IR 05000312/1982013
| ML20053A007 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 04/29/1982 |
| From: | Eckhardt J, Elin J, Hernandez G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20053A005 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-312-82-13, NUDOCS 8205240420 | |
| Download: ML20053A007 (4) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGI'0Nh Report No.
50-312/82-13 Docket No.
50-312 License No.
DPR-54 Safeguards Group Licensee:
Sacramento Municipal Utility District P. O. Box 15830 Sa ramento, California 95813 Facility Name:
Rancho Seco Inspection at:
Herald, California (Rancho Seco site)
inspection conducted:
April 3-4 and 7-8,1982 Inspectors:
h.
Wd 4/21/82.-
G.
ernandez, Reacto() Inspector
.Datt Signed GO
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nhdn Date Signed
[. O. Elin, Reactor Inspector 4/&9/88
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Approved by:
(J.
. Eckhardt, Acting Chief, Reactor Projects Ddt'e Sidned ection 1, Reactor Construction Projects Branch Summary:
Inspection on April 3-4 and 7-8, 1982 (Report No. 50-312/82-13)
Areas Inspected: A special inspection by regionally based inspectors of licensee nondestructive examination activities on four elbow to safe-end nozzles of the high pressure injection system. This examination was performad in response to indications found at Florida Power Corporation's Crystal River Plant and as described in IE Information Notice No. 82-09.
Additionally, licensee action on a previously identified inspection item was examined.
The inspection involved 22 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC inspectors.
Results:
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
820S240420 820429 PDR ADOCK 05000312 O
PDR RV Form 219(2)
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted a.
Sacramento Municipal Utility District (SMUD)
R. Columbo, Technical Assistant V. C. Lewis, Resident Engineer T. E. Perry, Site Supervisor-Quality Assurance b.
Bechtel Power Corporation C. Letellier, Quality Control Coordinator H. Davis, Civil: Inspector E. Conley, Mechai::al/ Welding Inspector 2.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Inspection Items (Closed) Follow-up Item (50-312/81-10/01):
Inservice Inspection (ISI)
Procedure No. 240 allows liquid penetrant examinations to be made at a non-standard temperature range The ASME. Code in Section V, Article 6 requires that when liquid penetrant examinations are to be performed at other than the standard temperature range (60*F to 125*F), the procedure shall be qualified at the proposed temperature range. The inspector was provided during this inspection with the qualification data for the temperature range (44*F to 125*F) allowed by the procedure. The inspector found the data consistent with the requirements of the code.
This item is closed.
3.
Cracking in Piping of Makeup Coolant Lines at B&W Plants On January 21, 1982, Florida Power Corporation's Crystal River Plant Unit 3 identified a leak associated with a 213 inch check valve in the makeup line to the 26 inch reactor coolant (RC)
loop A inlet line.
Investigation revealed a 140 degree circum-ferential crack in the check valve body near the valve to safe-end weld and subsequent nondestructive examination disclosed a number
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of cracks in the valve, the safe-end, and the thermal sleeve.
A visual inspection of the high pressure injection thermal sleeve revealed that the sleeve was loose and showed evidence of wear in areas of contact.
As a result of the Crystal River finding, all Babcock and Wilcox (B&W) olants initiated programs to inspect the high pressure
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injection nozzles to determine the condition of the thermal sleeves and associated piping.
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On April 3,1982, the Rancho Seco facility was shut down to perform ultrasonic and radiographic testing of the four high pressure injection nozzles. The resultant examination revealed unacceptable indications in two out of the four nozzles.
The following are the examination results:
a.
Nozzle " A" (Normal Make-up Nozzle)
Circumferential and longitudinal I.D. cracking of the nozzle safe-end was found upstream of the thermal sleeve. The cracking was believed to have initiated at the I.D. of the safe-end and progressed to a maximum of 20% through wall.
RT examinations of the safe-end showed the thermal sleeve weld
" buttons" to be worn, but in place. The thermal sleeve appeared to be missing.
The configuration of the thermal sleeve is such that it could enter the reactor coolant system inlet nozzle and be carried downward to the bottom of the reactor vessel where it would be trapped by the flow distributor.
B&W and the licensee are evaluating what effects the missing thermal sleeve might have on reactor operations.
b.
Nozzle "B" No nozzle or safe-end cracking was detected.
An RT examination indicated the thermal sleeve had moved 1" upstream toward the weld buttons, and two out of the eight buttons-were missing.
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Nozzles "C" & "D" No nozzle or safe-end cracking was detected. The positioning of the thermal sleeve was found to be satisfactory and all weld buttons were in place.
During the weekend of April 10-11, 1982, the "A" and "B" nozzles were visually examined and the "A" nozzle thermal sleeve was
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confirmed to be missing and the "B" nozzle sleeve was found to be loose.
At present, licensee representatives are performing ultra-sonic and liquid penetrant examinations of the inside of the nozzles to assure that no degradation has resulted from the loss of the "A" thermal sleeve and as a result of the movement of the "B" thermal sleeve.
Present licensee plans call for replacement of the safe-ends and both "A" and "B" thermal sleeves with newly designed thermal sleeves.
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Observations of Work and Work Activities On April 3-4, 1982, the inspector observed the B&W ultrasonic examination of the four elbow to safe-end nozzles on the high pressure safety injection lines. The inspector noted that the examination was performed using the same B&W ultrasonic procedure being used at all B&W plants and using B&W trained personnel.
The personnel certifications of the B&W personnel were examined.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
5..
Management Interview
At the conclusion of the inspection, the inspector discussed the scope and findings of the inspection with Mr. R. Columbo.
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