IR 05000346/2020003

Integrated Inspection Report 05000346/2020003

ML20318A039
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	11/12/2020
From:	Billy Dickson NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB2
To:	Tony Brown Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp
References
IR 2020003
Download: ML20318A039 (16)

Text

November 12, 2020

SUBJECT:

DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000346/2020003

Dear Mr. Brown:

On September 30, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. On October 23, 2020, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding did not involve a violation of NRC requirements.

If you disagree with a finding not associated with a regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Billy C. Dickson, Jr, Chief Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No. 05000346 License No. NPF-3

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Number:

05000346

License Number:

NPF-3

Report Number:

05000346/2020003

Licensee:

Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp.

Facility:

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

Location:

Oak Harbor, OH

Inspection Dates:

July 01, 2020 to September 30, 2020

Inspectors:

J. Harvey, Resident Inspector

D. Mills, Senior Resident Inspector

R. Ruiz, Project Engineer

Approved By:

Billy C. Dickson, Jr, Chief

Branch 2

Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Failure to Install Adequate Fuses Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green FIN 05000346/2020003-01 Open/Closed None (NPP)71153 A finding of very low safety significance (Green) was self-revealed when the licensee was required to manually trip the reactor after a loss of two reactor coolant pumps (RCP) due to a failed fuse. Specifically, the licensee failed to adequately evaluate a replacement fuse in 2014, which led to a spurious failure resulting in a loss of the RCPs.

Additional Tracking Items

Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000346/2020-002-00 LER 2020-002-00 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, Manual Reactor Trip on Trip of Reactor Coolant Pumps due to loss of 13.8 kV Bus Potential Transformer Fuse 71153 Closed

PLANT STATUS

The unit operated at or near rated thermal power for the entire inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), resident inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week and during that time conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D; observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or a portion of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on-site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) High pressure injection (HPI) train 1 during HPI train 2 planned testing during the week ending July 11, 2020

(2) Station blackout diesel during emergency diesel generator train 2 planned testing during the week ending July 11, 2020

(3) Containment spray (CS) train 1 while CS train 2 was inoperable during planned safety features actuation channel 4 maintenance during the week ending August 8, 2020

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

(1) Station blackout diesel building during the week ending September 25, 2020

(2) Auxiliary feed pump 2 (room 238): Fire area F during the week ending September 12, 2020

(3) A/C equipment room (room 603): Fire area HH during the week ending August 22, 2020

(4) Electrical penetration 1 (room 402): Fire area DG during the week ending August 29, 2020

71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures

Cable Degradation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated cable submergence protection in:

(1) Manholes MHSA1, MHSA2, MHSB1, and MHSB2 during the week ending September 25, 2020

71111.07A - Heat Sink Performance

Annual Review (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated readiness and performance of:

(1) Component cooling water heat exchanger 1

===71111.07T - Heat Sink Performance

Triennial Review (IP Section 03.02)===

(1) Emergency core cooling system room cooler 1, cooled by service water

(2) Ultimate Heat Sink, section 02.02d, specifically, sections 02.02d.4 and 02.02d.5 were completed

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during planned downpower to 95 percent for control rod exercising and turbine valve testing during the week ending September 5, 2020

Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated crew performance during three emergency plan training simulator scenarios on September 24, 2020

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (1 Partial)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function. At the end of the inspection period, the inspectors were awaiting the receipt of follow-up information from the licensee in order to complete Section 03.01 of this procedure:

(1)

(Partial)

Repeat failure of containment air cooler 2 service water outlet, SW1357 [Condition Report 2020-06619]

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:

(1) Shield building crane lift during the week ending July 4, 2020

(2) Component cooling water pump 1 inoperable due to high bearing vibrations, 72-hour LCO during the week ending July 15, 2020

(3) Pilot operated relief valve (PORV) block valve planned maintenance during the week ending August 22, 2020

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) CR 2020-06093: Emergency diesel generator 2 intake silencer throughwall leak

(2) CR 2020-05316: Control rod 7-3 absolute position indication issues

(3) CR 2020-04512: Auxiliary feed pump 1, PSL106D failed to close MS106 and MS106A

(4) CR 2020-02524: 1R21 Unapproved material found in containment during mode 3

(5) CR 2020-05002: Hole discovered during shield building crane anchor drilling

(6) CR 2020-06389: Component cooling water pump 1 elevated bearing vibration past operability

71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing

Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality:

(1) Safety features actuation system channel 4 power supply after planned replacement during the week ending August 8, 2020

71114.06 - Drill Evaluation

Select Emergency Preparedness Drills and/or Training for Observation (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) Tabletop emergency preparedness drill scenario during the week ending August 15, 2020

Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated:

(1) Tabletop emergency response scenario during the week ending August 8,

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification

The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

MS06: Emergency AC Power Systems (IP Section 02.05)===

(1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2019 - June 30, 2020)

MS07: High Pressure Injection Systems (IP Section 02.06) (1 Sample)

(1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2019 - June 30, 2020)

MS08: Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.07) (1 Sample)

(1) Unit 1 (July 1, 2019 - June 30, 2020)

===71153 - Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

Event Report (IP Section 03.02)===

The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):

(1) LER 05000346/2020-002-00, Manual reactor trip following trip of reactor coolant pumps due to loss of 13.8 kV bus potential transformer fuse, ADAMS Accession No.

ML20157A121. The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in this report under Inspection Results Section 71153. This LER is closed.

INSPECTION RESULTS

Failure to Install Adequate Fuses Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events

Green FIN 05000346/2020003-01 Open/Closed

None (NPP)71153 A finding of very low safety significance (Green) was self-revealed when the licensee was required to manually trip the reactor after a loss of two reactor coolant pumps (RCP) due to a failed fuse. Specifically, the licensee failed to adequately evaluate a replacement fuse in 2014, which led to a spurious failure resulting in a loss of the RCPs.

Description:

On March 25, 2020, operators manually tripped the reactor while in mode 2 during startup following refueling outage 21. The operators initiated the reactor trip after reactor coolant pumps 1-2 and 2-1 tripped, circulating water pump 4 tripped, and the 13.8 kilovolts (kV) B-bus indicated low voltage. Following the reactor trip, operators appropriately entered the post-trip procedure to stabilize the plant.

The licensee generated condition report (CR) 2020-02620 to document the event. Upon investigation, the licensee determined that the B-phase fuse for the B-bus potential transformer (PT) 1 failed, resulting in low bus voltage and pump trips. Additionally, the licensee submitted event notification EN 54611, "Manual Trip due to Loss of Reactor Coolant Pumps," per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), and subsequent licensee event report (LER)2020-002-00, "Manual Reactor Trip on Trip of Reactor Coolant Pumps due to loss of 13.8 kV Bus Potential Transformer Fuse," per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).

The licensee performed a causal evaluation to determine the primary cause of the failed fuse.

As a result of the causal evaluation, the licensee concluded that an inadequate part/component equivalent replacement package, PERP 000833, (performed in 2014) was the primary cause. Specifically, PERP 000833 resulted in the licensee replacing obsolete Cooper Bussmann JCT 1/2 E fuses with Cooper Bussmann 15.5CAV0.5E fuses. The PERP noted that the fuse clearing times were different but stated the difference was acceptable without a full evaluation of the shorter clearing time of the replacement fuses. The licensee determined that the shorter clearing time caused the 15.5CAV0.5E fuse to blow in response to expected inrush current. As documented in CR 2020-02620, following the trip, the licensee evaluated alternative replacement fuses and identified that a currently available fuse with similar clearing times to the original specification was more appropriate to the application than the 15.5CAV0.5E fuses. The licensee reviewed the extent of condition to identify other locations where the 15.5CAV0.5E fuses were used and generated corrective actions to replace all affected fuses by the next refueling outage.

The inspectors referenced NOP-CC-2007, "Part/Component Equivalent Replacement Packages," revision 03 while performing the inspection. Step 8.c of NOP-CC-2007 requires that the licensee evaluate the impact of the differences and/or operating experience identified and provide the basis for the acceptability of the differences or impact of the operating experience information. The inspectors determined the licensee failed to adequately evaluate the impact of the differences between the two fuse models.

Corrective Actions: Immediate corrective actions included replacing the failed fuses.

Additionally, the licensee performed an evaluation to determine the appropriate fuse for the application and generated corrective actions to track the replacement of all currently installed subject Cooper Bussmann 15.5CAV0.5E fuses.

Corrective Action References: Condition report 2020-02620

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The licensee failed to evaluate the impact of the differences of the 13.8 kV fuse replacement as required by NOP-CC-2007. This contributed to a spurious blown fuse which resulted in a loss of two RCPs, a circulating water pump and a subsequent manual reactor trip.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the licensee failed to adequately evaluate a modification associated with the high voltage fuses. This resulted in a fuse failure, causing a loss of reactor coolant pumps and a manual reactor trip.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.

Enforcement:

Inspectors did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements associated with this finding.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

• On October 23, 2020, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. T. Brown, Site Vice President and other members of the licensee staff.

• On October 2, 2020, the inspectors presented the triennial heat sink inspection results to Mr. G. Michael, Director, Site Engineering and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

71111.04

Corrective Action

Documents

20-04965

Immersion Heater to SBODG Auto Function not Working

06/10/2020

20-05467

BACC CS32 Pipe Cap

07/04/2020

Corrective Action

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

20-06171

Blowout Panels 6C/6B Missing 1 Bolt

08/04/2020

20-06172

ECCS Room# 1 Pedestal Corner is Broken

08/04/2020

Drawings

M-017D

Station Blackout Diesel Generator

M-033A

High Pressure Injection

M-034

Emergency Core Cooling System CTMT [Containment]

Spray and Core Flooding Systems

Procedures

DB-OP-06011

HPI Train 1

DB-OP-06011

High Pressure Injection System

DB-OP-06013

Containment Spray System

DB-OP-06334

Station Blackout Diesel Generator Operating Procedure

71111.05

Corrective Action

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

20-07050

Oil Leak on Snubber SNT310 for AFW Train 2

09/09/2020

Fire Plans

FHAR

Fire Hazards Analysis Report

PFP-AB-238

Auxiliary Feed Pump 2 Room

PFP-AB-603

A/C Equipment Room and Records and Storage Area, Fire

Area HH

PFP-S6-0000

Service Building 6, Laydown Area, Station Black-Out Diesel

Procedures

DB-FP-00007

Control of Transient Combustibles

EN-DP-01141

FHAR Updating

NG-DB-00302

DBNPS Fire Protection Program

PFP-AB-402

Number 1 Electrical Penetration Room

71111.07A Corrective Action

Documents

2016-05172

Less than Minimum Wall Thickness Measured on CCW #1

Shell per Order 200486506

04/12/2016

20-05972

QC ID Work Order 200643129 Minimum Wall Thickness not

Met for E22-1, CCW [Component Cooling Water] Heat

Exchanger 1-1

07/27/2020

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

Corrective Action

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

20-06135

FME Cover not on

08/03/2020

20-07564

Error in EER 600724048, CCW HX Tube Evaluation

09/29/2020

Miscellaneous

EPRI NP-7552

Heat Exchanger Performance Monitoring Guidelines

2/1991

M-023-00020-03

Operating and Maintenance Instructions for Component

Cooling Heat Exchangers

03/14/2005

MRPM

Maintenance Rule Program Manual

Procedures

NOP-ER-2006

Service Water Reliability Management Program

Work Orders

200643129

PM 0076 E22-1 Cln-Insp CCW HX #1

08/12/2020

200764549

CCW HX 1 Performance Test

07/23/2020

71111.07T Calculations

2501-703 (H&H-

1)

Thermal Performance Analysis for Ultimate Heat (UHS) Sink

Pond

C-ICE-009.01-

001

Ultimate Heat Sink Temperature Indications

C-NSA-009.05-

001

Ultimate Heat Sink Volumes and Surface Areas

C-NSA-009.05-

003

UHS Thermal Performance Analysis for Maximum

Evaporation Meteorological Conditions

C-NSA-032.02-

006 R03 PN09

C-NSA-032.02-009 Was Prepared as Alternate Evaluation of

ECCS Room Cooler Performance

09/19/2017

C-NSA-032.02-

009

ECCS Room Cooling Heat Exchangers Performance During

Post-LOCA

09/27/2017

Corrective Action

Documents

2017-03328

NRC 2017 UHS Inspection: Issues with ECCS Room Cooler

Clean/Inspection Strategy

03/23/2017

2017-03953

Historical Inspection Data for ECCS Room Coolers

04/06/2017

2017-06335

Tube Blockage Identified in DB-E42-2, ECCS Room Cooler 1 06/07/2017

CR-2019-02869

Results of Ultimate Heat Sink Bathymetric Survey

03/27/2019

CR-2019-02950

Issues with 2016 Ultimate Heat Sink Silt Depth Calculation

03/29/2019

CR-2019-10336

Results of Ultimate Heat Sink Silt Depth Survey

2/12/2019

Corrective Action

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

CR-2020-07638

Incorrect Value Reported in UFSAR 9.2.5

10/01/2020

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

Drawings

C-39

Circulating Water Intake System On-Shore Plan Profile &

Sections

M-041A

Service Water Pumps and Secondary Service Water System

M-041B

Primary Service Water System

M-041C

Service Water System for Containment Air Coolers

OS-020 SH1

Operational Schematic Service Water System

103

Engineering

Evaluations

Notification

600773046

ECCS Room Cooler Plugging Criteria Along with Maximum

Tube Plugging Limits

10/02/2017

Miscellaneous

M-410-00681

Vendor Manual Trane Co. Installation and Maintenance

Instructions for Air-Cooled Condensers Ca Series

11/19/2014

M-411 Q

Specification for Replacement Coils for ECCS Room Cooling

Units

11/26/2003

M-411Q-00001

Vendor Manual for Aerofin Type "WR" Coils for ECCS Room

Cooling Units

SD-018

System Description for Service Water System

Operability

Evaluations

POD for CR

2017-03953

POD for CR 2017-03953 for E42-1 and 2 and Closure

06/10/2017

Procedures

DB-OP-03007

Miscellaneous Instrument Daily Checks

DB-OP-06261

Service Water System Operating Procedure

Self-Assessments SA-BN-2020-

1935

Assess Davis-Besse's Compliance with Respect to the

Requirements Outlined in NRC Inspection Procedure 71111.07.

08/14/2020

Work Orders

200632106

PF4736-001 ECCS Room Cooler Monitoring Test

2/26/2017

200640589

PF4736-001 05.000 E42-1,2,3 TRN2 Coolers Monitoring

Test

06/13/2017

200665125

SP3006-001 05.000 SW TRN2 Cold Forebay Service Water

Train 2 Cold Forebay Design Flow

2/25/2019

200699715

Clean and Inspect DB-E42-1 ECCS Room Cooler

05/03/2018

200731883

E42-1 Inspection Completed

05/02/2018

200735477

SP3005-001 05.000 SW TRN1 Cold Forebay Service Water

TRN1 Cold Forebay Design Flow

2/17/2020

200741937

PF3023-001 05.000 P3-2 SW PMP 2 QTRLY SW Pump 2

Quarterly Test Service Water Pump 2 QTRLY Test

2/14/2020

200747409

PF3226-001 05.1+2 P3-2 SW Online Compreh P3-2 SW

07/29/2020

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

Online Comprehensive Test

200749494

PF3020-008 05.1+3 SW1424 Stroke SW1424 Stroke Time-

TS Applicable in Modes 1 Thru 4 Only

05/01/2020

200749496

PF3023-001 05.000 P3-2 SW PMP 2 QTRLY SW Pump 2

Quarterly Test Service Water Pump 2 QTRY Test

05/08/2020

200759098

PF3027-007 05.100 SW1395 Stroke SW1395 Stroke Time

FA Norm TS Applicable in Modes 1 Thru 4 Only SW1395

SYSE, SFAS TIME

07/10/2020

200760910

PP3020-007 05.100 SW1399 Stroke SW1399 Stroke Time

FA Norm-TS Applicable in Modes 1 Through 4 Only

SW1399 SYSE, SFAS TIME

07/23/2020

71111.12

Corrective Action

Documents

2017-10018

SW1357 Failed to Close During Air Drop Test due to

SV1357B Continuously Venting

10/31/2017

2018-02603

SW1357, CAC [Containment Air Cooler] SW [Service Water]

Outlet, would not Stroke Closed during Test

03/18/2018

20-06619

SW1357 would not Stroke Closed

08/23/2020

71111.13

Procedures

DBBP-OPS-003

Online Risk Management Process

NOP-OP-1007

Risk Management Plan

NOP-OP-1007-01 Risk Management Plan

71111.15

Corrective Action

Documents

2016-07315

CRD Abnormal Procedure Entry due to Rod 7-3 Degraded

API/RPI Indication

06/29/2016

2018-05792

Aux Feed Pump 1, PSL106C Failed to Close MS106,

MS106A

06/24/2018

20-02524

1R21 - Unapproved Material Found in CTMT during Mode 3

03/23/2020

20-04512

Aux Feed Pump 1, PSL106D Failed to Close MS106,

MS106A

05/24/2020

20-05002

Hole Discovered during Shield Building Crane Anchor Drilling 07/27/2020

20-06093

Small Hole Identified in Outer Skin of EDG-2 Intake Silencer

07/27/2020

20-06224

First Half IPA Site Gap Identified for Equipment Reliability

08/03/2020

20-06389

P43-1 Outboard Pump Bearing Axial Vibrations are

Increasing

08/13/2020

CR 2020-05316

Control rod 7-3 Absolute Position Indication Issues

06/27/2020

CR 2020-05355

Control Rod 7-3 Erratic

06/28/2020

CR 2020-05973

System Monitoring: Rod 7-3 API Indication Momentarily

07/25/2020

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

Affected during CAC #3 Testing

CR 2020-06837

Heat Related Degradation of PI Tubes Identified by Vendor

Inspections Performed Under CA 2016-07315

08/31/2020

CR 2020-07068

Rod 7-3 API Indication Erratic

09/16/2020

Work Orders

200756758

AFW Train 1 Level Control, Interlock and Flow Transmitter

Test

05/24/2020

71111.19

Procedures

DB-SC-03113

SFAS [Safety Features Actuation System] Channel 4

Functional Test

DB-SC-03113

SFAS Channel 4 Functional Test

Work Orders

200688175

SFAS Ch 4 Power Supplies

08/05/2020

200761396

SFAS Ch 4 Functional

08/04/2020

71114.06

Miscellaneous

Emergency Preparedness 3rd Quarter 2020 Emergency

Response Organization Scenario

07/29/2020

Procedures

NOP-LP-5011

Emergency Response Drill and Exercise Program

71151

Corrective Action

Documents

20-04930

Missed MSPI Failure Report in the First Quarter 2020

06/09/2020

Miscellaneous

MSPI

Reactor Oversight Program Mitigating System Performance

Index Basis Document

Procedures

NG-DB-00001

On-Line Risk Management

71153

Corrective Action

Documents

2014-07743

Sizzling Coming from HB05 PT-2 X02 Transformer

04/28/2014

2018-10428

EI6210, SU [Startup] XFRM [Transformer] 02 to Bus B

Voltmeter Indicates 6 kV

11/24/2018

20-02620

Reactor Trip due to Loss of B Bus PT Fuse

03/25/2020

Engineering

Evaluations

PERP 000883

PT Fuses JCT 1/2E are no Longer Available, Replacement

Requires Configuration Update

Miscellaneous

50-346/2020-002-

Manual Reactor Trip on Trip of Reactor Coolant Pumps due

to Loss of 13.8 kV Bus Potential Transformer Fuse

05/26/2020

Procedures

NOP-CC-2007

Part/Component Equivalent Replacement Packages

NOP-LP-2001

Corrective Action Program

48