IR 05000374/1983018
| ML20024F281 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 08/24/1983 |
| From: | Ahmed I, Gardner R, Mendez R, Naidu K, Naiou K, Williams C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20024F267 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-374-83-18, IEB-79-28, IEB-82-04, IEB-82-4, NUDOCS 8309090177 | |
| Download: ML20024F281 (12) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-374/83-18(DE)
Docket No. 50-374 License No. CPPR-100 Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company P.O. Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: LaSalle County Station, Units 1 & 2 Inspection At: LaSalle Site, Marseilles, Illinois Inspection Conducted: June 29 through August 5, 1983 Inspectors:
K. R. Naidu k
8;/I9[g'3
.k
& //9[P3 I. Ahmed R. Mendez 7#4,eb
$[/9/73 h
Date
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R. N. Gardner 3 M Date Yb*
Approved By:
C. C. Williams, Chie r / F3 Plant Systems Section Date Inspection Summary Inspection on June 29 through August 5, 1983 (Report No. 374/83-18(DE))
Areas Inspected: 50.55(e), open and unresolved items, installation of cables,
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instrument and instrument panels and review of installation records. The inspection involved 194 inspection-hours by four NRC inspectors.
Results: Of the areas inspected, three apparent items of noncompliance were identified (failure to follow procedures, Paragraph 5.d; failure to control design documents, Paragraph 8.a; failure to maintain sufficient inspection records, Paragraph 7.).
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO)
- R. H..Holyoak, Project Manager-Project Construction Department
- D. L. Shamblin, Superintendent W. E. Wahle, Lead Mechanical Engineer
- D. Skoza, Mechanical Engineer
- K. W. Steel, Lead Electrical Engineer
- M. Terras, Electrical Engineer
- S. P. Johnson, Construction Supervisor
- R. W._Gronewold, Startup Engineer E. Wendorf, Mechanical Engineer
. Quality Assurance R. Waninski, Inspector
- J. Woldridge, Supervisor
- E. R. Netzel, Supervisor
- W.
L. Hartig, Inspector
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Morrison Construction Company
- T. Johnson, Project Engineer
- M. Wherry,<QC Supervisor L. J. Butler, Assistant QC Supervisor
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. J. Zappia, Project Engineer H. P. Foley Company
- D. Haider, QC. Manager-
- D. Parks, Project Manager Cataract Engineering Company (Cataract)
' *R. Salyer, Project-Supervisor
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S. C. Fox, Level II TechnicianL D. Darling, Level II Technician
- J. Robinson, QA Supervisor
- Denotes those attending the exit interview on August 5,1983.
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2.
Licensee Action on 50.55(e) Items r
(CLOSED) Vacuum Breakers 374/82-05-EE. Morrison Construction Company per-formed the repairs on the four vacuum breakers. Mechanical Revision Directives (MRD) 536-15833, 34, 35 and 36 document the work performed on each of the vacuum breakers. Morrison Construction Company QC inspections included the welding and bolt torquing. The inspectors examined the docu-mentation package on each of the' four MRDs'which included the following:
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. Weld Data Report i
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Weld' Procedures Specification, Weldrod Consumed
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Results of the various in process inspections, final visual and
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-liquid penetrant examinutions The inspectors reviewed the certification on the weldrod, welder qualifi-cation and determined the records are acceptable.
.(CLOSED) Electrical Penetration Assemblies, IE Bulletin 82-04.
Bunker
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Ramo (CECO Report 82-08-EE), NRC Open Item 374/83-10-03. Licensee initiated.NCR 603 dated May 21, 1982 to identify problems in Bunker Ramo-penetrations-installed. The licensee identified that two out of four field installed butt splices connecting flex-#2 AWG cable to 7 strand
- 2,AWG cables did not meet the pull-out value specified by Underwriter's Laboratories Specification 486A. The manufacturer supplied butt splice
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_ sleeves were sized for flex #2 and not for 7 strand #2 wire. The licensee removed the Bunker Ramo modules having #2 AWG, #6 AWG, and #10 AWG size cables and installed CONAX type modules in penetrations 2AP96E, 2AP97E,
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i 2AP98E, and 2AP99E. The NRC-inspectors verified that the modules were
' replaced in penetration 2AP96E.
j Results of the review of the installation records are documented in
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Paragraph 7 of this report.
'(CLOSED) Unqualified Solenoids (CECO. Report 81-09): As stated in CECO's letter dated November 6, 1981 to Region III, CECO purchased 18 ASCO Type JV026-832-2F solenoids to replace the HV200-934-2F type solenoids valves installed in Unit 2.
Seven of the solenoid valves were not L
needed due to design changes and the remaining eleven were replaced.
= ASCo furnished a certificate of compliance stating that the subject
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valves meet the requirements of IEEE-323-1974, IEEE-382-1972 and-IEEE-344-1975 as substantiated-by testing valves of-generically equal
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design in accordance with ASCo Qualification Specification AQS-21678,
Revision B dated February 15,-1978. Review of the documentation on the
' installation of three solenoid valves identified no unacceptable findings.
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L(CLOSED) Terminal blocks in limitorque operators were underrated (CECO Report 81-01-EE). The licensee initiated NCR 591 dated August 24, 1981 to
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identify that limitorque motor operator contained terminal blocks (tbs)
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rated for 300V and do not meet CECO's standard requirement of 600V rating.
Action required was to remove the tbs and bolt the motor terminal lugs directly to the field cables per H. P. Foley Work Instruction WI 500.
This work was completed and verified to be acceptable on June 8, 1983.
(OPEN) Riley Temperature Switches Inaccuracies (CECO Report 83-01-EE).
The licensee in a letter dated June 3, 1983, indicated that the calibra-tion procedure for the subject switches was modified to solve the inaccuracy problem. The temperature switch module requires an input bias current. When this current passes through the detector wiring, the cable resistance causes a potential drop which offsets the detector output voltage. This causes an offset in the temperature indication as well as an offset in the switch trip point which is ccastant across the meter range and with time, but is variable from module / detector to module /
detector. Based on the above, the calibration procedure was changed. The switches were calibrated on June 24, 1983. The inspector requested to witness the calibration of two Riley temperature switches on July 26, 1983. The results of the calibration were unacceptable. The drif t on the switches exceeded + 3% tolerance specified. The licensee is investigating this matter.
Pending review of the results, this item is open.
(CLOSED) Replacement of Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) hoses (CECO Report 82-06-EE). The licensee notified Region III on July 29, 1982 that the flexible hoses which connect the compressed-air accumulator and the pneumatic actuator on the seven safety relief valves in the ADS were specified for 200 F service although the post-LOCA containment design temperature is 340* F.
The licensee has purchased flexible metallic hoses that meet the design conditions and ASME Section III and installed them. The inspectors visually verified the installation and reviewed the documentation associated with the certification and installation.
(OPEN) Deficiency in the containment low pressure instrument sensing line excess flow check valves (CECO Report 81-07-EE). These excess flow check valves designed to close by the available differential pressure resulting from a sensing line break immediately downstream of the valve in the event of a LOC.\\, would not be closed by the differential pressure avail-able, should the sensing line break occur at or near the instrument rather than at a location immediately downstream of the excess flow check valve.
Dragon Valves Inc., the manufacturer, designed a replacement spring and poppet assembly for the valve.
Installation of the replacement will allow the excess flow check valve to close with the lower available differential pressure should the sensing line break occur at the instrument itself during a LOCA. The replacement of spring and poppet assemblies and setting the limit switches was completed and verified by QA. The inspectors could not determine whether the modified valves meet the specification criteria. Review of the preoperation test procedure LIS-N3-15 Revision 0, dated May 7, 1982, indicates that the specified quantitative function cannot be readily verified. This matter is being pursued by Test Program Sections.
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(CLOSED) Inadequate ranges on pressure indicating instruments (CECO Report 82-09-EE). This item is also identified as an unresolved item 374/83-08-03.
General Electric initiated Field Deviation Disposition Request (FDDR) HA2-708, Revision 2, dated October 1, 1982, to replace the installed Robert Shaw pressure switches E12-N032 A/B and E-12-N033 A/B which have 0-600 psig range with pressure switches
'having a range of 0-1500 psig. The inspectors observed that the range on pressure switches E12-NO32A and 33A installed on R!IR local panel 2H22-P018 and pressure switches E12-N032B and 33B installed on RHR local panel 2H22-P021 is 0-1500 psig.
3.
Licensee Action on IE Bulletins (CLOSED) IE Bulletin 79-28. Replacement of NAMCO limit switches. The licensee purchased several environmentally qualified limit switches.
Certificate of compliance from NAMCO controls certifies that the NAMCO switches part number EA-740-8600 have been manufactured, inspected, tested and found to meet applicable bill of material and drawing specifi-cations. NAMCO further certified that these switches were manufactured to the same specification as for switch model EA-740-2000 Revision C which was qualified to IEEE-323-1974, IEEE-344-1975, IEEE-382-1972 per report QTR-11. The licensee generated a list of all the affected valves on which the limit switches have to be replaced. The replacements on the valves inside the containment are coraplete. The replacement pro-gram is documented and controlled.
CLOSED) IE Bulletin 82-04. Problems in Bunker Ramo Electrical Penetration Assemblies butt splices. This item is closed under 50.55(e) items in
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4.
Licensee Action on Open Items
.(CLOSED) Open Item (374/81-00-15). Environmental qualifications were inadequate on the Mainsteam Isolation Valves position indicator electrical terminations. The licensee purchased environmentally qualified electrical conductor seal assemblies manufactured by CONAX, Buffalo, New York.
CONAX furnished a certificate of conformance stating "the seal assemblies were produced with all contractually applicable specifications and that CONAX has available with them the chemical or physical test reports or other evidence of conformance to the applicable specifications." The i
inspectors observed that the seal assemblies have been replaccJ.
(CLOSED) Open Item (374/83-10-02). Replacement of Bunker-Ramo Butt
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. Splices. This item is closed in this report under 50-55(e) items.
(CLOSED) Open Item (374/83-10-03). Replacement of ADS hoses. This item is closed under 50.55(e) items in this report.
(CLOSED) Open Item (374/81-00-09). Repairs of Vacuum Breakers. This item is closed under 50.55(e) items in this report.
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d (CLOSED) Open Item (374/83-08-03).
Inadequate range on pressure indi-
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t cating switches in the_RHR system. This item is closed under 50.55(e)
I (items in this report.
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Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings J
(CLOSED) Unresolved Item'(374/81-14-01). _ It was previously identified
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that instrument sensing lines were not tagged with color coded tags. This
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requirement' is stated in Paragraph 2.1.1.e of Sargent & Lundy (S&L) design
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criteria DC-ME-01-LS Revision 1.
At that time, the licensee had stated
that this would be accomplished prior to fuel loading. During this inspection, the inspectors observed that the color coded identification
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tapes attached to instrument sensing lines to instrument racks
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2H22-P004, 2H22-P005, 2H22-P006 and 2H22-P022 did not denote the correct
reactor protection system segregation code. The inspectors established that Morrison Construction Company failed to follow their procedure WI-19,
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Revision 0 dated January 1982. The unresolved item is closed and is being
escalated to an item of noncompliance. The inspectors informed the licensee that Morrison Construction Company's failure to follow procedure WI-19 was an item of noncompliance contrary to the requirements of
10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V (374/83-18-01).
(CLOSED) Unresolved Item (50-374/81-14-02).
It was previously identified
. that the : licensee's cable termination procedures did not include torque requirements for belted connections. The licensee performed tests in December 1981 and January 1982, to determine if the current method of tightening bolted connections results in an adequate connection. The-test results indicate that the licensee's method is acceptable.
6.
Observation of Installed Instruments The ~ inspectors observed the following instruments and instrument racks which have been-installed:
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Instrument Racks
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2H22-P027, RPV level and Pressure Panel B 2D18-J005, RHR Service water Loop A, Radiation Panel 2D18-J006, RHR Service water Loop B, Radiation Panel p
2D18-J013, Off gas radiation monitoring panel
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Instruments iJ 2B21-N026B, RPV_ water level indicating and transmitting switch
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2B21-N051B, RPV pressure transmitter 2D18-N003A, Mainsteam line radiation detectors located at elevation.
710 and J-line wall in the reactor building
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2D18-N003B, Mainste'am line radiation detectors located at elevation
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j 710' and J-line wall in the reactor building
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2D18-N003C, Mainsteam line radiation detectros located at elevation
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710' and J-line wall in the reactor building 2D18-N003D, Mainsteam line radiation detectors located at elevation 710' and J-line wall in the reactor building
- 2D18-N009A, Reactor building vent exhaust plenum radiation detectors located at elevation 786' and 18-J-L in the auxiliary
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building 2D18-N009B, Reactor building vent exhaust plenum radiation detectors located at elevation 786' and 18-J-L in the auxiliary building
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2D18-N009C, Reactor building vent exhaust plenum radiation. detectors
located at elevation 786' and 18-J-L in the auxiliary building 2D18-N009D, Reactor building vent exhaust plenum radiation detectors
located at elevation 786' and 18-J-L in the auxiliary building 2D18-N011A, Off gas carbon bed vault radiation detectors located at elevation 674' floor in the off gas building
- 2D18-N011B, Off gas carbon bed vault radiation detectors located
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at elevation 674' floor in the off gas building c.
The inspectors observed the calibration of the following instruments
i (1) Scram discharge volume level switches (two out of a total of eight switches) identified as 2E11-N013A and 13F.
(2) Reactor recirculation pump 2A flow transmitter identified as 2B33-N011A.
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(3) Recirculation pump A inlet flow transmitter identified as 2B33-N014A.
In addition, the inspectors witnessed a loop verification of the recirculation pump suction flow "A" involving transmitter
2B33-N014A, square root extractor 2B22-K608A and recorder 2B22-R614.
(4) Scram discharge volume pressure transmitters 2C11-N012A, B,
C and D. The inspectors observed that the low and high
pressure line connections to the transmitters were reversed.
Morrison Construction Company QC inspections had not been performed. The licensee investigated this matter and deter-
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I mined that the' connections were reversed. Morrison Construc-
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-tion Company generated a NCDR to correct the piping.
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.No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in the above t
areas.
7.
Review of Instrument Rack Installation Records k
- Morrison Construction-Company installed the instrument racks, and torqued i
the foundation bolts. Walsch Construction Company grouted the bolts.
Morrison Construction Company documented their inspections on Form PC-75A l
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titled Equipment Installation Control Checklists. The inspectors selec-tively reviewed the PC-75A forms for instrument racks and determined that j
the checklists were signed-off by Horrison Construction Company QC inspec-tion personnel and no unacceptable findings were identified.
Review of Walsch grout checklists identified no unacceptable findings.
The inspectors reviewed fifteen nonconformance reports initiated by Morrison Construction Company and determined that appropriate corrective action was recommended and that the work performed was inspected by Morrison Construction Company QC inspectors and determined acceptable.
8.
Observation of Cable Installation a.
The inspectors observed the installation of cables identified as RR123, 125, 127 and 129 which belong to the Reactor Protection System Channels A1, A2, B1 and B2 respectively. The cables are routed in separate conduits and are adequately separated during the routing and inside the termination c;binets.
b.
The inspectors observed that inadequate separation was maintained between the following ESF Division 1 and 2 cables during installa-tion at elevation 783' inside the primary containment:
(1) Division I cable 2NB11 was in contact with Division 2 cable
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2NB12 (2) Division 1 conduit 2JB117C was in contact with Division 2 conduit 2JB114C.
(3) Division 1 cable 2NB894 was in contact with Division 2 cable 2NB896 (4) Division 1 cable 2NB917 was in contact with Division 2 cable 2NB918 l
l (5) Division 1 cable 2NB911 was in contact with Division 2 cable 2NB912 l
l Design Drawing 1E-0-3333 requires conduitt carrying various ESF l
Division cables to be separated by one inch It is logical to expect cables in air to be separated more than one.nch inside the contain-j
ment. However, procedural requirements were. ot established to l
specify the minimum separation distance between various ESF Division l
cables in air. The inspectors informed the licensee that failure to establish procedures specifying the minimum separation distance between various ESF Division cables in air was an item of noncompli-
ance contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appenix B, Criterion V (374/83-18-01).
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The inspectors observed that the junction box 2JB058C was incorrectly c.
identified with a blue tag instead of a yellow tag at elevation 783'.
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d.
The inspectors observed that cables 2NB683 and 2CT018 were incor-rectly identified with yellow tags with white stripes (Division 1 associated) instead of blue tag with white stripes (Division 2 associated) in riser R-385 in the vicinity of the recirculation pump at elevation 745', inside the containment.
The inspectors informed the licensee that the electrical contractor failed to maintain separation criteria while installing divisional associated cables and failed to identify the cable junction box and cables with correct color coded tags. The inspectors informed the licensee that this is another example of an item of noncompliance contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V (374/83-18-01).
One item of noncompliance was identified in the above area.
9.
Review of Cable Installation Records The inspectors reviewed the installation records for the following cables which consisted of cable pulling checklists generated by the electrical contractor (H. P. Foley) craftsmen, cable pulling inspection checklists signed by H. P. Foley QC inspectors, termination cards generated by the craftsmen after terminating the cables and QC verification of the te rminations.
Cable Segregation Cable Type Identification Code From To a.
IPR-16TW Shielded RR123 AIK 2H22-P022 2H13-P608 b.
IPR-16TW Shielded RR129 B2K 2H22-P010 2H13-P608 c.
IPR-16TW Shielded RR127 B1K 2H22-P009 2H13-P608 d.
IPR-ISTW Shielded RR125 A2K 2H22-P066 2H13-P608 e.
IPR #20 Shielded 2NB683 2B21-N030-K5 2LV94E f.
3 #16 TW Shielded 2CT-018 2TE-CT009 R2D2 g.
Single Twisted NB357 Rx.
level & Pressure H13-P613 Pair #16 Panel B H22-P027 Process inst. VB h.
Single Twisted N0358 Rx.
level and Pressure H13-P613 Pair #16 Panel B H22-P027 Process inst. VB Items e. and f. were identified with the incorrect color coded tags and is identified as an item of noncompliance in Paragraph 8.
Conduit containing cables NB357 and NB358 were found with a yellow / white tag identifying the cables as Division 1 associated cables whereas the cables are Division 2 and marked correctly inside the junction box at H22-P027. This discrepancy was due to the wrong identification of the conduit on S&L electrical installation Drawing No. 1E-2-3523,
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Revision AK, showing it as Segregation Code 2K instead of 2BK. The conduit is now correctly tagged with a blue metallic tag showing the cable and conduit in Division 2.
Cable routing was checked and found to be in Division 2 raceways.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
10.
Review of Electrical Penetration Rework The inspector observed the as-built replacement of the Bunker Ramo penetration assembly 2AP99E. The Bunker Ramo module was replaced with CONAX type module. The replacement appeared to be adequate. However, review of the Field Inspection Report File No. 1516 which documents the various inspections performed during the replacement process indicates that a visual inspection had been performed on April 4, 1983.
In addi-tion, Line 3 of Section 4 of the inspection document merely states that
" Installation performed per CONAX Installation Manual IPS-1004." The document does not specifically state that a meggar test was performed as required in Section 7.0 of the CONAX manual which states " Electrical tests consisting of, as a minimum, an isulation resistance test be con-ducted on the module assemblies after the installation, but prior to termination of the field conductors." This particular insulation resist-ance test consists of applying 500 volts DC between individual conductors and the grcund lead of the adapter module. The minimum permissible insula-tion resistance should be 100 meg-ohms. The inspectors informed the licensee that the available documentation on the insulation resistance tests on the installed CONAX modules is incomplete and, therefore, unacceptable; especially after the licensees were alerted on the "Defi-ciencies in Primary Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies" by IE Bulletin 82-04. Furthermore, in the absense of documented results of the insulation resistance values, it may not be possible to recognize degradation of individual conductors in the penetrations, should a problem arise in the future.
The inspectors informed the licensee that failure to provide adequate documentation to assure tbat the meggar tests were performed during the replacement of the electrical penetration modules, is an item of non-compliance contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVII (374/83-18-02).
11.
Independent Verification a.
Verification of As-Installed Drawings The inspectors independently ascertained whether the design drawings agreed with the DC switchgear breaker ratings and trip settings.
Specifically, the inspectors verified the breaker sizes indicated on S&L Key Diagram 1E-2-4000 EC for 250 V DC Motor Control Center (MCC)
221Y. The inspectors observed that of the 23 cubicles only three cubicles contained breakers that corresponded in size with that of the key diagram. Verification of S&L Key Diagram 1E-2-4000 FB for
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125 V DC distribution panels 211X and 211Y indicated that its cubicle 21 contained a 15 ampere breaker instead of the indicated 100 ampere breaker. The inspectors observed a 15 ampere breaker in cubicle 1 of panel 211X; Drawing IE-2-4000FB does not-show this breaker.
During a' previous inspection (IR 373/82-11) on LaSalle Unit I similiar problems with breakers settings had been observed. The problem consisted of breaker settings delineated on S&L Electric
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Service Orders (ES0) data sheets that did not correspond to the breaker settings at the equipment. During this inspection on Unit 2 the breaker sizes in the MCC and distribution panels did not match -
the sizes delineated in the S&L Key Diagrams. This appears to be a repeat item of noncompliance as previously identified in Unit 1.
' The inspectors informed the licensee that failure to establish con-trol of activities affecting quality to assure that-documents, in-cluding changes are reviewed and updated for adequacy is considered to be in noncompliance with 10 CFR, Appendix B, Criterion VI as described in appendix of the report transmittal letter (50-374/
83-18-03).
b.
Verification of Equipment Trip Settings The inspector observed the trip component set point in the following Motor Control Centers (MCC's):
MCC 236Y-1 Cubicle C-5 Cubicle E-2
~ Cubicle G-5 MCC 235Y-2 Cubicle D-3 Cubicle D-4 Cubicle E-1 MCC 235Y-1 Cubicle B-5 Cubicle E-3 MCC 236Y-2 Cubicle E-6 The set points are delineated on S&L ESO data sheets. No dis-crepancies were identified between the ESO sheets and the settings in MCC panels.
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c.
Verification of Overload Monitoring in Starters The licensee's commitment in Section 8.3.1.1.1 of the FSAR states that "all MCC cubicles except those with 120-V AC distribution panels are provided with short circuit protection or combination staters.
Each starter is provided with an overload relay and an auxiliary relay to monitor the status of the overload relay contacts." During observation of the MCC breaker settings, the inspectors determined that while Class 1E MCC starter cubicles were provided with auxiliary relays, the status of the overload relay contacts were not neces-sarily being monitored. The licensee could not state a basis or explain why the contact of some of the overload relays were not being monitored. The licensee agreed to discuss this matter with S&L the A/E and provide additional information.
Pending review of the additional information this item is considered unresolved (374/83-18-04).
One item of noncompliance was identified in this area.
12.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompli-ance or deviations. One unresolved item disclosed during this inspection is discussed in Section 11.c.
13.
Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives on August 5, 1983 and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection. The licensee acknow-ledged the findings as reported.
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