IR 05000373/1983020
| ML20024D084 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 07/14/1983 |
| From: | Guldemond W, Madison A, Walker R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20024D080 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-373-83-20, 50-374-83-19, NUDOCS 8308030143 | |
| Download: ML20024D084 (6) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Reports No: 50-373/83-20(DPRP); 50-374/83-19(DPRP)
-Docket Nos: 50-373; 50-374 License No: NPF-11; CPPR-100-Licensee: ' Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, Illinois 60690 Facility Name: LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: LaSalle Site, Marseilles, Il Inspection Conducted: May 18 through June 14, 1983 e b. $
Inspectors:
A. L. Madison bib
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. G. Guldemond I
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Approved By:-
R. D. Walker, Chief h/bO
Reactor Projects Section 2C Date Inspection Summary Inspection on May 18 through June 14, 1983 (Report No. 50-373/83-20(DPRP);
50-374/83-19(DPRP))
. Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by resident inspectors of licensee actions on previous inspection findings; operational safety; surveil-lance; Licensee Event Reports; Region III requests and plant trips. The inspection involved a total of 105 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC inspectors
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including 23 inspector-hours onsite during off-shifts.
Results: Of the'six areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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8300030143 830715 i
PDR ADOCK 05000373 G.
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DETAILS 1.'
Pers5ns Contacted
- G. J. Diederich,-Superintendent,'LaSalle. Station
- R.~ D. Bishop, Administrative and Support Services Assistant
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Superintendent J.1 G. Marshall,. Operating Engineer
- J. C. Renwick, Technical Staff Supervisor
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- R. Kyrouac, QualityfAssurance Supervisor-C. E. Sargent, Operating Assistant Superintendent M
The inspectors also talked with and interviewed members of the operations, maintenance, health physics, and instrument and control sections.
- Denotes personnel attending exit interviews.
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2.
Licensee Actions on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Confirmatory Action Letter dated April 13, 1983 (DPRP): This letter required the licensee to notify. Region III within 10 days of the 1results of a review of maintenance department practices that could have resulted in the introduction of-foreign materials onto the seating surface-of containment isolation valves and actions planned to preclude that possibility..The licensee's written response was received by Region III con April 22,;1983 and contained adequate corrective actions. These cor-
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-rective actions were implemented as verified by inspector observation _of
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repairs'to the Unit 1 main steam isolation valves documented in Inspec-tion Report No. 50-373/83-17..
-(Closed) Open Item (373/82-11-17(DPRP)): This open item required the licensee to review and modify their startup manual to clarify and define activities controlled by this manual. The licensee has completed startup-manual revisions'.
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'(Closed) Open Item (373/82-49-04(DPRP)): This open item documented the (:
poor operating history of the main vehicle access gates. The licensee has replaced the gates.
.(Closed)-open Items-(373/82-52-04(DPRP)): This open item documented a failure of Unit i recirculation pumps to shift to slow speed. The licensee has modified the' control circuitry to solve the problem.
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.(Closed) Open Item'(373/81-00-03(DPRP)): This open item tracked licensee L
actions required by condition 2.C.8.b of NRC Operating License NPF-11.
L-Those actions have been completed-and the item is considered closed for L
- both Unit 1 and Unit 2.
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.(Closed) Open Item (373/83-17-03 and 374/83-16-02(DPRP)): This open item
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tracked the intended hardware modifications'to remedy problems experienced with Riley temperature switches. The problems appeared to be corrected
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with modifications to.the calibration procedures. The manufacturer does
not recommend any hardware changes.
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(Open) Open Item (373/82-52-03(DPRP)):.This open item tracked the licensee's response to the inspector's concerns regarding lack of pro-cedures for heat tracing. The licensee is in the process of writing procedures to address the concerns expressed by the inspector. This item will remain open to track completion and implementation of said procedures.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
3.
Operational Safety Verification The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs, and conducted discussions with plant operators during the period May 18 - June 14, 1983. The inspectors verified the operability of celected-emergency systems, reviewed tagout records, and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of Unit 1 and Unit 2 reactor buildings and turbine buildings were conducted to observe -
plant equipment conditions, fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been expeditiously initiated and resolved for equipment in need of maintenance.
The inspector, by observation and direct interview, verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan, and that radiation protection controls were being implemented.
During the inspection period, the inspector walked down the accessible portions of the High Pressure Core Spray System to verify operability.
No items of noncomplisnce or deviations were identified.
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Surveillance The inspector observed the following Technical Specification required surveillance testing:
LIS-NB-18 Reactor Vessel Low Pressure LPCS/LPCI Injection Valve Permissive Calibration and Functional Test The inspector verified that the testing was performed in accordance with spproved procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limit-ing conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with Technical Specifications and procedure requirements, that test re-sults were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were pro-perly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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5.
Licensee Event Reports Followup Through_ direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records,-the following Licensee Event Reports (LER) were re-
. viewed to determine that.reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accompliched, and-corrective action to prevent recurrence had-been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications.
LER #
TITLE-373/83-27/03L-0 Failed Welds cm Turbine Control Valve Stem Seal Leakoff and -Below Seat Drain Lines
~373/83-01-03L-0 Failed Static 0 Ring Switches 373/83-25/03L-0
_ Failed Hydrogen Analyzers 373/83-02/03L-0 Failure to Perform Surveillance on HPCS " Keep Filled" Alarm 373/83-03/03L-0'
Missed Surveillance on Condenser Low Vacuum Switches 373/83-18/03L-0 Instrument Drift of the RCIC High Suction Pressure Alarm Setpoint 373/83-17/03L-0 Airbound Lake Blowdown Flow Monitor 373/83-34/03L-0 Instrument Drift on HPCS High Level Isolation-Switch 373/83-45/03L-0 Instrument Drift on HPCS High Level Isolation Switch'
373/83-44/03L-0 Organic Contaminants in the Reactor Coolant System 373/83-32/03L-0 Improper Setpoint on Turbine Stop Valve Limit Switch 373/83-33/03L-0-Locked In Alarm on the Radwaste Effluent Process Radiation Monitor 373/83-37/03L-0 Locked In Alarm in the Radwaste Effluent Process Radiation Monitor 373/83-38/03L-0 Improper Performance of HPCS Water Pressure Surveillance.
373/83-40/03L-0
. Spiking on the Stark Noble Gas Effluent Monitor 373/83-42/03L-0 Excessive MSIV Leakage 373/83-43/03L-0 Blown Fuse on Battery Charger
373/83-36/03L-0 Welding Procedures in Conflict With ASME Code L
373/83-41/03L-0 Instrument Line Steam Leak 373/83-28/03L-0
. Air' Ejector Steam Leak L
373/83-35/03L-0 Failed Off-Gas Hydrogen Analyzers LER 373/83-26/03L-0 reported a locked in alarm on-the radwaste discharge Process Radiation Monitor (PRM) due to high fixed levels of background radiation. The PRM was_ returned to service within the Technical Specifi-L-cation required time interval. All reporting requirements were satisfied l
and theLLER is considered closed; however, because of continuing problems l
with this monitor, the-licensee is pursuing changes in equipment design I
and location ~as a permanent solution. These changes will be followed as-an open item (373/83-20-01(DPRP)).
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-LER~373/83-30/03L-0 reported an improperly performed Local Leak Rate Test (LLRT) on the Unit 1 Control Rod Drive (CRD) removal hatch seals..
LAll'. reporting requirements were satisfied, the corrective a6tions are
. deemed acceptable, and the'LER is considered closed; however, the
' licensee committed in the'LER to issue.a new LLET procedure for the-CRD removal hatch. This procedure has yet to be issued.
Its issuance-
' will be tracked as an open item '(373/83-20-02(DPRP)).
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' No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
6.
Followup on Regional Requests
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On May 31, 1983, NRC Region III. directed the Resident Tnspector'to evalu-
- ate concerns regarding potentially unmonitored failures in. Class 1E cir-cuit breakers _ required to close during accident conditions. The condern
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related specifically to a breaker position indication _ circuit failure which could lead to erroneous breaker position = indications for those breakers having an electrically sensed position indicator.
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The ' inspector determined that three types of Leirciilt breakers are employed at LaSalle which close under accident conditions.
ITE Model'3~ breakers are used in 4160 volt applications. GE ~ AK2A-25--I and AK2A-50-1 breakers are used-in 480 volt applications. These breakers utilize mechanically.
driven auxiliary contacts.to provide local and remote position indications and are thus not subject to the types of failure af-concern.
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No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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7.
Plant Trips
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.On May 28, 1983, Unit 1 achieved criticality following completion of
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'an extended maintenance outage'to perform repairs on "B" recircula-
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tion pump seal, the main condenser, and the main steam isolation:
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valves.
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p On June 1, 1983, while performing turbine-overspeed! trip' testing, Unit 1 experienced a reactor scram on low reactor vessel water level.
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L When the turbine was tripped, the non-safety related electrical
' busses automatically transferred;1however, somed oads, tripped on undervoltage. Among these was
"A" condensate pudp. Subsequently,,
"A" turbine driven feed pump tripped on low suction pressure and when
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restarted would not accelerate.above 1400 RPM. The affected. breakers and loads were examined and t6 sting was successfully performed on the
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automatic transfer function to ensure proper operation.
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.On June 6, Unit 1 experienced an automatic reactor scram i responce to turbine stop valve fast closure. The-vibration sensor on #8'
bearing failed giving erroneous indication of high vibration. Thir
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caused the turbine trip. No Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)'
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equipment actuated and all other systems fur.ctioned properly with the exception of one of two slow speed breakers for the "B" recirculation
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pump..This breaker did not trip as required; however, the fast speed and one slow speed breaker did trip stopping the pump. The licensee inspected the breaker and performed testing on the logic and sensing circuitry and found nothing abnormal. After repairing a bad connec-
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tion on the vibrati'on sensor, the licensee commenced a normal reactor
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startup.
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-Unit 1~ experienced an automatic reactor scram at 12:08 A.M. on June 8, 1983. The scram was caused by two simultaneous Intermediate Range Monitor (IRM) "INOP". conditions occurring during ranging operations. The licensca has~ determined that, going from range 6 to range 7 on the IRMs periadically results in'a spurious "INOP"
indication.
It is believed that this is the result of electronic amplifier switching which octurs during the ranging operation. The
licensee'has implemented more strict administrative controls over
_ ranging operations pending final resolution of the amplifier
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switching issue.
Initial attempts at resetting the scram were unsuccessful in that
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several CRD hydraulic control unit valves failed to repositicn.
This was caused by an air leak in a fitting in the scram air system.
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The air leak was repaired-and she reactor was returned to criticality at 9:15 AM on June 8, 1983. No safety systems were challenged during this event.
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On June 14, Unit 1 experienced a second spurious high vibration
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turbine trip from #8 bearing monitor. No ECCS equipeent actuated and
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all other systems operated as designed. Following the scram the licensee replaced the vibration monitor on the #8 bearing, tightened some loose connections found on the leads.from the sensor, and in-stalled a three second tice delay on the high vibration turbine trip to prevent spurious trips. The unit returned to criticality at 9:30 PM on June 14.
8.
Open Items
y Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which
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will be reviewed further by the inspector and which involve some action
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on'the part of the URC-or., licensee or both..
Open' items disclosed during
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the' inspection are discussed in Paragraph 5.
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Exit' Interview
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,'The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
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'throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection period and
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summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The
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licensee acknowledged these findings.
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