IR 05000352/1980002
| ML19331B714 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Limerick  |
| Issue date: | 06/03/1980 |
| From: | Mattia J, Mcgaughy R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19331B704 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-352-80-02, 50-352-80-2, 50-353-80-02, 50-353-80-2, NUDOCS 8008120652 | |
| Download: ML19331B714 (15) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION I
50-352/80-02 Report Nos.
50-353/80-02 50-352 Docket Nos.
50-353 CPPR-106 License No.
CPPR-107 Priority Category A
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Licensee:
Philadelphia Electric Company 2301 Market Street Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19101 Facility Name:
Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:
Limerick, Pennsylvania Inspection Conducted:
January 22-31 and February 1-22, 1980 Inspectors:
.( k kM I. C. Mattia, Reactor Inspector date date date Approved by: '/fd/ lbh,o
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9(7 4,
F. W. McGaugby'/ fff, Projects Section,
' crate Reactor Cons ru fon and Engineering Support Branch Inspection Summary:
Unit 1 Inspection on January 22-31 and February 1-22, 1980 (Report No. 50-352/80-02)
Areas Inspected:
Routine inspection by the resident inspector of work activities relative to: installation and welding of reactor coolant pressure boundary and other piping. Electrical work activities and fire prevention / protection during construction.
The inspector also performed plant tours and reviewed licensee action on previously identified items. The inspection involved 46 inspector hours, including 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> during offshift, by the NRC Resident Inspector.
Results:
Of the 4 areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were identified in 2 areas; 2 apparent items of noncompliance were identified in two areas (Infraction
- Failure to comply with procedures regarding drawing control paragraph 2; in-fraction - failure to comply with procedures regarding pipe supports paragraph 9).
8008120 (, 5 2_
Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 1977)
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Unit 2 Inspection on January 22-31 and February 1-22, 1980 (Report No. 50-353/80-02)
Areas Inspected:
The inspector performed plant tours and reviewed licensee action on previously identified items. The inspection involved 3 inspector hours by the NRC Resident Inspector.
Results:
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Philadelphia Electric Company Note D. Clohecy, QA Engineer 1, 3 J. Corcoran, Field QA Branch Head 1, 2, 3, 4 D. DiPaolo, QA Engineer 1,2,3 F. Gloeckler, QA Engineer J. Fedick, Construction Engineer 1, 3 G. Lauderback, QA Engineer D. Marascio, Construction Engineer A. McLean, Construction Engineer The inspector also interviewed other PECo employees, as well as employees of Bechtel, Reactor Controls Company and General Electric Company.
Bechtel Corporation T. Altum, Welding Supervisor
A. Arch, Assistant Project Field Engineer
D. Blackwell, Project Fire Marshall L. Campbell, Welding Engineer E., Chalifoux, QC Engineer J. J. Curci, QA Engineer 1,2,4 B. Dragon, QA Engineer 1,2,3,4 P. Dunn, QA Engineer 3, 4 T. F. Fallon, Assistant Project Field QC Engineer 1,3,4 H. D. Foster, Project Field QC Engineer 1,2,3 S. J. Fletcher, Project Safety Supervisor
D. Gallino, Pipe Hanger Engineer J. Gwin, Project Superintendent 1,2,3 A. M. Hill, Office Engineer
M. Iyer, Lead Resident Engineer
G. Kelley, QA Engineer
E. R. Klossin, Project QA Engineer 1,2,3 R. A. Leingang, Assistant Project Field Engineer 2, 4 V. Mehta, Piping Engineer M. Norm, Assistant Lead QC Welding Engineer J. R. Reiney, Project Construction Manager
J. Ruud, QA Engineer 2,3,4 M. Tokolics, QA Engineer 3, 4 T. Waters, Lead QC Welding Engineer A. Weedman, Project Field Engineer 1,2,3
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Notes 1 - Denotes those present at exit interview conducted on January 24, 1980 2 - Denotes those present at exit interview conducted on January 31, 1980 3 - Denotes those present at exit interview conducted on February 14, 1980 4 - Denotes those present at exit interview conducted on February 21, 1980 2.
Plant Tours - Units 1 and 2 The inspector observed work activities in progress, completed work and the plant status in several areas of the plant during general inspections of the plant. The inspector examined work for any obvious defects or noncompliance with regulatory requirements or license conditions. Particular note was taken of presence of quality control, evidence such as inspection records, material identification, housekeeping and equipment preservation.
The inspector interviewed, when appropriate, craft personnel, craft supervision and QC personnel in work areas. The inspector during a tour, observed that several drawings were on a platform next to two iron workers erecting portions of a platform in Unit 1 reactor building at elevation 300 feet. The inspector asked the iron workers if they were using the drawings for erecting the platform. They stated that the drawings did not belong to them and they were not using them. There were ten drawings located at this platform. The ten drawings were checked with the current Bechtel revision listing (register) to determine if they were current and valid. The results of this review was as follows:
Field Dwg. No.
Revision Current Revision 8031-C43CC-16-4
4 8031-C43I-1427-3
3 C-1197
8 C-1196
4 C-1184
15 C-1183 e
10 (obsolete)
C-1182
6 C-1181
4 C-1179
7 C-1177
8 It was determined that the drawings belong to the iron workers foreman and that the designated area had received updated drawings of C-1182 and C-1183. The inspector informed the licensee that this lack of document control was contrary to Bechtel's procedures (Job Rule G-5) and Criterion V of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B (352/80-02-01).
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3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Unit 1)
(Closed) Unresolved Item (352/79-07-02): A written acceptance criteria for the allowable gap between the weld root and backing bar was not available for the welding of pipe restraints. A Drawing Change Notice #3 (7/27/79) to Bechtel Drawing C-276, Revision 6, was issued to state that the maximum separation between the backing bar and weld joint shall be 1/16 inch. This item is considered resolved.
(0 pen) Noncompliance (352/79-07-04): Misalignment of Pipe Restraint Weld Joints which exceeded design requirements (Drawin'g C-292). Bechtel issued five nonconformance reports (Nos. 3841, 3820, 3735, 3639 and 3709) con-cerning this item. The inspector reviewed these reports and also the following additional documents:
Bechtel Field Inspection Reports C2-QCG1-84 and 85, dated 11/19/79
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Magnetic Particle Examination Reports PBT-MT-124,125 and 128
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The inspector also inspected the Reworked Restraint #PR-9. This item remains open until NRC inspectors review what corrective action has been taken to preclude recurrence. In accordance with the licensee's response letter, the corrective action will be implemented by January 1, 1980.
This date had not been met and the licensee stated that a new Job Rule (#42) concerning this matter is currently under review (2nd draft) and will be implemented by February 29, 1980.
(Closed) Unresolved (352/79-07-01): Unauthorized welding was performed by the crafts on pipe. The inspector reviewed Revision 18 of Job Rule G-16, which now includes the requirement to notify QC prior to repairs being
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performed. A training session was also held on July 3 and 5, 1979 with l
supervisors, general foremen, foremen and area piping engineers.
The inspector also reviewed the closeout of Quality Action Request QAR #F-128 and NCR 3615. This item is considered resolved.
4.
Safety-Related Piping Activities (Units 1 and 2)
a.
The inspector observed the welding of piping hanger HBB-160-H2/0 i
located at elevation 224' in area 15 in accordance with welding procedure PI-A-Lh/3. The inspector inspected the welding material used, weld deposited, the cleaning of weld pass and verified that the welder was properly qualified. A review of the data at location was also performed. No items of noncompliance were identified.
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b.
With information obtained (Portable Rod Warmer Identification Elec-trade Code Identification Numbers and Weld Withdrawal Authorization)
from the above inspection. The inspector inspected the welding material issuing location in the turbine building for the following:
Welding material withdrawals and return are in accordance with
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approved procedures Material clearly identified and segregated
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Material stored in accordance with procedures
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Storing ovens were calibrated and set at proper temperature
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
5.
Safety-Related Electrical Work Activities (Unit 2)
The inspector observed the testing of two T-modules (Nos. TM-43 and TM-1)
from the Unit 2 PGCC terminal cabinet # 20C788. The testing was being performed in accordance with GE Procedure F.D.I. #TRDA which was issued on January 4, 1980. The test consisted of a 100% pull test on each lug at a specified force (depending upon wire size). A continuity and resistance test was also performed for each connection. The inspector verified that the instruments (GE #103 and #111 meters) used were calibrated. No items of noncompliance were identified.'
6.
Safety-Related Piping (Unit 1)
The inspector examined the completed weld for joining piping spools FSK-EBB-1-5 and EBB-131-1-2 at elevation 298' in the reactor building.
The inspector questioned the wall thickness in an area on the pipe adjacent to weld. The area had localized depression which probably occurred during fabrication. The licensee measured the area with a calibrated ultrasonic wall thickness meter. The depression varied from 0.635" - 0.670". The minimum wall thickness for this pipe is 0.602". No items of noncompliance were identified.
7.
Reactor Recirculation Documentation (Unit 1)
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l The inspector reviewed the receiving inspection and code data reports for several of the preplaced reactor recirculation piping. The following documents were reviewed:
a.
Documentation for Pipe Spools (28" diameter) identified as RS-1-A4 and RS-1-84
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Receipt Inspection Report QCIR-M-1-MRR-70279
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Material Receiving Report #70279
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GE Product Quality Certification #SSO9 and associated Deviation
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Description Reports (DDR) #18905 and 18911 ASME Code Data Reports
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Documentation for Piping Spools (22" diameter) identified as RD-1-A1,
-H1, -A3, -B3, -A9 and -B13 Receipt Inspection Report QCIR-M-1-MRR-70269
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Material Receiving Report #70269
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GE Product Quality Certification #LL285 and associated DDR
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- 18905, 18906, 18911, 18912 ASME Code Data Reports
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Documentation for Piping Spools (28" diameter) identified as RS-1-82,
-A3, -83, -A2 and -82 Receipt Inspection Report QCIR-M-1-MRR-70271
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Material Receiving Report #70271
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GE Product Quality Certification #SS010 and associated DDR
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- 18911, 18913 and 18914
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ASME Code Data Reports During the above data review the following was noted:
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The code data reports did not indicate that the 22" diameter
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pipe (longitudinal weld seam) was liquid penetrant tested (Note: the 28" pipe code data report indicates that it was)
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There was a discrepancy in the effective code dates which were used to fabricate the piping. The associated pipe vendor stated that the code used was the ASME Section III 1977 Edition and the 1977 Summer Addenda, while the ARMCO Vendor stated it used the 1977 Edition of Section III and the 1978 Summer Addenda
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A copy of the applicable General Electric Specification was not available at site to review and determine the piping fabrication requirements. During this inspection period, the licensee obtained a copy of certified material test report for the 22 inch pipe. The report was for 2 pieces of 22" diameter piping with minimum wall thickness of 1.009" and 60 feet long.
The two pieces were serialized (SN9-6698-3P2 and SN-6698-7P2). The report indicated that the welds were liquid penetrant tested in accordance with paragraphs 82560 (Section III ASME Code) and the ARMCO Procedure QC-7 (Revision 4)
and were acceptable. The inspector informed the licensee this item is considered unresolved pending review of the applicable GE Piping Fabrication Specification by the inspector (352/80-02-02).
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8.
Electrical Supports Inside Containment (Unit 1)
The inspector observed the welding of the galvanized U-channel struts to the containment liner at 302 foot elevation without the removal of the galvanized coating prior to welding. The strut is to be used to support
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electrical conduit. The licensee informed the inspector that Bechtel document E-1406 allows the welding to galvanized materials. The inspector reviewed E-1406, Section 10.3, which stated that " Galvanizing is not considered to be detrimental and need not be removed prior to field welding of struts and or fittings either to each other or to structural steel. Excess galvanizing, i.e., drips and runs, shall be removed prior to welding." During this inspection report period the licensee submitted a Bechtel letter (dated February 14, 1980) and some test data which indicated that it is not necessary to remove the galvanizing coating prior to welding. The inspector informed the licensee that this item is considered unresolved pending review by NRC of the data submitted to the resident inspector (352/80-02-03).
9.
Pipe Supports and Hangers (Unit 1)
The inspector randomly selected an installed core spray pipe support hanger (HBB-120-H17) to verify that it was installed, located and welded as specified in the applicable design drawing, specification and the weld procedure. The results of inspection indicated that one of the drawings (HBB-120-H17, Revision 4) dimension (3' - 8-15/16") locating the support to the pipe was not within the drawing tolerance. This dimension was measured by the inspector (also verified by licensee) to be 2' - 6".
A Design Change Notice or Field Change Request was not issued for the discrepancy. A discussion with the licensee and A/E revealed that there are, as of December 1979, approximately 2000 hangers installed that were awaiting inspection by t;i cognizant area engineer prior to turnover to
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quality control for the required final inspection. The licensee was aware of this situation as indicated in an Audit Report (P-278 issued 9/21/79)
and PEco Construction Memorandum, dated 12/3/79. The Bechtel Job Rule G-5 (Revision 27) allows design modifications for pipe hangers and pipe supports to be implemented by the crafts prior to the issue of an approved
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l Field Change Request. The only provision on the Job Rule is that a Field i
Change Request must be transmitted to the appropriate Bechtel Lead Dis-cipline Staff Engineer for processing. The inspector reviewed the status of 37 safety related pipe supports and hangers inspected in January by the cognizant area engineer. Of the 37 inspected a total of twelve Field Change Requests were required to be issued, twenty-two required some rework and the remainder (3) were acceptable as installed.
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The inspector also questioned the licensee if he evaluated this for reportability to the NRC as a significant in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) requirements. The licensee stated that the he did and that his signing of the PECo finding report (Form QAF-8) signifies that he did review for reportability. The licensee then informed the inspector that a change to the form is currently being processed. A check off section is being added to record evaluations for reportability. A draft copy was shown to the inspector. This item is considered unresolved pending review by the inspector of the revised licensee findings report form.
(352/80-02-04).
The inspector observed that the base plates for pipe support GBB-112-H10 had one mounting hole offset. A review of the drawing for base plate depicted that the four holes are to be on l' - 3" centers. The inspector told the licensee that he suspected (based upon grinding of plate at this offset hole) that the original hole was plug welded. The licensee acid etched the area but it did not reveal any indications of welding. The licensee then had the area radiographed. Radiography verified that the base plate hole was plug welded. Bechtel issued a Nonconformance Report (#3979) for this nonconformity. The inspector informed the licensee that this is an item of noncompliance for failure to follow the requirements in the Design Specification #319, paragraph 4.5.3. for misalignment of predrilled holes. The specification requires the use of welded rein-forcing plates (352/80-02-05).
The inspector observed the cutting out of weld joints of pipe restraint PR251 located at elevation 268' inside the Unit 1 containment. This repair was in accordance with a disposition in nonconformance report (NCR) #3892 validated 12/17/79. The NCR also required similar repairs of welds in pipe restraints PR248 and PR249. The NCR indicated that the repair was required because of rejectable indications shown on radiographs.
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I Further investigation by the inspector as to the cause of bad weld joints revealed that all three restraints were welded by the same welder. This particular welder was qualified to weld per the applicable procedure (P1-A-Lh) on 7/3/79. The inspector examined tne weld material withdrawal authorization slips for the 3 restraints and determined the following:
For restraint PR248 the welder started to weld it on 7/24/79
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For restraint PR249 the welder started to weld it on 8/2/79
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For restraint PR251 the welder started to weld it on 8/28/79
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Based on the above, it was the NRC inspector's conclusion that this welder may not have been sufficiently competent since these welds made soon after qualification were rejectable and required major repairs. The
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licensee was asked to provide the inspector with information concerning whether the welder in question was retrained and requalified. It was also questioned whether other welds made by this individual had been adequately examined to ensure acceptability in view of questionable welder performance.
The licensee was informed that this item is considered unresolved pending review of the licensee's information concerning this matter (352/80-02-06).
When inspecting hanger DLA-107-H1 the inspector noticed that the connecting pin clearance to the pipe support clamp appeared to be excessive (approxi-mately 1/8"). A review of the pipe hanger drawing to determine the clearance revealed that the pipe clamp was welded to clevis plate not in accordance with the drawing requirements. The licensee investigated and found that the pipe clamps interfered with the box beam. Bechtel area engineering issued a Field Change Request (FCR) No. M-4340F to correct the interference but approval of the FCR was denied by the Bechtel Project Engineer. The NRC inspector questioned why the pipe support was modified in accordance with the disapproved FCR. (The FCR was disapproved on 1/4/80 and the welding of the modified support per FCR M-4340F was started on 2/8/80 and completed on 2/11/80. The licensee stated that the Bechtel area engineer needed a temporary hanger to support the pipe and elected to use the one outlined in the disapproved FCR. The NRC inspector discussed this with the cognizant area engineer who stated that there was a temporary hanger sign on hanger DLA-107-H1 the day NRC inspected it. The possible use of the unacceptable practice of placing " temporary" signs on discrepant items in order to mask the true circumstances will be reviewed during future inspections. This item is considered unresolved pending review of the new design and inspection of the pipe support installation (352/80-02-07).
Visual inspecticn of the weld (clevis to beam) on hanger DLA-112-H5 by NRC inspector indicated that there appeared to be a linear indication of the fillet weld. The licensee QA engineer and Bechtel Lead QC engineer inspected the weld with magnification and found it to be free of cracks.
The licensee issued surveillance check report #P-301 to document this.
The inspector had no further questions on this matter.
10.
Fire Prevention / Protection in Safety-Related Work Areas (Unit 1)
The inspector conducted an inspection of various work areas to verify that the requirements of Bechtel's Jcb Rule S-5, Revision 3, was being implemented. The following are results of the inspection:
a.
Core Spray Pump Rooms (elevation 177') - welding was being performed in these rooms. The inspector noted that fire extinguishers were just outside rooms in hallways. Verified that extinguishers were inspected on a nightly basis. The current inspection was performed on 1/21/80.
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Outside of the core spray room in hallway area a fire hose station had the handwheel of a manually operated valve taped with masking tape to protect it during painting of walls which could interfere with its operation. This was removed by licensee during the inspection.
c.
In RHR room, the fire hose station was inaccessible (blocked by scaffold). This was corrected by the contractor during this inspection period. The hose station was relocated in the RHR room on an accessible wall.
d.
The following conditions were found inside the containment.
A wooden clean room was recently erected by the subcontractor for work activities inside the reactor pressure vessel. It appeared that the wood may not have been treated with a fire resistant chemical Bechtel uses color (green) coded system to signify fire resistant wood. The subcontractor took corrective action during this inspection period by coating the wood with fire resistant coating.
e.
An excessive amount of wood was being stored in the containment. The contractor corrected this by removing some unnecessary wood and covered remaining wood with a fire resistant covering.
f.
Job Rule S-5 states in Section 6.3 that " fire extinguishers shall be kept. full and in proper working condition at all times." Contrary to this, the inspector found one pressurized water fire extinguisher not full, the indicator was in the red area, thus indicating a
recharge was required. The A/E stated that with water type extin-
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guishers they don't recharge when the indicator is within the upper band of the red area. If they were to do so it would be done almost daily or more frequently because the crafts use the water for other uses than fighting fires.
The A/E stated that the Job Rule S-5 will be revised to allow a decrease in pressure for water extinguishers. This item is considered unresolved pending review of revision to the Job Rule (352/80-02-08).
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The inspector also reviewed the records to verify that the fire brigades assemble monthly (May - December, 1979) for special training.
The inspector also verified that the second shift fire brigade members were involved in this training.
I No items of noncompliance were identified.
11.
Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary - Observation of Work Activitie-
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(Units 1 and 2)
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The following listed activities were observed to determine if the require-
ments of ASME Section III and IX Codes, applicable procedures, specific actions and drawings had been adhered to:
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a.
Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Safe Ends Replacement (Unit 2)
The inspector observed the following activities in Unit 2 for safe end replacement:
Observed the grinding of liquid penetrant indications on a
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reactor recirculation nozzle wald prep located at azimuth 210*
Observed the final results of a liquid penetrant test of weld
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prep indications for reactor recirculation nozzles at locations 270* and 300*
Observed that the penetrant which had been on the reactor
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recirculation replaced safe end (located at azimutti 330*) weld prep of the joint did not penetrate the weld joint properly.
Further investigation indicated that penetrant was on approxi-mately 1 hours1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and was performed by the subcontractor's techni-cian who was not qualified to ANST requirements. Further discus-sions with the subcontractor and licensee revealed that after the initial liquid penetrant examination (performed by a qualified level II examiner) where all the indications are documented, the subcontractor performs " informational" liquid penetrant examination to expedite the removal of indications (Note: the maximum depth of grinding the indications is controlled by the a G.E. procedure). The inspector stated that the ASME code does not address or disallow " informational" liquid penetrant examin-ations. The inspector stated that for an " informational" examin-ation to be useful that it should be done properly. The inspector also reviewed the initial penetrant examination report dated 1/17/80 which was performed by a qualified examiner in accordance with GE procedure 18XA9404 to verify that it was in accordance with ASME code. Since the final liquid penetrant i
examination is also done in accordance with the ASME code l
requirements, the inspector did not have any further questions j
on this matter.
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Observed machining of reactor recirculation weld prep for
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nozzle at azimuth 90*
b.
The following inspections were also performed in the Unit 1 containment area:
Inspected the fitup of 12" diameter weld joint for main steam
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identified as FSK GBC-101-14 located at elevation 242'. Verified the qualifications of tack weldor. Inspected weld data card at the job location. Verified using proper weld material per weld procedure P1-AT-LH/5
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Observed and inspected the welding of reactor recirculation
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restraint (R-1) at elevation 259'
Observed the welding in progress for reactor recirculation
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(28") piping. The weld joint was identified as No. WA-6. The inspector verified that welders were adhering to the require # cents of weld procedure P8-AT-AG/1. The welder's qualifications were also reviewed Observed the welding in progress for the main steam weld joint
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identified as FSK-GBC-101-3-10 and 11. The inspector verified that welders were adhering to requirements of weld procedure P1-AT-Lh/5. The welder's qualification was also reviewed No items of noncompliance were identified for the above items.
c.
During inspection of reactor recirculation piping activities, the inspector noted that the end covers were removed from 28" gate valve (S/N 49327-33). The inspector looked inside the valve and noticed that on the valve wall a rather deep grind out at the 9 o' clock position, approximately 8" in from edge of weld prep. The depth of grind out appear to be approximately in depth and 3/4" diameter.
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The inspector was concerned if the minimum wall was encroached. The inspector reviewed the data package for this valve (manufacturer was Lunkenheimer) and found this particular grind out was not mentioned or measured. The inspec' tor informed the ifcensee that this item is considered unresolved pending the measurement of the wall thickness at this location (352/80-02-09).
d.
The inspector observed the following activities inside containment during the second shift.
grinding of welds (horizontal and vertical) for restraint
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identified as PR 63 welding of restraints #PR210 and PR68, verified that the proper
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minimum preheat was adhered to No items of noncompliance were identified.
12.
NRC Meeting with Local Officials During this report period, an information meeting was held on January 31, 1980 with the Limerick Township supervisors and several Montgomery County officials. The meeting was at the request of NRC (Region I) and was held at Limerick Township Building. The following items were discussed at this meeting:
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Description of the mission and also the functional organization of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, b.
The establishment of a resident inspector's office at the Limerick site and the role of the resident inspector.
c.
The Limerick Public Document Room.
d.
Brief plant / site description.
After the above discussion, a question and answer session was held.
13.
Followup of Circular 79-10 and Part 21 Item The NRC received a letter (dated 4/4/79) from a material supplier stating that in compliance with 10 CFR, Part 21, they are informing the Commission that there are _ossible defects that can occur to fittings they purchased from Tube Turns during welding due to high carbon content. Tube Turns then informed the Commission (letter dated 5/10/79) what nuclear power plants were involved, Limerick being one of them. The inspector reviewed the following documentation which was supplied to him by the licensee:
Bechtel QA Audit (PFA-252). This audit consisted of a review of
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field material requisitions and supplier's documentation to determine if Tube Turn fittings were purchased. This audit found one supplier that had purchased Tube Turn fitting for Limerick.
Bechtel letter (July 16, 1979) to fabricator of safety-related pipe
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that they reviewed records to determine if any Tube Turn fittings were used.
Reply letter from piping fabricator stating found three piping
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spools (HBB-124-2-9, HBC-260-2-2 end LDE-1.24-3-2) that contained Tube Turn fittings. Corrective action was taken to test fittings.
Those fittings found with high carbon content were removed and l
scrapped.
Reviewed letters from various fabricators of equipment containing
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piping such as diesel generator, hydrogen recombiner, etc.
l Reviewed Tube Turn letter dated January 11, 1980 informing Bechtel
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that a possibility existed that the incorrect alloy steel (AISI-4130)
was used, where ASTM A106 Grade B should have been. During the review of data associated with this item the inspector noted that pipe fabricator identified that a pipe spool (HBC-260-2-3) contained a fitting #N571-M5 (90' elbow) which needed replacement. This spool piece is still at the piping fabricator and there is no objective evidence at site that it was replaced.
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There was no reply from General Electric (NSSS Supplier) that they or their suppliers had used any Tube Turn fittings. The inspector informed the licensee that this item is considered unresolved pending review of the GE response to licensee's request on use of Tube Turn fittings and the verification that the pipe spool HBC-260-2-3 was corrected.
14.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or
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deviations. Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11.
15.
Exit Interview At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were held with facility management (dates and attendees are noted in detail 1)
to discuss inspection scope and findings.
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