IR 05000313/1981013
| ML20004D712 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 05/05/1981 |
| From: | Jay Collins, Hackney C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20004D704 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-313-81-13, 50-368-81-11, NUDOCS 8106090674 | |
| Download: ML20004D712 (6) | |
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G U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMNISSION OFFICE OF IN5PECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION IV
Report Nos. 50-313/81-13 50-368/81-11 Docket No. 50-368 Licensee:
Arkansas Power & Light Comptny Facility Name:
Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2 Inspection at:
Arkansas Nuclear One site near Russellville, Arkansas
Inspection Conducted:
March 23-26, 1981
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Inspector:
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C. A. Hackney, Emergency Coor,dinator
,0 ate Accompanying Personnel:
D. M. Rohrer E. E. Hickey T. A. Kenern R. Doda R. Van Niel C. Wisner J. Hickman J. Callan W. D. Johnson Approved by:
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,y. T. Collins, Deputy Director Date Summary Insoection Conducted During Period of March 23-26, 1981 (Recort Nos. 50-313/81-13; 50-368/81-11)
Areas Insoected:
This routine announced inspection of ANO Units 1 and 2 involved 260 inspection hours which includes onsite inspector hours for the emergency exercise and coordinated meetings with the Licensee, Federal Emergency Management Agency, State and local agencies.
Results:
Of the area inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
810 s09 of 7sf
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OETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted J. O'Hanlon, General Manager W. Cavanaugh, Sr. Vice President D. Snellings, Technical Analysis Superintendent T. Pugh, Emergency Planning Coordinator
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H. Hollis, Safeguards B. Terwilliger, QA Superintendent D. Rueter, Director, Technical & Engineer Services Other Organizations J. Benton, Federal Emergency Management Agency W. Tid 5all, Federal Emergency Management Agency H. Harrison, Federal Emergency Management Agency M. Tull, State of Arkansas Department of Health Mrs. Martindale, St. Marys Hospital Mrs. Williams, St. Marys Hospital NRC Resident Insoectors W. Johnson J. Callan 2.
Entrance Interview The entrance interview was conducted on March 23, 1981, with the General Manager.
3.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 26, 1981.
4.
Licensee Action on Previous Insoection Findings Not inspected.
5.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
6.
Control Room (CR)
The control rocm personnel upon notification of the different changes in simulated operating condition responded in a very efficient manner.
Plant personnel consulted their procedures and noise level was kept at a minimun.
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1 The control room observer kept the NRC inspector appraised of the staff's
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activities.
a.
Communications - There are not an adequate number of telephones for incoming and outgoing calls.
The following problems were identifiad:
(1) The Shift Administrative Assistant had to make three unsuccessful
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attempts to get an outside line to call the cppropriate emergency teams and make notifications.
There was no call back proce-dure for verification, nor a telephone available for call back.
The SAA needs all cal' numbers on one list rather than have numbers referenced ir nother procedure.
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(2) Persons contacted were told that this was a drill, there was considerable time spent dialing numbers.
If many people request information, one SAA is not sufficient.
7.
Technical Supoort Center (TSC)
a.
Although the observers were briefed on the temporary status of the TSC it should also be recognized that the TSC should be functional.
The TSC is a normal working office space and required office furniture to be rearranged.
The Emergency Plans are located in a file cabinet outside of the TSC and the Implementing Procedures are located in a t
bookcase labeled " Emergency Plan."
(1) Noise level in the TSC was kept at a minimum and the Duty Emergency i
Coordinator had control over the TSC.
(2) Upon activation of the TSC it was evident that several people I
were aware of their duties, however, outside people had to be called in to assist in answering the telephone and assist in various functions.
(3) Visual aids were present, however, the status board indicated that the plant was in an alert condition throughout the exercise.
The NRC was notified around 0630 of the alert and the board did not
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reflect any more calls.
Persons coming into the TSC could not get any indication of previous releases, dose assessments, etc.
(4) The publfc address system could not be heard in the TSC (or other parts of the building).
(5) Oose assessment was slow and due to two people attempting to do calculations on one small hand calculator.
(6) The radio operator did not have any previous training and required on-the-spot training.
There was difficulty in conversing with the corporate office in Little Rock.
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(7) No radiation monitoring in the TSC was observed during the exercise.
(8) The present TSC will not meet the habitability requirements of NUREG 0696.
If the control room is to be the back-up, there is not sufficient space nor communications to accommodate personnel from the TSC.
The area of TSC habitability will be reviewed during subsequent inspections (50-313/81-13; 50-368/81-11).
8.
Radiation Monitoring Teams The on-site radiological monitoring team was observed putting on their anti-contamination clothing.
They were dispatched into the plant and conducted in plant surveys.
The offsite monitoring teams were dispatched to the field.
It was noted that the monitoring teams did not have adequate equipment especially to detect radiciodine.
The teams did not have any capability of determining radiciodine in the field, however, the data for radiciodine levels were supposed to be coming from the field in some cases.
There appeared to be a lack of traiaing for the plant offsite mcsitoring teams.
There was a great deal of confusion as to where they were supposed to go for monitoring and they did not have an offical observer with them to feed artifical data to them.'
Personal vehicles were used and there is doubt that the teams could travel off of the main roads during bad weather conditions.
The area of capability to adequately detect radiciodine in the field will be reviewed during subsequent inspections (50-313/81-13; 50-368/81-11).
9.
Fire and personnel Emergency a.
There was no simulated fire for this exercise, however, the fire team did assemble.
b.
There was a person who was simulated to be injured and contaminated.
i This person was sent to the St. Mary's Hospital for evaluation and
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treatment.
The emergency van was not protected inside to prevent
possible spread of contamination.
The station person who went with the van did not check and release the rescue squad or the van.
There appears to have been a break down of communications between the hospital and AP&L.
The emergency equipment has been neglected.
The radiatien detectors would not ocerate and the dosimeters had drifted.
A traiaing session was held two weeks prior to the drill by the State.
Some Hospital personnel used plastic for foot coverings, and had the plastic held on by tape.
Some effort, should be made to procure proper anti-contamination clothing.
There was no AP&L observer for the ambulance or at the hospital.
Once the i
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patient arrived at the hospital the AP&L Health Physics technician left and did not coordinate with the hospital staff.
In a post-accident interview with the ambulance rescue team, it was stated by the team that they had requested training and equipment for emergency response.
Arkansas Power & Light sent them a film for
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plant people, which they consider inadequate.
The hospital can only accept three contaminated victims, if this is the same hospital that the State will,use, there is some doubt that this facility will be sufficient to accommodate over three to five people at one time.
The area of hospital staff and doctors training will be reviewed during subsequent inspections (50-313/81-13; 50-368/81-11).
10.
Emergency Comunications Center The Emergency Control Center is located in a temporary house trailer.
Presently there is sufficient room to accommodate a very limited response team.
This refers to the fact that the Nuclear Regulatory Ccamission, Federal Emergency Management Agency, reporters, state, and local agencies did not go to the ECC.
Visual aids were not kept up to date and it was difficult to have a historical picture due to limited information.
AP&L did not make any recommendations to the state for offsite public action.
There was a lack of State and AP&L interaction especially in getting offsite monitoring activities.
Offsite monitoring was controlled by the Little Rock staff and there did not appear to be a coordinated effort with the plant offsite teams.
11.
Health Physics and Radiochemistry It was noted that there tai no health physics or radiochemist on tne back shifts.
During the extrcise a telephone call was made to one of the radiochemistry representatives to verify availability.
The person was available and would have returned to work if requested.
The NRC Radiological Appraisal Team in their report (Report 50-313/80-20; 50-368/80-20) expressed concern about the lack of health physics coverage on the back shift.
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In a letter to all licensees, Post-TMI Requirements For The Emergency Operations Facility (Generic Letter 81-10), Table III. A.1.2-1 indicates the necessity for back shift coverage for health physics and radio-chemistry duties.
Arkansas Power and Light addressed this subject in their letter (GR-0481-04)
to Mr. Eisenhut, Director, Division of Licensing.
Arkansas Power and Light Company has committed to meet Table III.A.1.2-1 by July 1, 1982.
The area of health physics and radiochemistry personnel on back shifts l
will be reviewed during subsequent inspection (50-313/81-13; 50-368/81-11).
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Scenario The scenario was not written to fully exercise the response capabilities of the plant staff.
The full scenario was delivered to the NRC five days prior to the exercise which, according to AP&L, could not be changed.
There were changes to the scenaric by AP&L withoot consulting with the NRC team inspector on the day of the exercise.
There appeared to be a lack of site / corporate coordination for the exercise.
The exercise started off with the plant being in an " Unusual Event" for 11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br /> and then compressed the " Alert" and " General Emergency" into a very short time frame.
It was apparent that most of the plant staff was very well aware of the drill and what was expected of certain people to do prior to the excercise.
There were areas which were not covered by observers from AP&L.
There should be more effort expended and more time available for the State, FEMA, and NRC to review the proposed scenario.
The final scenario should be available to the appropriate agencies no less than 30 days prior to the exercise.
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