IR 05000341/1991001
| ML20024G909 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 02/28/1991 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20024G908 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-341-91-01, 50-341-91-1, NUDOCS 9105020082 | |
| Download: ML20024G909 (19) | |
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SALP 12 INITIAL SALP REPORT U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION Ill SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE Inspection Report No. 50-341/91001 Detroit Edison Company Fermi 2 Nuclear Plant l
January 1, 1990 through February 28, 1991 l
9105020002 910429 DR ADOCK 050003 1
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SUMMARY OF RESULTS
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A.
Overview Detroit Edison Company's (DECO) overall performance during the assessment period was acceptable in all areas and showed a conservative and safe operations philosophy. Overall performance improved from the previous assessment period with no Category 3 ratings although there was a decline in
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emergency __ preparedness from a Category 1 to a Category 2.
The overall improvement was manifested in a significant reduction in the number of operational events and personnel errors, and in better communications.
Management also made significant strides in initiating or continuing programs to reduce the source term which ultimately will result in lower site doses, and in reducing the risk of accidents while the reactor is shut down.
However, a problem involving contractor control which was identified es a weakness during the previous assessment period persisted.
Plant operations, maintenance / surveillance, engineering / technical support, and safety assessment / quality verification were rated Category 2.
All except maintenance / surveillance were also rated 2 in the previous assessment period, and that functional area was rated as Category 3 improving. Although Deco showed several strengths in these areas such as a dedicated staff, response to events, maintenance outage planning, engineering support to operations, and problem identification, it also showed several weaknesses.
Some examples were untimely and/or inadequate implementation of corrective actions, and the less than adequate control of contractor activities noted above. Although this latter weakness has improved from the previous assessment period, further attention is required.
Security was rated Category 1 which is an improvement from the previous assessment period in which it was rated Category 1 declining.
The efforts to reverse the declining trend were manifested in improved performance.
However, additional scrutiny of tactical response training and related contingency drills is warranted.
Radiological controls was rated as Category 1 declining.
The performance in this area was not significantly different than in the previous assessment period, but overall it appeared to be slightly less effective.
DECO has a strong ALARA program in which it is changing all control rod blades and stellite containing valves to reduce radiation sources, and is retubing the condenser to improve water quality.
However, there also was a lack of contractor control which led to problems with the shipment of radioactive material and a neutron source.
Furthermore, there was a lack of timely and appropriate corrective action for unlocked high radiation doors.
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Emergency preparedness declined from a Category 1 to a Category 2.
Although the administration of the program remained essentially the same as in the previous assessment period, the demonstr:itions of your capability during the annual exercise and medical drill conducted early in this period were weak.
Although efforts were successful in correcting the initial medical drill weaknesses, additional weaknesses were identified in subsequent medical drills.
The performance ratings during the previous assessment period and this assessment period according to functional areas are given below:
Rating Last Rating This
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Functional Area Period
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Plant Operations
2 Radiological Controls
1 Declining Maintenance / Surveillance 3 Improving
2 Security 1 Declining-
Engineering / Technical Support
2 Safety Assessment / Quality Verification
2-B.
Other Areas of Interest None, III. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS The total number of inspection hours expended during the assessment period was 4471.
This total does not include operator license examiner hours, or hours expended by NRR staff.
The inspection hours attributed to each functional area are presented in the following paragraphs.
A.
Plant Operations 1.
Analysis Evaluation of this functional area was basea upon the results of nine routine inspections by the resident inspectors.
There were 1,523 inspection hours expended in this functional area comprising 34.1% of the total inspection hours expended during this assessment period.
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Staffing in the area of plant operations was good.
Long term shift staffing needs were addressed and were increased when four reactor operator candidates i
and twelve senior reactor operator candidates passed their initial licensing examinations. This was a 100% pass rate. One significant staffing improvement occurred early in the assessment period when the licensee permanently added another licensed control room operator to the standard shif t complement.
This contributed to better management of control room activities.
Midway through
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the assessment period, personnel in key management positions changed. All positions were filled with qualified personnel through in-house promotions.
As a result of staf fing the new position in the control room, of the key management changes, and of the failure of three of twelve operators on the requalification examinations, some minor strain was evident on the operations department and extra overtime had to be worked.
However, the overtime was controlled within Technical Specification (TS) limits, and no personnel errors were attributed to this temporary strain.
Management involvement in assuring quality was adequate.
Plant management kept informed of plant status and crew performance by attending daily control room plant status meetings and by direct involvement in planned major plant evolutions. A conservative and safety conscious approach was exhibited in overall power generation decisions.
The same approach was demonstrated in planning decay heat removal systems and electrical safety systems availability for refuel outage 2.
Numerous outages were undertaken to improve balance-of-plant material condition.
These actions reduced unwarranted challenges from the feedwater and turbine systems.
Removal of safety divisions from service for maintenance was properly integrated with other equipment out of service. Though complex, management's written administrative policies were generally well stated and defined.
The complexity, however, was a minor contributor to several performance errors during routine operations.
Operating procedures provided adequate direction for equipment manipulations.
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Shift team response to operational events was generally good.
Balance-of plant transients, the two unanticipated reactivity transients and unplanned engineered safety feature actuations and the one reactor scram from power were promptly and conservatively controlled by shift personnel.
The fire brigade responded quickly and effectively to fire alarms and indications of fire.
Non-routine, complex evolutions were well planned and properly executed. This was evident in the August 1990 power reduction coupled with single loop operation, the five reactor startups and three controlled shutdowns. All were accompl',shed with minimal operaticnal errors during this assessment period.
However, the April 10, 1990 scram revealed minor weaknesses in operator emergency training and in some shift actions to the event, During routine evolutions, TS operational constraints were followed.
Shift personnel continued to perform their duties in a professional manner and control room decorum was maintained at a high level.
Shift log keeping practices were usually satisfactory.
In general, shift turnovers and pre-evolution briefings were properly conducted.
Shif+ status meetings with chemistry and radiological personnel present were a strength.
However, there were three areas where execution of routine evolutions was weak. These were implementation of administrative controls (identified as a weakness in the previous two
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assessment periods); cognizance of equipment conditions; and quality of operator plant tours.
In the first case, throughout the assessment period operators repeatedly failed to comply with tagging and equipment status posting
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requirements and other administrative processes.
In the second case, on a number of occasions equipment performance discrepancies were not recognized by operators until pointed out by the NRC resident inspector staf f.
In the third case, during plant tours operators did not identify or correct numerous material control deficiencies that occurred from time to time such as ladders chained to safety-related piping and oil accumulations on/around diesel generators.
Enforcement history was adequate and reflected the three areas of weakness.
Plant housekeeping and combustible material control was generally good.
However, there were several instances of poor control such as during new fuel receipt activities on the refuel floor and in the residual heat removal (RHR)
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building. When deficiencies were identified, corrective action was promptly taken. Corrective action for refuel outage housekeeping deficiencies could not be evaluated because no refuel outage occurred this assessment period.
Overall, management's resolution of technical issues was adequate.
Management recognized performance shortcomings and established an adequate approach to correct them.
Some of these approaches were accountability meetings and formalized critiques for event-related situations. An excellent example of this was the second inadvertent closure of main steam isolation valves (MSIVs)
by operators in less than nine months.
In addition to attributing this event to " operator error," management conducted a control room man-machine interface operational review which resulted in additional human factors modifications to the MSIVs. Also because of management involvement, shift crew understanding of TS support systems, which was identified as a weakness in the previous assessment period, improved.
However, problems sometimes recurred due to instances of slow or poor implementation of corrective actions.
2.
Perfo.mance Rating The licensee's performance is rated Category 2.
The licensee's performance was rated Category 2 in the previous assessment period.
3.
Recommendations None.
B.
Radiological Controls 1.
Analysis Evaluation of this functional area was based on the results of four inspections by regional inspectors, a followup maintenance team inspection and observations by the resident inspectors.
There were 225 inspection hours expended in this functional area comprising 5% of the total inspection hours expended during this assessment period.
Enforcement-related performance was adequate except for circumstances surrounding a failure to make an adequate radiation survey on a radioactive material shipment package and for exceeding the regulatory radiation level limit
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on the bottom of the package.
There also was an unexpected neutron expcsure from processing startup sources for shipment.
This exposure was identified by the licensee's good practice of routinely processing all thermoluminescent J
dosimeter (TLD) badges for neutron exposure.
The two events were a significant concern because they involved weaknesses in communications and in poor management oversight of contractor activit'es.
They were well investigated by the licensee and strong corrective actions were implemented to correct the problems and prevent their recurrence.
Personnel qualifications and staffing in both the radiation protection and the chemistry groups continued to be good.
The continuing low turnover rate in both groups resulted in an increasing experience level.
Experience lost by the resignation of two professional health physicists (HPs) was of fset by reassignment of an experienced corporate HP and the planned hiring of two additional experienced HPs.
Subsequent to the assessment period, one new HP joined the as-low-as-reasonably-achievable (ALARA) group which the licensee recognized was understaffed.
However, the group was effective as evidenced by the continued low station cumulative radiation dose.
The technician training program was well implemented.
Management involvement in assuring quality in both the chemistry and radiation protection areas was generally good.
The laboratory quality assurance (QA)
program was well managed and properly implemented with good agreements for nonradiological chemistry comparisons with seven agreements in seven comparisons. The radiological environmental monitoring program was well managed and properly implemented. Owners group guidelines for water quality continued to be well implemented. Management support was evidenced by the plugging of condenser tubes and plans for changeout to titanium tubes which will help control radioactive material in plant systems through improved water quality.
The licensee effectively used the radiological awareness program to record, investigate, and implement corrective actions for identified radiological problems.
Management efforts in the area of ALARA were aggressive, generally proactive and resulted in an overall low cumulative worker dose.
Management commitment to minimize personnel exposures in the drywell was evidenced by the continued implementation of a slow reactor shutdown scheme that decreases the rate of crud buildup in the reactor vessel and associated piping.
Management continued its strong initiatives to reduce potential radiation sources. One example of this was the decision to replace all of the reactor control rod blades because they contain stellite.
This effort began in 1989 and is scheduled for completion during refuel outage 2 in the spring of 1991. Another example is that all valves containing stellite were identified, evaluated, and prioritizea for replacement.
Conversely, as noted above, management oversight of contractoc preparation of control rod blades and startup neutron source: for shipment was weak.
Also, actions taken to correct unsecured high radiation area door problems were not adequately prioritized or timely, resulting in other unsecured door occurrences.
The licensee's approach to the identification and resolution of technical
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issues was good. Total station dose in 1990, a non-refuel year, was low at
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about 85 person-rem; personnel contamination events were also low and there were no internal exposures, Radioactive gaseous and liquid effluents remained well within TS limits.
The licensee adequately addressed a weakness associated with eating and smoking litter identified within the radiological control area (RCA), and continued to reduce solid radwaste production through modifications
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to the condensate polisher demineralizers increasing the run time from a few days to approximately 15 days.
The licensee performed a thorough investigation of an apparent finding of I-131 in milk, concluding that the I-131 was most likely a false positive result from the vendor laboratory and not the result of Fermi 2 operations.
2.
Performance Rating The licensee's performance is rated Category 1 with a declining trend.
The licensee's performance was rated Category 1 in the previous assessment period.
3.
Recommendations None.
C.
Maintenance / Surveillance 1.
Analysis Evaluation of this functional area was based on the results of nine routine resident inspections with support from region based and headquarters inspectors on two occasions, two region based inspections and followup of maintenance team inspection weaknesses by a region based team.
There were 1,075 inspection hours expended in this functional area comprising 24% of the total inspection hours expended during this assessment period.
Key positions within the maintenance and surveillance areas were adequately defined and staffed.
Some personnel departed key maintenance supervisory
positions but management filled these vacancies with experienced, qualified personnel in a timely manner.
Also, a mere centralized planning unit was-established in March 1990.
These management and organizational changes contributed to performance improvements especially during plant outages.
Overtime guidelines were met and no performance weaknesses were attributed to lack of resources.
Training programs were clearly defined and vigorously implemented in the maintenance area.
This contributed to generally good craft performance.
In those few instances when field maintenance performance was weak, excellent feedback was provided to the training depaitment to improve the training in similar types of work.
Enforcement history improved significantly from the previous assessment period. Most violations were minor implementation errors. One significant violation was identified early in this assessment period.but the event actually occurred late in the previous assessment period.- That violation reflected a
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significant loss of management control of the contractors performing the reassembly of a turbine bypass valve.
Corrective actions were instituted but because there was little contractor involvement at Fermi for the remainder of the assessment period, the effectiveness of these actions could not be fully assessed.
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Operational events reflected positively upon the maintenance and surveillance area with none of the numerous plant outages being caused by maintenance inadequacies.
The only significant negative event occurred when the limiting condition for operation (LCO) for the hydrogen / oxygen analyzer expired because of poor coordination between maintenance and procurement personnel in obtaining spare parts for the system.
Preparations had begun to shut the plant down before the problem was resolved.
Management involvement to assure quality associated with surveillance activities was adequate and reflected improvement from the previous assessment period. The surveillance program was well defined, and procedures were generally adequate with only occasional, random technical inadequacies, implementation of the surveillance scheduling program was excellent, and no surveillances were missed.
Procedures generally were implemented properly and results dispositioned as required.
Management involvement to assure quality in a number of maintenance activities was evident and effective.
The preventative maintenance program continued to
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be implemented satisfactorily and deferrals were technically supported.
Non-outage corrective maintenance backlogs were reduced significantly.
The number of control room equipment deficiencies was adequately managed and was somewhat reduced during the second half of the assessment period.
Furthermore, management emphasis ensured that improperly alarming annunciators did not detract from operator cognizance of the facility and that unidentified plant leakage was significantly reduced.
A number of weak areas from the previous assessment period improved through management involvement.
Significant improvement was noted in planning, scheduling, managing the scope of emergent work and supervising work activities for plant outages, which were major program weaknesses from the last assessment period. Though these improvements have not been tested in a refuel outage, a demanding time for managing work activities, it was evident that the licensee was better prepared for the second refuel outage.
Increased maintenance support to security equipment improved the avaiiability of l
detection equipment. Maintenance related turnovers and briefings improved.
Improvements were also noted in the implementation of the lubrication program.
Conversely, there were other areas where management was not as ef fective.
The most significant of these dealt with safety system outages at power, which on numerous occasions were prolonged unnecessarily. This was caused in part by weaknesses in work package preparation, lack of appropriate tools at the Jobsite, and lack of spare parts.
Contractor control, a weakness from the previous assessment period, continued in this assessment period as demonstrated by problems identified during refuel floor activities.
Some less significant weaknesses were also evident in the content and periodicity of certain preventative maintenance tasks and minimal progress was made in reducing the number of jumpers and lif ted leads.
However, a strong jumper reduction program was planned for the second refuel outage.
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The licensee's approach to resolution of technical issues from a safety standpoint was generally adequate.
The substantive improvements to previous assessment period weaknesses reflected sound resolutions.
In response to the contractor control weaknesses an ambitious contractor indoctrination program
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J and licensee oversight network was established for the second refuel outage.
More rigorous goals were established near the end of the assessment period for safety system availability with some improvements noted on the first 'our systems selected. Also, corrective actions were effective in improving availability of tools at the job site, one contributor to the length of safety system outages.
2.
Performance Rating J
The licensee's performance is rated a Category 2.
The licensee's performance was rated Category 3 with an improving trend in the previous assessment period.
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3.
Recommendations None.
D.
Analysis Evaluation of this functional area was based on the results of two inspections conducted by region-based inspectors and observations made by resident inspectors. There were 116 inspection hours expended in this functional area comprising 2.6% of the total inspection hours expended during this assessment
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period.
Enforcement related performance remained good.
Management involvement in assuring quality and support of the emergency preparedness (EP) program was generally good.
For example, management made maintaining emergency response organization (ERO) qualification an individual responsibility and denied protected area access to those who were delinquent.
An automated callout system was implemented to reduce the time needed to notify ERO members However, numerous performance problems were noted in the annual exercise and in various medical drills.
The licensee's identification and resolution of technical issues from a safety standpoint was good and generally conservative.
In response to an emergency plan activation, the licensee conducted a post-activation review for the event to identify areas which could be improved.
Most items identified through this review as well as critiques of drills and exercises, internal and external audits were tracked and resolved in a timely manner.
Although a challenging scenario had been developed for the annual emergency preparedness exercise, implementation and performance were only fair.
This was caused in part by the overuse of simulation, such as not operating the ventilation system in the Technical Support Center (noise reduction) and in plant teams not employing self contained breathing apparatus, and by environmental sampling team performance.
The scenario itself was fast moving and involved most of the ERO.
Assembly and accountability were successfully
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e demonstrated; this resolved an exercise weakness from the prior year's exercise.
However, licensee personnel failed to appropriately classify the initiating event, although subsequent events were properly classified.
Problems were also observed with documentation of information in the Operation Support Center.
Scenario content and preparation, drill conduct, and player response activities during the medical drill, held the day following the exercise, were marginal. The event misclassification and medical drill problems were considered exercise weaknesses. As corrective action, the licensee revised procedures and conducted additional training and drills. The drills focused on medical response to contaminated injured personnel.
These efforts were successful in correcting the initial medical drill problems but additional problems related to handling contaminated and injured personnel were observed.
The licensee evaluated the lessons learned from these drills and initiated corrective actions.
The licensee's response to operational events was good.
The one emergency plan activation event was properly classified as an unusual event, with timely notification to state, county, and NRC officials.
Staffing of the emergency preparedness group was good and included personnel with varied expertise.
During the assessment period, two new persons with considerable plant experience were assigned to the EP group to replace two individuals who were reassigned to other responsibilities.
Staffing of the ERO was good. The licensee generally had at least three individuals qualified for each ERO position.
The licensee's selection and training process ensured that the ERO remained staffed with trained individuals.
The emergency preparedness trainins program was generally well implemented.
During this assessment period, the licensee improved the emergency plan training program by consolidating several courses.
Most of these courses were also changed from an individual instruction format to a formal classroom presentation.
Lessons learned through drills, exercises, and actual events were incorporated into the training program.
However, the number of first aid trained individuals limited the licensee's backshift medical response capabilities.
Also, the limited practical training provided to emergency environmental sampling team members was evident in the weak drill performance.
2.
performance Rating The licensee's performance is rated a Category 2.
The licensee's performance was rated a Category 1 in the previous assessment period.
3.
Recommendations None.
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E.
Security 1.
Analysi s Evaluation of this functional area was based on the results of four inspections performed by region-based inspectors and observations made by the resident inspectors. There were 145 inspection hours expended in this functional area comprising 3.2% of the total inspection hours expended during this assessment period.
Enforcement-related performance was adequete.
Management involvement to assure quality of the security program was excellent.
The Nuclear Security Compliance Section within the Nuclear Security Department (NSD) performed well in assuring thf t regulatory commitments were met and security procedures were consistent with security plan requirements.
A key element of this program was the comprehensive management review of findings and determination of root causes.
Remedial corrective actions were also reviewed to determine if they were sufficient and prevented recurrence.
This process was particularly effective in identifying and correcting enforcement issues and programmatic weaknesses.
Staff operating procedures were comprehensive in scope and provided detailed guidance to security personnel.
Aggressive management actions resolved the marginally acceptable maintenance support concern identified during the previous assessment period. The quality of licensing related activities, such as security plan changes, was excellent.
The lack of attention to detail in licensing matters, identified during the last assessment period, was adequately addressed.
The approach to the identification and resolution of technical issues was generally good.
A thorough technical evaluation of the closed-circuit television (CCTV) system was performed, which resulted in the procurement and installation of an improved system.
However, the investigation by NSD of three potential tampering incidents was untimely because of the lack of prompt coordination / communication by plant operations with NSD.
Eventually all three incidents were thoroughly investigated by NSD, Security reporting and logging was conservative.
One security event required
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telephone notification to the NRC.
Initially, the event was not properly evaluated and resulted in delayed compensatory measures and a late 10 CFR 73.71 report.
Staffing continued to be a major strength of the security program.
Section managers displayed a high degree of dedication, professionalism, and technical knowledge. Day-to-day supervision of the guard force continued to be strong and 4.ggressive.
The security force training and qualification program continued to be ef fective; however, a program implementation weakress was identified in the area of tactical response training and related con'.ingency drills.
Corrective actions to address this weakness were delayed unt'l the supervisory position, which was vacated late in the assessment period, is filled.
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performane_e_ Rating
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The licensee's performance is rated Category 1.
The licensee's performance was rated Category 1 with a declining trend in the previous assessment period.
3.
Recommendations None.
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F.
Engineering / Technical Support 1.
Analysis
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Evaluation of this functional area was based on routine inspections, operator licensing examinations, and interactions between the licensee and the staff of NRR. There were 324 inspection hours charged to this functional area. An additional six person-weeks of NRC contractor effort were expended in evaluating aspects of the Engineering / Technical Support functional area.
Enforcement history was good.
Management involvement to assure quality improved as the assessment period progrcssed, but weaknesses persisted.
Positive involvement was apparent as exemplified by good reactor engineering support to operations and implementation of the anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) modifications. Positive management involvement improved the configuration control / drawing control program, although weaknesses were evident in secondary containment design information.
Engineering support for forced and system maintenance outages was poor at the beginning of the assessment period but was adequate by the end of the assessment period.
This improved performance can be partially attributed to improved interdepartmental communications.
However, significant slippage in the scheduled completion of the simulator upgrade project occurred.
Weaknesses were apparent in the administration of the initial operator and requalification training programs.
Operator training included inappropriate delineation of abnormal operating procedure immediate actions and inadequate training on the use of the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system in emergency conditions.
The requalification written question bank and the job performance measures (JPM) test bank contained several examples of incorrect or multiple correct answers. Many ouestions needed-to be revised in order to properly test operator analysis and comprehension skills.
In addition, JPM tect questions were not sufficiently task-oriented, A near compromise of an examination by a training instructor occurred late in the assessment period.
The licensee's approach to the resolution and identification of technical issues was mixed. On the positive side, strong, timely corrective actions were taken regarding the following issues: weak engineering review of-procurement documents; inadequate analysis and disposition of motor operated valve diagnostic test results; concerns regarding standby liquid control system operability; weaknesses in maintaining primary containment integrity during sampling evolutions, and weak training in operator emergency actions.
The actions to l
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evaluate unplanned engineered safety feature actuations induced by relay failures and to deal with zebra mussel infestation were timely and effective.
As-built drawing condition concerns from the previous assessment period were resolved through the implementation of the results of walkdowns of several
.ystems. With regard to the fatigue induced failures in the RHR small bore piping, the licensee's analysis and modification efforts were appropriate; however, its initial efforts did not adequately scope the problem, and the licensee was slow to appreciate the safety significance of the issue.
Weaknesses associated with the implementation phase of the temporary modification program were slow to be resolved.
Degrading equipment trends identified frcm preventive maintenance, corrective maintenance, and testing were not evaluated to ensure timely corrective actions were implemented.
Poor and untimely resolution of balance-of plant design deficiencies significantly contributed to four plant outages and a 62,000 gallon feedwater spill in the turbine building. Weak technical evaluations during either the design change or operating experience review process coritributed to both of the automatic scrams during this assessment period.
Unplanned engineered safety feature actuations occurred prior to implementation of effective corrective actions for som^ design weaknesses.
Staffing within the engineering department was adequate.
Substantial engineering work responsibilities were transferred from an architect-engineer to the licensee with no apparent reduction in engineering effectiveness.
Key positions in the organization were adequately defined and filled.
Staffing in the training organization was also adequate except in the licensed operator requalification area.
Strained resources in this area contributed to the weaknesses identified in the requalification training program discussed above.
In addition, resources were further strained during the assessment period subsequent to the exam with the loss of two individuals in key training positions. These positions were subsequently filled.
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performance Rating The licensee's performance is rated Category 2.
The licensee's performance was rated Category 2 in the previous assessment period.
3.
Recommendations None.
G.
Safety Assessment / Quality Verification 1.
Analysis Evaluation of this functional area was based on routine resident inspections and on region based inspection.
The activities examined included the Quality Assurance (QA) groups, the onsite and offsite review functions, and the licensee's internal corrective action program.
There were 1063 inspection hours expended in this functional area comprising 23.8% of the total inspection hours expended during the assessment period.
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P Enforcement history significantly improved; no violations were issued.
A substantial amount of resources were applied to almost all the quality assessment groups. The QA/ Quality Control (QC) groups were well staffed and well utilized for surveillances and associated audits were of high quality.
For example, the licensee committed greater than 1000 hours0.0116 days <br />0.278 hours <br />0.00165 weeks <br />3.805e-4 months <br /> to perform audits during the assessment period in an effort to determine the effectiveness of the plant's self-assessment groups and activities.
The plant safety group, which coordinated and reviewed the internal corrective action system, was well I
staf fed and contributed to a substantial reduction in outstanding corrective action reports. Attendance at offsite and onsite review committee meetings was well above minimum requirements.
The only indication of resource strain was in the Independent Safety Engineering Group (ISEG) due to the large number of documents reviewed, Personnel were generally well qualified for their duties. All QA groups had well trained personnel and conducted performance based audits.
The leadership and root cause analysis programs continued to expand with 150 and 300 persons, respectively, receiving training, qualification, or requalification.
One performance based audit of particular note was an emergency operating procedure (EOP) audit in which the operations personnel walked through E0P activities and identified several significant findings.
In addition, the Quality Program Assurance group exchanged auditors with other utilities to obtain additional expertise for inspections in certain areas. A well qualified review team conducted a safety system functional inspection (SSFI) on the control room ventilation system and identified a design deficiency.
Management involvement in the assurance of quality continued to be evident and effective in a number of the licensee's independent quality oversight activities.
The Nuclear Safety Review Gro v (NSAG) was well organized, reviewed QA audits and performed excellent assessments of the plant.
Plant management was responsive in implementing NSRG recommendations.
The NSRG/ISEG continued its rating process for safety evaluation reports.
Self-evaluations, the SSFI, and monthly human performance evaluation investigations were thorough and of high quality. Also, a recent QA initiative for evaluating plant groups was implemented to ensure that plant personnel continued to strive to improve their performance. Overall, good foll uup of oversight committees' findings and observations were performed to ensure corrective actions were implemented, except for findings and observations identified by ISEG, where a significant portion of the findings was not actively monitored.
Management involvement was noted in reducing the internal corrective actions backlog, in the review of vendor information, and in reducing personnel errors, all of which were weaknesses in the previous assessment period.
For example, requests for corrective action implementation extensions were more closely scrutinized with fewer extensions approved.
Fewer corrective action extensions contributed to a reduction in the number of outstanding corrective action reports and the length of time a corrective action remained outstanding. These reductions (
were accomplished without increasing the threshold for initiating a corrective action report. Also, only one licensee event report was attributed to personnel error, f
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On the other hand, management oversight has not yet been fully effective in reducing previous problems with compliance with administrative procedures and operator cognizance of plant equipment status as discussed in the plant operations functional area. lhe occasionally ineffective, untimely resolution to technical issues captured by the deviation event report (DER) process, also persisted in this assessment period.
Several plant events could have been prevented if equipment and design deficiencies had been resolved in a timely manner.
During the assessment period the licensee improved the quality of its licensing submittals in response to weaknesses identified in the last assessment period.
This aided the NRC staff in processing a large number of licensing issues, greatly reducing the licensing backlog for the facility.
Except in isolated cases, license amendment requests were prioritized according to importance and safety. Though improved, some weaknesses were present as seen in untimely inservice test relief request submittals and issuing TS changes to the control room without the accompanying revised surveillance procedures on two occasions, 2.
Performance Rating The licensee's performance is rated Category 2, The licensee's performance was rated Category 2 in the previous assessment period.
3.
Recommendations None, s
IV.
SUPPORTING DATA AND SUMMARIES A.
Major Licensee Activities 1.
On April 10, 1990, a reactor protection system (RPS) motor generator tripped causing a loss of power to that portion of the RPS and partial isolation of the drywell. - The nitrogen supply to the MSIVs was one of the isolated drywell systems and this coupled with a slow nitrogen leak caused the MSIVs to drift closed resulting in a reactor serem.
The unit returned to 100 percent power af ter a short forced outage.
2.
On June 27, 1990, the licensee reduced power to 50 percent to repair a condenser tube leak followed by a shut down on July 1,_1990, to perform repairs on the feedwater/ extraction steam system and the No. 3 north feedwater heater tubes.
The outage was completed on July 5,1990, and the unit reached 100 percent power on July 15, 1990.
3.
Between August 25, and September 11, 1990, contractors received an unplanned neutron dose while processing control rod blades, neutron startup sources, and local power range monitor strings.
The unplanned dose emanated from the neutron sources which had been erroneously calculated to be depleted.
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4.
On September 17,1990, the licensee--improperly shipped a box of radioactive materials with external readings of-380 mrem /hr in evrass of the regulatory
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limit-(200 mrem /hr) due to an inadequate radiation survey of the box.
5.
-On September 28, 1990,-the licensee shut down the reactor for a short maintenance outage to troubleshoot possible feedwater heater and condenser tube leaks. The outage was complete 0 on October 5,1990 - On October 6, 1990, while the unit was in startup at 30 psig, a reactor scram occurred due to a low reactor water level-condition.
Incomplete filling of the i
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-common reference legs for the level int'rumentation resulted in inconsistent reactor water level indication which led to the reictar scram.
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6.
On November 26,-;990, the licensee shut down the rcactor due to excessive main turbine generator vibration which had significantly,incriased
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throughout November-1990. The, licensee removed the fourC4 stage blading of
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the No. 3 low pressure turbine and installed pressure plates for the-missing fourth and ~ fif th stage blading.
The unit was restarted on-
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January 1, 1991.
B.
Major Direct Inspection and Review Activities 1.
Inspection Data Twenty-three inspection reports are discussed in this SALP 12-report
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(January 1,1990,- through = February 28, 1991)-and'are listed below.
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Facility:
Fermi-2 Nuclear Plant
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Docket No.:
50-341 Inspection Report Nos.:
90002 through 90015, 90017 through 90021, and 91003 through 91006 2.
Significant Inspection Summary l
Significant inspections performed during this SALP 12 assessment period-are listed below:
a, From February 12-16, 1390, an Emergency Preparedness team inspection was conducted of the Fermi.2 Nuclear Plant's emergency exercise.
(Inspection Report No. 341/90003)-
b.
-During routine inspectionJactivities,from-March 31 to May 25, 1990, the resident inspectors identified thatithe work control process and the-control of contractors was inadequate with regard to maintenance activities-on-a turbine bypass. valve.
(Inspection Report No. 341/90007)
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c.
-During routine' inspection activities f' rom August 20 through October 19, 19?0, the resident inspectors' determined that licensed operators were nci adequatesy cognizant of plant equipment status nor in complidnce with some admi-istrative: controls.
(Inspection Report-No-341/90013)
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d.
From October 1-5, 1990, a team inspection was conducted to follow up on those areas identified as poor in the November 1989 Maintenance Team Inspection (MTI).
Improvements were identified in work planning, supervisor command and control, and interdepartmental communications.
(Inspection Repor' No. 341/90014)
e.
From October 22-26, 1990, a routine safety inspection was conducted which reviewed the problems related to rsdioactive shipments. Poor communications and inadequate licensee management control of contractor activities were identified.
(Inspection Report No. 341/90018)
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