IR 05000313/1978022
| ML19261C357 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 01/30/1979 |
| From: | Boyter N, Madsen G, Westerman T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19261C352 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-313-78-22, 50-368-78-29, NUDOCS 7903220320 | |
| Download: ML19261C357 (10) | |
Text
.
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION IV
Report flos. 50-313/78-22 50-368/78-29 Docket No.
50-313 License No. DPR-51 50-368 License flo. NPF-6 Licensee:
Arkansas power and Light Company P. O. Box 551 Little Rock, Arkansas 72203 Facility Name: Arkansas Nuclear One (AN0), Unit Nos. 1 and 2 Inspection At: AN0 Site, Russellville, Arkansas Inspection Conducted: December 18, 1978 through January 14, 197.9 Inspectors:
N#/bv h/
//se'/79 7. F. Westerman, Refctor Inspector Date
'
a (
kT
\\lb6lT)
N. C. Boyter, Reactor Inspector Date (,6fYT V3c/7n
. uw W. D hnson, Reactor Inspector Date L&!Y lm VD/79 am E. A. gupp, Reactof Inspector Date Approved By:
JONfM
/[J*/79 me t. L. Madsen, Chief, Reactor Operations and Date
'
Nuclear Support Branch 790322032o
.
.
-2-Inspection Summary Inspection during period of December 18, 1978 through January la, 1979 Report _!io. 50-313/78-22)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced inspection of organization and the overflow of the sodium hydroxide storage tank.
The inspection involved 11 inspector-hours on-site by three NRC inspectors.
Results: Within the two areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were identi fied.
Inspection du. ing period of December 18, 1978 through January 14, 1979 Report No. 50-368/78-2_9_)
Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of testing of pipe support and restraint systems, power ascension testing, organization, plant operations, independent inspection time, and low power physics data review.
The inspection involved 91 inspector-hours on-site by three NRC inspectors and 32 inspector-hours on-site by the resident inspector.
Results: Within the six areas inspected, four items of noncompliance were identified relative to maintaining the jumper and bypass log (paragraph 5 -
Infracti'on); proper closure of fire doors (paragraph 5 - Infraction); LC0 for entering Mode 2 from Mode 3 (paragraph 6 - Infraction); and following of procedures (paragraph 7 - Infraction).
,
+
.
-3-DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Arkansas Power & Light Company Employees J. P. O'Hanlon, Atl0 Plant Manager G. H. Miller, Engineering & Technical Support Manager L. Alexander, QC Engineer B. A. Baker, Af40-2 Operations Supervisor T. fl. Cogburn, ?!uclear Engineer E. C. Ewing, Production Startup Supervisor D. R. Hamblin, QC Engineer T. Holcomb, Scheduler P. Jones, Maintenance Supervisor S. M. Strasner, QC Technician B. A. Terwilliger, Operations & Maintenance Manager J. Robertson, At10-1 Operations Supervisor S. Petzel, Licensing Engineer D. Williams, Licensing Manager F. Foster, Plant Administrative Manager M. Stroud, Electrical Maintenance Supervisor G. Bruss, Shift Supervisor (Unit 2)
R. Weaver, Shift Supervisor (Unit 2)
L. Bell, Shif t Supervisor (Unit 2)
J. Lowman, Assistant I&C Supervisor R. Elder, I&C Supervisor R. Tucker, Assistant I&C Supervisor J. McWilliams, Planning & Scheduling Supervisor R. Beta, QA Engineer 2.
Plant Status Unit 1 Shutdown for repair to main turbine.
Unit 2 Power ascension testing in progress at 20% plateau.
3.
Organization and Administration (Units 1 and 2)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's on-site and off-site organiza-tions to verify conformance with the requirements of the Technical Specifications.
The scope of this review included personnel qualifi-cations, personnel authority and responsibility, shift crew composition, and on-site and off-site review committee memberships and qualification.
-4-Amendment 5 to the Unit 2 Technical Specifications and Amendment 37 to the Unit 1 Technical Specifications were issued on ?;ovenber 13, 1978.
These amendments include a major revision of the licensee's on-site organization and specify implementation of the revised organization within 90 days of amendment issuance.
The licensee's on-site organization was in a transition state at the time of this inspection.
Several newly-created positions were not yet filled.
It will be necessary to revise Procedure 1005.01, the Administrative Controls Manual, to reflect the new organization.
This is an open item (313/78-22-01 and 368/78-29-01) and will be reviewed further in a future inspection.
fio items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
4.
Overflow of Sodium Hydroxide Storage Tag (Unit 1)
The inspector, who was at the site at the time of the incident, inter-viewed the Shift Supervisor and Operators, reviewed the P&ID's, and visually inspected portions of the systems.
a.
Events At approximately 1000 on January 3,1979, the recirculation of T-9, the Sodium Thiosulfate Storage Tank, using P-29, the Sodium Hydroxide Recirculation Pump, had been completed and the pump had been realigned to recirculate T-)0, the Sodium Hydroxide Storage Tank.
However, the valves at the tanks were not realigned to T-10, and as a result when pump P-29 was restarted, Sodium Thiosulfate was pumped from tank T-9 to tank T-10 causing T-10 to overflow through relief valve PSV-1617. The Sodium Mydroxide with a pH of 13.7+ flowed from T-10, which is outside, into a storm drain and ultimately to the Unit l'o.1 discharge canal resulting in exceeding the pH discharge limits of 6.0 to 9.0.
The value of the pH at the point where the discharge canal flows into Lake Dardanelle was measured at 9.2 when the spill was discovered at approximately 1500 on January 3,1979.
Followup pH samples indicated that the high pH was localized at the discharge point into the lake and dissipated after the leak was stopped and isolated.
b.
Items Identified For Which the Licensee is Taking Further Corrective Action (1) Operator error in that an incomplete valve lineup was per-formed for the recirculation of tank T-10.
OP 1104.05, Rev. 5, valve lineup was not followed. A licensee noncon-formance report is being issued. This item is to be carried as an unresolved item (313/78-22-02).
(2)
Control room operator error in that when t! a low level alarm on T-9 and high level alarm on T-10 were received, the operator failed to properly evaluate and respond to the
.
-5-alarms and continued to be unaware of the problem for an extended period of time.
A licensee nonconformance report is being issued.
This item is to be carried as an unresolved item (313/78-22-03).
(3) The current P&ID M-236 is not correct in that the print shows an additional pump, P-ll8, installed in the system for recirculation of Sodium Thiosulfate.
This pump is physically installed on mounts but not connected to the system.
A licensee nonconformance report is being issued. This item is to be carried as an unresolved item (313/78-22-04).
(4) The operator log sheets do not have the set points of the various Technical Specification (TS) limited parameters.
The licensee has stated that the Unit 1 logs will be updated to identify TS limited parameters.
This item is to be carried as an open item (313/78-22-05).
5.
Review of Plant Operations (Unit 2)
The inspectors reviewed plant logs and records to verify conformance to plant procedures and to confirm that Technical Specifications were met. The inspectors also conducted a plant tour of accessible areas to observe general housekeeping and to verify selected component configurations.
The following logs and records for October through December 1978 were reviewed:
Monthly Remote Shutdown Channel Check Log Monthly Post Accident Log Shutdown Log Auxiliary Operator's Outside Log Power Distribution and Burnup Log (December only)
Daily Shift Containment Sump Discharge Log CEA Position Log Control Room Log (December only)
Unit 2 Station Log During this review of logs and records, the inspector noted that the Unit 2 Auxiliary Operator's Outside Log had no entry for the Emergency Pond Level on five occasions in October 1978, as required by Technical Specification 4.7.4.1.a.
A check of Unit 1 Auxiliary Operator's Outside Log showed that the pond level had been checked and recorded on those dates by Unit 1 personnel.
No further problems w.th this reading were noted in November or December logs.
The inspector noted a frequent problem with operator signatures and review signatures missing from various logs.
This was discussed with the Operations Supervisor for Unit 2 and resolve.
-6-The inspector verified that the operating orders did not conflict with the intent of the Technical Specification requirements and that the Abnormal Plant Condition Reports contained no noncompliance items which involve Technical Specification reporting or LC0 requirements.
The inspector selected several entries in the Jumper and Bypass Log and with a licensee representative observed those jumpers and bypasses to verify that installation was in agreement with the log. As a result, it was determined that three jumpers had been removed without document-ing their removal in the log.
Two jumpers for system 99Y had been put
'into panel 2C99A and logged ir January 1978, and subsequently removed in February 1978, but not cleared from the 109 One jumper in system 49 had been removed and logged removed but no verification of removal had been documented.
The licensee was informed that failure to maintain these records current is contrary to procedure 1005.04, Control and Use of Bypasses and Jumpers, and that this failure to follow procedures is considered an item of noncompliance.
The following general observations were made during the plant tour:
No excessive fluid leaks or piping vibrations were observed.
.
Seismic restraints and pipe hangers appeared to be in satis-
.
factory condition.
Selected valves were observed to be in the required positions.
.
Selected equipment caution and hold tags were verified to be
.
correct.
Control room operators were knowledgeable in annunciator status.
.
Selected recorders were recording properly.
.
Radiation controls were observed to be established properly.
.
Control room manning was in accordance with Technical Specifications.
.
In general, plant cleanliness was satisfactory.
However, the inspector observed several cardboard cartons containing insulating material to be stored in the north diesel generator room.
Procedure 1005.17, Control of Combustibles, prohibits use or storage of combustible materials in this room and prohibits leaving transient combustibles unattended in a safety-related fire zone.
This same procedure requries that all wood used in safety-related fire zones be treated with a fire retardant or painted with a fire retardant coating.
The inspector observed an untreated wood ladder inside the rear of the Engineered Safety Features
.
.
-7-Auxiliary Panel in the control room.
These two items and the item con-cerning the jumper log, discussed above, will be treated as three examples of a single item of noncompliance involving failure t~o adhere to procedures.
During the plant tour, the inspectors noted the following discrep-ancies involving fire doors:
The fire door at elevation 335 between the Auxiliary Building
.
stairwell and the 2P36B cubicle area was open and its closing mechanism was broken or disconnected.
Fire door number 235 was open and its closing mechanism was
.
broken or disconnected.
The door to the battery charger room would not shut freely,
.
requiring slamming for complete closure.
Fire door number 278 was held partially open by a dislodged
.
piece of door stripping material.
Fire door number 259 was not fully shut.
This door required
.
slamming for complete closure.
Technical Specification 3.7.11 requires that all penetration fire barriers protecting safety related areas shall be functional, or that a continuous fire watch be established on at least one side of the affected penetration.
The four fire doors noted above which were open or partially open at the time of the inspector's plant tour on January 11, 1979, were not functional as fire barriers. Thus, they could not fulfill their design feature of ensuring that a fire will be confined or adequately retarded from spreading to adjacent portions of the facility.
The licensee's failure to maintain these fire doors functional as fire barriers or to establish a continuous fire watch is a violation of Technical Specification requirements.
6.
Inoperable Control Rod (Unit 2)
From a review of the Unit 2 Shift Supervisor's Log, the inspector found that during the aporoach to criticality on December 19, 1978, control rod Group A CEA-52 had stopped at 144 inches withdrawn due to an apparent failed lift rod.
The control rod was left as-positioned and the reactor taken critical.
The control rod was within seven inches of the other Group A control rods.
The inspector informed the licensee that although the contr~ol rod did not appear inoperable
.
-
-8-due to excessive friction, mechanical interference or known to be untrippable as outlined in Technical Specification (TS) 3.1.3.1.a, TS 3.1.3.1.c does address operation with an inoperable control rod (caused other than as outlined in TS 3.1.3.1.a).
TS 3.1.3.1.c does allow operation to continue in Modes 1 and 2; however, TS 3.0.4~
states in part that, " Entry into an Operational Mode or other specified applicability condition shall not be made unless the con-ditions of the Limiting Condition for Operation are met without reliance on provisions contained in the Action Statements unless other-wise excepted." The entry from Mode 3 to Mode 2 was identified by the inspector as being contrary to TS 3.0.4.
Exceeding a Limiting Condition for Operations was also identified by the inspector as reportable under TS 6.9.1.8.b (14-day).
The licensee has subsequently issueo a 14-day report.
Changes have been initiated to OP 2102.02 and 2102.03 which require the operator to verify that Mode 1 conditions are satisfied before entering Mode 1 from Mode 2.
The 14-day report was forwarded to all Unit 2 operators. Although this is an item of noncompliance, no reply will be necessary since corrective action is already being taken.
7.
Plant Operations (Unit 2)
During a reactor startup of Unit 2 on December 20,1978, the inspector observed that an operator under instruction was allowed to perform a step out-of-sequence in the procedure, " Approach to Criticality," 2102.08.
Procedural Step 6.4, which withdraws the safety rods, was performed prior to Step 6.2, which withdraws the part length control rods. Technical Specification 6.8.1 states that,
" Written procedures shall be established, implemented and maintained covering... tne applicable procedures recommended in Appendix "A" of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978" which includes nuclear startup under part 2.b.
The licensee's failure to perform the approach to criticality in accordance with procedure 2102.08,
" Approach to Criticality," is an apparent item of noncompliance with Section 6.8.1 of the Technical Specifications.
8.
Testing of Pipe Supports and Restraint Systems (Unit 2)
a.
Records of Pipe Support Testing As previously reported in paragraph 5 of report 50-368/78-26, only one of eleven systems met the original acceptance criteria.
The licensee's resolution to this problem as requested by Startup Field Report No.1062 was to calculate new deflection criteria based on measured temperatures. The response to this field report was:
.
-9-Visual inspection of piping showed no binding or inter-ference.
Based on computer analysis of piping and interpolation of measured deflections, the measured deflection is acceptable and the piping stresses do not exceed code allowances.
Although new acceptance criteria for the deflections was not transmitted to the site and entered in the test procedure, the evaluation of the test results was made and the results found acceptable. The licensee's final. acceptance of test 2.650.15,
" Pipe / Component Hot Deflection Preoperational Test" was delayed pending final acceptance at 20% reactor power of a correction to a deficiency on binding of main steam lines downstream of the M31V's.
Followup inspection of this deficiency was satis-factory and the test was signed as complete.
b.
Examination of Pipe Supports Visual inspections of the pipe support and restraint systems will be completed following completion of the transient tests 2.800.13 (Piping Dynamic Transient Test) and 2.800.14 (Steady State Vibration Power Escalation Test). This will be carried as an open item.
(368/78-29-02)
9.
Low Power Level Data Review (Unit 2)
The purpose of this inspection effort was to ascertain whether the low power testing has been conducted in accordance with approved test procedures, and whether the test results have been reviewed and are acceptable.
The inspector reviewed the results of the test procedure,
" Low Power Physics Tests" (2.750.01 R.2) with emphasis on the following specific areas:
a.
Moderator temperature reactivity coefficient and defect measure-ment.
b.
Boron reactivity measurements, c.
Pseudo rod ejection test, d.
Control rod reactivity worth determination, verify rod insertion limits and assure adequate shutdown margin.
This testing was initiated on December 5, 1978 and completed on December 16, 1978.
In the review of the test results, the inspector found that:
All final results met the acceptance criteria.
.
.
-
-10-All changes to the tests were properly made.
.
The four reported test deficiencies, none of which were against
.
the acceptance criteria, were properly resolved.
The previously reported (paragraph 12.b of Report 50-368/78-281 problem with CEA 4-11 being a more reactive ejected rod than the predicted rod CEA 6-1, although not reported as a test deficiency, was properly resolved.
The required resetting of specified protective trips was made.
.
Prior to authorizing further Power Ascension Tests, the licensee
.
completed an initial review of the test results.
The inspector had no additional questions in this area.
10.
Power Ascension and Transient Tests (Unit 2)
The power ascension and transient testing, which are being conducted according to the Power Ascension Test Procedure 2.800.01 was initiated on December 16, 1978, but a sustained 20% power level had not been achieved as of January 5,1979 due to problems with steam dump bypass valves, main condenser tube breaks, feedwater heater tube leaks, and main turbine vibrations.
As the test progresses, inspection effort will continue to be placed on the witnessing of various parts of the tests.
11.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to ascertain whether they are acceptable, items of noncompliance or deviations.
There were three unresolved items identified during this inspection.
(Details, paragraph 4)
12.
Exit Meetings (Units 1 and 2)
Exit meetings were conducted on December 21, 1978 and January 5,1979 with Mr. J. 0'llanlon (Plant Manager) and other members of the AP&L staff; and on January 12 with Mr. B. Terwilliger (Manager Operations and Maintenance) and other members of the AP&L staff.
The inspectors discussed the scope of the inspection and summarized the inspection findings which are detailed in this report.