson, QA Engineer R. Fisher, Lead QC Inspector WSH/Boecon/Bovee and Crail GERI A. Larson, Quality Assurance Manager P.
Young, Quality Control Inspection Supervisor J.
Knauer,,
Swing Shift Inspection Supervisor
- Denotes those present at exit interview.
In addition, Mr.
C. Bryant of Bonneville Power Administration, and Hr.
W. Yatch of Seattle City Light Company, attended the exit intervie I I~
L
-2-2.
Construction Status Licensee representatives reported that the construction of WNP-2 was 6M complete as of April 5, 1979.
~
~
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Ins ection Findin s a ~
b.
Closed
. Noncom liance 50-397/78-10 Ol
- Structural column anchor. bolt lock nuts were not installed.
The licensee's response to the item of noncompliance was summarized in WPPSS letter G02-78-275 of December 27, 1978.
In additi'on to installing the missing lock nuts, the licensee issued instructions to all site contractors requiring them to assure their'installation procedures will avoi.d similar over-sights in the future.
The inspector reviewed the documentation associated with the new locking nuts to verify materials.met specified engineering, requi} ements.
In addition, completed installation of the locking nuts was verified.
The instructions provided to other contractors were reviewed and discussed with representatives of two on-site contractors.
In both cases the contractors have established measures to indicate the status of inspections which, when implemented, would assure that
'equired inspections are not bypassed.
It is considered that the action taken by the licensee is appropriate to preclude the" recurrence of such a condition.'his item is closed.
0 en)
Follow-u item 50-397/78-10/07
E ui ment maintenance ins ection record forms are inconsistent with'corres ondin The licensee has implemented the revised equipment maintenance inspection program defined in work procedure no.
WP-'106.
,The programmatic aspects of the revised program were examined during a previous inspection and were found satisfactory.
Implementation of the program was examined during the current inspection.
A sample of eight recently inspected butterfly valves and the associated inspection records were examined.
It was noted that several of the components were somewhat dirty, that physical protection was not provided in one case, and that six valves were not properly positioned (slightly off the seat).
While these items were corrected prior to end of the current inspection, it is noted that additional efforts are required to assure the components are maintained in a clean and protected fashion as required by the maintenance progra c.
Closed)
Follow-u item (50-397/79-01/02):
Pro ram for the control of ta es adhesives and i e do e
com ounds was not full im lemented.
'he inspector examined material controls in the warehouse and the use of controlled materials in the field. It was determined that the program to control tapes, adhesives, and pipe dope compounds, as defined in procedure No. gCP-23, has been satisfactorily implemented.
4.
Safet Related Com onents The status of safety related HYAC components under the jurisdiction of the Waldinger Corporation (TWC) was reviewed with cognizant licensee, Burns 5 Roe, and TWC personnel.
Haldinger construction, activities at, the HNP-2 site were reported, to be, approximately 75/ complete.
The inspector noted that the licensee had identified significant problems with the quality of TWC work in October, 1978.
A corrective action program (documented on report No.
CAR-1331 of October 6, 1978)
was developed by the licensee, Burns
Roe and the contractor which included rewrite and resubmittal of all THC
.quality implementing procedures, retraining of THC personnel, review of nonconformance reports, and commitments for strong management corrective action for violations to the quality program.
, was closed on January 5, 1979, following completion of the specified actions.
One area requiring continued attention was noted by the licensee.
This related to certain work performed prior to October, 1978, wherein some inprocess quality records, such as weld fit-up inspection records, had not been maintained.
A noncon-formance report is being issued in each case where this situation
.
is identified.
The NCRs are being reviewed and disposition by Burns.
& Roe engineering and project gA groups.
The inspector found that the licensee and Burns 5 Roe representatives have maintained a high surveillance rate of the contractor's quality activities to assure compliance with PSAR and specification requirements.
During the current inspection the inspector examined selected TWC procedures work activities, and quality records, as reported below, to assess the effectiveness of the TWC progra t
~,
]r,
Review of A Im 1ementin Procedures The Hald'i'nger Corporation (THC) Quality Assurance Manual and selected implementing procedures were examined by the inspector for compliance to requirements of:
CFR Part 50, Appendix B; the PSAR, Appendix D.O;, and contract specification 2808-216.
The procedures examined were:
(1) Field Quality Control Procedure No. FQCP-10.0,
"Visual Weld Inspection" (2). Field Qual'ity Control Procedure No. FQCP-10.4,
"Installation Inspection" Rev. 3, Rev. 1, (3) Field Quality Control Procedure No. FQCF-15.0, Rev. 1,
"Nonconformance Control" While no items of noncompliance or deviation were identified, it was noted that section 14 of the QA tlanual, regarding control of inspection and test status, addressed only 'shop activities (at the THC shop in Iowa).
The corresponding field document (FQCP-14.0, entitled "Control and Status of Installations" )
lacked specific provisions for interim status control and had been recently disapproved by Burns 5 Roe.
Cognizant licensee representatives stated that work status would be controlled in accordance with the previous revision of FQCP-14.0.
The inspector has no further question on this item.
Observations of Work and Work Activities THC wor k and work activities, except welding,
" relating to the four reactor building ventilation isolation-valves ivere examined'or compliance to applicable drawing and work procedure require-ments.
Melding is separately addressed in paragraph 5 of this report.
These valves are designed to function as dampers on the inlet and outlet venti:1'ation ducts to the reactor building, and as such, are required to maintain the minus 0.25 inch w. g.
pressure of the reactor building when closed.
The valve installations were in various states of completion, with one valve still in the warehouse (ROA-V-2),'ne partially installed (ROA-V-l), arid two completely installed (REA-V-1 and -V-2).
The examination included observations of storage, handling,'nstallation, and protection of the valves and the associated support structure (support No. 5006).
Work activities were found to be in compliance with applicable drawings and work procedures.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie C.
Review of ualit Records The qual ity records ass oci ated with the procurement, materi al certification, receiving inspection, storage inspection, fabri-cation and installation of the four reactor building ventilation isolation valves were examined.
The records were examined for compliance with the requirements of the PSAR and contract specification No. 2808-216.
Th'e records examined were found to be in compliance with the requirements.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identif'ied.
5.
Safet Related Weldin a ~
Review of ualit Im lementin Procedures b.
The inspector examined the current THC welding procedures HPS-15 and HPS-15 Addenda
and found them to be in compliance with the requirements of the ASNE BKPV Code.
Also, the weld inspection requirements as given in the contract specification (Section 17 A, "Supplementary Requirements for Welding and NDE") were reviewed and were found to meet the Code. requirements.
Observations of Work and Work Activities The NRC inspectors observed welding in progress (weld ROA-H2)
on reactor building ventilation system-isol'ation valve ROA-V-1
'84 inch), and completed weldments for valves REA-V-1 and REA-V-2-.
Meld ROA-M2 was a manual shielded metal arc weld of the valve to a duct extension.
The welding was being performed in accordance with the applicable THC weld procedures (MPS.-15 and HPS-15 Addenda 1).
The inspector noted areas on duct welds adjacent to'alve REA-V-2 where reinforcement measured 5/32".
The inspection criteria f'r these welds specifies a reinforcement limit of 4/32".
Licensee representatives initiated action to reduce the reinforce-ment.
Subsequent to the inspection licensee representatives notified IE:V that reinforcement had been ground down to less than 4/32".
The inspector has no further questions on this item.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie ~
'
c.
Review of gualit Records The records associated with the welds identified in paragraph 5.
b above, were examined for compliance with procedure and contract specification requirements.
In addition the inspector requested the inprocess welding inspection records for the structural su'pport (No. 5006) of valve REA-V-1.
These records examined were found to meet requirements.
Contractor represen-tatives, however, were unable to locate inprocess inspection records for, welds REA-W-1 and -2 and for support structure No.
5006.
- Licensee representatives stated that neither the welds nor the 'support had been finally accepted by the contractor,;
and that the missing records would have been identified by the
'ontractor quality program at the time of final acceptance.
Contractor representatives took immediate action to resolve the situation of the missing inprocess records.
The inspector has no further questions 'on this item at this time.
Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundar Pi e Meldin The NRC inspector examined the following pipe welds to ascertain compliance with selected requirements invoked by Section III of the ASNE BSPV Code.
Weld Identification No.
Weld Status RRC-565-1 Weld A-41 RHR-874-6 Weld 8 RHR-874-6 Meld 8A and 8C MS-552-1.2 Weld 1B MS-530-1.3 Meld C9
. MS-530-1.3 Weld C10-1 Complete except for ISI blending-.
Root pass complete.
Weld preparation'n progress.
Welding in progress.
Consumable insert being installed.
Complete except for ISI blending.
Specific elements verified during the examination (either by direct observation or from review of weld records)
included filler metal withdrawal control, preheat and interpass temperature, weld prepara-tion and cleanliness, alignment, and weld reinforcement,*
No deYi;gati.on or items of noncompliance were identifie f'
7.
IE Circular Follow-u The licensee's actions taken in response to nine IE Circulars were examined.
Licensee and Burns 5 Roe engineering reviews have deter-mined that Circulars 78-04, 78-07, 78-12 and 78-14 are not appli-cable to HNP-2 since the type of equipment described in these Circulars is not utilized at the project.
The status of the other five Circulars examined is as follows:
a.
78-02 Proper Lubrication Oil for Terry Turbines:
The licensee verified that the manufacturers recommendations for turbine lubrication were implemented.
The inspector verified that the Lubrication Schedule specified the proper type of lubrication oil for the RCIC Terry Turbine.
b.
78-06 Potential Common Mode Flooding of ECCS Equipment Rooms at BWR Facilities:
The condition described in the Circular is being analyzed in conjunction with problem of excess moisture resulting from the fuel pool boiling (refer to NRC report 50-397/78-11).
Various design alternatives to correct this problem are currently being evaluated.
It is expected that the design will be finalized in May, 1979.
c.
78-13 Inoperability of Multiple Service Hater Pumps:
Burns
Roe engineering evaluated conditions reported in the Circular and determined that it is not credible for a similar problem to occur at WNP-2.
Self cleaning strainers, which were reported in the Circular to have failed, are not used in the service water system at HNP-2.
In addition, since WNP-2 service.
'ater is drawn from the spray ponds, rather than the river, the problems of high silt "walls", low river water level, and frazil ice (which were reported in the circular) are not considered to be a problem at HNP-2.'.
78-15 Check Valves Fail to Close in Vertical Position:
The licensee determined that the problem described in the Circular exists as HNP-2.
This condition was reported to the NRC as a
50.55(e)
item by letter on November 6, 1978 (WPPSS letter No. 602-78-245).
An engineering directive (PED-215-M-0542)
was issued to modify the deficient valves.
The modifications
. are expected to be completed by June, 1979.
e.
78'-16 Hear Failure of Limitorque Valve Operators:
The licensee reviewed the maintenance requirements for Limitorque operators and will monitor stroke timing in conjunction with the inservice inspection program to assure operability is not jeapardize 'I Items 5.b and 5.d will be further examined during a subsequent inspection.
The inspector has no further questions regarding the licensees action on the other Circulars.
8.
50.55 e)
It'ems Follow-u a.
Defective Welds Found in Pipe Whip Restraint Brackets:
By letter dated March 13, 1979, the licensee informed IE:V of the details associated with weld'efects identified in pipe
. whip restraint brackets fabricated by the Leckenby Company.
Each of the forty-five brackets supplied by Leckenby was examined. using radiographic and/or ultrasonic techniques.
Thirty-four brackets were found to be defective.
Twenty of these brackets were completely refabricated and fourteen brackets were repaired.
The inspector examined the records associated with three brackets (Nos.
PWS l-l, PWS 3-2, and PHS 4-2).
The inspector observed that Leckenby drawing F272 Rev.
4 for PHS 1-1 specifies the use of a 1/4" fillet weld for attaching the 1" thick bracket plate to the sacrificial shield wall.
The Structural Welding Code, AWS Dl.l., specifies a minimum fillet size of 5/16" for materials thicker than 3/4". 'icensee representaties stated that this situation would be reviewed; The subject of Leckenbyfillet weld size is considered unresolved and will be examined
~ further during a subsequent inspection (50-397/79-06/01).
The inspector has no further questions regarding other aspects of the bracket repairs.
b.
Possible Violation of'rimary Containment After. a Penetration Weld Failure:
The licensee's letter of February 22, 1979 informed IE:V of a design error which, if uncorrected, would subject the RPV Sampling Line penetration (X690) to thermal cycling in excess of the design fatigue life permitted by the ASME Code.
The deficiency was-identified during fatigue analyses of'll instrument penetrations.
Burns 5 Roe is currently performing stress analysis of penetration No.
77Aa to verify its suitability to serve as the RPV Sample Line Penetration.
This item will be examined further following completion of redesign activities (50-397/79-06/02).
c.
Titling Disc Check Valves Failure to Close when Installed in Vertical Position:
Licensees action to date for this 50.55(e)
item was discussed in paragraph
.7.d of this report.
9, Unresolved. Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations.
One unresolved item was identified during this inspection and is discussed in Paragraph 8; I II ll I
il
10.
Exit Interview At the conclusion of the inspecti'on, a meeting was held wi,th.
Licensee and Burns
Roe representatives denoted in Paragraph l..
The activities covered during the inspection and observations and findings of the inspectors were discussed.
Licensee representatives stated that immediate action would be taken on the items identified during the current inspectio '