IR 05000312/1982016
| ML20053A000 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 05/05/1982 |
| From: | Canter H, Obrien J, Thomas Young NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20052J074 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-312-82-16, NUDOCS 8205240409 | |
| Download: ML20053A000 (8) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
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Report No. 50-312/82-16 (OPS)
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Docket No. 50-312 License No.
DPR-54 Safeguards Group Licensee:
Sacramento Municipal Utility District P. O. Box 15830 Sacramento, California 95813 Facility Name:
Rancho Seco Unit 1 Inspection at:
Heralf California (Rancho Seco Site)
Inspection conducted:
April 1 to May 2, 198J Inspectors:
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C or, Senj ogy gstopnt inspector Date Signed h-.
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John O'Brien, Ljiit Resgdytt ingpector Date Signed Date Signed
[-8"b Approved By:
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jects section #2 Date Signed
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T. Young, Chic 4 Reac t(p F
Reactor Operatibns Pron _ e s Branch Summary:
Inspection between April 1 - May 2, 1982 (Report 50-312/82-16)
Areas Inspected: Operational safety verification; long term shutdown activities; maintenance observations; surveillance observations; follow-up on Regional requests; follow-up on lleadquarter's requests; and independent inspection effort.
The inspection involved 160 inspector-hours by the Resident Inspectors.
Results: Of the seven areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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RV Form 219 (2)
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- R. Rodgriguez, Manager Nuclear Operations
- P.
Oubre', Plant Superintendent D.
Blachly, Operations Supervisor E. Bradley, Emergency Plan Coordinator N. Brock, Electrical /I&C Maintenance Supervisor D. Cass, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor
- R.
Colombo, Technical Assistant G. Coward, Maintenance Supervisor
- S.
Crunk, Associate Nuclear Engineer D. Gardiner, Senior Chemical & Radiation Assistant J. Jewett, Quality Assurance Engineer W. Jurkovich, Site Resident Engineer (Generation Engineering)
F. Kellie, Assistant Chemistry and Health Physics Supervisor R. Miller, Chemistry / Radiological Supervisor J. Newey, Senior Chemical & Radiation Assistant
- T.
Perry, On-site Quality Assurance Supervisor J. Price, Surveillanca Test Coordinator S. Rutter, Quality Assurance Engineer L. Schwieger, Quality Assurance Director
- B.
Spencer, Shift Supervisor T. Tucker, Planner / Scheduler J. Uhl, Mechanical Engineer D. Whitney, Engineering and Quality Control Supervisor B. Wichert, Plant Mechanical Engineer W. Wilson, Senior Chemical & Radiation Assistant The inspectors also talked with and interviewed several other licensee employees, including members of the engineering, maint-enance, operations and Quality Assurance (QA) organizations.
- Denotes those attending the Exit Interview on May 3, 1982.
2.
Operational Safety Verification The plant was critical and at power until the swing shift on April 2, 1982, when the licensee began plant shutdown for non-destructive inspection of the high pressure injection (HPI)
nozzels, safe-ends and thermal sleeves.
Based on the results of the inspection, the licensee placed the plant in cold shut-down on April 6, 1982, and drained down the RCS for repairs on the HPI nozzles.
The ins 7ector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators.
The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper
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-2-return to service of affected components.
Tours of the auxiliary
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building and turbine building were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards fluid
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leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.
The inspector verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with.the station security plan.
The inspector examined plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified the implementation of radiation protection controls.
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The inspector also walked down the accessible portions of the auxiliary feed system and emergency power system to verify opera-bility, and witnessed portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with radwaste barreling.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
3.
Long Term Shutdown Activities The plant was shutdown with the RCS drained down between April 7 and 25, 1982.
In addition to the above, the licensee conducted an inspection of the auxiliary feedwater header in-t side the OTSGs.
Repairs are expected to keep the plant shut i
down for an as yet undetermined period (See Paragraph 7).
During the report period the inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions j
with control room operators.
The inspector verified that sur-veillance tests required during the shutdown were accomplished, reviewed tagout records, and verified containment integrity.
i Tours of the Auxiliary Building and Reactor Building, includ-ing exterior areas were made to assess equipment conditions
and plant conditions.
Also, the tours were made to assess
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the effectiveness of radiological controls and adherence to
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regulatory requirements.
Maintenance work requests was veri-fled to have been initiated for equipment maintenance.
The j
inspectors observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and looked for potential fire hazards.
The inspectors, by observation and direct interview, verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's jumper / bypass controls to verify there were no conflicts with technical specifications.
Finally, the inspectors witnessed
portions of the radioactive waste systems controls associated
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with_radwaste shipments.
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l No items of noncompliance:or deviations were identified.
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4.
Maintenance 0b~servations The inspectors observed portions of *he maintenance activities listed below and verified that work was accomplished in accor-dance with approved procedures, that work was accomplished by qualified personnel, that provisions for stationing a fire watch to oversee activities involving welding and open flame were complied with and that LCO requirements were met during repair.
(a)
(b)
Replacement of "B" HPI pump lube oil coolers (CCW and NSRW).
(c)
HPI nozzle "A" and "B" repair.
(d)
Makeup pump motor installation.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
5.
Surveillance Observations The inspectors observed portions of the below listed surveillance testing to verify that the tests were covered by properly approved procedures; that the procedures used were consistent with technical specification requirements; that a minimum crew requirements were met; that test prerequisites were completed; that special test equipment was calibrated and in service; and, that the test re-sults were adequate.
(a)
SP200.18 Monthly Auxiliary Feed Pump P-319 Operational Verification Test (b)
SP201.03B Surveillance of Plant Fire System (diesel).
(c)
SP210.03A Turbine Steam Stop Valves.
(d)
SP203.05A Quarterly DHR System
"B" Loop (P261B).
(e)
SP203.08 Quarterly Core Flooding System Surveillance Test at Shutdown No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
6.
Follow-up on Regional Requests During the month of April, 1982, personnel from the Region V office of the NRC in Walnut Creek, California requested infor-mation from the Resident Inspectors regarding the operation and maintenance of the Rancho Seco power plant.
Information was obtained and transmitted to the Region V office concerning:
(a)
High pressure injection nozzle inspections and repairs.
(b)
Auxiliary feedwater header inspection.
(c)
Loose parts-monitoring system.
(d)
NSEB construction schedule.
(e)
Outstanding inspector follow-up items.
(f)
IAEA seals found broken.
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No.: items of noncompliance or' deviations were identified.
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7.
Follow-up on Headquarter's Requests During the. month of April,-1982, personnel from the NRC Headquarters in Bethesda, Maryland, requested information from the Resident Inspectors about the operation, design and maintenance of. the Rancho Seco power plant.
Information was.obtained and transmitted to the NRC Headquarters on:
(a)
Loose parts monitoring system.
(b)
Outstanding inspector follow-up items.
(c)
Early warning system installation schedule.
(d)
Personnel access hatch to the Reactor Building.
l (e)
High Pressure Injection Nozzle Repairs
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Rancho Seco was shut down during the evening of April 2,
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1982 to commence nondestructive examination of the four-High' Pressure Injection (HPI) nozzles, safe-ends and thermal sleeves.
The initial inspections were performed on April 3-4, 1982.
The results of these and other in-spections have been reported in Licensee Event-Report 82-09.
By the end of April, 1982, new thermal sleeves had been installed in the normal makeup nozzle ("A" nozzle) and one of the other three HPI nozzles ("B" nozzle).
The "A" nozzle
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also had a new safe-end welded to it due to cracking indica-
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tions which were found on the inner diameter approximately
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1.5-inches in from the elbow.
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was filled and vented on April 25, 1982.
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The NRC'had a number of items which required answers.
The
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Regional Office has asked the Office of Nuclear Regulation
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(NRR) to assume the lead responsibility on follow-up to these items.
The following items are included in this follow-up.
(1)
An evaluation of the consequences.of the missing
"A" thermal sleeve entering the reactor coolant j
piping and reactor. vessel and the justification for Racho Seco returning to power operation prior
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to retrieval of the thermal sleeve from the reactor vessel.
(2)
An evaluation of the final design of the thermal
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sleeves to minimize recurrence of thermal sleeve
failure.
(3)
Based on (1) and (2) above, determine the need to replace the "C" and "D" thermal sleeves, and
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required surveillance of these thermal sleeves
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should the reactor be returned to operation prior
to their replacement.
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(4)
An evaluation of the adequacy of the loose parts monitoring system to detect loose parts such as the "A" thermal sleeve in the reactor coolant system.
(f)
Auxiliary Feedwater Header Deformation-Visual examinations of the Once Through Steam Generators (OTSG) auxiliary feedwater heaters by the licensee during the week of April-19, 1982, _ have revealed de-formations and loose parts similar to that previously reported for Davis-Besse.
Because of the substantive NRC technical review of this problem that will be necessary, the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) was asked to assume lead NRC responsibility for this review.
The NRR technical review will in-clude, but not be limited to the following areas.
(1)
An evaluation of the cause of auxiliary feedwater header deformations.
(2). Changes in the design of the auxiliary feedwater header and/or changes in plant operating conditions to prevent recurrence of similar head deformations.
(3)
An evaluation of potential damage to steam generator intervals due to foreign objects such as dowel pins or broken header supports.
The licensee has stated that a two to four month extension to the current outage is possible.
But, since final inspection of tne header, analysis _of the problem and design for the repair have not been completed, it may be premature to speculate on a start-up date for Rancho Seco.
The Resident Inspector attended a meeting in NRC Headquarters on April 23, 1982.
The meeting was held to discuss the informa-tion obtained on the header deformations by the licensees' and B&W up to that time.
Future meetings of this sort are probable.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were discussed.
The inspectors will follow this issue as part of their review of Licensee Event Report 82-10.
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Independent Inspection Effort-Discu'ssions'wer'e hNld between the Resident Inspectors and
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operations,_ security.and. maintenance personnel in an attempt to better understand problems they may have which are related to' nuclear safety.
These discussions will continue as a standard practice.
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-6-On numerous occasions, during the month of April, 1982, the Resident Inspectors attended operations and outage status meetings.
These meetings are held by the Operations Supervisor and the Plant Scheduler to provide all disciplines on-site with an update on the plant status and on-going maintenance work.
In addition to the above, independent inspection effort was performed on the following items:
Corrective Actions and Reporting The Systematic Appraisal of Licensee Performance prc. gram (SALP)
recently reported on Rancho Seco's performance for June, 1980 through June, 1981.
The area of Corrective Action and Report-ing was identified as being in Category 3, which is defined as a combination of attributes which demonstrates achievement of only minimally satisfactory safety performance.
In response to the SALP findings,.the licensee described a program which'is being developed to address the concerns.
(Refer to an April 9, 1982 letter, Mattimoe to Sternberg).
On April 15, 1972, the inspector reviewed QAP 27, Revision 0, entitled Corrective Action, which was effective on September, 1981.
This procedure only defines the Quality Assurance Organizations responsibilities "for acceptable corrective action formulation."
However, it does not appear to establish the procedure for maintaining the control or corrective action requirements as stated in the procedure's purpose.
The referenced letter, also discusses a new procedure QCI No. 7, entitled Corrective Action Program, which had not been issued yet.
The licensee states in the referenced letter that "This program should raise the per-formance level of the functional area (corrective action) to an acceptable level."
The inspector was informed on April 15, 1982, that a QA Corrective Action Coordinator was appointed.
This coordinator will be referenced in QCI No. 7.
His main function should be to assure that the root cause of issues are addressed.
The inspectors will perform future reviews of this area to monitor the progress of these new commitments.
MSRC MEETING On April 30, 1982, the inspector attended an MSRC meeting at SMUD Headquarters.
Among other items, the licensee discussed the status of Auxiliary Feedwater Header repairs.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives throughout the month and at the' conclusion of the inspection on May 3, 1982.
(See Paragraph-1).
The inspectors summarized their-inspection findings.
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