IR 05000341/1993013
| ML20046C008 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 07/30/1993 |
| From: | Phillips M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20046C004 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-341-93-13, NUDOCS 9308090113 | |
| Download: ML20046C008 (14) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
i Report No. 50-341/93013 (DRP)
Docket No. 50-341 License Nos. NPF-43 t
Licensee: Detroit Edison Company
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2000 Second Avenue
Detroit, MI 48226 i
facility Name:
Fermi 2 Inspection At:
Fermi Site. Newport, Michigan
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i Inspection Conducted: June 22, 1993, through July 27, 1993 l
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Inspectors:
W. J. Kropp K. Riemer T. Tongue
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R. Leemon
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Approved By: HEP Phi lips, Chief
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p Reactdr Projects Section 29 Date j
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Inspection Summary Inspection from June 22. 1993, throuah July 27, 1993
Beport No. 50-341/93013(DRP))
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Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced safety inspection by the resident inspectors of action on previous findings; operational safety verification; J
engineered safety feature systems; current material condition; housekeeping and plant cleanliness; radiological controls; security; licensee event report
followup; deviation event reports; maintenance activities; surveillance activities; engineering and technical support; and report review.
Results:
Within the 13 areas inspected, no violations were identified.
One i
unresolved item was identified which pertained to the potential reportability i
of an ESF system initiation / actuation (paragraph 3.a).
Two inspection j
followup items were identified concerning a backwash and precoat evolution in
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the reactor water cleanup (RWCU) system (paragraph 3.a) and a piping elbow
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leak caused by erosion / corrosion (paragraph 6.a).
The following is a summary of the licensee's performance during this inspection period-
9308090113 930730 pDR ADOCK 05000341
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Plant Doerations j
i The licensee's performance in this area was good.
The material condition of the plant was very good with a dark annunciator board noted several times by the inspectors.
The minimal number of alarming annunciators resulted from~
aggressive licensee actions. Shift briefings and plan of the day meetings continued to be very good. The operators' timely identification of an
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increase in off-gas radiation levels was excellent.
The inspectors
accompanied one non-licensed operator (NPPO) during a routine plant tour..The
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NPPO obtained the required data for the plant logs in a satisfactory manner.
However, the inspectors were concerned that the NPP0 limited the plant tour to
obtaining the necessary data for the plant logs and did not perform a more:
l comprehensive tour by assessing the overall condition of equipment and
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components.
Since recent inspection reports have identified discrepant j
material conditions during NRC plant tours, the adequacy of NPP0 tours may
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potentially be a generic issue and/or an example where management expectations.
for NPP0 tours have not been effectively promulgated to the plant staff.
We
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understand your staff has initiated actions to ensure plant tours by non-
licensed operators are performed in a comprehe'nsive manner consistent with l
management expectations.
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Radioloaical Controls
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The licensee's performance in this area was excellent.
The technicians'_
i response to hot spots in the plant as a result of a backwash and precoat
evolution in the reactor water cleanup system was prompt and thorough.
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Radiation protection's interface with other departments at the main control I
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point prior to' entering the controlled area was helpful and proactive. The response to the leaking fuel assembly was conservative and prudent.
Maintenance and Surveillance J
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The licensee's performance in this area was very good. The response to the Division 11 Control Center Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning (CCHVAC)-
inoperability issue was very good.
Good planning and execution of the repair work was evidenced by the fact that repairs were completed within the allowed
LC0 time frame.
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Enaineerina and Technical Support
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The licensee's performance in this area was very good.
Engineering support j
for the CCHVAC maintenance and subsequent request for enforcement discretion
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was good. The response to the possible leaking fuel assembly was prompt and
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thorough.
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DETAILS
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Persons Contacted j
l Detroit Edison company i
- K. Burke, Nuclear Shift Supervisor
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- J. Clark, Supervisor, Operations i
- R. Eberhardt, Superintendent, Radiation Protection
- P. Fessler, Director, Technical Manager
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- D. Gipson, Vice President, Nuclear Operations-j
- L. Goodman, Director, NQA i
- J. Hughes, Maintenance
- R. Jacques, Maintenance
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- J. Korte, Director, Nuclear Security
- A. Kowalczuk, Plant Support j
- J. Malaric, Supervisor, Modifications j
- R. McKeon, Plant Manager, Nuclear Production l
- W. Miller, Director, Nuclear Licensing l
- J. Nolloth, Superintendent, Maintenance l
- J. Nyquist, Supervisor, Safety Engineering
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- D. Ockerman, Director, Nuclear Training
- G. Pierre, Work Control
- R. Stafford, Manager, Nuclear Assurance
- R. Szkotnicki, Supervisor, Inspection & Surveillance
- J. Tibai, Principal Compliance Engineer, Licensing i
- W. Tucker, Superintendent, Technical
- J. Walker, General Director, Plant Engineering
- F. Wszelaki, Senior Engineer, Turbine Group i
- C. Youngert, NPP0 l
- Denotes those attending the exit interview conducted on July 27, 1993.
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The inspectors also had discussions with other licensee employees,
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including members of the technical and engineering staffs, reactor and
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auxiliary operators, shift supervisors, and electrical, mechanical and i
instrument maintenance personnel, and security personnel.
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2.
Action on Previous Inspection Findinas (92701)
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a.
(Closed) Violation (341/91002-03 a throuah d (DRP)):
Failure to I
follow established radiation protection procedures.
This included
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four examples of a contractor employee failing to follow various i
radiation protection procedures. The licensee's respnnse. included
dismissal of the individuals; training of radiation protection j
technicians and management personnel for greater awareness;
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emphasis during retraining of site personnel; and a radiation
protection procedure revision for better radiation protection
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requirements.
In addition, a special QA assessment was conducted with no additional findings.
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(Closed) Unresolved Item (341/91007-03 (DRP)):
Interpretation of
requirements for containment penetration "as found" local leak
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rate testing. By memorandum. dated June 20, 1991, the Division of Reactor Safety (DRS), Region III, requested review and
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interpretations of this matter by NRR. NRR responded by memorandum dated June 1, 1992, stating the generic position that as-found type B and C testing were not required during non-type A test outages.
In addition, as-found local leak rates could be
waived for those penetrations which were known to leak as long as the licensee recorded the penetrations as failed with indeterminent leakages. This interpretation was consistent with the current industry practices.
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(Closed) Open Item (341/91007-04(DRP)):
Disposition of DER 91-
0306 and completion of the corrective actions to the loss of an uninterruptible power supply (UPS).
The licensee completed the disposition of the DER and the corrective actions for the event.
The corrective actions consisted of procedure revisions with
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cautions when lifting electrical leads; placing a permanent
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resistor in parallel to a capacitor in the battery charger circuitry to eliminate the need for a jumper; assuring that non-
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Fermi personnel were monitored by Fermi personnel when working in the plant with procedures for self checking; review of the DER in appropriate training classes; and review of the adequacy of alarm i
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response procedure 3D10.
The corrective actions appeared acceptable, d.
(Closed) Open Item (341/91009-01(DRP)): Completion of corrective f
action to Human Engineering Discrepancy (HED) 775.
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was a carry over from Open Item (341/84020-05(DRP)) where Priority
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III human factors items related to instrumentation color banding.
The work was completed during the third refueling outage RF03.
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(Closed) Unresolved Item (341/91009-02(DRP)): Human Engineering Discrepancy (HED) 719/726 identified an apparent error in the-color banding on a control room recorder.
The color banding was
used to indicate normal, abnormal, and operating ranges.
The specific recorders identified had minor errors.
The corrective
actions included correcting the banding error on the affected instruments in the control room and simulator; distributing a memo to the engineering staff that emphasized the importance of timely DER submittal; and issuing the associated DER (91-0522) for all QA i
personnel to read.
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(Closed) Open Item (341/91009-03(DRP)):
Reportability of the lack of a fire detector in a small cable vault. Although Division I
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and Division II cables passed through the same area, the two
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divisions were separated by a three hour fire wall; the room was
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locked; and cable insulation was the only combustible material present. The cables were not 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, safe shutdown related.
Therefore, this matter is not considered reportable.
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(Closed) Open Item (341/91009-05(DRP)):
Review and implementation-
of a proposed design change to the main turbine over speed trip i
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reset.
This matter was considered only as a design enhancement to a balance of plant system. The proposed modification was evaluated and subsequently eliminated from the second refueling-i outage with no plans to implement it. This item is closed.
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(Closed) Open Item (341/91009-07(DRP)):
Concerns with
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communications within the engineering department related to
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t problems identified with motor operated valves (MOVs). The licensee formed a dedicated MOV group within the engineering
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department. This group handled all activities related to MOVs and
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appeared to have adequately addressed the problems with timeliness l
of corrective action, etc. To date, no new concerns have been
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raised.
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(Closed) Unresolved Item (341/93004-05(DRP)):
Reliability of high pressure coolant injection-(HPCI) system.
The licensee had previously formed a task force comprised of representatives from
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systems engineering, plant engineering, independent safety evaluation group (ISEG), and licensing to address the issues of HPCI reliability and availability.
Regional specialists have reviewed the actions taken and planned by the task force and have no further concerns.
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3.
Plant Operations Fermi 2 operated at power levels up to 93.5 percent power during this
inspection period.
Due to noticeable increases in turbine component t
vibration as well as pressure pulsation between the 52 inch steam
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I manifold and first-stage inlet pressure at the turbine, the licensee administrative 1y limited reactor power to 93.5 percent.
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will continue to operate at this power level until there is a full understanding of the consequences of the vibration and pressure pulse on plant equipment and components.
a.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
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The inspectors verified that the facility was being operated in conformance with the license and regulatory requirements, and that
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the licensee's management control system was effective in ensuring safe operation of the plant.
On a sampling basis, the inspectors verified proper control room staffing and coordination of plant activities; verified operator-adherence with procedures and technical specifications; monitored control room indications for abnormalities; verified that electrical power was available; and observed the frequency of -
plant and control room visits by station management.
The inspectors reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with
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control room operators throughout the inspection period.
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inspectors observed a number of control room shift turnovers.
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turnovers were conducted in a professional manner and included log reviews, panel walkdowns, discussions of maintenance and surveillance activities in progress or planned, and associated LCO time restraints, as applicable.
The inspectors had the following observations:
During a tour with a Nuclear Power Plant Operator (NPP0),
e the inspectors noted that the NPP0 performed well in obtaining required data and logs.
However, the tour was limited in focus and scope with respect to observing overall equipment condition, system status, housekeeping and material condition of the plant.
Examples of items not checked or observed included locked valve positions, radiation monitors, loose lagging on piping and water on the floor.
The inspectors were concerned that by hurrying from reading to reading, and focusing on obtaining required log-keeping data, the potential existed for NPP0s to identify degraded equipment conditions or items in need of repair.
These observations corresponded to inspector concerns, identified in prior inspection reports, where the inspectors identified discrepant conditions during plant tours that had not been previously identified by the licensee.
Some examples were a bent needle on a HPCI discharge pressure gauge, loose bolts on HPCI piping supports, and the position of a local control switch for the Division 1 Switchgear Room Air Conditioning Unit. We understand your staff has initiated actions to ensure plant tours by non-licensed operators are performed in a comprehensive manner consistent with management expectations.
On July 7, during a backwash evolution on the "B" Reactor e
Water Cleanup (RWCU) Demineralizer, the personnel contamination monitor located near the demineralizer panel al armed.
Radiation protection (RP) personnel investigated the cause of the alarm and discovered that general area dose rates 10 feet from the RWCU valve room wall were two to five mr/hr.
The area was posted by RP personnel and further investigation commenced.
Radiation protection personnel performed surveys of the major portions of RWCU piping and discovered two hot spots; 2 R/hr on piping in the RWCU valve gallery and five R/hr on top of the torus.
No personnel over exposure resulted from the event.
Operations department personnel rechecked the valve line up for the backwash evolution and all valves appeared to be in the correct position.
Later, a problem was found with a reach rod operated valve, G33-F0538.
The valve indicated shut remotely and no further valve movement was noted when the valve position was checked.
However, the valve did not appear shut at the local station.
The valve was then shut locally and the RWCU lines were subsequently flushed to clear the hot spots.
The licensee initiated a deviation
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I event report (DER) to document and track resolution of the-problem.
The problem with the valve's remote operation, and potential applicability to other reach rod operated valves, was considered an Inspection Followup Item pending further review by the licensee and NRC (341/93013-01(DRP)).
On July 26, control room operators noticed that all heat
exchangers cooled by general service water (GSW) were rapidly increasing in temperature. Operators manually initiated both divisions of emergency equipment cooling water (EECW). One torus to drywell vacuum breaker cycled due to the cooling of the drywell by EECW.
The licensee determined that the manual initiation of EECW and operation i
of the vacuum breaker were not reportable.
The licensee stated that EECW was manually initiated as a planned response to GSW system problems and that the vacuum breaker
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operation was expected due to an anticipated pressure drop in the drywell.
Pending NRC and licensee review of the event and reportability determination, this is an Unresolved item (341/93013-02(DRP)).
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Enaineered Safety Feature (ESF) Systems (71710)
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During the inspection, the inspectors selected accessible portions of several ESF systems to verify status.
Consideration was given to the plant mode, applicable Technical Specifications, Limiting Conditions for Operation requirements, and other applicable requirements.
Through observation, the inspectors verified that the following was acceptable:
installation of hangers and supports; housekeeping; freeze protection, if required, was installed and
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operational; valve position and conditions; no potential ignition i
sources; and major component labeling, lubrication, cooling, etc.
The inspectors also verified that instrumentation was properly installed and functioning and that significant process parameter values were consistent with expected values; that instrumentation was calibrated; that necessary support systems were operational; and that locally and remotely indicated breaker and valve i
positions agreed.
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During the inspection, the accessible portions of the following system was walked down:
Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) No.11
Low Pressure Injection (Divisions I and II)
The inspectors had no substantive concerns as a result of the wal kdowns.
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c.
Current Material Condition (71707)
The inspectors performed general plant as well as selected system and component walkdowns to assess the general and specific
material condition of the plant, to verify that work requests had
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been initiated for identified equipment problems, and to evaluate housekeeping.
Walkdowns included an assessment of the buildings, components, and systems for proper identification and tagging,
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accessibility, fire and security door integrity, scaffolding,
radiological controls, and any unusual conditions, Unusual
conditions included but were not limited to water, oil, or other
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liquids on the floor or equipment; indications of leakage through l
ceiling, walls or floors; loose insulation; corrosion; -excessive noise; unusual temperatures; and abnormal ventilation and lighting.
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During this inspection period, a dark annunciator board was noted
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several times by the inspectors. The number of alarming
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annunciators was kept to a minimum during the inspection period by aggressive licensee actions.
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d.
Housekeepina and Plant Cleanliness
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a The inspectors monitored the status of housekeeping and plant cleanliness for fire protection and protection of safety-related
equipment from intrusion of foreign matter.
Housekeeping was
considered very good throughout the plant.
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Radioloaical Controls (71707)
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l The inspectors verified that personnel were following health
physics procedures for dosimetry, protective clothing, frisking,
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posting, etc., and randomly examined radiation protection
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instrumentation for use, operability, and calibration.
- The radiation protection department's response to the reactor water cleanup evolution was excellent. Actions taken to investigate the matter were comprehensive and thorough. The inspectors also observed activities at the main control point prior to entering the radiologically controlled area (RCA).
The inspectors noted good communication and dialogue between the RP technician and maintenance personnel; dose rates, area
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radiological conditions, and specific RP requirements for the job were discussed prior to entering the RCA.
In response to the
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leaking fuel pin, radiation protection personnel increased radiological monitoring and surveys and implemented increased i
radiation protection requirements.
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f.
Security (71707)
Each week during routine activities or tours, the inspectors
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monitored the licensee's security program to ensure that observed
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actions were being implemented according to the approved security
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pl an.
The inspectors noted that persons within the protected area displayed proper photo-identification badges, and those individuals requiring escorts were properly escorted.
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Additionally, the inspectors also observed that personnel and packages entering the protected area were searched by appropriate i
equipment or by hand.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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Safety Assessment /Ouality Verification (40500 and 92700)
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a.
Licensee Event Reoort (LER) Follow-uo (92700)
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Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed-
to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, that i'
immediate corrective action was accomplished, and that corrective action to prevent recurrence had been or would be accomplished in
accordance with Technical Specifications (TS).
(Closed) LER (341/91006):
Balance of Plant Breaker Opened _ Causing Reactor Building Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning Isolation. This was originally addressed in Inspection Report i
(341/91009(DRP)).
The licensee analysis of the tripped breaker
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revealed that one phase had failed to trip _ due to contact degradation.
The preventative maintenance program was reviewed
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and no problem was identified. The breaker was replaced and the new breaker was tested satisfactorily.
(Closed) LER (341/91009):
Loss of Power to Bus 65F Causes'
Engineered Safety Feature Actuation.
This event was reviewed in i
part and addressed in Inspection Report (341/93007(DRP)) for-independent verification. Although the event'resulted from a
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personnel error, the licensee conducted an adequate investigation and took corrective actions to prevent recurrence for the same cause.
i (Closed) LER (341/91019 Revisions 00 and 01):
Reactor Water
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Cleanup System Isolations Due to High Pump Room Differential Temperature and Personnel Error During System Restoration.
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licensee replaced the failed temperature detector.
Although the j
second isolation was due to personnel error while removing an
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electrical jumper, the results had minimal safety significance and the licensee investigation and subsequent corrective actions
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appeared extensive'enough to prevent recurrence for the same l
causes.
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(Closed) (LER 341/91020 Revisions 00 and 01):
High Pressure Coolant Injection System Start Failure During Quarterly
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Surveillance Test.
The licensee investigation attributes the failure to corrosion in the governor control system due to water
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intrusion into the HPCI lubrication oil system from a leaking turbine seal.
This was corrected by replacement of the EGR and the affected turbine seal. Two deviation reports-(DER's) were generated out of this event; DER 91-787 and DER 91-878, and were inspected by regional specialists and addressed in Inspection
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Report (341/93007(DRS)). Any followup actions will be addressed _
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and tracked under that report.
(Closed) (LER 341/91022):
Primary Containment Negative Pressure
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During Shutdown.
Following an extensive investigation into the.
cause of this event, the licensee provided training to operations,
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maintenance, and technical staffs and managers.
The training has i
also been included in periodical event training for future
operations personnel.
In addition, a statement to warn operators of this phenomenon was placed in an appropriate general operating procedure.
(Closed) (LER 341/92001): Unplanned Breach of HPCI Oil System. A
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review of the licensees investigation, analysis, and corrective
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actions was completed.
The licensee provided drawings of the fittings to be incorporated into the vendor manuals to better inform technicians of the configuration.
The preventative
maintenance instruction for calibration was revised to refer to l
the drawings and vendor manuals; the LER was made required reading i
for appropriate personnel; and the event was made part of the lessons learned for instrumentation and control technician
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continuing training.
In addition to the foregoing, the inspector reviewed the
licensee's deviation event report (DER) generated during the i
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inspection period.
This was done in an effort to monitor the conditions related to plant or personnel performance, potential
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trends, etc.
DERs were also reviewed to ensure that they were
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generated appropriately and dispositioned in a manner consistent
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with the applicable procedures.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Maintenance / Surveillance (62703 & 61726)
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Maintenance Activities (62703)
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i Routinely, station maintenance acti, were observed and/or i
reviewed to ascertain that they were
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approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or
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standards, and in conformance with technical specifications.
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The following items were also considered during this review:
limiting conditions for operation were met while components or
systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior
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to initiating the work; functional testing and/or calibrations l
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i were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; and activities were accomplished by qualified personnel.
Portions of the following maintenance activities were observed or
reviewed:
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WR 000Z931132 Implement EDP 13779 Change Noninterruptible Air Supply (NIAS) Valve Type.
WR 000Z933070 Control Switch for Division II CCHVAC Makeup Giving Erratic Indications.
WR 000Z933067 Division II CCHVAC Emergency Make-up Filter Fan / Motor.
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WR 000Z932877 Elbow Upstream of P95 F401 B Leaking.
WR 000Z933113 Dedicated Shutdown Panel Condensate Storage Tank (CST) Level Indication Sticking.
b.
Discretionary Enforcement The licensee requested discretionary enforcement from the NRC to perform repairs to the Division II Control Center Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning (CCHVAC) System in accordance with WR 000Z933067.
On July 6, the Division II CCHVAC make-up air supply fan failed to automatically shift to the recirculation mode as required during the performance of Surveillance 44.080.402, "CC Make-up Air Manifold Radiation Monitor, Division 2."
The operators declared Division II CCHVAC inoperable and entered a seven day LCO.
Further investigation by the licensee discovered damaged insulation on the power cable to the fan. motor. The insulation was brittle and carbonized with indications that the wire had experienced sometime in the past a high current condition.
To perform the required repairs to the fan motor, the
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common plenum shared with the Division I fan had to be breached, which rendered both divisions of CCHVAC inoperable and required entering a six hours to hot shutdown LCO.
The licensee was confident that the expected repairs to the system could be completed within the six hour timeframe; however, if anything unexpected had arisen during the course of the work, the potential existed to unnecessarily challenge the operators and the plant to complete a shutdown within the time left in the LCO timeframe.
The licensee requested, and the NRC granted, a one time extension to the required Technical Specification LC0 from six hours to 14.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />. The licensee presented work plans, contingency measures,
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and compensatory action in a conference call placed with the
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resident inspectors and regional and headquarters personnel.
The NRC concurred with the licensee's assessment that the one-time extension did not present any additional risk to the public. The licensee staged all required tools and material and briefed
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personnel prior to breaching the system.
The inspectors monitored
the licensee's planning, preparation, and execution of the work.
The licensee's performance with respect to this evolution was excellent.
The required work was performed, and the system returned to an operable status, within the timeframe of the LCO.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
b.
Surveillance Activities (61726)
During the inspection period, the inspectors observed technical specification required surveillance testing and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly resolved.
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The inspectors also witnessed or reviewed portions of the following surveillances:
44.080.402
"CC Make-up Air Manifold Radiation Monitor, Division II, functional" e
AA38930719 " Perform Torus Water In-Leakage Measurement and Calculation" t
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"EDG 11 Start and Load Test - Slow Start" e
24.000.02
"Shiftly, Daily, and Weekly Required Surveillance" e
24.203.02
" Division I Core Spray System Pump and Valve Operability" No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Enqineerina & Technical Support (37700)
a.
The licensee performed Work Request (WR) 000Z932877 to repair a low pressure extraction steam line drain leak.
The leak in an elbow upstream of valve P95 F401B was due to erosion / corrosion.
This section of piping was in the licensee's erosion / corrosion program and was predicted to be the weakest link.
However, it was not expected to fail as soon as it did. The licensee installed a Furmanite enclosure around the leaking elbow as a temporary corrective action and will repair the leak during the next refuel outage. The licensee was also evaluating other measures to alleviate the problem.
In addition, other locations will be
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selected for testing during the refuel outage and the results compared to the erosion / corrosion program prediction.
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l review by the NRC of the licensee's permanent repair to the piping and evaluation of other selected sites in the erosion / corrosion program, this matter is considered an Inspection Followup Item (341/93013-03(DRP)).
b.
The inspectors attended one of the licensee's Personnel Error Reduction Training seminars that were developed in response to past events at the station. Attendees included personnel from multiple disciplines ranging from front line supervisors to clerical help.
The training included the required session where a senior manager leads the training to emphasize management support and backing. The inspectors noted good class participation and discussion and observed open and candid discussions between the attendees and the senior manager.
The inspectors considered the training to be positive in nature and well received by the
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personnel in attendance.
On July 23, control room operators noted an increase in off-gas
radiation levels and notified the chemistry department.
The off-gas radiation release rate increased from approximately 137 uci/sec to approximately 1190 uci/sec. The Technical Specification limit requires the rate to.be less than 340,000 uci/sec.
The release rate results indicated a small leak in one fuel rod.
The failed fuel response team provided a list of recommendations to the plant manager in accordance with the Failed Fuel Action Plan (FFAP). The recommendations for continued operation (RCO) provided to the plant manager addressed the following topics:
reactor shutdown; reduction in reactor power; alterations to power distribution; alterations to reactor coolant and condensate cleanup modes; alterations to off-gas cleanup modes; alterations to radwaste processing modes; increased chemistry and radiochemistry sampling and analysis; increased
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radioactive effluent and radiological environmental sampling analysis; increased radiological monitoring and surveys; increased radiation protection requirements; communications; applicable Technical Specifications; and system and component monitoring. At the end of the inspection period the licensee was planning a " flux
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tilt" operation to try and determine the location of the defective fuel bundle. The resident inspectors will continue to monitor licensee actions with respect to the fuel leak during outline resident inspections.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Report Review During the inspection period, the inspector reviewed the licensee's Monthly Performance Report for June 1993.
The inspector confirmed that the information provided met the requirements of Technical Specification 6.9.1.6 and Regulatory Guide 1.16.
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The inspector also reviewed the licensee's Monthly Performance Report for May 1993.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Inspectior Followup Items Inspection Followup items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed by the inspector'and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both.
Inspection followup items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in paragraphs 3.a and 6.a.
9.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations, or deviations. An unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in paragraph 3.a.
10.
Meetinas and Other Activities a.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspectors met with the licensee representatives denoted in paragraph I during the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection on July 27, 1993.
The inspectors summarized the scope and results of the inspection and discussed:the likely content of this inspection report. The licensee acknowledged the information and did not indicate that any of the information disclosed during the inspection could be considered proprietary in nature.
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