IR 05000341/1993009
| ML20046D062 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 08/05/1993 |
| From: | Jickling R, Mccormickbarge, Steven Orth, Simons H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20046D055 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-341-93-09, 50-341-93-9, NUDOCS 9308160086 | |
| Download: ML20046D062 (14) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION III
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Report No. 50-341/93009(DRSS)
Dockets No. 50-341 Licenses No. NPF-43
- i Licensee: Detroit Edison Company 2000 Second Avenue Detroit, MI 48226
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Facility Name:
Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant Inspection At:
Fermi Site, Newport, MI
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Inspection Conducted:
July 13-16, 1993
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Inspectors:
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N H. Simons Date
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[rkb cA B C 93 R. Jickling
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U BfSI98
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b S. Orth Date'
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t Accompanying Inspector:
T. Colburn Approved By:
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mM-ppg M5Yvq l
J. W. McCormick-Barger, Ch'ief
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Emergency Preparedness and Non-Power Reactor Section i
Inspection Summarv Inspection on July 13-16. 1993 (Report No. 50-341/93009(DRSS))
l Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced inspection of the Fermi emergency preparedness exercise involving review of the exercise scenario (IP 82302),
observations by four NRC representatives of key functions and locations during the exercise (IP 82301), and follow-up on licensee actions on previously i
identified items (IP 92701).
i Results: One non-cited violation was identified regarding the licensee's failure to notify the NRC within one hour of declaring an Unusual Event on November 18, 1992 (Section 4).
9308160086 930806 PDR ADOCK 05000341 G
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Overall,. exercise performance was very good. However, one exercise weakness was identified in the Control Room concerning the proper classification of a Site Area Emergency (Section Sa).
In addition, the licensee did not. properly-simulate the notification of the NRC of a General Emergency.
This concern.
related to demonstration of NRC notifications will be tracked as an Inspection Followup Item (Section Sa).
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DETAILS
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NRC Observers and Areas Observed H. Simons, Control Room Simulator (CRS)
S. Orth, Operational Support Center (OSC)
T. Colburn, Technical Support Center (TSC)
R. Jickling, Emergency Operations Facility (E0F) and alternate E0F
2.
Eersons Contacted D. Gipson, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Generation R. McKeon, Plant Manager J. Plona, Superintendent, Operations W. Miller, Director, Nuclear Licensing L. Goodman, Director, Nuclear Quality Assurance
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W. Colonnello, Supervisor, Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness K. Morris, Emergency Response Planner R. Eberhardt, Superintendent, Radiation Protection
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J. Korte, Director, Nuclear Security J. Tibai, Principle Compliance Engineer D. Ockerman, Director, Nuclear Training J. Walker, Director, Plant Engineering The personnel listed above and others attended the NRC exit interview on July 16, 1993. The inspectors also contacted other licensee personnel during the inspection.
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3.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items (IP 92701)
(Closed) Unresolved Item No. 50-341/92017-02: The licensee failed to notify the NRC Headquarters 0perations Officer within one hour. of declaring an Unusual Event (UE) on November 18, 1992. The UE was declared due to initiation of the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI)
system. The NRC was notified one hour and 46 minutes after the' UE was declared.
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This late notification was identified by the licensee and the following corrective actions were taken:
Lessons learned regarding the late ENS notification were included
in the licensed operator requalification Training cycle starting 2/12/93,
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Night orders were issued to operations personnel in regards to the e
late ENS notification, and Emergency procedures (EP) 102, " Unusual Event"; 103, " Alert";.104,
" Site Area Emergency"; and 105, " General Emergency" were revised 1/27/93, placing additional emphasis on ENS notification.
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Although this is a violation of 10 CFR 50.72(a)(i), this violation will not be cited, as the criteria specified in Section VII.B of 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C were satisfied. This item is closed.
(Closed) Inspection Follow Vo Item No. 50-341/92006-01:
There was no planned preventive maintenance or periodic testing of the ventilation-system in the Emergency Operations Facility (E0F).
The licensee reviewed Information Notice (IN) 92-32, " Problems identified with Emergency Ventilation Systems for Near-Site (Within 10 Miles) Emergency Operations Facilities and Technical Support Centers" and determined that the following actions were appropriate.
e A work instruction was written and issued on December 3,1992 to provide guidance on operating, testing, and requesting maintenance on the E0F air filtration unit;
Two preventive maintenance events were created for the EOF l
ventilation system which included an 18 month check of the air filter, supply fan and exhaust fan; and a 5 year disassembly and inspection of the air actuators.
As stated in IN 92-32, the NRC has not specifically identified maintenance and test criteria for these ventilation systems, but instead
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has provided a degree of flexibility within which licensees can exercise-management prerogative in their maintenance program. Considering the licensee's review of this concern and the action taken which are outlined above, this item is closed.
4.
General j
i An announced, daytime exercise of the licensee's emergency plan was i
conducted at Fermi on July 14, 1993. This was a utility only exercise.
The exercise tested the licensee emergency response organization's capabilities to respond to an accident scenario. Attachment I describes
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the scope and objectives of the exercise. Attachment 2 summarizes the exercise scenario.
The licensee's response was coordinated, orderly and timely.
If scenario events had been real, the actions taken by the 1icensee would i
have been sufficient to mitigate the accident and permit State and local authorities to take appropriate actions to protect the public's health and safety.
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Specific Observations (IP 82301)
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Control Room Simulator (CRS)
The CRS crew did an excellent job of overcoming radio problems early in the exercise. The Nuclear Shift Supervisor (NSS) showed i
excellent concern for the fire brigade member who lost
communications with the CRS.
The NSS assumed something had
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happened to the person and took commensurate actions, rather than assuming it to be a radio problem.
After a fire alarm annunciator was received, an announcement warning plant personnel of the fire and activating the fire brigade was made immediately. The NSS then started looking at the emergency action levels (EALs). He decided that if the fire could not be extinguished within 10 minutes, an Unusual Event (UE)
classification would be necessary. He proactively told the assigned communicator to start filling out the appropriate notification forms. After the 10 minutes had been exceeded, the NSS declared an UE and notification to-the State and counties was performed in a timely manner.
The NSS did not thoroughly review the EAls as no consideration was given to the fire affecting nuclear safety systems or engineered safety features. About eight minutes after the NSS declared the UE, the Shift Technical Advisor (STA) reviewed the Alert EAL related to fires and recommended that the NSS upgrade the emergency classification to an Alert.
The NSS accepted this recommendation. At this time, the NSS was prompted by the controllers to declare a Site Area Emergency (SAE).
10 CFR 50.54(q) requires that the licensee follow and maintain an emergency plan. The licensee's emergency plan required that' a.
Site Area Emergency be declared based on a fire affecting nuclear safety systems or engineered safety features.
However, the NSS failed to properly classify a Site Area Emergency based on a fire affecting an engineered safety feature.
The failure of the NSS to properly classify the emergency will be tracked as an Exercise Weakness (No. 50-341/93009-01).
The CR properly retained responsibility for notifications to the NRC after the Technical Support Center (TSC) was activated.
However, the licensee did not use a response cell to simulate these notifications. As a result, it was not clear to the players that these notifications, particularly for the General Emergency declaration, were to be demonstrated by the use of simulation.
The failure to fully demonstrate NRC notifications due to a simulation problem will be tracked as an Inspection Follow Up Item (No. 50-341/93009-02).
No violations or deviations were identified.
However, one exercise weakness and one inspection follow up item were identified.
b.
Technical Support Center (TSC_1 Activation of the TSC was properly initiated after the SAE declaration. During the activation process, the Emergency Director (ED) maintained low noise levels and good command and
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control.
Upon achieving minimum staffing, the ED immediately conferred with the NSS to assess the technical needs in support of the CRS staff.
During initial manning of the TSC, arriving personnel did not sign in on the personnel status board. While the TSC Administrator effectively tracked personnel for the ED, use of this status board would have allowed an immediate visual assessment of the staffing status.
After the TSC was fully manned, the TSC Administrator updated the
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personnel status board for TSC personnel, but did not complete the other half of the status board which had an area to list key players in the other facilities.
Status board updates were generally accurate and timely.
Status board clerks aggressively obtained new information.
In one instance, however, the meteorological status board was not updated for 30 minutes even though constantly shifting wind direction would have made more frequent updating appropriate.
Status briefings by the ED to the TSC personnel were frequent, informative, and concise. The focus of emergency response efforts and discussions on priorities were included.
However, several times TSC personnel did not give their full attention to the ED during these briefings. The ED asked other TSC managers for additional input during briefings; however, these inputs were not clearly audible to the TSC staff.
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The engineering support staff performance was good.
They investigated alternative methods for driving control rods and assessed damaged equipment from the fire.
Efforts to vent containment could have been more thoroughly examined by the I
engineering staff. The rapidly increasing pressure did not elicit the same urgency for attention as the control rod and boron injection problems, even though the containment was the last intact fission product barrier.
Emergency operating procedures were used effectively. However, the Emergency Response Information System (ERIS) could have been used to anticipate when significant events may have occurred, such as the containment failure.
No violations or deviations were identified.
c.
Operational Succort Center (OSC)
The OSC was functional approximately 15 minutes after the Site Area Emergency declaration.
The OSC Coordinator immediately announced the facility's activation and briefed the staff on plant conditions.
Habitability of the facility was properly monitored throughout the event.
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The OSC Coordinator maintained excellent command and control of the facility and repair actions. Briefings were-conducted at an
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appropriate frequency._ However, the OSC Coordinator had to brief the command center and subsequently, his staff in an adjacent
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room. Although this did not hinder his response, the repetition could have become cumbersome if scenario events had become more demanding.
l The OSC Coordinator and staff maintained good direction of inplant
repair teams. The OSC status board accurately documented team composition, location, and progress. The OSC Coordinator-
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monitored the progress of repairs and ensured that teams were
notified of changing plant conditions and radiological concerns.
Inplant teams effectively relayed follow up information to the i
OSC.
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Briefings and debriefings of inplant teams were very good in detail.
Briefings addressed both physical hazards and
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radiological concerns.
Information was clearly communicated to team members. Upon return to the facility, the teams relayed appropriate information to the OSC staff.
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The OSC staff effectively monitored radiological conditions and
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controlled inplant team exposures. The staff appropriately-used
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radiation monitor data in directing team activities. Dose extensions and dosimetry exemptions were properly obtained from the TSC for the post accident sampling system (PASS) team.
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staff questioned radiation monitor data and used inplant' teams to verify radiation levels.
The inspectors observed selected repair teams including the fire brigade, the electrical buss inspection team and the PASS team.
All teams demonstrated good teamwork and radiological practices.
Pre-job planning was good, as the teams gathered necessary tools and instruments.
Protective clothing were properly donned when required. The TSC electrical engineer assigned to the buss team was instrumental in analyzing the components affected by the fire in the breaker. The PASS team, however, encountered a minor delay in its formation and dispatch from the OSC, while waiting for
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chemistry technicians and resolution of dosimetry needs. Although the team was not released from the OSC until 30 minutes after it was requested, the PASS analysis would have been completed within approximately 2 and one-half hours of the TSC request.
No violations or deviations were identified.
d.
Emeroency Operations Facility (EOF) and Alternate EOF The E0F was activated at the Site Area Emergency classification.
Prior to the EOF being declared functional, the facility I
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experienced a simulated loss of power. After a subsequent simulated loss of the E0F emergency diesel generator, the decision
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was made to abandon the facility and activate the Alternate E0F (AE0F). The Emergency Officer (EO) conducted a very good briefing in preparation for abandoning the E0F including safety and communications concerns.
The activation of the AEOF was rapid and efficient with departure time from the E0F at approximately 8:56 a.m.,
arrival time at the AE0F at 9:35 a.m., and the AE0F being declared functional at 10:14 a.m.
The E0 maintained very good facility management and control.
Briefings given by the E0 were timely and extremely informative.
The E0 also provided good updates to the State Emergency Director over the phone. The E0 did not explain nlant conditions to the State Emergency Director in terms of oss 9f fission product barriers. This could have enhanced ti..
.planation of plant conditions. Noise levels were kept low considering the small size of the AEOF.
The facility did a good job continuously monitoring plant condi-tions.
The technical groups aggressively monitored radiological and plant conditions. There were many discussions on the information received and requests for verification when the data did not seem valid.
For example, the staff was confused by and therefore questioned Containment High Radiation Monitoring System (CHRMS) data that did not agree with the ERIS data.
Offsite dose assessment was very good. Offsite monitoring teams were dispatched and in position should a radiological release have occurred. Dose projections were continuously made to account for the many possible plant degradation scenarios. Meteorological conditions were monitored and forecasts were obtained.
Protective action decision making was good.
Good discussions were conducted to consider various protective actions and take into account the meteorological conditions, CHRMS readings, and other plant parameters. The E0 properly modified the protective action
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recommendation due to the shifting wind direction.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Exercise Ob.iectives and Scenario Review (IP 8is02)
The exercise scope and objectives and the exercise scenario were submitted to NRC within the proper time frames. The licensee adequately responded to the lead inspector's questions pertaining to the scenario.
The scenario was challenging in that the initiating condition required a Site Area Emergency declaration. The licensee also demonstrated assembly and accountability. However, during the exercise, the simulator did not operate as expected and the simulator events were completely different from what the scenario postulated.
However, the
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exercise objectives were able to be demonstrated despite the simulator
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problems. Hard copy data was not available to support the exercise.
In addition, the controllers were not prepared to handle these simulator problems. The simulator problems detracted from overall problem solving demonstration during the exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Exercise Control and Critioues (IP 82301)
Exercise control was very good. There were adequate controllers to control the exercise. No improper instances of controllers prompting participants to initiate actions, which they might not otherwise have taken, were observed.
The licensee's controllers held initial critiques in each facility with participants immediately following the exercise. These critiques were well detailed. The licensee provided a summary of its preliminary
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strengths and weaknesses prior to the exit interview which were in
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strong agreement with the inspectors' preliminary findings.
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Exit Interview The inspectors held an exit interview on July 16, 1993, with the
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licensee representatives identified in Section 2 to present and discuss
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the preliminary inspection findings. The licensee indicated that none of the matters discussed were proprietary in nature.
Attachments:
1.
Exercise Scope and Objectives 2.
Exercise Scenario Summary
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Scenario 10 Enercise Package
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P 1.0 EXERCISE SCOPE FERMEX '93 is a utility only exercise. All onsite emergency response facilities will be activated. The Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) will be simulated by controllers..The State Emergency Operations Center, Monroe County Central Dispatch and Wayne County Comrnunications Center will participate to demonstrate communication capabilities. The alternate Emergency Operations Facility located in Detroit Edison's Wayne Monroe Division Headquarters approximately 25 miles from Fermi 2 will be activated.
The exercise is announced, the participants will know the date and approximate start time.
No facilities will be prestaged. The exercise will occur July 14,1993, start at 0730, and be conducted from the simulator control room.
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Scenaric 10 Exescise Package
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2.0 OBJECTIVES The FERMEX '93 exercise scenario will challenge player and facility capabilities to demonstrate the following objectives in response to postulated conditions:
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Accident Detection and Assessment i
Detect the existence of accident conditions through recognition of off-normal plant a.
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parameters or other available indications.
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Utilize available instrumentation and indications to provide initial assessment and continuous monitoring of changing plant conditions.
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Emergency Classification Recognize conditions that require classification as an emergency in accordance with RERP a.
Plan implementing Procedures.
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Notification of Onsite and Offsite Emergency Responders Notify onsite personnel of the declaration of any emergency.
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Notify the offsite authorities (State of Michigan, Wayne County, Monroe County) within 15 l
minutes of any emergency declaration.
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Notify the NRC Operations Center within one hour of any emergency declaration.
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Provide follow-up event information to the offsite authorities.
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Communications
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Utilize communication circuits between the onsite emergency response facilities and the j
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offsite authorities. Provide follow up information to the offsite authorities as appropriate, b.
Establish communications with in-plant emergency teams.
Communicate with offsite radiological emergency teams, including understanding message j
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i Scenario 10 I
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Exercise Package
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Radiological Exposure Control Identify and evaluate potential radiological hazards by performing adequate radiological a.
monitoring and surveillance.
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Establish and implement appropriate radiological controls and radiation protection practices l
consistent with ALARA principles.
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Distribute and maintain record of dosimetry devices for emergency responders, read c.
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direct-reading dosimeters at an appropriate frequency, and maintain record of any emergency dose received.
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Protective Action Recommendation
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Evaluate plant conditions and/or projected doses to the population-at-risk to develop a.
appropriate Protective Action Recommendations.
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Formulate and communicate a timely Protective Action Recommendation to offsite i
authorities upon declaration of a general emergency.
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Update Protective Action Recommendations commensurate with changing radiological, c.
meteorological or plant conditions.
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Staff Augmentation Coordinate response with offsite support agencies and provide for logistic support for a
emergency personnel as required, Identify shift reliefs for Emergency Response Organization positions to provide continuous b
24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> staffing.
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Shift Staffing Activate the Emergency Response Organization and staff Emergency Response Facilities a.
commensurate with the emergency classification, b.
Staff emergency positions within the time allocated in Table B-1, commensurate with the emergency classification declared, Exercise Specific Objectives:
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Demonstrate the Emergency Operations Facility diesel generator emergency power capability.
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Demonstrate operation of the alternate Emergency Operations Facility.
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Activate the fire brigade, and respond to a fire in accordance with procedures.
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Scenario 10
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Exercisa Package
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.0 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS SEQUENCE OF EVENTS TIME KEY EVENTS 0700 Comt. ence turnover (message #1)
Initial Conditions: Reactor operating at 98% power. Standby Liquid Control Pump A is out of.=ervice for maintenance (mini-scenario 10A). LCO 93-FERMEX-01 expires 7/19/93.
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"! 9W Div ll operating in preparation for surveillance 24.206.01,' RCIC System Pump and valve Operability Test.
0730 Announce start of exercise (message #2)
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l 0745 RHR pump D started (contingency message #3)
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(a pprow..)
0747 Fire alarm, zone 14 (Div fl switchgear rowm), fire brigade (approx.)
activated RHR pump D trips if not already storped by operators (mini-scenario 10B).
l NSS declares Site Area Emergency due to fire affecting safety sptem (contingency
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messages #4 and #5)
Assembly and Accountability OSC, TSC, EOF activated (contingency message #6)
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0825 EOF power failure (message #7)
I 0835 EOF emergency diesel generator failure (message #8)
Alternate EOF activated (contingency message #9). EOF personnel relocate to Alternate EOF.
0905 Main turbine trip due to low stator water cooling flow (mini-scenario 10D). Reactor falls to scram (mini-scenario 10C). East bypass valve falls to open fully (mini-scenario 10E).
SRVs open to control reactor pressure.
Control room enters Level / Power control and intentionally lowers RPV level to lower reactor power.
Control rods cannot be inserted manually (mini-scenario 10C)
Control room crew attempts to inject boron with. standby liquid control pump B (mini-scenario 10G)
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t Scenario 10
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Exercise Package
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SEQUENCE OF EVENTS TIME KEY EVENTS i
0920 Startup level control valve fails open (mini-scenario 10F). RPV level increases rapidly.
Rapid and severe power transient occurs causing fuel clad damage.
l 0922 MSIVs isolate on high radiation. SRVs open to control reactor pressure.
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Emergency Director declares a General Emergency based on plant transient requiring.
operation of reactor shutdown systems, failure to scram and core damage evident (contingency message #12)
Protective actions recommended.
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0930 Alternate EOF declared functional
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Terim-Drill Coordinator will notify lead controllers in each facility nation when termination criteria are met and all objectives have been demonstrated. Lead controllers deliver message #13.
Termination Criteria:
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Reactor shutdown by rods or boron injection achieved.
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Alternate EOi has made at least one change in protective action recommendations.
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