IR 05000335/1990018
| ML17223A956 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 09/14/1990 |
| From: | Crlenjak R, Elrod S, Michael Scott NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17223A955 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-335-90-18, 50-389-90-18, NUDOCS 9010020195 | |
| Download: ML17223A956 (19) | |
Text
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+P*deW UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, Nfl.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos:
50-335/90-18 AND 50-389/90-18 Licensee:
Florida Power 5 Light Co 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33102 Docket Nose I 50-335 and 50-389 P
Faci l ity Name:
St. Lucie 1 and
License Nos.:
DPR-67 and NPF-16 Inspection Conducted:
July 24 - August 20, 1990 Inspectors:
. A.
'rod, enior Resident Inspector
\\
1.
.
cott, Resi ent nspector g
Approved By:
7I'Uf/.
xu <cali>
R.
V. Crlenjak, Section Chief Division of Reactor Projects Da e
gned a
e g
e
/ /Y ~iG D te igned SUMMARY Scope:
This routine resident inspection was conducted onsite in the areas of plant operations review, maintenance observations, surveillance observations, review of plant changes, review of nonroutine events, and follow-up of previous inspection findings.
Results:
The licensee utilized this inspection period to perform major repairs on both units.
Unit 1 performed the final reassembly of a RCP and Unit 2 ended the period performing main turbine generator work.
As indicated in the outage section of this report, the licensee demonstrated overall good performance during the complex Unit
RCP repair.
Within the areas inspected, the following noncited violation was identified:
NCV 335/90-18-01, Failure to Install Instrumentation In Accordance With Design Mounting Details, paragraph 6.
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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees D. Sager, St. Lucie Site Vice President
- G. Boissy, Plant Manager
- J.
Barrow, Operations Superintendent J.
Barrow, Fire Prevention Coordinator
- R. Church, Independent Safety Engineering Group H. Buchanan, Health Physics Supervisor
- C. Burton, Operations Supervisor C. Crider, Outage Supervisor D. Culpepper, Site Juno Engineering Manager
- R. Dawson, Maintenance Superintendent
- R. Englmeier, guality Assurance Superintendent
- R. Frechette, Chemistry Supervisor
- C. Leppla, ISC Supervisor
- G. Madden, Plant Licensing Engineer
- L. NcLaughlin, Plant licersing Superintendent L. Rogers, Electrical Maintenance Supervisor N. Roos, Services Manager
- D. West, Technical Staff Supervisor J.
West, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor W. White, Security Supervisor-G.
Wood, Reliability and Support Supervisor
.
" E. Wunderlich, Reactor Engineering Supervisor Chairman Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.
2.
Review of Plant Operations (71707)
Unit
began the inspection period in an outage to repair the 1A1 RCP, whose high vibration and excessive seal leakage had forced a unit shutdown.
The unit was returned to power on August 4 - within one day of the projection, and ended the inspection period at power.
Unit 2 began the inspection period at power but was shut down on August ll, due to excessive turbine generator shaft vibration at the number nine bearing located at the exciter.
The shutdown was normal and the unit was restarted on August 18, following repairs.
By the morning of August 20,
vibration had increased and was unaffected by a power reduction.
The unit was subsequently shut down for further root cause analysis and repair.
a 0 Plant Tours b.
The inspectors periodically conducted plant tours to verify that monitoring equipment was recording as required, equipment was properly tagged, operations personnel were aware of plant conditions, and plant housekeeping efforts were adequate.
The inspectors also determined that appropriate radiation controls were prope'rly established, critical clean areas were being controlled in accordance with procedures, excess equipment or material was stored properly and combustible materials and debris were disposed of expeditiously.
During tours, the inspectors looked for the existence of unusual fluid leaks, piping vibrations, pipe hanger and seismic restraint settings, various valve and breaker positions, equipment caution and danger tags, component positions, adequacy of fire fighting equipment, and instrument calibration dates.
Some tours were conducted on backshifts.
The frequency of plant tours and control room visits by site management was noted to be adequate.
The inspectors routinely conducted partial walkdowns of ESF, ECCS and support systems.
Valve, breaker, and switch lineups and equipment conditions were randomly verified both locally and in the control room.
The following accessible-area ESF system walkdowns were made to verify that system lineups were in accordance with licensee requirements for operability and equipment material conditions were satisfactory:
Unit
ICW platform; Unit
CCW platform; Unit
Containment; and Unit 2'AFW/NSIV areas.
Plant Operations Review The inspectors periodically reviewed shift logs and operations records, including data sheets, instrument traces, and records of equipment malfunctions.
This review included control room logs and auxiliary logs, operating orders, standing orders, jumper logs and equipment tagout records.
The inspectors routinely=observed operator alertness and demeanor during plant tours.
They observed and evaluated control room staffing, control room access, and operator, performance during routine operations.
The inspectors conducted random off-hours inspections to assure that operations and security.
performance remained at acceptable levels.
Shift turnovers were observed to verify that they were conducted in accordance
.with approved licensee procedures.
Control room annunciator status was verified.
Except as noted below, no deficiencies were observed.
During this inspection period, the inspectors reviewed the following tagout (clearance):
1-4-8 containment spray isolation header
"A" valve, MV 07-3B.
The inspectors reviewed quality assurance activities and findings
.
concerning control room operations to determine if the objectives were being met.
The following activities were reviewed:
Performance Monitoring Report - June, QSL-OPS-90-746, issued July 3, 1990; Performance Monitoring Report - July, QSL-OPS-90-751, issued August 9, 1990; Quality Assurance Audit Report, QSL-OPS-90-736, Document Control, issued May 10, 1990; and Quality Assurance Audit Report, QSL-OPS-90-745, Corrective Action Program, issued July 10, 1990.
The above reports covered areas of regulatory'oncern and had substantive findings.
The performance monitoring reports covered many real-time operational activities.
These quality program reports effectively identified areas for improvement and have the potential to positively impact plant safety when corrective actions are implemented.
The posting of required notices to workers was reviewed and found to acceptable.
At the end of the Unit 1 refueling outage, the 1A CCW pump/motor vibration increased.
After A'CW header fill and venting of the replacement A'rain containment coolers, the 1A CCW pump vibration was about 5 mils, total displacement.
It had been less than 2 mils prior to the outage.
No pump or motor work had been performed.
The increased vibration was initially attributed to venting problems and high flow conditions with the SDC coolers in operation.
Following the cessation of SDC and after multiple ventings, the pump was declared operable based on satisfactory ASME Code Section XI testing and other site and corporate staff reviews.
During the recent short-notice outage to repair the 1A1 RCP, the licensee had the 1A CCW pump motor disassembled and inspected based on the licensee's Reliability and Support Group's recommendation.
This recommendation was based on the group's more analytic evaluation using discreet vibration techniques.
No motor problems were found, which resulted in a decision to disassemble and inspect the pump.
The licensee's pump inspection revealed three adverse conditions:
The impeller was eroded and had cavitation pitting.
The erosion and cavitation were postulated to be due to improper venting
and/or higher-than-normal flow rates while supplying both CCW headers with one pump during outages.
The erosion had caused two holes in the impeller vanes.
Two foreign objects, a grinding wheel and a flapper wheel, were lodged in the impeller.
The flapper wheel consisted of loose sheets of grit attached to a central spinning hub and would be used to clean up worked metal areas such as weld zones.
The wheels were thought to have entered the open CCW system during the replacement of the four containment coolers this past refueling outage.
The driver side shaft sleeve was loose on the shaft.
The shaft sleeve, which was replaced with the impeller, was thought to have been incorrectly installed when the pump was overhauled several outages ago.
The licensee was considering the following long term corrective actions:
Boroscopic examination of the
"B" and
"C" CCW pumps for debris at their next availability; these pumps did not display any imbalance during this inspection period.
Review of the correlation between the venting procedure and the system configuration for potential procedure changes.
Review of operating procedures for potential changes regarding pump run out such as when one pump would supply two headers.
Evaluation of using pump strainers to prevent debris damage after work involving system entry.
During the Unit 2 turbine generator vibration shutdown, the "D" vital power inverter, which normally supplied the
"D" channels of RPS, AFAS, and ESFAS, was found with degraded performance such that the output frequency rose from 60 Hz to 62 Hz.
Priority lA NPWO 5268/62 was written to address the problem but was not worked imoediately.
The following day, a nonlicensed operator noted that the output voltage had risen from a
nominal 120 V to 140 V.
This condition persisted another day until electrical technicians began inverter maintenance.
The licensee responded to the inverter malfunction within the two days allowed for a 1A priority NPWO, but slower than appropriate for the circumstances.
Sometime after the "D" inverter output voltage rise, RPS channel
"D",
located in the control room, blew a fuse.
The operations staff, not connecting the two events, issued a
NPWO for I&C to trouble shoot the fuse problem.
A NPS overheard the electrical technician discussing the inverter high voltage, made the correlation between the inverter high output and the blown RPS channel fuse, and ordered the bypassing
of the "D" channel of RPS, AFAS, and ESFAS while the "0" inverter was removed from service and the protective cabinets'ower source was manually switched to a vital NCC.
The licensee evaluated the extent of the problem and took corrective action to repair the inverter and assess the potential protective cabinet damage.
The ISC Department found that a failed power supply in the
"D" RPS channel had caused the blown fuse.
Prior to this
.
inverter failure, the electrical department had planned to examine the Unit 2 inverter internals for signs of aging and replace parts or cards in accordance with the inverter vendor manual.
Close examination of the "0" inverter existing condition revealed signs of aging and indicated that this planned action was appropriate.
The licensee was evaluating procedure revisions or alarm modifications that would ensure prompt action on inverter related problems.
c.
Technical Specification Compliance Licensee compliance with selected TS LCOs was verified.
This.
included the review of selected surveillance test results.
These verifications were accomplished by direct observation of monitoring instrumentation, valve positions, and switch positions, and by review of completed logs and records.
Instrumentation and recorder traces were observed for abnormalities.
The licensee's compliance with LCO action statements was reviewed on selected occurrences as they happened.
The inspectors verified that related plant procedures in use were adequate, complete, and included the most recent revisions.
d.
Physical Protection The inspectors verified by observation during routine activities that security program plans were being implemented as evidenced by: proper display of picture badges; searching of packages and personnel at the plant entrance; and vital area portals being locked and alarmed.
As a result of the routine plant tours and operational observations described above, the inspectors determined that the plant and system material conditions were being adequately maintained.
The slow review of the inverter malfunction did not actually cause a plant problem.
3.
Surveillance Observations (61726)
Various plant operations were verified to comply with selected TS requirements.
Typical of these were confirmation of TS compliance for reactor coolant chemistry, RWT conditions, containment pressure, control room ventilation and AC and DC electrical sources.
The inspectors verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated, LCOs were met, removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished properly, test results met requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directi ng the test, and that any deficiencies identified
during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
The following surveillance tests were observed:
OP 2-0110050, Rev 9, Control Element Periodic Exercise; 18C 2-00110068, Rev 2,
Six Month Operational CEA Block Circuit Functional Test; OP 2-0700050, Rev 17, Auxiliary Feedwater Periodic Test; and OP 1-2200050, Rev 40, Emergency Diesel Generator Periodic Test and General Instructions.
The licensee tested steam-driven AFW pump 2C per OP 2-0700050, Rev 17, Auxiliary Feedwater Periodic Test.
Unit
had been shut down for approximately a week and the plant was being maintained hot by operating the "B" loop RCPs.
Thus, the "A" SG and associated piping were relatively cooler and water had condensed in the steam lines.
An "A" loop RCP was started to provide additional heat and steam for the 2C AFW pump test.
When the test started, the "B" steam supply was opened, the pump started, and it operated normally.
While waiting for AFW pump oil temperature to stabilize, operators opened a
steam admission valve from the
"A" main steam line to the pump as part of a separate valve stroke time test procedure.
The 2C AFW pump immediately tripped on overspe'ed.
Since either or both steam supplies could be opened automatically, this was unanticipated.
The event could not be repeated.
Licensee investigation determined that the main steam line drains were closed and a water slug from the steam line had entered the turbine and caused the overspeed.
They found that operating procedures were focused on shutting down to cold or starting up from cold, not shutting down to hot standby and staying there.
A temporary procedure cha'nge was issued to open the drains for the existing condition.
Additional permanent unit shutdown procedure steps were to be added to open the main steam line drains to prevent moisture collection in the lines.
The inspectors determined that the above surveillances were performed properly.
4.
Maintenance Observation (62703)
Station maintenance activities involving selected safety-related systems and components were observed/reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with requirements.
The following items were considered during this review:
LCOs, were met; activities were accomplished using approved procedures; functional tests and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; and radiological control's were implemented as required.
Work requests were reviewed to determine the status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority was assigned to
safety-rel ated equipment.
activities were observed:
\\
Portions of the following maintenance PWOs 7735/70, 7177/61, and 7255/61 worked the 1A1 RCP repair (see outage activities below);
PWO 7175/61 replaced/
reworked instrument mounts in the containment during the outage (see plant changes below);
PWOs 2766/61 and 5897/61 worked the 1A CCW pump (see paragraph
above);
PWO 5268/62 worked the 2D vital 120 volt inverter (see paragraph
above);
and PWO 6335/62 worked the electronics for CEA 56.
The above PWOs were, for the parts of the evolutions observed, performed within. in the applicable site work control procedures and within regulatory parameters.
CEA 56 failed to respond to a group withdrawal signal during the Unit 2 initial startup attempt on August 17.
Attempts to clear the CEA control and operation in individual mode were not successful.
ILC troubleshot the controls and found a coil driver card with two failed computer chips.
The chips would not pass two phases of power to driver coils that provide CEA motive power.
The chips were properly diagnosed and replaced within an hour, allowing startup preparations to resume.
The inspectors found that the above work was carried out effectively.
5.
Outage Activities (62703)
The inspectors observed the following SHOW activity during the ongoing Unit 1 outage:
As discussed in HRC report 50-335,389/90-16 (section 2), Unit 1 was shut down to repair the 1A1 RCP, which had high vibration indications and excessive seal leakoff.
During the pump overhaul, the licensee had:
replaced the pump impeller, pump shaft, and hydrostatic bearing with the used assembly removed from the 281 RCP during the last Unit 2 refueling outage; installed a
new 1A1 pump cover and other peripheral parts; and contracted the services of the RCP vendor, Byron Jackson, and another company experienced in RCP repair, Babcock and Wilco The licensee had expended considerable resources attempting to correct the pump's problems and adequately
'reassemble it.
Because of the complexity of the pump reassembly task and the degree of dimensional configuration control required during each work phase or major step, the licensee appropriately required:
meetings with the vendor, review of work accomplishments, and coordination between trades and various support groups.
As expected, because of the complexities discussed above, some degree of rework was required.
In the area of procedure preparation and specific job preplanning, more attention could have been paid to detail.
This is considered a minor comment in light of the job scope.
On multiple occasions, the reassembly procedure required changes due to the as-found condition being different than anticipated and/or the vendor requirements being changed based on inspection results.
The licensee planned to incorporate lessons learned for future RCP work.
HP aspects of the RCP repair were challenging and well controlled overall.
The several minor inspector comments were quickly resolved by the HP staff.
Three highly radioactive pump pieces were located inside containment during this work, the RCS was open at the pump casing, and divers conducted underwater disassembly operations in the refueling canal.
The highly radioactive pieces by themselves represented a great potential for overexposure of workers during handling; none occurred
'due to good overall practices.
Some foreign material from the internal rubbing of the pump parts was found in the RCS and on the pump parts themselves.
Cleanup and 'verification of cleanness included a
number of radiologically significant actions; HP control of this work was good.
As stated above, the utility has demonstrated that they could organize to resolve complex problems with no simple solutions and return the plant to an operable condition.
Design, Design Changes,,and Modifications (37700/37878)
The inspectors reviewed the following modifications with regard to plant implementation:
PCM 150-190D, Unit 1 Waste Gas System - Sampling System, pump bypass option PCM 128-190D, Unit 1 Waste Gas Analyzer Oxygen Analyzer Replacement PCM 137-190, Containment Rosemount Transmitter Mounting Details The above waste gas PCMs were reviewed to assess plant impact.
The licensee had determined that the system had not worked as well as anticipated since construction and had selected the system for special upgrading emphasis.
The above PCMs were a part of this effort.
Review of the PCMs showed that the modifications improved system reliability in that:
( 1) waste gas could subsequently be processed on a part time basis
without needing the gas compressors and (2) oxygen analyzer reliability had been improved.
The Rosemount mounting detail PCM corrected a
long-standing Uni.t
condition where safety-related or seismic instrumentation mounting details for changes or replacements remained a construction sketch vice being converted to a plant drawing.
Years later, plant staff members were not always able to find these details.
The inspector found Unit 1 instruments FT-07-3 and LT-07-6 mis-mounted compared to PCM 061-190D and found a
number of transmitters that had fewer nuts than required.
Analysis showed a high confidence level that the installations, while not completely correct, would function.
The engineering department and the ISC shop collaborated to produce a
PCM to show all the authorized mounting configurations and to detail essential element equivalents such as lock washers, lock nuts, etc.
The PCM also l.isted which plant drawings will contain the information when issued.
Records show that the shop then quickly restored the instrumentation to plan prior to Unit 1 startup from the lA1 RCP outage.
Failure to install seismic, quality related instrumentation in accordance with installation details is a violation of
CFR 50, Appendix B,
Criterion V; Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings; and is identified as NCV 335/90-18-01.
This NRC-identified violation is not being cited because criteria specified in Section V.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy were satisfied.
As demonstrated above, the inspectors found that the plant management had taken steps to improve overall plant reliability.
Onsite Followup of Events (Units 1 and 2)(93702)
Nonroutine plant events were reviewed to determine the need for further or continued NRC response, to determine whether corrective actions appeared appropriate, and to determine that TS were being met and that the public health and safety received primary consideration.
Potential generic impact and trend detection were also considered.
During this inspection period, Unit 2 conducted two orderly shutdowns to repair the exciter end of the main turbine generator.
No requirements were observed to be violated during these well controlled evolutions.
Followup of Post-TMI Action Items (92701)
(Closed - Unit 1)
TMI Item II.K.3.5.b, BIO Task Force - Auto Trip of RCPs, Modifications.
This subject was discussed in detail in IR 335,389/90-16 dated August 16, 1990.
The discussion applied to both Unit 1 and Unit 2 but characterized the subject as being closed for Unit 2.
The subject is also closed for Unit Followup of Corrective Actions for Violations and Deviations (Units 1 and 2)(92702)
(Closed - Unit 1) VIO 335/90-14-01, Failure to Follow a Test Procedure.
FPL letter L-90-291, dated August 9, 1990, responded to this Notice of Violation.
The violation involved performing a test in a manner not described in the approved test procedure.
Licensee evaluation concluded that.the violation resulted from a personnel error in not initiating a procedure change to incorporate desired changes.
The personnel error was addressed by counseling and reminders to the staff to follow procedures.
The test procedure involved, OP 1-0120051, Rev 10, RCS Flow Determination by Calorimetric Procedure, was revised on August 8, 1990, to correct the data collection instructions.
The inspector found Rev 11 adequate for its purpose though further human factors revision opportunities were pointed out to the licensee's staff for consideration.
This item is closed.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August 24, 1990, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed below.'roprietary material is not contained in this report.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
Item Number Status 335/90-14-01 Closed Description and Reference VIO - Failure to Follow a Test Procedure, paragraph 9.
335/89-18-01 Open NCV - Failure to Install Instrumentation In Accordance With Design Mounting Details, paragraph 6.
Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Initialisms A
AB ABB AC ACTM ADV A/E AFAS AFW ALARA ANPO ANPS ANSI AP Ampere(s)
Auxiliary Building ASEA Brown Boveri (company)
Alternating Current Automatic CEA Timing Module Atmospheric Dump Valve Architect/Engineer Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation System Auxiliary Feedwater (system)
As Low as Reasonably Achievable (radiation exposure)
Auxiliary Nuclear Plant [unlicensedj Operator Assistant Nuclear Plant Supervisor American National Standards Institute Administrative Procedure
ASME Code ATI ATWS B80 BCS BQAP CAR CCW CE CEA CEDM CEDMCS CET CFR CIAS CIS CRAC CRT CS CST CT CVCS CWD CWO DC DCN DCRDR DDPS DEH DEV DPR ECC ECCS EDG ENS EOP EPA EPRI ERDADS ESF ESFAS F
FCV FI FIS FPL FRG FSAR FT Pressure s Inc.)
)
cense)
American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Vessel Code Automatic Test Instrument (in the ESF cabinets)
Anticipated Transient Without Scram (NRCj Bulletins and Orders (Task Force)
Backfit Construction Sketch Backfit guality Assurance Procedure (EBASCO Service Corrective Action Request Component Cooling Water Combustion Engineering (company)
Control Element Assembly Control Element Drive Mechanism Control Element Drive Mechanism Control System Core Exit Thermocouple Code of Federal Regulations Conta'inment Isolation Actuation Signal Containment Isolation System Control Room Auxiliary Control {panel)
Cathode Ray Tube Containment Spray
{system)
Condensate Storage Tank Current Transformer Chemical 5 Volume Control System Control Wiring Diagram Construction Work Order Direct Current Design Change Notice Detailed Control Room Design Review Digital Data Processing System Digital Electro-Hydraulic (turbine control system)
Deviation (from Codes, Standards, Commitments, etc.
Demonstration Power Reactor (A type of operating li Estimated Critical Position Emergency Core Cooling System Emergency Diesel Generator Emergency Notification System Emergency Operating Procedure Environmental Protection Agency Electric Power Research Institute Emergency Response Data Acquisition Display System Engineered Safety Feature Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Fahrenheit Flow Control Valve Flow Indicator Flow Indicator/Switch The Florida Power 8 Light Company Foci lity Review Group Final Safety Analysis Report Flow Transmitter
'GDC'E GL GMP gpm HCV HFA HJTC HP HPSI HVE HVS HX HZ INC ICW IFI ILRT IN INPO IR ISI IX JPE JPN KV KW LC LCO LER LIY LOCA LOI LPSI LT LTOP MKTE MCC MFIV MFP MFW MG min MOV MOVATS mrem MP MSIS MSIV
'MSR Appendix A)
stem, etc.)
tern, etc.)
cycle per second)
(system)
ution)
General Oesign Criteria (from 10 CFR 50, General Electric Company
[NRC] Generic Letter General Maintenance Procedure Gallon(s)
Per Minute (flow rate)
Hydraulic Control Valve A GE relay designation Heated Junction Thermocouple Health Physics High Pressure Safety Injection (system)
Heating and Ventilating Exhaust (fan, sy Heating and Ventilating Supply {fan, sys Heat Exchanger Hertz (a unit of frequency equal to one Instrumentation and Control Intake Cooling Water
[NRC] Inspector Followup Item Integrated Leak Rate Test(ing)
[NRC] Information Notice Institute for Nuclear Power Operations
[NRC] Inspection Report InService Inspection (program)
Ion Exchanger (Juno Beach)
Power Plant Engineering (Juno Beach)
Nuclear Engineering KiloVolt(s)
KiloWatt(s)
Load Center {electrical distribution)
TS Limiting Condition for Operation Licensee Event Report Licensee Identified Violation Loss of Coolant Accident Letter of Instruction Low Pressure Safety Injection (system)
Level Transmitter Low Temperature Overpressure Protection Measuring 5 Test Equipment Motor Control Center (electrical distrib Main Feed Isolation Valve Main Feed Pump Main Feed Water Motor Generator minute Motor Operated Valve Motor Operated Valve Test System millirem Maintenance Procedure Main Steam Isolation Signal Main Steam Isolation Valve Moisture Separator/Reheater
MTI MV MW NCR NCV NDE NPF NPO NPS NPWO NRC NSSS NUREG OI ONOP OP'AP PBT PCM PCV PAID PI PIC PIS PM PORV PSB Pslg
~
ppm
~ PT PWO PWR QA QC QI QSPDS RAB RCB RCFC RCO RCP RCPB RCS RDT Rev RG RNWO RO RPS RTGB rating license)
ication)
Maintenance Team Inspection
.Motorized Valve Megawatt(s)
Non Conformance Report NonCited Violation (of NRC requirements)
Non Destructive Examination Nuclear Production Facility (a type of ope Nuclear Plant Operator Nuclear Plant Supervisor'uclear Plant Work Order Nuclear Regulatory Commission Nuclear Steam Supply System Nuclear Regulatory (NRC Headquarters Publ Operating Instruction Off Normal Operating Procedure Operating Procedure Post Accident Panel Performance Based Training Plant Change/Modification Pressure Control Valve Piping 8 Instrumentation Diagram Pressure Indicator Pressure Indicator/Controller Pressure Indicator/Switch Preventive Maintenance Power Operated Relief Valve Plant Systems Branch (of NRC Headquarters)
Pounds per square inch (gage)
Part(s)
per Million Pressure Transmitter Plant Work Order Pressurized Water Reactor Quality Assurance Quality Control Quality Instruction Qualified Safety Parameter Display System Reactor Auxiliary Building Reactor Containment Building Reactor Compartment Fan Cooler Reactor Control Operator Reactor Coolant Pump Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Reactor Coolant System Reactor Drain Tank Revision
[NRCj Regulatory Guide Relay Nuclear Work Order Reactor [licensed] Operator Reactor Protection System Reactor Turbine Generator Board
RVLMS RWT SAL SALP SAS SDC SDCHX SDCS SER SFP SG SI SIT SNOW SNPO SPDS SRO SSER STA Tavg TC TCB TCW TDI TE TEDB TI TMI TR TS URI V
VCT VIO Reactor Vessel Level Monitoring System Refueling Water Tank Service Advice Letter Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance Safety Assessment System Shut Down Cooling Shut Down Cooling Heat Exchanger Shut Down Cooling System Safety Evaluation Report Spent Fuel Pool Steam Generator Safety Injection (system)
Safety Injection Tank Short Notice Outage Work Senior Nuclear Plant [unlicensed] Operator Safety Parameter Display System Senior Reactor [licensed] Operator Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report Shift Technical Advisor Reactor average temperature Temporary Change Trip Circuit Breaker Turbine Cooling Water Training Department Instruction Temperature Element Total Equipment Data Base
[NRC] Temporary Instruction Three Mile Island Temperature Recorder Technical Specification(s)
[NRC] Unresolved Item Volt(s)
Volume Control Tank Violation (of NRC,requirements)