IR 05000335/1990031
| ML17223B098 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 02/08/1991 |
| From: | Crlenjak R, Elrod S, Michael Scott NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17223B097 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-335-90-31, 50-389-90-31, NUDOCS 9102200012 | |
| Download: ML17223B098 (19) | |
Text
UNITEDSTATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323
+)t*++
Report Nos.:
50-335/90-31 and 50-389/90-31 Licensee:
Florida Power Im Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street
'iami, FL 33102 Docket Nos.:
50-335 and 50-389 Facility Name:
St. Lucie 1 and
License Nos.:
DPR-67 and NPF-16 Inspection Conducted:
Dec ber 18, 1990, Inspectors:
. Elrod, Se r Resident through January 2,
991 Inspector Dat S gne
, Resi ent nspector Approved y:
R.
V.
r enga
,
ection C
e Division of Reactor Projects Date S'gn aeSgne SUMMARY Scope:
This routine resident inspection was conducted onsite in the areas of plant operations review, maintenance observations, surveillance observations, safety system inspection, review of special reports, review of nonroutine events, and followup of previous inspection findings.
-Results:
On January 11,- 1991, the NRC Regional staff presented the SALP results (IR 335,389/90-27).
The inspection period activity primarily consisted of routine power operation.
The 1A condensate and 2A intake cooling water pumps were out of service for most of the period with appropriate swing pumps meeting operational as well as technical specification requirements.
Within the areas inspected, the following non-cited violation was identified:
NCV 335,389/90-31-01, Use of unapproved procedures for preventive maintenance of the 2C auxiliary feedwater pump governor, paragraph 6.
Wf02200012 910208 PDR ADOCK 05000335
Persons Contacted REPORT PETAILS 2.
Licensee Empl oyees
- K. Harris, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Operations D. Sager, St. Lucie Site Vice President
- G. Boissy, Plant Manager
- J. Barrow, Operations Superintendent J. Barrow, Fire Prevention Coordinator R. Church, Independent Safety Engineering Group Chairman A. Bailey, guality Assurance Supervisor H. Buchanan, Health Physics Supervisor
- C. Burton, Operations Supervisor
- D. Culpepper, Site Engineering Supervisor
- R. Dawson, Maintenance Superintendent R. Frechette, Chemistry Supervisor
- C. Leppla, I8C Supervisor
- L. McLaughlin, Plant licensing Superintendent L. Rogers, Electrical Maintenance Supervisor N. Roos, Services Manager C. Scott, Outage Management Supervisor
- D. West, Technical Staff Supervisor J. West, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor W. White, Security Supervisor G. Wood, Reliability and Support Supervisor E. Wunderlsch, Reactor Engsneersng Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
NRC Employees S. Elrod, Senior Resident Inspector R. Schin, Project Engineer
- M. Scott, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.
Review of Plant Operations (71707)
Unit I began and ended the inspection period at power.
The unit ended the inspection period in day 83 of power operation.
Unit 2 began and ended the inspection period at power.
The unit ended the inspection period in day.46 of power operatio Plant Tours The inspectors periodically conducted plant tours to verify that monitoring equipment was recording as required, equipment was properly tagged, oper'ations personnel were aware of plant conditions, and plant housekeeping efforts were adequate.
The inspectors also determined that appropriate radiation controls were properly established, critical clean areas were being controlled in accordance with procedures, excess equipment or material was stored properly, and combustible materials and debris were disposed of expeditiously.
During tours, the inspectors looked for the existence of unusual fluid leaks, piping vibrations, pipe hanger and seismic restraint settings, various valve and breaker positions, equipment caution and danger tags, component positions, adequacy of fire fighting equipment, and instrument calibration dates.
Some tours were conducted on backshifts.
The frequency of plant tours and control room visits by site management was noted to be adequate.
The inspectors routinely conducted partial walkdowns of ESF, ECCS, and support systems.
Valve, breaker, and switch lineups and equipment conditions were randomly verified both locally and in the control room.
The following accessible-area ESF system walkdowns were made to verify that system lineups were in accordance with licensee requirements for operability and equipment material conditions were satisfactory:
Unit
and 2 EDG'ooms, Unit 2 fan room, Unit 1 CCW platform, Unit 1 RWT area, and Unit 2 ECCS space.
Tour findings involving the Unit
CCW platform, RWT area, and the Unit 2 ECCS space are discussed in paragraph 4 of this report.
Plant Operations Review The inspectors periodically reviewed shift logs and operations records, including data sheets, instrument traces, and records of equipment malfunctions.
This review included control room logs and auxiliary logs, operating orders, standing orders, jumper logs and equipment tagout records.
The inspectors routinely observed operator alertness and demeanor during plant tours.
They observed and evaluated control room staffing, control room access, and operator performance during routine operations.
The inspectors conducted random off-hours inspections to assure that operations and security performance remained at acceptable levels.
Shift turnovers were observed to verify that they were conducted in accordance with approved licensee procedures.
Control room annunciator status was verified.
Except as noted below, no deficiencies were observed.
During this inspection period, the inspectors reviewed the following tagouts (clearances):
2-1-18 2A Battery Charger, and 2-1-68 2B ED C ~
V The operations staff recently implemented interim changes to their control room NPWO tagging and control methods.
The changes were introduced via training and operational night'rders.
The main emphasis of the changes was in the area of operator understanding of the r'easons for the work tags and what actual equipment was affected by the tags.
The tags NPWO had been an issue of interest during past NRC inspections (ref.
IR 335,389/90-09)
and this recent change will be reviewed by the resident inspectors over the next several months.
The operations staff, by operational night order, had also instituted a
change to control room access.
Where access control had been somewhat informal, access is now restr'icted/limited by the control room staff with more visible operator control, printed signs, and barriers.
A permanent modification for a barrier to limit access is being considered.
The site vice president issued a letter to all employees notifying them of the change in the access rules.
This was
"
considered a positive change by the resident staff.
Technical Specification Compliance Licensee compliance with selected TS LCOs was verified.
This included the review of selected surveillance test results.
These verifications were accomplished by direct observation of monitoring instrumentation, valve positions, and switch positions, and by review of completed logs and records.
Instrumentation and recorder traces were observed for abnormalities.
The licensee's compliance with LCO action statements was reviewed on selected occurrences as they happened.
The inspectors verified that related plant procedures in use were adequate, complete, and included the most recent revisions.
d.
Physical.Protection The inspectors verified by observation during routine activities that security program plans were being implemented as evidenced by: proper display of picture badges; searching of packages and personnel at the plant entrance; and vital area portals being locked and alarmed.
Operational controls were appropriate for the steady state operation during this period.
3.
Surveillance Observations (61726)
Various plant operations were verified to comply with selected TS requirements.
Typical of these were confirmation of TS compliance for reactor coolant chemistry, RWT conditions, containment pressure, control room ventilation and AC and DC electrical sources.
The inspectors verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated, LCOs were met, removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished properly, test results met requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified
during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
The following surveillance tests were observed:
OP 2-2200050, Rev 27, Emergency Diesel Generator Periodic Test and General Operating Instructions, on the 2B diesel; and OP 1-2200050, Rev 51, Emergency Diesel Generator Periodic Test and General Operating Instructions, on the 1B diesel.
During the 2B EDG run, controlled testing was performed on the DC control circuit power consumption as discussed in the maintenance paragraphs below.
The above satisfactorily completed surveillances were conducted properly, with reasonable control by the operations staff.
Maintenance Observation (62703)
Station maintenance activities involving selected safety-related systems and components were observed/reviewed to-ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with requirements.
The following items were considered during this review:
LCOs were met; activities were accomplished using approved procedures; functional tests and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; and radiological controls were implemented as required.
Work requests were reviewed to determine the status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority was assigned to safety-related equipment.
Portions of the following maintenance activities were observed:
NPWO 5565/62 controlled testing on the 2B EDG during performance of the surveillance indicated above.
Included in the NPWO were engineering instructions for the test performance.
The test objective was to collect raw data on the actual DC power consumed by the EDG control circuits during its startup and operation.
A plant electrical engineer was present to assist in the electrical hookup and data collection.
The data was being used to calculate/substantiate the actual loads on the 125V DC batteries.
Upon test completion, the data was being sent to corporate engineering for data reduction and analysis.
Over half of the site diesels had been tested and results were pending from corporate engineering.
NPWO 3412/62 was utilized to control special radiological work on defective incore probe strings that had been removed from the Unit 2 core during the recent outage.
A contractor had chopped up the incore strings in the Unit 2 spent fuel pool and loaded the string sections into a
shipping cask while it was under water in the pool.
The same contractor, with the assistance of the licensee, loaded the cask onto a truck for shipment and disposal.
Site health physics personnel were effectively
controlling the cask loading and subsequent truck loading utilizing their own HP program and the contractor's procedure, TR-OP-019, Rev H, Handling Procedure for CNSI Transport Cask CNS-.3-55.
NPWO 0380/62 controlled work during the "B" train ICW lube water piping repair.
The welded flange just upstream of the Zurn strainer (SS-21-3Bl)
and associated upstream elbow were replaced when the flange developed a
circumferential crack in its neck between the weld and the flange face.
Unit 2 entered a
72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO during this repair.
The work was completed in approximately half of that time.
Engineering supported the repair effort via an interim response to NCR 2-440 requiring replacement of the affected piping.
An NCR resubmittal was planned, following a root cause analysis based on destructive testing of the replaced cracked flange.
The equivalent flange on the "A" lube piping also showed corrosion.
The licensee planned to replace this still-operable piping shortly after the end of this inspection period.
Other examples of piping system corrosion related problems involved gas house hydrogen and nitrogen piping.
The licensee issued NPWO 0379/62 to control the repair of 12 separate instances of corroded yet intact piping features.
Tours of the Unit
RWT and CCW platform areas revealed several degraded conditions that were identified to the licensee; In response to the NRC findings, the licensee generated the following NPWOs.
None of the identified items reduced the system operability.
3087/61 for pitting in a piping run downstream of NV-14-3; 3084/61 for extensive corrosion on fasteners for valve SB 21339, drain valve for SS-21-1B; 7931/61 for rusted conduit to LT 07-2D, RWT level transmitter; 5052/61 and 5133/61 for rusted and degraded conduit and cable wrap to NV 07-1A and HV 07-1B, respectively; 3100/61 for "Y" support beam rusted on RWT fill line; 7943/61 for electrical box B
154E conduit (at ground level)
was rusted; and 3108/61 for a one-inch air line rubbing the ICW inlet pipe to the 1B CCM HX.
Additionally, there were three other items identified during the NRC walkdown which were either repaired'rior to the end of the inspection period or tracked by other than the NPMO system.
LT 07-2C and a
non-safety related RWT Barton level gage had missing identification tags.
These discrepancies were identified with plant labeling deficiency tags
0905 and 0922, respectively.
A rusted hanger for valve V 7198 which is an isolation valve for LT 07-2B was repaired under NPWO 3088/61.
Concurrent with the NRC inspection of the CCW platform, a contractor under the control of Work Process Sheet 6946-1625 was beginning another cycle of rust removal and painting of the CCW platform, components, and piping.
The licensee discovered severely rusted feet on ICW strainer SS-21-1B.
NCRs 1-571 AND 1-572 were generated to cover the degraded angle iron supports for both trains'trainers.
Engineering evaluation JPN-PSL-SE-91-003 of January 11, 1991, indicated that the strainers were acceptable for operation and their function had not been compromised for the near term.
Permanent repair efforts were to occur after the end of the inspection period.
Tours of the Unit 2 "A" train HPSI, LPSI, and Containment Spray pump areas revealed several leaking valves.
In all cases, the valves had no currently active leakage.
The valves were not identified during the recent pressurized system tests completed just prior to the end of the outage.
The leakage probably occurred when the systems were in a
pressurized evolution coming out of recent outage.
This minor valve leakage does not adversely affect system operability or integrity.
The primary interest in the potential leakage was possible radiation levels in the ECCS space during a postulated LOCA.
In response to the NRC's findings, the licensee generated the following NPWOs:
2523/62 for valve 07136, isolation valve for the containment spray pump 2A suction, packing leak; 2530/62 for valve 3766, valve for HPSI feed to loop 2A1, leak under lagging; 2524/62 for valve 3712, isolation valves for LPSI pump 2A header supply to SDC purification, packing leakoff line leak; 2525/62 for valve 3456, motor operated valve for SDC HX 2A outlet cross-tie to low pressure header A, packing leakoff line leak; 2321/62 for valve 7145, isolation valve for containment spray pump 2A discharge, packing leak; and 2528/62 for valve 3443, isolation valve for LPSI pump 2A discharge sample, packing gland nut not fully engaged.
The Unit 2 refueling outage ended in early December, 1990.
The above listed discrepancies for the units were found immediately after the holiday period (January 6th)
when many of the plant staff had been on vacation and minimal activity had occurred.
.NPWO 5263/62 controlled preventive maintenance repairs of the 2A battery charger.
Capacitors and circuit cards in the charger were replaced.
The
technical manual for the charger did not provide a list of preventive replacement parts or any periodicity. for inspection of component parts.
The electrical department had assumed this maintenance activity on their own.
Some observed degradation of the safety-related inverters that are in the related circuits and which were built by the same vendor prompted their actions.
Inspection of all replaced 2A parts indicated no serious degradation; only some mild darkening of the phenolic of one of the circuit boards.
The licensee will continue to change parts on all Unit 2 chargers.
The similar Unit 1 120V bus components are scheduled to follow the other unit.
NPWO 0352/62 was issued to control work on the 2A ICW pump that had developed moderate vibration (in the alert range)
as the unit came out of its refueling outage.
The backup 2C pump was placed in service with the already operating 2B ICW pump and no TS LCO was entered.
The 2A ICW pump had been modified in the 1989 refueling outage such that it was self-lubricating and no longer required a
shaft sleeve
~
packing/water bearing lubrication system.
The licensee had been evaluating this self-lubricating modification prior to implementing the change on the remaining five pumps on both units.
During the 1989 installation of the modified 2A pump, the mechanics had to insert shims between the motor and pump discharge head (motor fit area or rabbit) to correct a perceived axial misalignment.
After installation, the pump appeared to work well except it tended to wear out shaft sleeve packing rapidly.
This rapid wear could have been attributed to a number of possible reasons.
Teardown and inspection of the 2A ICW pump revealed that there were a
number of dimensional discrepancies and the water bearings were worn.
The pump discharge head was returned to the pump contractor who had modified the pump.
The contractor found that a subcontractor had improperly machined several pump head surfaces, which had caused the rapid packing wear and the noted vibrational problems.
The pump head was returned to a dimensionally correct condition by the pump modification contractor and reinstalled with new bearings.
The pump surveillance was satisfactorily performed on January 11.
Maintenance activities were cohesive and geared to support plant operations.
Onsite Followup of Written Nonroutine Event Reports (Units
and 2)
(92700)
LERs were reviewed for potential generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective actions appeared appropriate.
Events that the licensee reported immediately were reviewed as they occurred to
~
determine if the TS were satisfied.
LERs were reviewed in accordance with the current NRC Enforcement Policy.
LERs 389/90-05 and 09 are close a 0 b.
'I (Closed - Unit 2)
LER 389/90-05, Leak Due to Shell-to-Tube-Sheet, Weld Degradation The events relating to LER 389/90-05 were" discussed in NRC IR 335,389/90-30.
This'ER was voluntarily reported by the licensee.
The LER covered details involving shell-to-tube-sheet bimetallic weld defects that were found in the 2B CCW heat exchanger during the recent Unit 2 return from outage.
The above referenced IR opened an IFI (90-05-01)
to track followup of the event.
This LER is considered closed because adequately reported the event.
(Closed - Unit 2)
LER 389/89-09, Valve 'Closure Stop Out of Adjustment This voluntarily reported LER addressed problems with containment purge valve FCV 25-5, which failed its normal surveillance due to a
perceived valve closure stop out of adjustment.
The valve was repaired within the time constraints of the Unit 2 TS and thus no reporting was required under
CFR 50.73.
The valve failed its surveillance several more times during the next year.
An LER revision was issued on December 20, 1990, addressing the subsequent failures and the engineering approved fix.
Ultimately, the licensee put a blind flange on the pipe that leads to the purge valve.
The valve was only used during outages to provide containment ventilation to prevent worker heat stress.
The inspectors reviewed engineering evaluation JPN-PSLP-90-032 (dated November 9,
1990)
covering the blind flange.
No problems in the evaluation were identified.
This item is closed.
6.
Followup of Corrective Actions for Violations and Deviations (Units 1 and 2)(92702)
'a ~
(Closed - Unit 2)
VIO 389/90-02-02, Failure to Implement Preventive Maintenance on 2C AFW Pump Governor.
This violation involved the lack of a preventive maintenance program for the 2C auxiliary feedwater pump governor oil system, which led to a failure of the pump.
For corrective actions, the licensee scheduled and accomplished governor PM oil changes at the frequency recommended by the technical manual.
PM oil changes were done in March and September, 1990.
These oil changes were accomplished under plant work orders, which were each approved by a maintenance foreman and a quality control reviewer.
Each PWO included attached sheets which contained different detailed instructions for accomplishing the oil change.
These instructions were not in the technical manual, but had been developed by the 18C maintenance personnel.
The oil change instructions were an improvement over the limited technical manual guidance, but had not been written in the form of a procedure or approved by the FRG as required by procedure gI 5-PR/PSL-1; Preparation, Revision, Review/Approval of Procedures.
A gA audit. in September, 1990, had identified the use of unapproved procedures for conducting the 2C auxiliary feed pump governor oil change PM.
An NRC
'
l
followup inspection on January 9,
1991, found th'at the PM procedure had not yet been properly reviewed, approved, or issued.
The PM procedure was approved by the FRG on January 10', 1991, and was issued on January ll, 1991.
The licensee plans to'issue a clarification to their letter to the NRC of April 13, 1990, which described corrective actions in response to the Notice of Violation.
Also, the licensee plans to review their tracking system to assure that other corrective actions are tracked to assure completion.
In addition, the licensee plans to review other PM detailed instructions to assure that they are approved procedures.
TS 6.8.1 requires that procedures be established and implemented covering activities recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33.
Regulatory Guide 1.33 recommends written procedures for maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment.
Procedure gI 5-PR/SL-1, Preparation, Review/Approval of Procedures, requires that procedures recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33 be reviewed and approved by the FRG.
Contrary to the above, procedures used for accomplishing preventive maintenance to the 2C AFW pump governor in April and September, 1990, were not approved by the FRG.
This licensee-identified violation is not being cited because the criteria cited in section V.G.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy were satisfied.
This item is identified as open NCV 389/90-31-01, Use of unapproved procedures for PM of 2C AFW pump governor.
In response to VIO 389/90-02-02, the licensee also reviewed and revised approximately 400 mechanical maintenance PM procedures to include appropriate Technical Manual recommendations, provide more detailed inspection guidelines and acceptance criteria, require documentation of conditions found, include post-maintenance testing requirements, and require a completion signature and date.
VIO 389/90-02-02 is closed.
(Closed - Unit 2)
NCV 389/90-02-04, Inadequate Procedure for CS System Check Valve Surveillance.
This item identified that procedure AP 2-0010125A, Surveillance Data Sheets, Data Sheet ll, was inadequate to control the return to normal of locked valves that required independent verification of position changes.
For corrective action, the licensee reviewed and revised as necessary all survei'llance data sheets in AP 0010125A for both Unit 1 and Unit 2.
However, the licensee inadvertently failed to review the surveillance procedure for the corresponding Unit 1 CS system check valves, which was contained in Letter of Instruction T-41, Containment Spray Full Flow Test and Check Valve Surveillance, dated February 21, 1990.
AP 1-0010125A, Rev.
18, dated October 31, 1990, incorrectly stated that the Unit
CS pump discharge check valves were to be exercised by LOI T-42.
The applicable LOI T-41 procedure was adequate in controlling locked valves in that it did not require the operation of any locked valves.
In response to this item, the
licensee accomplished a substantial amount of corrective action..
The NRC noted that the licensee's corrective action tracking system did not track the item to assure completion.
The licensee plans to review the tracking system to assure that corrective action commitments are tracked (see NCV 90-31-01).
This NCV is closed.
In this area, one non-cited violation was identified.
7.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 1,
1991, with those persons indicated in paragraph
above.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed below.
Proprietary material is not contained in this report.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
Item Number Status Description and Reference 389/90-31-01 389/90-'02-02 389/90-02-04 389/89-09 389/90-05 open closed closed closed closed NCV - Use of Unapproved Procedures for PM -of 2C AFW Pump Governor, paragraph 6.
VIO - Failure to Implement PN on 2C AFW Pump Governor, paragraph 6.
NCV - Inadequate Procedure for CS System Check Valve Surveillance, paragraph 6.
LER - Valve Closure Stop Out of Adjustment, paragrapha 5.
LER - Leak Due to Shell to Tube Sheet Meld Degradations, paragraph 5.
8.
Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Initialisms AFM CCW CFR CS ECCS EDG ESF FCV FIS FPL FRG HP HPSI Auxiliary Feed Water Component Cooling Water Code of Federal Regulations Containment Spray Emergency Core Cooling System Emergency Diesel Generator Engineered Safety Feature Flow Control Valve Flow Indicator/Switch The Florida Power
& Light Company Facility Review Group Health Physics High Pressure Safety Injection (system)
HX I&C ICW IFI IR JPN LCO LER LOCA LPSI LT MV NCR NCV NPWO NRC OP PM PSL PWO QA QI Rev RWT SDC TS URI VIO Heat Exchanger Instrumentation and Control Intake Cooling Water
[NRC] Inspector Followup Item
[NRC] Inspection Report (Juno Beach)
Nuclear Engineering TS Limiting Condition for Operation Licensee Event Report Loss of Coolant Accident Low Pressure Safety Injection (system)
Level Transmitter Motorized Valve Non Conformance Report Non-Cited Violation (of NRC requirements)
Nuclear Plant Work Order Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operating Procedure Preventive Maintenance Plant St. Lucie Plant Work Order Quality Assurance Quality Instruction Revision Refueling Water Tank Shut Down Cooling Technical Specification(s)
[NRC] Unresolved Item Violation (of NRC requirements)