IR 05000313/1978019
| ML19259B388 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 12/14/1978 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19259B386 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-313-78-19, NUDOCS 7902090123 | |
| Download: ML19259B388 (20) | |
Text
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U. S. f!UCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISS10ti 0FFICE OF INSPECTION AtiD Ef4FORCEMENT
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REGION IV
Report fios. 50-313/78-19 50-368/78-26 Docket flos. 50-313 License fio. DPR-51 50-368 Construction Permit tio. CPPR-89/
Facility Operating License I!PF-6 Licensee:
Arkansas Powe and Light Company P. O. Box 551 Li ttle Rock, Arkansas 72203 Facility flame: Arkansas t;uclear One (A!10), Unit !!os.1 and 2 Inspection At: All0 Site, Russellville, Ai kansas Inspection Conducted:
October 23 - tiovember 19, 1978
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Inspectors:
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T. F. Westerman, React r Inspector Date
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G. H. Verduzco, Reector Inspector Dah C\\C M4r=~
> uh /n fl.C.Boyter,Reacto)l Inspector Date s
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k. G. Spangler, Reactor Inspector (Intern)
Date
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Approved By:
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,G. L. Madsen, Chief, Reactor Operations and Date lluclear Support Branch
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-2 Inspection Sunmary flo. 50-313/78-lV) period of October 23 through November 19,1978(Report Insgection during Arer Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of records, procedures, open items, IY Bulletins and Circulars, and previous item. of noncompliance and deviations.
The inspection involved 60 inspector-hours on-site by three f!RC inspectors and two hours by the resident inspector Resul ts :
fio items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
In_spection during period of October 23 throuqh November 19,1978 (Repor_t_
fio.50-368778-26)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of records, procedures, open items, previous items of noncompliance and deviations, independent inspection, preparation for Oparating License issuance, review of con-struction deficiencies, on-site and off-site safety committee reviews, and surveillance of pipe support and restraint system.
The inspection involved 54 hours6.25e-4 days <br />0.015 hours <br />8.928571e-5 weeks <br />2.0547e-5 months <br /> by tuo tiRC inspectors and 135 hours0.00156 days <br />0.0375 hours <br />2.232143e-4 weeks <br />5.13675e-5 months <br /> by the resident inspector.
Results: Within the nine areas inspected, two items of noncompliance were identified relative to a nonfunctional fire barrier (paragraph 15, Infraction)
and Safety Review Committee reviews (paragraph 7, Infraction).
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-3-DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Arkansas Power A Light Company Employees G. H. Miller, Acting AMO Plant Manager L. Alexander, QC Engineer J. R. Anderson, Assistant Production Startup Supervisor B. A. Baker, ANO-2 Operations Supervisor T. N. Cogburn, Nuclear Engineer E. C. Ewing, Production Startup Supervisor D. R. Hamblin, QC Engineer T. Holcomb, Scheduler P. Jones, Maintenance Supervisor S. M. Strasner, QC Technician B. A. Terwilliger, Supervisor Plant Operations R. Elder, Instrument Supervisor J. Robertson, ANO-1 Operations Supervisor S. Petzel, Licensing Engineer D. Williams, Licensing Manager F. Foster, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor M. Stroud, Electrical Maintenance Supervisor 2.
Plant Status Unit 1 Steady state 100% power. operation.
Unit 2 Post core hot functional testing is in progress.
Estimated criticality date is now the week of November 26, 1978.
Problems with the number 2 emergency diesel generator and control rod No. 58 may delay criticality.
3.
Inspector Follow Up on Previously Identified Items (Unit 1)
(Closed) Item of Noncompliance (Inspection Report 50-313/78-10_l: Failure to complete the Annual Requalification Examination withir. a twelve month period.
The Licensing Manager of AP&L, in a letter dated September 18,1978 to G. L. Madsen (NRC/RIV), has agreed that the definition of ' annual' with regard to requalification examinations will be twelve (12) nonths +
two iaonths.
This resolves the issue in contention and the inspector has no further questions in regard to this item.
7802006/-& 3
-4-(Closed) Item of Noncompliance (Inspection Report 50-313/78-12): The a rc T
nl
os The inspector verified that the required audit had been completed on July 19-20, 1978.
Licensee actions with regard to scheduling inspections at the required frequency without regard to plant conditions are acceptable.
There are no further questions in this area.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (Insp_ection Report 50 41_3/77-11, paragraph 5):
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Procedure 1302.01, " General Process Instrument Calibration Procedure,"
did not specify_t_he use of manufacturers instructions nor require that acceptance criteria be specified.
Revision 2 to Procedure 1302.01 requires the use of manufacturers instructions, of pre-formulated data sheets, and requires that accept-ance criteria be specified.
paragraph 7.b):
(Close_d) Unresolved Item (Inspection Report 5_0-313/78-06,_
a The Safety Review Committee had not reviewed Reportable Occurrence 77-22_
at the time of inspection 78-06.
LER 77-22 and the item of noncompliance in inspection report 77-21 were reviewed during the SRC maeting held on April 10, 1978 according to the official minutes.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item (Inspection Report 50-313/78-04, yarag_raph 5):
'The Spent Fuel ' col Area Ventilation System is not 'lP _ listed.
The APSL Licensing Manager indicated that he would initiate the necrasary papers to add this system to the Unit One 'Q'
list.
This item remains unresolved pending the approval of the above.
(Closed) Deviation (Inspection Report 50-313/78-15, paragraph 16):
Fire doors found propped open.
The inspector reviewed the posting of fire doors during plant tours and noted the distribution of the plant manager's memorandum regard-ing the above deviation.
The above actions are acceptable and this matter is considered closed.
(Closed) Open Item (Inspection Report 50-313/77-25, paragraph 35):
Boric acid crystalization on carbon steel studs of numerous valves.
The inspector noted that job orders 4006, 4011 and 4012 had been issued and completed during the last refueling outage to clean boric acid
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-5-crystals from numerous valves.
The inspector also noted during recent plant tours the results of the above work.
It appears that the licensee concurrs with the inspector's concerns in this area.
With the qualifi-cation that this is an ongoing operational problem, this item is con-sidered satisfactorily resolvcd.
.(Closed) Open Item (Inspection _ Report 50-313/7_8-10, paragrap_hy) :
Implementation of a tool accountability log for the refueling cavity.
The licensee's flaintenance Superintendent and Supervisor have indicated during discussions with the inspector that they feel that the present inspection controls are sufficient to prevent the loss of tools into the reactor system during Reactor Vessel Head Removal.
In view of this and a lack of past problems of this nature, the inspector has decided not to pursue this issue any further for the present.
_(_03en) Open Item (Inspection Report 50-31_3/_73-04, paragraph 8):
Recl a_ s-sification of snubbers in the category of 'Especially Difficult to Remove."
During inspection 78-04, the inspector noted that of the 74 snubbers listed in the Technical Specifications, 48 of them are classed as
"Especially Difficult to Remove." Snubbers classed as above and having once been functionally tested are exempted from the annual functional testing sample. The Licensing Manager indicates that snubbers were classed in the above category on the basis of a visual inspection during which snubbers were classed as "Especially Difficult to Remove" if any rigging or scaffolding were required for removal.
As a result of remov-ing and functionally testing all snubbers during the last refueling outage, it appears that some of the snubbers in this category may be improperly classified.
For example, in one day 17 of these snubbers were removed or installed out of a total of 25 snubbers handled. While a statistic such as this is not conclusive, it does appear that this classification of snubbers should be reviewed in light of the functional testing performed during the refueling outage.
The AP&L Licensing Manager has agreed to review this during the next refueling outage.
The resolution of this item will depend on the outcome of this review.
4.
Inspector Follow Up on Previously Identified Items (Unit 2)
,(C_lctse_d) Item of fioncompliance (Inspection Regrt 50-358/78-23):
HPSI Control Switches in " Pull-to-Lock" during Mode 3 operation in nonconfor-mance to TS 3.5.3.
The inspector verified that Procedure OP 2102.03 was revised by Perma-nent Change fio. 3 (9/28/78) to require that the HPSI hand switches be returned to normal operation prior to entering Mode pen) Item of !!oncompliance (Inspection Report 50-366/78-23):
Fa ilure to perform monthly channeT check on seiraic instrumentation.
The licensee was informed that until such time as a Technical Specifi-cation change has been issued, performance and documentation of a monthly seismic instrumentation channel check will be required.
(_ Closed) It_em of Noncompliance (Inspection Report 5-368/78-23):
flon-functional fire barrier.
The licensee has issued formal instructions to all parties involved concerning the rendering of fire barriers nonfunctional.
(Closed) Deviation (Inspection Report 50-368/78-23):
Failure to maintain fire doors closed.
The inspector found that the licensee's actions are in conformance with their October 24. 1978 letter to RIV (File #2-0232).
(Closed) Deviation (Inspection Report 50-368/77-11, 77-16, 77-24):
Issuance of Operating, Emergency and liaintenance Procedur es.
All required plant operating procedures have now been issued.
(Closed) Deviation (Inspection Report 50-368/77-26):
Issuance of Start-up Test Procedures All required startup test procedures have been issued.
(Closed) Deviation (Inspection Report 50-368/78-03):
PSC review of i te:as of noncompliance.
The inspector verified that the plant QC organization has established a tickler file containing items of noncompliance to be reviewed by the PSC.
_(Closed) Open Item (Inspection Report 50-368/78-25):
Instrument Inverters Testing.
flodification and testing of the essential instrument inverters was accomplished by Work Plans WP 2-12 and 2-13 under Job Orders 4615-2 and 4614-2.
The inspector observed the Plant Safety Conmittee fleeting on October 24, 1978 during which both of these work plans were reviewe.
-7-The most significant results of this modification and testi n, as witnessed in part by the inspector, consisted of the following actions:
Changing of the 480 V Transformer (T2) tap setting to limi the
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rectified DC input to less than 140 V DC with a 540 V AC input.
The 540 V is the maximum anticipated voltage surge expected during startup of the emergency diesel generators.
Limiting the rectified DC input to less than 140 V DC during a maximum AC input is anticipated to limit the in line fuse failures.
The static switch transformer set points were adjusted to the
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maximum limits of their associated potentiometers.
These set points now correspond to about 1603 to 2005 of rated current output (originally 120%) and (60% of rated voltage (originally 803).
During testing, the 480 volt essential buses were de-energized
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by accuating their associated undervoltage relays.
Th emergency diesel generators started and assumed their associated essential loads.
There were no blown fuses nor did the inverters transfer to alternate.
RIV Proposes no further action at this time.
The operational history of the inverters will continue to be monitored by the resident inspector.
10 pen)_0 en Item (Inspection Report 50-363/78-25, paragraph 2):
Review f
cf Computer Alarm and Sequence of Events Printout (Unit 2)
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The licensee, in follow up to the September 16, 1978 incident, has determined that the reason for the failure of the computer to provide an alarm printout was due to a local control switch in the computer room which was in the off position.
The licensee stated that the switch is now being left on.
The licensee did find that there are excessive alarms assigned to the alarm printout and an effort is undenvay to review the alarm inputs to computer.
It is the licensee's intent to reduce the number of alarm inputs.
The inputs to the sequence of event printout are being reviewed with the intent of adding additional inputs.
A design change to provide for a sequence of event printout on the loss of instrument power is being considered.
(0 pen) Open Item (Inspection Report 50-368/78-12, paragraph ll.a):
.C P_C_
~ Response Time Testing The response time testing of the T nd T Resistance Temperature h
Detectors has not been completed. cSatisfactory test results are required prior to going into Mode 2 in order to meet Technical Specification.
-8-(Closed) Unresolved Item 7825-2 (Inspection Report 50-368/78-25, paragraph 7:
Failure of 2Al Bus to Strip _ Following the September 16 Fvent Follcwing testing and review by the licensee, it was determined that the Unit 2 generator lockout test switch associated with 2Al bus was out-of-service at the time of the emetgency and precluded the stripping of the 2Al bus by the Safety In.iection Actuation Signal (SIAS).
.(Closed) Open Item (Inspection Report 50-368/78-23,Eragraph 16.b(2)):
Improper Setting of RWF Upper Alarm Set Point.
The affected alarm set point has been reset to 900F (Job Order 5499).
(Closed) Open Item (Inspection Report 50'J68/78-23, pa ragraph _16. b( 3)) :
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Containment Pressure Air Temperature and Relative Humidity Conformance to Technical Specification Figure 3.6-l.
The Control Room Log has been revised to assure compliance with Technical Speci fication Figure 3.6-1.
] Closed)OpenItem(InspectionReport 50-368/78-23, paragraph 7);
Completion of Seismic Modifications to Preclude Feedwater Piping Break in the Penetration Room The inspector verified that all outstanding Design Change Notices (DCN's) have been completed.
These DCM's included DCN 5/Rev.15, DCN 12/Rev.19 and DCN 8/Rev. 9.
This item is considered closed.
(Clos _ed) 0 pen Item (Inspect _ ion Report 50-368/78-23, paragraph 16.b(4)):
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Verification of the Operability of the Main Stream Isolation Valves
}MSIV's) Prior to Entry into Modes 1, 2 and 3 Permanent Change (PC) 6 to 2102.02 and PC-3 to 2102.03 were issued and require testing of the MSIV's prior to entry into Mode 3 (Technical Speci fication 3.7.1.5).
(Closed) Opep Item (Inspection Report 50-368/78-23, p_aragraph 16.b(5))
C Shutdow1 ooling Svstem Automatic Isolation and Interlock Action Instrtm. nt Set Point The associate Shutdown Cooling System Instrumentation set points were reset (Job Order 4834-2) for <.300 psia and are in conformance with Technical Specification (TS) 4.5.2. The associated Shutdown Cooling System Instrumentation set points were reset (Job Order 4834-2) for <300 psia and are in conformance with Technical Specification (TS) 4.5.2.d.1.
(Closed) Open Item (Inspection Report 50-368/78-12, paragraph ll.b):
CPC Auxiliary Reactor Trips flo further action is being taken by f1RR on this item as is reflected by the deletion of this item from the Technical Specifications.
RIV considers this item closed.
5.
Testing of Pipe Supnort and Restraint Systems (Unit 2)
a.
Pipe Support Examination at Operating Temperatures and Pressure Accompanied by licensee representatives, the i.ispector conducted a visual examination at operating temperature and pressure of the dynamic and fixed pipe supports and support structures which had been previously inspected at ambient temperatures (Inspection 78-05).
I;o discrepancies were noted.
Visual inspections of the pipe support and restraint systems will be completed following completion of the transient tests 2.800.13 (Piping Dynamic Transient Test) and 2800.14 (Steady State Vibration Power Escalation Tests).
b.
Records of Pipe Support Testing The inspector reviewed Procedure 2.650.15 R1, " Pipe /Compon'.nt Hot Deflection Preoperational Test," and noted that 28 of 59 data location points had measured operating temperatures less than the specified allowable temperature ranges and that the measured pipe deflection at many of these data points did not meet the deflection acceptance criteria.
The licensee representative explained that the deflection criteria was based on projected piping temperature which, as noted above, were not always accurate.
fiew deflection criteria, which is being recalculated based on the measured temperatures, will be used to evaluate the measured deflections.
This item remains open and the complete results of the test will be reviewed during a future inspection.
This is considered an open item.
6.
Review of Program and Procedures for Surveillance of Pipe Support and Restraint Systems (Unit 2)
The licensee's surveillance program for pipe supports and restraint systems was reviewed to ascertain that it is in conformance with Technical Specifications and licensee conTaitments.
The following
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-10-deficiencies were found in the procedure 2304.84, " Hydraulic Shock Suppressor Visual Inspections" (2/4/78);
a.
The procedure lists for visual inspection only eight of the twelve hydraulic shock suppressors listed in Table 3.7-4 of the Technical Specifications.
b.
The visual inspection required by the Technical Specification is to determine whether the hydraulic shock suppressor is operable; however, the procedure's acceptance criteria is vague in defining the minimum requirements for hydraulic fluid.
One of the procedural steps specifies a hydraulic fluid reservoir level of half-full or greater as the proper level.
The fluid reservoirs for the hydraulic shock suppressor on the steam generator have permanent type markings for the maximum and minimum levels for both the hot and cold plant conditions while the reservoirs for the reactor coolant pumps suppressors have no markings.
Since the quantity of fluid in the reservoir is one of the key visual indicators of the operability of the hydraulic shock suppressor, a quantitative acceptance criteria would be appropriate.
These two deficiencies are considered cpen items.
7.
_ Technical Specification Compliance of Safety _ Conmittees (Unit 2)
The meeting minutes of the Plant Safety Committee (PSC) and Safety Review Coamittee (SRC) since fuel load were reviewed to assure that the Technical Specifications were satisfied.
The minutes of the SRC meeting on August 31, 1978 state that the members were contacted for approval of a change to Section 3/4 6-5 of the Technical Specifications.
The SRC Secretary explained that the members were contacted individually.
This failure to form a quorum for review of a Technical Specification is an apparent item of noncompliance in that Section 6.5.2.7.d of the Tech-nical Specifications require the SRC to review such changes and Section 6.5.2.6 requires a minumum quoruin of at least the Chairman and four SRC members to perform an SRC review.
8.
Status of Mode 2 Ooen Items - Attachment 2 to Operatin1 License NPF-6 Tlinit2)
a.
Item A.1 - Startup Punchlist Heating problem in PPS panels is still under review. This is the only item remaining.
b.
Item A.2 - Completion of Preoperational Tes_t.
The completion of Preoperation Test 2.083.01, " Main Steam Supply and Safety Relief Valves," is considered open by RIV.
Testing by
-11-the hydraset method was found to be initially in error.
In order to assure a proper set point of the main steam safety relief valves using the hydraset, it has been necessary to take each safety relief valve to an actual partial lif t.
The manufacturer's instructions stated that the first audible discharge (simmer)
corresponded to the valve set point.
The difference between the set points determined by partial lift and valve simmer was as great as 200 psi.
In addition, the blowdown is being verified by actual lift of the safety relief valves. The blowdown has been reduced from the 40% found on PSV-1002 (1078 psig + 1%) to around 12%.
The se hty relief valve performance is still being evaluated.
The licensee has stated that it is planned to cooldown and repair PSV-1002 and PSV-1052.
These two safety relief valves are now leaking as the result of testing.
The internal adjusting rings are to be changed and a different bushing installed in these two valves. The plant is then to be heated up and these two valves retested prior to cooldown to 2600F for initial criticality.
c.
Item A.3 - Startup Program Test Deficiencies The closecut of the 2.650 series test deficiencies remains incomplete.
d.
Item A.4 - Approval and Issuance of 2.800.01, App. U The item has been closed.
(See Inspection Report 50-368/78-26)
e.
Item A.5 - Containment Piping Penetration liain Feedwater Line Break Modi fications This item has been closed.
(See paragraph 4 of this Inspection Report)
f.
Item A.6 - Radiation Protection (1)
Item 6.a - Installation and Calibration of HP Monitoring.
Equipment This equipment is to be set up just prior to initial criticality.
(2)
Item 6.b - Area Radiation Monitors Applicable portions of Calibration Test Procedure 2304.24 were verified by the inspector to be complete.
This item is closed.
(3)
Item 6.c - Process Radiation Monitors Calibration Calibration remains incomplet.
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Item 7 - Hanger Installation Hanger installation has been completed. This item is considered closed.
h.
Item 8 - Penetration Breaker DC Power Supplies DCP 638 has been closed out by Job Order 5450 on August 29, 1978.
This item is considered closed.
i.
Item 9 - Facility Operating Procedures There are no outstanding facility operating procedure discrepancies.
This item is considered closed.
j.
Item 10 - Resolution of Hydrogen Purge _ System Tect_ Discrepancies By nemo f rom URR to IE, dated November 1,1978 (J. F, Stolz, Chief, LURB Mo. I to J. H. Sniezek, AD for Field Coordination, Division of Reactor Operations Inspection, IE), IE has been informed no further changes to this system are required.
With regard to the Freon 112 test requirement, the licensee has evaluated that iodine tests which were performed are a satisfactory substitute for the original planned tests.
RIV has no further questions with regard to this item.
This item is considered closed.
k.
Item 11 - LPSI Pump Motor Failure This item has been previously closed.
See Inspection Report Mo.
50-368/78-26.
1.
Item 12 - Safety Injection System Loose Part This item has been previously closed.
See Inspection Report No.
50-368/78-26.
9.
Construction Deficiency Reports (Unit 2)
a.
Electrical Penetration Qualification Test (AP&L Letter of 4/27/78)
No further action on this item is required.
b.
Feedwater Line Break in Penetration Room (AP&L Letter of 7/12/78)
No further action on this item is required.
See paragraph 4 of this repor.
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_LPSI System Stop Check Valve (AP&L Letter of 8/24/78)
c.
flo further action on this item is required.
d.
LPSI Pump Drain Line through Uall Crack (AP&L Lett of 9/14/78)
The September 14, 1978 report is preliminary.
Investigation into the cause is still in progress.
Bent Stem 2CV-4950 (AP&L Letter of 9/20/78)
e.
flo further action on this item is required.
f.
"B" LPSI Pump Thrust Bearing Failure (AP&L Letter of 9/21/78)
fio further actior. on this item is required.
g.
Foxboro Transmitter Seismic Mounting (AP&L Letter 9/23/76)
!!o further action on this item is required, h.
Main Steam Safety Valves (AP&L Letter 8/29/78)
f?o further action on this item is required.
Acceptance testing is being conducted as a part of the post core hot function testing program.
10.
General Design Criteria #17 (Unit 1)
The inspector verified that an interim measure (Special Order fio. 5)
had been issued until circuitry char jes on safety related equipment to auto load sequences regardless of power source had been completed.
This was accomplished by dividing the loads between Startup 1 and 2 t rans formers.
Subsequent to Special Order flo. 5, circuitry modifications (Design Change Request DCR 657) were made to sequence on the start of the primary makeup, Service Water, Reactor Building Spray and Decay Heat removal on off-site power using the same sequence timers associated
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with the emergency diesel generators.
The irispector verified the completion of DCR 657 and testing of associated circuitry.
fio items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie.
-14-11. Millstone Degraded Voltage Fix for ANO (Unit 2)
The inspector verified that the design changes summarized on page 20 of the AP&L March 30, 1978 letter (D. H. Uilliams, AP&L Licensing Manager to J. F. Stolz, Chief, LWRB No. 1) have been completed.
This included the installation of the additional 92% undervoltage relays in a coincident logic schua on each of the two safety trains.
These modifications were accomplished in accordance with the following Design Change Packages (DCP)/ Design Change Requests (DCR):
DCP/DCR Compietion Date DCP 583 5/11/78 DCP 675 6/22/78 DCP 649 5/5/78 DCP 540 2/15/78 DCP 564 4/11/78 DCR 2-51 11/3/78 The inspector reviewed selected portions of each of these packages for conformance to the AP&L March 30, 1978 letter.
There were no items of noncompliance or deviations.
12.
Borg Warner Valves (Unit 2)
During recent difficulties which were experienced during flow coast down testing, the licensee found that the flow D/P instrument isolation valves were the source of these difficulties.
The valve's internal globe to stem coupling is a threaded connection which should be tack welded.
The licensee found that these instrument globe valves (3/4" to 1") were not tack welded and had unthreaded.
On reverse pressure the valve would seat itself and prevent the associated instrumentation from fur-tioning.
The vendor determined from the some 2,000 valves (3/4" and l") supplied for Unit 2, that 45 valves had insufficient documentation to determine if the valves had been tack welded internally.
The licensee's investigation, which is in progress, indicates that some of these valves have not been tack welded internally.
During the licensee's present cooldown, all normally open valves are to be inspected.
The vendor reports that ANO received all but two of the suspect valves which were manufactured back in 1973.
One valve went to Millstone and the other went to USERDA.
Region I has been informed of the one suspect valve sent to Millston.
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-15-This item will be carried as open pending the completion of the current licensee's inspection.
13.
Chloride Swipes (Unit 2)
Following the September 16, 1978 incident which resulted in actuation of the Unit 2 containment building spray system, the licensee committed to take swipes inside the containment building for possible chloride contamination on exposed pipe stainless steel.
The swipes were taken in accordance with the same method used following the Browns Ferry fire of March 22, 1975.
The flRR staff acceptance of this method is documented in f!UREG 0061 (Browns Ferry Fire Safety Evaluation).
The acceptance standards were based on RDT Standard F5.1.T.
The results of the fgur random swipes taken at ANO Unit 2 indicated a maximum of 2.8 pg/in (micrograms per inch squared). The flRR staff accepted limit following the Browns Ferry fire was 5 pg/in2 RIV plans no further action. This item is considered closed.
14. Witness of Startup Activities (Unit 2)
The following startup activities were witnessed by the inspectors:
a.
Plant Safety Committee Meetings, The inspector observed the October 24, 1978 Plant Safety Committee meeting review of work plans 2-12 and 2-13 which were associated with the testing and modification of the Unit 2 instrument inverters.
b.
Test Working Group _
The inspector observed the November 2,1978 Test Working Group meeting review of the following test results:
2.650.17, Rev. 2, SIS Check Valve Retest 2.650.10, Rev. 1, RCS Leakage Measurements 2.650.llA, PC-1 RCS Cold Leg Restraint Gap Measurement c.
Scheduling The inspector reviewed the October 23, 1978 two week outage schedule. The following daily schedules were reviewed:
flovember 6, 7, 8, 9 and 20,1978.
d.
2.650.01 Post Core Hot Functional Test Controlling Procedure The completion of this sequencing document was reviewed by the inspector through flovember 8,197.
.
-16-Test Program Chronological Log e.
The inspectors reviewed this log for the period of October 11 through Muvember 6, 1978.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
15.
Nonfunctional Penetration Fire Barrier (Unit 2)
During the swing shift on October 24, 1978, the inspector identified a penetration fire barrier which was made nonfunctional by passing a temporary cable through it without installing a penetration fire barrier or establishing a fire watch as required by Technical Specifi-cation 3.7.11.
In followup, the licensee recalled the construction craf t during the same swing shift to the site to remove the cable.
This item of non-compliance is similar to the item cited in Inspection Report 50-368/78-23.
Corrective action has been initiated to require the coordination of work through the plant's scheduling organization.
Follow-ing this event, a formal memo was forwarded to all involved parties to provide additional delineation of responsibilities.
No further action on this item is required at this time.
The inspector will continue to monitor this item during the normal course of the I&E inspection program.
16.
Procedures (Units 1 and 2)
The inspector reviewed procedures to verify that they had been reviewed and anproved, that control of changes was in accordance with the Technical Specifications, that TS revisions have been incorporated into procedural changes, and that contenes of the procedures conform to TS requirements.
In addition, the technical content of several procedures was reviewed for their adequacy to control safety-related operations within applicable regulatory requirements.
The following areas were inspected by selective review of representative procedures in each area.
Procedures a.
Administrative 1004.12A (Rev. 5, PC-1) 9/14/73, Operational Test Control 1004.21 (PC-6) 7/20/73, Procedure Review and Approval 2004.07 (Rev. 1, PC-2) 9/12/78, Adminsitering the Post Fuel Load Test Program
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.,
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-17-b.
General Plant Operating Procedu ns 1102.02 (Rev. 6, PC-1) 8/11/78, Nuclear Startup 2102.02 (Rev 1, PC-5) 8/29/78, Plant Startup c.
Startup Operation and Shutdown of Safety-Related Systems Procedures 1103.02 (Rev. 2, PC-2) 11/29/77, Reactor Coolant System Filling and Venting 1104.02 (Rev. 5, PC-2) 6/27/78, Reactor Cleanup System Operation 1104.29 (Rev. 4, PC-2) 10/3/78, Component Cooling Water System Operation 1104.05 (Rev. 4, PC-2) 9/13/77, Spent fuel Cooling System Operation 1105.09 (Rev.1, PC-1) 9/19/77, CRD System Operation 1104.03 (Rev. 5, PC-4) 9/19/78, Chemical Addition System Operaiton 1104.24 (Rev.1) 7/29/75, Instrument Air System Operation 2103.02 (Rev. 1, PC-2) 7/21/78, Reactor Coolant System Filling and Venting 2104.02 (Rev. O, PC-4) 8/24/78, CVCS Operation 2104.28 (Rev. O, PC-1) 3/14/78, Component Cooling Water System Operation 2105.09 (Rev. O, PC-1) 7/2/78, CED Mechanism Control System Operation 2104.03 (Rev.1, PC-2) 9/30/78, Chemical Addition System Operation 2104.24 (Rev. O, PC-2) 3/9/78, Instrument Air System Operation d.
Abnormal (Alarm) Condition Procedures (1)
1203.12 (Rev. O, PC-2) 8/19/77, Annunciator Corrective Actions (a) Low Total Seal Flow to RCP's (K08-A7) 4/26/74 (b) Letdown Line High Temperature (K09-A7) 5/8/74 (c) CRD CW inlet Temperature High (K10-CS) 5/8/74 (d) Spent Fuel Storage Pool Level Hi/Lo (Kll-AS) 5/8/74 (e) Control Rod Withdrawal Irhibited (K10-D5) 5/8/74 (f) Sodium Thiosulfate Storage Tank Hi/Lo (Kll-A3 5/8/74 (g)
Instrument Air Compressor C2B Trouble (Ys12-B1) 5/8/74 (2) 2203.12 (Rev. O, FC-2) 9/14/78, Annunciators Corrective Actions (a) RCP 2P328 Reverse Rotation (2Kil-D3) 7/14/77 (b) Volume Control Tank 2T4 Pressure Hi/Lo (2K12-D2) 7/14/77 (c) RCP 2P32A CW Discharge Flow Lo (2Kll-G2) 7/14/77 (d) Fuel Pool Temperature Hi (2Kll-G6) 7/14/77 (e)
CED'lCS Bus Undervoltage (2K10-DS) 7/14/77 (f)
Charging Pumps Header Low Flow (2K12-K2) 7/l4/77 (g)
Instrument Air Header Hi/Lo Pressure (2Kll-D6) 7/14/77
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Procedures for Emergencies and Other Si nificant Events S
1202.06 (Rev. 3, PC-2) 9/7/78, LOCA 1202.12 (Rev. 4) 7/22/75, Loss of InCrument Air 1203.05 (Rev. 1) 4/11/74, Loss of Containment Integrity i202.17 (Rev. 2) 7/22/75, Loss of Flux Indication 2202.05 (Rev. O, PC-5) 10/2/78, Loss of Reactor Coolant 2202.12 (Rev. O, PC-1) 5/27/78, Loss of Instrument Air 2202.17 (Rev. O, PC-1) 2/16/78, Loss of !!autron Flux Indication f.
plaintenance 1401.02 (Rev.1) 2/5/74, Pressurizer Relief Removal and Replacement 1304.67 (Rev.1, PC-l) 2/8/73, Makeup and Letdown Flow Calibration 2401.03 (Rev. O, TC-2) 10/4/78, Pressurizer Relief Test flo items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
17.
Records (Units 1 and 2)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's procedures for the control of records and drawings to verify:
a.
That the program for control, storage, retention and retrieval of records is in conformance with applicable Technical Specifications and accepted industry standards such as ANSI fl45.2.9 - 1974.
b.
That as-built drawings are being raintained.
c.
That records are sufficient to permit reviews by licensee personnel to detect adverse trends in equipment or operational histories d.
That records of test and experiments are being maintained as described in 10CFR50.59(b).
The procedures included in this review were:
fiumber Title Unit 1005.23 Drawing Control 1, 2 1005.24 Plant Records Management 1, 2 1005.25 Document Retention and 1, 2 Disposition As a result of this effort, the inspector found that the " Document and Retention Table" called out in Procedure 1005.25 had not yet been fully updated to include all Unit 2 records listed in that Unit's Technical Specifications.
The table needs to be expanded to include the following classes of records:
.
.,
.
-19-(1)
Records of change to the CPC Software (TS 6.10.2.1)
(2) Unit 2 Startup Test and Surveillance Records (TS 6.10.1.d)
This ite~ is an open item against Unit 2.
As the result of an inspec-tor's tour of the vault during which numerous records were selected at random in the areas of tests and surveillance activities, preventative maintenance, logs and data sheets, and recorder charts, it appears that the licensee's program is in corformance with the above noted criteria.
The review of the as-built drawings controls was completed for Unit 1 with no adverse findings.
As the plant staff had not yet assumed full control of the Unit 2 drawings this portion of the inspection will be completed during a future inspection.
The inspector found no items of noncompliance or deviations in those areas inspected.
18.
Follow Up on RPS Grounds Problem - Reference B&W Report of tlarch 9,1978
_
The inspectors found that the licensee had performed the following testing with regard to Reactor Protection System (RPS) grounds.
Job Order 8160 was initiated and completed during the last refueling outage at A!40-1 to investigate the consequences of lifting ground leads within the RPS system.
In no cases were AP&L personnel able to isolate system grounds without causing an RPS channel trip.
The Instrument and Controls Supervisor at ANO indicates that on the basis of the above testing, no periodic test program of the RPS to verify system grounds is currently in effect or planned. The licensee also found that the multiple grounds associated with the RPS make it almost impossible to isolate the system grounds.
19.
IE Bulletins and Circulars (Unit 1)
a.
Scope of Inspection (1) The inspector verified by record review, observation and discussion with licensee personnel, the following items with respect to IE Bulletins.
Appropriate distribution to licensee personnel.
.
Licensee's reply supported by facility records and/or
.
observations.
Corrective action complete.
.
Reply was prompt.
.
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(2) The inspector verified the following items with respect to IE Circulars.
Circular was received.
.
Circular was reviewed for applicability.
.
Licensee proposed corrective action was appropriate.
.
b.
Findings (1) The following Bulletins were reviewed and discussed with various licensee personnel-78-05 Malfunction of GE Circuit Breaker Auxiliary Contact Mechanism - CR105X 78-05 Defective Cutler Hammer, Type M Relays with DC Coils 78-07 Protection Afforded by Air-Line Respirators and Supplied-Air Hoods 78-08 Radiation Levels from Fuel Element Transfer Tubes No further actions are required for these bulletins and they are considered closed.
(2) The licensee's review of the following circulars was evaluated by the inspector and found acceptable.
77-14 Separation of Contaminated Water Systems from Hon-contaminated Plant System 77-15 Degradation of Fuel Oil Flow to the Emergency Diesel Generator 78-02 Proper Lubricating Oil for Terry Turbines 78-03 Packaging Greater than Type A Quantities of Low Specific Activity Radioactive Material for Transport 78-04 Installation Errors that could Prevent Closing of Fire Doors 78-05 Inadvertent Safety Injection During Cooldoun 78-05 Potential Common Mode Flooding of ECC5 Equipment Rooms at BWR Facilities 78-07 Damaged Components of a Bergen-Paterson Series 25000 Hydraulic Test Stand 78-09 Arcing of General Electric Company Size 2 cntactors 78-15 Tilting Disc Check Valves Fail to Close with Gravity in Vertical Position 20.
Exit Meetings (Unit 1 and 2)
Exit meetings were conducted on October 27, November 3 and November 9, 1978, with Mr. Miller and other members of the plant staff. The inspectors discussed the scope of the inspection and summarized the inspection findings which are detailed in this report.