IR 05000346/1994006
| ML20149F241 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 08/02/1994 |
| From: | Lanksbury R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20149F220 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-346-94-06, 50-346-94-6, NUDOCS 9408100040 | |
| Download: ML20149F241 (12) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-346/94006(DRP)
Docket No. 50-346 Operating License No. NPF-3 Licensee: Toledo Edison Company Edison Plaza, 300 Madison Avenue Toledo, OH 43652 facility Name: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Inspection At: Oak Harbor, Ohio i
Inspection Conducted: June 3, 1994, through July 22, 1994 '
Inspectors: S. Stasek J. M. Shine T. M. Tongue Approved By: VfMTi R.'D. Lanksbury, Chie G' Dite Reactor Projects Section 3B Inspection Summarv l
Inspection on June 3. 1994. throuah July 22. 1994 I (Report No. 50-346/94006(DRPQ j
Areas inspected: A routine safety inspection by resident inspectors of plant i operations, surveillances, maintenance, onsite engineering, plant support, !
previous inspection findings, and licensee ever.t report {
Results: One violation (with three examples) of inadequate adherence to plant administrative procedures was identified during this inspection. In addition, one unresolved item and one inspection followup item were identifie An executive summary follows: {
i Plant Operations: Overall, performance of the operating crews was good this inspection period. Adherence to administrative controls was generally adequate. However, one example of a violation predating the current inspection period was identified relating to a night order that allowed {
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deviation from an approved procedure (paragraph 6.a). Additionally, foielgn material exclusion control for the spent fuel pool area was inadequate for nine days during this period (paragraph 1.d). This was considered a second example of th9 aforementioned violation relating to inadequate adherence to administrative procedures. Key control for the electrical switchyard was identified as in need of improvement (paragraph 1.b). On one occasion, the moisture separator reheater demineralizer recirculation tank was observed to 9408100040 940802 PDR ADOCK 05000346 i G PDR l
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be overflowing to the floor during a backwash /precoat evolution due to inadequate monitoring by the chemistry technician conducting the evolution (paragraph 1.a).
Maintenance: Maintenance and surveillance activities observed during the inspection period appeared to be conducted in accordance with applicable plant requirements. However, an inadequate scaffolding configuration that impacted on safety related equipment was identified by the inspector and was considered the third example of the violation that related to inadequate adherence to administrative procedures (paragraph 3.a). An inspection followup item was identified that related to observed blockages of ventilation duct filters / louvres associated with important-to-safety plant equipment that called into question the adequacy of the current preventive maintenance activities (paragraph 3.b). Resolution of a problem with vibration data taken during a surveillance on the control room emergency ventilation system (CREVS)
- 1 fan was accomplished in 8 days; one day beyond the associated technical specification limiting condition for operation (LCO) (paragraph 2). No CREVS equipment operability concerns subsequently resulted. However, any potential operability concerns should have been resolved as expeditiously as possible, and in all cases within the associated LC0 timefram Enoineerino: Engineering support for day-to-day operation of the unit was goo One unresolved item was identified associated with operability of the station batteries when the associated room ventilation system (s) were removed from service (paragraph 4).
Plant Support: Personnel adherence to the radiation protection and security programs was good during this inspection period. The June 8, 1994 emergency preparedness exercise appeared to be well conducted (paragraph 5.b).
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DETAILS Plant Operations (71707) (92901)
The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable ;
logs, and conducted discussions with control room operators during the l inspection period. The inspectors verified the operability of selected i emergency systems, reviewed tagout records, and verified tracking of i limiting conditions for operation (LCO) associated with affected i components. Tours of the auxiliary and turbine buildings were conducted t to observe equipment material condition and plant housekeepin !
Walkdowns of the accessible portions of the following systems were i conducted to verify operability by comparing system lineups with plant i drawings, as-built configuration, or present valve lineup lists; >
observing equipment conditions that could degrade performance; and i verifying that instrumentation was properly valved, functioning, and j
calibrate l
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Emergency Diesel Generator 1-1 l
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Emergency Diesel Generator 1-2 ;
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Control Room Emergency Ventilation System - Trains 1 and 2 !
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Motor Driven Feedpump !
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Station Blackout Diesel Generator
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Service Water System (Portions of)
The inspectors also reviewed potential condition adverse to quality l (PCAQ) reports during the inspection period and verified known t deficiencies were identified and tracked via the PCAQ reporting syste j Specific observations and reviews included the following: Recirculation Tank Overflow !
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On July 20, 1994, during a routine plant tour, the inspector noted that the moisture separator reheater (MSR) demineralizer !
recirculation tank was periodically overflowing to the floor. At j the time, the MSR demineralizer was undergoing a backwash /precoat i evolution. This evolution was normally condected by chemistry i technicians, however, at the time, no technician was observed to l be in attendance. Subsequently, a chemistry technician responded t to the demineralizer and isolated valving to terminate the i overflow condition. The licensee determined that the overflow was (
a result of establishing too high of a flowrate to the tank i earlier in the backwash /precoat evolution. Discussions with ;
licensee personnel also revealed that the tank had overflowed on !
previous occasions as well. Although a review of the associated i procedure identified no verbatim performance deviations and ;
overall safety significance was minimal, the fact that the ;
technician was not sufficiently in attendance to monitor tank level to prevent its overflow is itself considered a poor ,
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The chemistry superintendent indicated that closer monitoring of the tank was the expectation during such evolutions and reinforcement of that expectation would be made with chemistry ;
personne l Switchyard Access Control During the period the inspector reviewed licensee administrative i controls over switchyard access and control of vehicular traffi Overall, the program appeared adequate to control switchyard ,
activitie However, discussions with personnel indicated that the overall level of control was less than licensee management expectations. Specifically, while program documentation described strict control and specified requirements to obtain access keys, t industrial security indicated that a multitude of keys had been ;
issued, and that a portion of the keys were now uncontrolled. The t matter was discussed with the plant manager, who initiated action i to increase the overall level of control. The inspectors will :
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continue to monitor control of switchyard activitie i Tagging Program [
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A review of the station tagging process found it to be implemented i as delineated by procedure. One potential weakness was identified in that an individual could place a " Personal Red" tag on a !
component for work in addition to the normal danger or caution !
tags. In a special situation, a " Personal Red" tag could be placed on a motor operated valve (MOV) for testing or lubrication with no other tag. The " Personal Red" tag could be left in place ,
greater than a shift (i.e., over a shift turnover) with no i indication in the control room of the status of the M0V. Neither the open or closed position indicating lights would be i illuminated. This situation could lead to a loss of continuity in :
uhift turnovers and operator cognizance of equipment status. The i inspectors will continue to evaluate this matter as part of the :
routine inspection progra ' Spent Fuel Pool Foreign Material Exclusion On June 30, during a plant tour, the inspector noted that foreign ,
material exclusion (FME) control for the spent fuel pool was >
inadequate. Specifically, the rope boundary normally utilized for access control to the pool had substantially been removed. Nearly all of the west side of the pool was directly accessible without entry into a FME control area. Discussions with licensee personnel revealed that the rope barrier had been removed ;
approximately 9 days earlier upon completion of radiological decontamination activities. On June 21, the radiation protection (RP) department "deposted" the spent fuel pool area upon completion of their decontamination activities. Due to inadequate communication between RP and the Operations department, the FME barrier was left in a degraded conditio In addition, a
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subsequent review of the material access log, noted discrepancies as to what was logged into the pool area. These discrepancies included scaffolding materials, gloves, electrical cords, tools, ,
tape, and rop Administrative procedure DB-MN-00005, Foreign Material Exclusion i established the spent fuel pool as a FME exclusion zone !
Exclusion zone 3 requirements included, as a minimum, access control, including a rope / tape barrier with signs, and use of an !
access control log for materials ar.i personnel entering the are '
Because the FME barrier was inadequately established and the j material access log was found to be inaccurate, this is considered ;
an example of a violation for failure to follow procedures .
(346/94006-01a(DRP)). Specifically, the licensee's administrative *
controls established for foreign material exclusion contro !
An example of one violation was identified in this area. No deviations were identifie :
2. Surveillance (61726) (92902) l l
The inspectors observed safety-related surveillance testing and verified '
that the testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures; that test instrumentation was calibrated; that limiting conditions for l operation (LCOs) were met; that removal and restoration of the affected ;
components were accomplished; that test results conformed with Technical !
Specification and procedure requirements and were reviewed by' personnel i other than the individual directing the test; and that any deficiencies i identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by .,
appropriate management personne ,
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The following test activities were observed and/or reviewed: i
- DB-SC-03005, Diesel Driven Fire Pump Annual Tes DB-SC-03070 Emergency Diesel Generator #1 Monthly Tes DB-SC-03071, Emergency Diesel Generator #2 Monthly Tes DB-SP-03162, Auxiliary Feedwater Train #2 Monthly Valve Verificatio DB-MI-03401, Channel Calibration of RE1770 A & B, RE1878 A & B, RE4686 Liquid Process and RE1822A Waste Gas System Outlet Radiation Monitor C-2005.10, Process Radiation Monitor Linearity Chec j
- DB-MI-03059, Reactor Protection System Channel 3 Quarterly Functional Tes DB-SC-04271, Station Black Out Diesel Generator (SB0DG) Monthly Tes DB-FP-03008, Containment Local Leak Rate Test - Emergency Escape Hatch - Penetration P-8 DB-SS-03041, Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Train 1 Monthly Tes . . - - - . _ - - --. . _ - . _-- .--
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Specific observations / reviews included the following:
During performance of surveillance DB-5S-3041, Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) Train 1 Monthly Test, data indicated an increase in vibration on CREVS fan #1. Although the data indicated that the vibration had increased approximately five to six times the normally expected value, resolution of the discrepant information was not i attempted during the particular test. The test was completed, signed ,
off, and during subsequent review by performance engineering, a decision '
was made to rerun the test. At the time the decision was made, it was assumed the data was in error and was caused by a problem with the test instrumentation. This determination was made based upon a review of the vibration magnitude versus the frequency respons However, the second test was not conducted until approximately 8 days following the first test (and identification of the problem data).
Although the second test identified that no equipment degradation had been involved, the timeframe in which to make the final determination of equipment condition was greater than the 7-day limiting condition for operation (LCO) allowed by the plant technical specification Licensee management indicated that root cause and corrective actions would occur as part of the followup to potential condition adverse to quality report (PCAQ)94-057 No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Maintenance (63702) (92902)
Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components were observed and/or reviewed during the inspection period to ensure that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, and industry codes or standards, and in conformance with technical specification The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation (LCO) were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the ,
work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemente Maintenance work orders (MW0s) were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority was assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which might affect system performanc .. . . - - .. = _ - - - _ - ~ _ . - . - - - . .
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The following maintenance activities were observed and/or reviewed:
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MWO 1-94-0535-00, Repair of Moisture Separator Reheater Drain Tank ;
1-1 Drain to Condenser Check Valv .
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MWO 7-93-0415-04, Containment Vessel Hydrogen Analyzer Channel #1 f Fuse Replacemen l
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- MWO 1-94-0179-00, Replace Hand Switch for Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (AFP) Room #1 Ventilation Fa MWO 2-93-0035-08, V0TES Testing of AF3869, AFP l-1 to Steam !
Generator 1-2 Stop Valv !
- MWO 92-0046-004, RE17708, Modification of Process Radiation ,
Monitor MWO 2-91-0030-01, Addition of New fuel Bridge Hois '
Specific observations / reviews included the following: Inadequate Scaffolding Configuration ,
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On July 12, 1994, during a routine plant tour, the inspector noted an inappropriate scaffolding configuration in the #1 low voltage i switch gear room. The scaffolding was observed to be secured (tied off) to safety-related conduit and safety-related conduit
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supports. In addition, a horizontal cross member was in physical ,
contact with a louver on the room's ventilation damper. It was i surmised thac the damper may not have been capable of j repositioning if require Licensee personnel were subsequently contacted and the discrepant condition appropriately addresse .
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although not in conformance with administrative procedure DB-MS-01637, Scaffolding Erection and Removal Guidelines. This is considered an example of a violation for failure to follow administrative controls (346/94006-Olb(DRP)). Degraded Ventilation Components During the inspection period, partial blockages of ventilation i supply ducts / louvres / filters associated with important-to-safety :
equipment were noted. In addition, the unit's main transformer i required cleaning of its heat transfer areas to prevent ;
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overheating while operating with an unusually high MVAR outpu Specific observations included:
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An estimated 10% to 15% blockage of two ventilation intake i ducts in the #2 auxiliary feedwater (AFW) vault. The
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ventilation system was not seriously degraded, however the
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level of foreign material observed indicated insufficient cleaning on a periodic basis. Upon identification, plant personnel subsequently cleaned the intakes duct / louvre The AFW system engineer indicated that the duct / louvres had, i at one time, been included in a preventive maintenance (PM)
schedule, but the PM had been deleted at some point. It appeared the ducts / louvres had not been cleaned for at least 3 years. The AFW vault #1 louvres had been cleaned more recently and exhibited no blockag Partial blockage of intake filter screens servicing essential power supply inverters YVI and YV3 located in the low voltage switchgear (LVSG) rooms. Foreign material observed appeared to be mostly " cottonwood" and moths, which had been pulled into the LVSG room from outside the plant via the normally operating ventilation system and had settled on the screens. Once identified, actions were taken to clean the screens. The inspector had observed similar blockage of the same screens approximately 1 year ag Currently, the screens are incicded in a monthly preventive maintenance activity. However, it appeared that during periods when " cottonwood" is more prevalent, more frequent cleanings may be necessar During discussion of these matters, the Plant Manager indicated that a review of ventilation related preventive maintenance activities associated with this type of periodic cleaning would be bene ficial . Pending completion of the aforementioned review and, subsequently, further followup by the inspectors, this matter is considered an inspection followup item (346/94006-02(DRP)).
An example of one violation and one inspection followup item were identified in this area. No deviatione were identifie . Onsite Enaineerina (37551) (92903)
Selected engineering problems or events were evaluated to determine their root cause(s). The effectiveness of the licensee's controls for the identification, resolution, and prevention of problems was also examine The inspection included review of areas such as corrective action systems, root cause analysis, safety committees, and self assessment in the area of engineerin Specific observations / reviews included the following:
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Battery Room Ventilation During review of a maintenance tagout (clearance 00009103), which addressed maintenance activities associated with the battery room
- 1 ventilation system, the inspector had a concern whether operability of the associated batteries had been properly evaluated to support the work in the room. The licensee indicated
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that bi-shiftly checks of the battery room area temperatures were obtained during the time the ventilation system was not operabl The batteries would have been declared inoperable if the room temperatures had exceeded the specified temperature band (60 - 104 F).
The inspector specifically questioned the post accident temperature profile for the batteries / battery rooms during a substantial discharge condition of the batteries as well as the hydrogen generation rate for the batteries during any subsequent recharging with the ventilation system inoperable. At the conclusion of the inspection period the inspectors were in the process of reviewing associated engineering calculations and battery vendor information. Pending completion of inspector review, this matter is considered an unresolved item (346/94006-03(DRP)).
No violations or deviations were identified in this area. One unresolved item was identifie . Plant Suonort (71750) (92904)
Selected activities associated with radiological controls, radiological effluents, waste treatment, environmental monitoring, physical security, emergency preparedness and fire protection were reviewed to ensure conformance with facility procedures and regulatory requirement Specific observations / reviews included the following: , Contamination Surveys During observation of a local leakrate test of the containment emergency escape hatch, a questionable radiation protection practice was noted. Specifically, the radiation protection technician directed the inspector to go to the auxiliary building radiological restricted area (RRA) entrance for a contamination survey upon exit from the escape hatch area (itself posted as an RRA). This required a lengthy trip around the outside of the plant and through the turbine building to do the survey. If an individual were contaminated, it could have resulted in the spread of contamination over a considerable area as compared to performing a contamination frisk in the area of the escape hatc Licensee management acknowledged the observation and was performing a review into the matte Emergency Preparedness Exercise On June 8,1994, the licensee held a practice emergency preparedness exercise that involved most of the site staff and notification of offsite agencie The inspector monitored portions of the exercise such as communications, and other various phases. This was also an opportunity for the inspector to observe
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the uniqueness of the technical support center (TSC) and the emergency control center (ECC) being in a common location in the ,
Davis-Besse Administration Building (DBAB). During the exercise, '
when the order was given to evacuate the site of nonessential personnel, the evacuation went smoothly and promptly. The inspector did note that there were a number of people assembled in the parking lot just outside of the main access facility after they had been directed to report to the training center lunch room. Subsequently, it was found that this was authorized by a special controller message. However, since this was allowed during a drill, it was questioned as to whether the people were aware that this would not be allowed during an actual even The scenario was varied in such a way that it was realistic and ,
involved nearly all of the response personnel and resource No violations or deviations were identified in this are . followun of Previous Insoection Findinas (92901) (92902) (92903) (92904) (Closed) Unresolved Item (346/94002-02(DRP)): Cold weather protection program implementation problems. Regarding the first of two issues, potential condition adverse to quality (PCAQ)
report 94-114 documented that work requests required per procedure DB-0P-06331, " Freeze Protection and Electrical Heat Trace" addressing heat tracing alarm and recorder discrepancies were not initiated in all cases. The apparent cause of the omitted work requests was a night order, issued January 13, 1994, to the operating crews, which conflicted with the requirements of the above approved procedure. Consequently, some operations personnel were utilizing the night order in lieu of the approveo procedur Further review indicated that the night order was not prepared in accordance with approved procedure DB-0P-0006, " Night Order / Standing Order Log." Specifically, procedure note required that night orders "shall not provide instructions which conflict with or substitute for approved procedures." The subject j night order required that when a heat trace or freeze protection i
circuit was noted to have a problem, electrical shop personnel I were to be notified. If the electricians were unable to review or resolve the problem, then the work request would be submitte This guidance was contrary to DB-0P-06331, Section 3.2, which required that work requests be initiated for electrical heat trace problems noted on the control room DORIC recorder (without
- exception). The PCAQ (94-114) generated on January 31, 1994, documenting DB-0P-06331 procedural adherence problems resulted in immediate efforts to initiate the required work requests and comply with DB-0P-06331. The inspector verified that the requests r were submitted in a timely manner. Although the DB-0P-06331 procedural adherence problems were licensee identified, the procedural adherence problem related to the night order procedure, DB-0P-0006, an apparent root cause of the overall problem, was NRC
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i identified. Therefore, issuance of the January 13, 1994, night order which was prepared contrary to the licensee's administrative procedure for preparation of night orders is considered an example '
of a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, which required that activities affecting quality be accomplished in accordance with prescribed procedures (346/94006-Olc(DRP)).
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Regarding the second issue,' operations personnel, while completing DB-0P-06913, " Plant Winterization Checklist," determined the .
service water pump room sprinkler heat trace circuit was obsolete and no longer used, whilst the procedure required verification !
that the circuit was in place and in service. The personnel were ,
unable to locate the circuit in the plant or on electrical drawings. The procedure step was then initialed as not applicable ;
based on the above action Subsequent licensee review concluded that the circuit was required. Although the circuit was not -
verified operable when the checklist was performed, the licensee subsequently verified the circuit was operable. No procedural violations were identified. The inspectors discussed the matter with licensee management, whereby actions were taken to reiterate '
management expectations to personne Since the first issue will be tracked as part of the followup to ,
the associated violation, and the second issue is closed, this unresolved item is also considered close i (Ocen) Insoection Followuo Item (346/93013-03(DRP)): Safety-related panel in emergency diesel generator room found open. In response, the licensee posted specific signs addressing the need to maintain certain panel doors closed, and placed additional requirements in maintenance control procedures-to insure that ;
safety-related panel doors were properly controlled. However, '
i during a recent walkdown in the control room back panels, the inspector identified an example of where doors in the radiation monitoring panels were left open at the completion of the day's ;
work by Instrumentation and Control (I&C) personnel. Although certain signs were posted in the plant, and procedural i requirements were instituted to address this issue, communication -
of the issue to plant personnel was not adequate to insure an '
adequate level of understanding was achieved. This matter will remain open pending a determination that a closer adherence to the !
administrative requirements has been achieve }
An example of one violation was identified in this are No deviations were identifie ;
7. Followuo of Licensee Event Reoorts (92700)
Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and '
review of records, the following licensee event reports (LERs) were ,
reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, ;
immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to !
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i prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical l specification :
, (00en) LER 94-001-00. Inoperable Safety Features Actuation System ;
Instrument Strings. During performance of a systems-based -
instrument and control inspection by the licensee's independent !
safety engine 2 ring group, it was identified that safety features actuation system (SFAS) channel 4 containment radiation monitor i trip setpoint was inappropriately established for Mode 6 .
conditions. The technical specifications required that the radiation monitor be set at less than two times background at :
rated thermal power (RTP). Background radiation readings in l containment at the location of the monitor at RTP were i approximately 2 to 3 millirem-per-hour (mr/ hour). However, the 4 licensee determined the radiation monitor trip setpoint during :
mode 6 operations had been calibrated at 15 mr/ hour. Although !
four monitors existed to perform this SFAS function, three were e required per the technical specifications. A historical review !
detennined that from October 1,1984, until October 7,1984, i another containment radiation monitor was also inoperable in *
Mode 6 in addition to the subject monitor. This, therefore, !
resulted in a condition that exceeded the technical specifications t
- minimum operability requirement l f
The licensee's proposed corrective actions involved modification ;
of the radiation monitor setpoint prior to any entry into a Mode 6 l
. condition. However, establishment of what the new setpoint should be had not been determined at the conclusion of the inspectio !
The licensee was considering modification of the two times i background technical specification requirement. In addition ,
potential use of an alternate containment radiation monitor was ;
being evaluated. This LER will remain open pending licensee '
determination of the appropriate setpoint and recalibration of the ;
subject monitor to that setpoin j No violations or deviations were identified in this are , Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in ,
paragraph 10) throughout the inspection period and at the conclusion of l the inspection on July 22, 1994, and summarized the scope and findings ;
of the inspection activities. The licensee acknowledged the finding :
After discussions with the licensee, the inspectors determined there was ,
no proprietary information contained in this inspection repor l Definitions l Insoection Followuo Items
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Inspection followup items are matters that have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the
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inspectors, and which involve some action on the part of NRC or licensee or both. An inspection followup item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in paragraph ' Unresolved Items f
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An unresolved item is a matter requiring more information in order to ascertain whether it is an acceptable item, a violation, or a deviation. An unresolved item was identified in paragraph ;
1 Persons Contacted l Toledo Edison Company f
- A. Gibbs, Director, Engineering <
- S. C. Jain, Director, Nuclear Services !
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J. K. Wood, Plant Manager
- T. J. Myers, Director, Nuclear Assurance l
- J. W. Rogers, Manager, Maintenance ;
- S. Byrne, Manager, Plant Operations ;
B. Donnellon, Manager, Plant Engineering i J. E. Moyers, Manager, Quality Assessment j
- D. Crouch, Superintendent, Mechanical Maintenance i
- P. Ricci, Supervisor, Operations !
- P. W. Smith, Supervisor, Compliance .
- R. A. Greenwood, Radiation Protection Manager !
- L. Borysiak, Supervisor, Design Engineering, I&C '
W. T. O'Connor, Manager, Regulatory Affairs !
- C. Hawley, Manager, Quality Control !
- J. L. Michaelis, Manager, Materials Management
- S. S. Hawley, Manager, Quality Services G. J. Melssen, Superintendent, Electrical Maintenance :
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G. R. McIntyre, Supervisor, E/C Systems
- R. J. Scott, Superintendent, Chemistry
- K. L. Tyger, Supervisor, Quality Assessment ,
- W. Molpus, Superintendent, Scheduling ,
- A. J. Lewis, Assistant Shift Supervisor
- J. Theisen, Security Analyst '
- G. T. Duncan, Supervisor, Technical Skills Training i
- Denotes those licensee personnel attending the July 22, 1994,~ exit i meetin i
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