IR 05000346/2025002

Integrated Inspection Report 05000346/2025002 and Exercise of Enforcement Discretion

ML25216A272
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	08/07/2025
From:	Sanchez E NRC/RGN-III/DORS/RPB2
To:	Tony Brown Vistra Operations Company
References
EAF-RIII-2025?0125 IR 2025002
Download: ML25216A272 (1)

Text

SUBJECT:

DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000346/2025002 AND EXERCISE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION

Dear Terry Brown:

On June 30, 2025, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. On July 17, 2025, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

One Severity Level (SL) IV violation associated with exercise of enforcement discretion in accordance with Section 3.10, Reactor Violations with No Performance Deficiencies, of the Enforcement Policy is documented in this inspection report. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

The violation involved the failure of the Division 1 Emergency Diesel Generator during performance of the fast-start diesel surveillance because of a malfunctioning field flash selector switch. This failure occurred in May 2021. The NRC concluded there was no performance deficiency associated with the violation as documented in ML22108A157. The violation was considered for escalated enforcement action because its circumstances aligned with a SL III violation example in Section 6.1.c.1 of the Enforcement Policy. The NRC Enforcement Policy can be found at the NRCs website at https://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html.

August 7, 2025 Based on the facts detailed in the enclosed report, and consultation with the Office of Enforcement and the Regional Administrator, I have been authorized to exercise enforcement discretion in accordance with Section 3.10 of the Enforcement Policy to categorize this violation as an SL IV violation. The NRC concluded that for this case a SL IV NCV would be appropriate due to 1) the age of the issue (approximately four years old); and 2) the licensee has already taken appropriate corrective actions for the underlying technical issue.

No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified during this inspection.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:

Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely, Elba M. Sanchez Santiago, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket No. 05000346 License No. NPF-3 Enclosure:

As stated cc: Distribution via LISTSERV Signed by Sanchez Santiago, Elba on 08/07/25

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Violation of Technical Specification 3.8.1, AC Sources-Operating Cornerstone Severity Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Not Applicable Severity Level IV NCV 05000346/202500201 Open/Closed EAF-RIII20250125 Not Applicable 71153 A self-revealed Severity Level (SL) IV non-cited violation of Technical Specifications (TS)

Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) 3.8.1, AC Sources-Operating, was identified when the Division 1 emergency diesel generator (EDG) failed during performance of the fast-start diesel surveillance as a result of a malfunctioning field flash selector switch (FFSS). Based on the information the licensee provided during a regulatory conference associated with this issue as well the inspectors' evaluation of the information, it was determined the Division 1 EDG was inoperable for 29 days, from April 29, 2021, to May 28, 2021, while the unit was in Modes 1, 2, and 3.

Additional Tracking Items

Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status URI 05000346/2 02300401 Shield Building Operability Determination 71152A Closed URI 05000346/2 02209001 Potential Technical Specification Violation Associated With Emergency Diesel Generator Field Flash Selector Switch Failure 71153 Closed

PLANT STATUS

Davis-Besse operated at or near rated thermal power for the entire inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed onsite portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection

Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal mayfly infestation during the week ending May 31, 2025

Impending Severe Weather Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for flood watch and severe thunderstorms and high winds during the week ending April 5, 2025

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) Auxiliary feedwater (AFW) train 2 during AFW train 1 maintenance during the week ending April 19, 2025

(2) Component cooling water (CCW) train 1 during CCW train 3 maintenance outage during the week ending May 24, 2025

(3) Service water loop 1 supply header during service water pump 3 maintenance outage on June 17, 2025

Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the AFW train 2 during normal standby/at-power operation during the week ending April 26, 2025

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

(1) Auxiliary feed pump 2 room, room 238, fire area F on April 16, 2025

(2) Low voltage switchgear room F-Bus and battery room B, room 428 and 428A, fire area X on March 3, 2025

(3) Turbine lube oil tank room, room 432, fire area II, elevation 603' on May 12, 2025

Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the onsite fire brigade training and performance during a simulated fire in turbine building elevation 623' in unit electrical substation EF6 in the BF6 transformer on May 23, 2025

71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures

Flooding Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the emergency core cooling system room 1, elevation 585' during the week ending May 10, 2025

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated licensed operator performance in the simulator during emergency response organization evaluated exercise on May 13, 2025

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components remain capable of performing their intended function:

(1) Emergency feedwater pump maintenance rule (a)(1) status and prescribed actions to return the system to (a)(2) during the week of April 21, 2025

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:

(1) Assessment of elevated risk and mitigating actions due to scheduled maintenance on startup transformer X02 during the week of April 28, 2025

(2) Assessment of elevated risk and mitigating actions due to containment entry for core flood tank 1 level instrument calibration on May 14, 2025

(3) Assessment of elevated risk and mitigating actions due to performing the quarterly surveillance of the AFW train 2 on May 28, 2025

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensees justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) Operability determination of control room envelope boundary due to control room emergency ventilation system (CREVS) train 2 air inleakage exceeding the limit of the acceptance criteria on April 1, 2025

(2) Operability determination of high-pressure injection train 1 due to valve in leakage and depressurization, during the week ending April 12, 2025

(3) Operability determination of containment isolation valve DW6831A due to failure of closed indicator in control room when stroking valve during the week ending May 3, 2025

(4) Operability determination of high-pressure injection train 2 due to high running load for closing thrust during the as-found testing of high-pressure injection line 2-1 isolation valve HP2A on May 8, 2025

(5) Operability determination of AFW train 2 due to failure of the AFW pump turbine speed governor to respond to control input from the main control room after being raised to the high-speed stop on May 29, 2025

71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk

The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:

Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

(1) Post-maintenance test of station blackout diesel generator following maintenance on the air start system during the week ending April 5, 2025

(2) Post-maintenance test of AFW train 2 valve strokes following scheduled maintenance during the week ending April 12, 2025

(3) Post-maintenance test of emergency diesel generator 184-day test following scheduled maintenance during the week ending April 12, 2025

(4) Post-maintenance test of AFW train 1 following maintenance valve inspections and relay calibrations during the week ending April 19, 2025

(5) Post-maintenance test CREVS/CREATS after scheduled maintenance outage during the week ending May 3, 2025

Inservice Testing (IST) (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) As-found testing of high-pressure injection line 2-1 isolation valve HP2A on May 7, 2025

71114.06 - Drill Evaluation

Required Emergency Preparedness Drill (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated an emergency plan training exercise simulating a series of plant events that lead to a General Emergency declaration on April 8,

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

IE01: Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.01)===

(1) July 1, 2024 through March 31, 2025 IE03: Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)

(1) July 1, 2024 through March 31, 2025

IE04: Unplanned Scrams with Complications Sample (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)

(1) July 1, 2024 through March 31, 2025

MS05: Safety System Functional Failures Sample (IP Section 02.04) (1 Sample)

(1) July 1, 2024 through March 31, 2025

MS06: Emergency AC Power Systems (IP Section 02.05) (1 Sample)

(1) July 1, 2024 through March 31, 2025

MS07: High-Pressure Injection Systems (IP Section 02.06) (1 Sample)

(1) July 1, 2024 through March 31, 2025

MS08: Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.07) (1 Sample)

(1) July 1, 2024 through March 31, 2025

MS09: Residual Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.08) (1 Sample)

(1) July 1, 2024 through March 31, 2025

MS10: Cooling Water Support Systems (IP Section 02.09) (1 Sample)

(1) July 1, 2024 through March 31, 2025

BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample (IP Section 02.11) (1 Sample)

(1) July 1, 2024 through March 31, 2025

71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03)

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

(1) Inspectors conducted a review of the corrective action program concerning isophase bus hydrogen analyzer adverse trends during the week ending May 24, 2025

(2) Inspectors conducted a review of the corrective action program concerning station blackout diesel generator (SBODG) degraded cooling during the week ending June 21,

OTHER ACTIVITIES

- TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL

92709 - Licensee Strike Contingency Plans Licensee Strike Contingency Plans

(1) On April 10, 2025, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 245 membership compiled a membership vote for a strike following several weeks of contract negotiations. In preparation for a potential strike, the NRC inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the licensees strike contingency plan. The inspectors assessed the adequacy of the plans strike staffing levels, staff qualifications, safety conscious working environment, and site access in meeting operational and security requirements.

INSPECTION RESULTS

Unresolved Item (Closed)

Shield Building Operability Determination URI 05000346/202300401 71152A

Description:

On January 30, 2024, Unresolved Item (URI) 05000346/202300401 was opened related to the operability determination of the shield building with locations where the laminar crack widths exceeded 0.050 inches. In the operability determination, the licensee changed a design and licensing basis load combination per Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR)

Section 3.8.2.3.4 to not evaluate the shield building for the applied loads due to the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) and the accident temperature (due to the loss of coolant accident or a high energy line break) concurrently. The licensee did not apply the 10 CFR 50.59 process to this change. Therefore, the URI was opened to determine whether a violation occurred.

The NRC reviewed the impact of the licensees change against the criteria in 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Test, and Experiments. Based on the nature of the change, two criteria appeared potentially applicable and were the focus of the review:

• Change in Method of Evaluation: USAR Section 3.8.2.2.4 stated that the shield building is designed using the ultimate strength method in accordance with ACI 31863, and that the load combinations listed in Section 3.8.2.3.4 are applied for this design methodology. One such load combination explicitly includes the simultaneous application of accident thermal loads and SSE loads. Under 10 CFR 50.59, a change to the method of evaluation includes modifications to elements of the evaluation methodology described in the USAR. The licensees decision to decouple the SSE and accident thermal loads altered the conditions under which the shield building was assessed during the operability determination. While this change affected an element of the design-basis evaluation described in the USAR, NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0326, Operability Determinations, clarifies that alternative methods used solely for operability determinations are not subject to 10 CFR 50.59 unless those methods are adopted as part of the final corrective action.

Since the alternative approach was limited to the operability determination and the licensee is implementing corrective actions to restore the shield building to the original design basis, the NRC concluded that this change does not trigger the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59(c)(2)(viii).

• Temporary Compensatory Action: 10 CFR 50.59 may also apply if an interim compensatory action involves a temporary change to facility procedures or configuration. NEI 96-07, Guidelines for 10 CFR 50.59 Implementation, Revision 1, clarified that the evaluation should focus on whether the compensatory action itself (not the degraded condition) affects other aspects of the facility described in the USAR. This guideline was endorsed by the NRC in Regulatory Guide 1.187, Guidance for Implementation of 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Test, and Experiments.

NEI 96-07 provided examples of temporary changes, such as jumpering terminals, placing temporary shielding, or removing barriers. In contrast, the licensees decision to decouple the SSE and accident thermal loads was part of their assessment of the degraded shield building condition. Accordingly, the NRC determined that the change did not constitute a temporary compensatory action subject to 10 CFR 50.59.

Based on consultation with the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), it was determined that the change associated with decoupling the loads for the shield building operability assessment did not fall within the scope of 10 CFR 50.59. Therefore, the inspectors did not identify a violation of 10 CFR 50.59 requirements.

However, while the NRC concluded that the change was not subject to 10 CFR 50.59, the inspectors identified concerns with the technical justification provided in the operability determination for excluding the concurrent application of SSE and accident thermal loads.

Calculation CCSS099.20089, Shield Building Laminar Crack Evaluation, Revision 0, Section 5.5, Loads and Load Combinations, stated that per [] Generic Letter 87-02, it is unrealistic to combine accident thermal with SSE loads, which was conservatively considered in the original design. Generic Letter 87-02, Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors, Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46, resulted in adoption of the Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG) Generic Implementation Procedure as the method for verifying seismic adequacy of specific equipment classes. While the SQUG method is NRC-accepted, it does not apply to building structures, including the shield building.

Licensee procedure NOP-OP1009, Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessment, Revision 9, Attachment 2, stated that the use of loads, load combinations, and load factors should be consistent with design and licensing basis assumptions unless adequately justified. The inspectors concluded that a performance deficiency existed because the licensee did not provide adequate justification for decoupling the accident thermal and SSE loads from the licensing basis combination in the operability determination.

Nonetheless, the inspectors determined that the overall operability conclusion was not adversely affected because:

• USAR Appendix 3A, Descriptions of Load Factors for Shield Building and Containment Vessel Internal Structure Design, Section 3A.7.0, Loss-of-Coolant Accident Load, stated that the steel containment vessel practically isolates the Shield Building from the Reactor Coolant Systems and therefore eliminates significant pressure and temperature loads on the Shield Building during an accident. As such, most of the accident thermal loads are expected to be absorbed by the internal containment vessel rather than the shield building.

• The operability determination included significant conservatism. It assumed the outer reinforcement mat was ineffective around the entire shield building shell, even though repairs had restored reinforcement in several shoulder areas. The operability determination itself also acknowledged that in many unrepaired areas, the outer reinforcement remained engaged and capable of resisting imposed loads. Based on these conservative assumptions, the inspectors determined that the available margin in the operability determination mitigated concerns regarding the exclusion of accident thermal loads.

Because the issue did not challenge the barrier integrity cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that the shield building protects the public from accident-related radionuclide releases, the performance deficiency was determined to be of minor significance. The inspectors did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements associated with this minor performance deficiency and noted that the licensee is implementing corrective actions to restore the shield building to its original design condition.

Corrective Action Reference(s): CR 202505291 Violation of Technical Specification 3.8.1, AC Sources-Operating Cornerstone Severity Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Not Applicable Severity Level IV NCV 05000346/202500201 Open/Closed EAF-RIII2025-0125 Not Applicable 71153 A self-revealed Severity Level (SL) IV non-cited violation of Technical Specifications (TS)

Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) 3.8.1, AC Sources-Operating, was identified when the Division 1 emergency diesel generator (EDG) failed during performance of the fast-start diesel surveillance as a result of a malfunctioning field flash selector switch (FFSS). Based on the information the licensee provided during a regulatory conference associated with this issue as well the inspectors evaluation of the information, it was determined the Division 1 EDG was inoperable for 29 days, from April 29, 2021, to May 28, 2021, while the unit was in Modes 1, 2, and 3.

Description:

On May 27, 2021, the Division 1 EDG failed during performance of the fast-start diesel surveillance test and the EDG was declared inoperable. The NRC performed a special inspection (ML21321A365) and ultimately determined that there was no performance deficiency associated with the issue (ML22109A157). An unresolved item (URI 05000346/202209001) was opened to determine whether a violation of a TS LCO 3.8.1 occurred as a result of the malfunctioning FFSS. Specifically, as a result of the malfunctioning FFSS, the EDG may have been inoperable prior to discovery and for longer than the TS allowed outage time.

LCO 3.8.1, AC Sources-Operating, requires two EDGs, each capable of supplying one train of the onsite class 1E AC electrical power distribution system, be operable when the reactor was operating in Modes 1, 2 and 3. When the licensee evaluated the timeframe the Division 1 EDG was inoperable, they considered when the FFSS was last tested successfully. This test was performed on the EDG (April 29, 2021) prior to the failure on May 28, 2021, which would be a total of 29 days. The inspectors evaluated the licensees conclusions and compared the timeframe with the TS required actions when an EDG is inoperable. Ultimately, the inspectors determined that a TS violation had occurred that needed to be dispositioned.

Corrective Actions: The licensee took the following corrective actions associated with this violation:

(1) replaced the existing FFSS with a new FFSS on May 28, 2021,

(2) added test procedure enhancements to check the electrical continuity of the FFSS after operation, (3)added a step to the emergency operating procedure to manually override the FFSS, (4)initiated enhanced preventive maintenance to inspect and replace the FFSS in necessary and

(5) performed an EDG reliability assessment.

Corrective Action References: CR 202104282 and CR 202106146

Performance Assessment:

The NRC determined this violation was not reasonably foreseeable and preventable by the licensee and therefore is not a performance deficiency.

Enforcement:

The NRC exercised enforcement discretion in Enforcement Action EAF-RIII20250125, in accordance with Section 3.10 of the Enforcement Policy because the violation was not associated with a licensee performance deficiency. Specifically, the violation was not attributable to equipment failures that were avoidable by reasonable licensee quality assurance measures or management controls. This enforcement discretion will not be considered in the assessment process of the NRC's Action Matrix.

Severity: The inspectors assessed the severity of the violation using Section 6.1 of the Enforcement Policy. The circumstances of the violation aligned with a SL III violation example in Section 6.1.c.1 of the Enforcement Policy and was considered for escalated enforcement action. However, the NRC concluded that for this case a SL IV NCV would be appropriate due to 1) the age of the issue (approximately four years old); and 2) the licensee has already taken appropriate corrective actions for the underlying technical issue.

Violation: Technical Specification 3.8.1, AC Sources-Operating, requires two EDGs, each capable of supplying one train of the onsite class 1E AC electrical power distribution system, be operable when the reactor is operating in Modes 1, 2 and 3.

Contrary to the above, from April 29, 2021, to May 28, 2021, Division 1 EDG was inoperable when the reactor was operating in Modes 1, 2 and 3 and the required action statement was not entered or performed. Specifically, due to an issue with the field flash selector switch, Division 1 EDG would not be able to fulfill its safety function.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

The disposition of this violation closes URI: 05000346/2022090-01.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

• On July 17, 2025, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to T. Brown, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

DBOP06913

Seasonal Plant Preparation Checklist

RAEP02810

Emergency Plan Off Normal Procedure Tornado or High

Winds

71111.01

Procedures

RAEP02830

Emergency Plan Off Normal Procedure Flooding

DBOP06233

Auxiliary Feedwater System

DBOP06261

Service Water System Operating Procedures

71111.04

Procedures

DBOP06262

Component Cooling Water System Procedure

PFP-AB238

Auxiliary Feed Pump 2 Room, Room 238, Fire Area F

PFP-AB428

Low Voltage Switchgear Room FBus Room 428 Fire Area X

PFP-AB428A

Battery Room B Room 428A Fire Area X

Fire Plans

PFP-TB432

Turbine Lube Oil Tank Room, Room 432, Fire Area II

71111.05

Operability

Evaluations

DBFP00005

Fire Brigade

71111.12

Procedures

NOP-ER3004

Maintenance Rule Program

Corrective Action

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

CR202503315

Documentation of Resident NRC Questions

04/30/2025

DBHP01152

Performance of High Exposure Work

DBSP03160

AFP 2 Quarterly Test

71111.13

Procedures

NOP-OP1007

Risk Management

CR202502269

CREVS Train 2 Leakage Greater than Acceptance Criteria

03/29/2025

CR202502605

Received Computer Points Q479 HP INJ VLV Leaking and

P465 HP INJ VLV IN PRESS

04/08/2025

CR202502751

Received Computer Points Q479 HP INJ VLV Leaking and

P465 HP INJ VLV IN PRESS

04/13/2025

CR202503517

HP2A High Running Load Impacts Required Closing Thrust

05/07/2025

CR202504003

AFP 2 Governor Failing to Lower

05/28/2025

71111.15

Corrective Action

Documents

CR202504020

FME AFPT 2 Governor

05/29/2025

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

Corrective Action

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

CR202503210

Documentation of NRC Resident Question

04/28/2025

Procedures

DBPF03811

Miscellaneous Valves Test

CR202502452

While Performing SBODG Monthly DBSC04271 Jacket

Water Temp Went High and Had to Reduce Load to 2300SK

04/03/2025

CR202502908

AFPT 1 Pump End Bearing Temperature Indicated Open

Thermocouple

04/17/2025

CR202502909

Low AFP 1 Pump Outboard Bearing Oil Level While Raising

AFPT 1 Speed to the High-Speed Stop

04/17/2025

Corrective Action

Documents

CR202503517

HP2A High Running Load Impacts Required Closing Thrust

05/07/2025

DBPF03163

AFW Train 2 Valve Testing

DBSC04271

SBODG Monthly Test

DBSP03151

Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1 Quarterly Test

DBSS03042

Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Train 2

Monthly Test

Procedures

DPPF09302

Testing Motor Operated Valves

200912579

AF 3870/MS106 Valve Stroke

04/15/2025

200917108

EDG 2 184Day Test

04/09/2025

200956808

Install EC for Vibration Probes

04/07/2025

71111.24

Work Orders

200970641

PMT Valve Stroke for AF 3871/AF 3872

04/07/2025

CR202405002

SBODG Low Radiator Air Flow Readings

06/07/2024

CR202405480

SBODG Jacket Water Outlet Temperature High Out of Spec

06/27/2024

CR202407418

Jacket Water Outlet Temperature Limit Exceeded During

DBSC04271

09/19/2025

CR202502452

While Performing SBODG Monthly DBSC04271 Jacket

Water Temperature Went High and Had to Reduce Load to

2300 kW

04/03/2025

CR202503745

Generator Hydrogen Analyzer Adverse Trend on 'A' Phase

and 'C' Phase

05/15/2025

71152A

Corrective Action

Documents

CR202504415

SBODG Radiator Fan 'B' Bearing Needs Replaced

06/16/2025