IR 05000312/1982025
| ML20058D933 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 07/09/1982 |
| From: | Canter H, Obrien J, Thomas Young NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20058D915 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-312-82-25, NUDOCS 8207270450 | |
| Download: ML20058D933 (10) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report No. 50-312/82-25 (OPS)
Docket No. 50-312 License No. DPR-54 Safeguards Group Licensee: Sacramento Municipal Utility District P. O. Box 15830 Sacramento, California 95813 Facility Name:
Rancho Seco Unit 1 Inspection at:
Herald, California (Rancho Seco Site)
Inspection conducted: June 2,1982 to July 5,1982 M
k(,#T Y~ f' N Inspectors:
m g.~ Canter, nior Resident Inspector Date Signed
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D & fl~J b fue 7 - 4-Ert O'Brien,fitResidentInspector Date Signed Approved by:
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ToTbert Young, Jr/, Chief, Reactpr Projects Date Signed Section2,ReactdrOperatjqyProjectBranch Summary:
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Inspection between June 2 to July 5, 1982 (Report No. 50-312/82-25)
Areas Inspected: Long term shutdown activities; maintenance observations; surveillance observations; review of plant operations; design changes and modifications; follow-up on Headquarter's requests; follow-up on Regional requests; Licensee Event Reoort follow-up; and independent inspection effort. The inspection involved 176 inspector hours by the Resident Inspectors.
Results: Of the nine areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
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- R. Rodriguez, Manager, fluclear Operations P. Oubre', Plant Superintendent
- D. Blachly, Operations Supervisor E. Bradley, Emergency Plan Coordinator
- M. Caldwell, Records 11anagement Supervisor
- L. Conklin, Electrical Engineer, GED
- R. Colombo, Technical Assistant G. Coward, Maintenance Supervisor
- S. Crunk, Associate fluclear Engineer D. Gardiner, Senior Chemical and Radiation Assistant
- W. Jurkovich, Site Resident Engineer (Generation Engineering)
F. Kellie, Assistant Chemical and Health Physics Supervisor
- R. Lawrence, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor R. Miller, Chemistry / Radiological Supervisor
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J. flewey, Senior Chemical and Radiation Assistant
- T. Perry, Onsite Quality Assurance Supervisor J. Price, Surveillance Test Coordinator
S. Rutter, Duality' Assurance Engineer
- L. Schwieger,. Quality Assurance Director l
T. Tucker, Planner / Scheduler
- J. Uhl, Mechanical Engineer
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- W. Wells, Administrative Assistant D. Whitney, Engineering and Quality Control Supervisor
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- B. Wichert, Plant Mechanical Engineer W. Wilson, Senior Chemical and Radiation Assistant The inspectors also talked with and interviewed several other licensee emoloyees, including members of the engineering, maintenance, operations, and quality assurance organizations.
- Denotes those attending the Exit Interview on June 30, 1982.
2.
Long Term Shutdown Activities
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The plant was in cold shutdown for the entire month to perform repairs to the "A" and "B" High Pressure Injection flozzles and
Thermal Sleeves, and the Auxiliary Feed headers in both Once-l Through-Steam Generators (OTSGs).
During the report period, the inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs, and conducted discussions
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with control room operators. The inspectors verified that sur-veillance tests required during the shutdown were accomplished, that tagout records were reviewed, and that containment integrity
was verified. Tours of the Auxiliary Building and Reactor Building, including exterior areas, were made to assess equipment and plant
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conditions. Also, the tours were made to assess the effectiveness of radiological controls and adherence to regulatory requirements.
Maintenance work requests were verified to have been initiated for equipment maintenance. The inspectors observed plant housekeeping /
cleanliness conditions and looked for potential fire hazards. The inspectors, by observation and direct interview, verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's jumper / bypass controls to verify there were no conflicts with technical specifications.
Finally, the inspectors witnessed portions of the radioactive waste systems controls associated with radwaste shipments and solidification.
Auxiliary Feedwater Internal lieader Reoairs
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Since discovering the damaged internal headers in April 1982, the licensee has gone ahead with designing and installing an external feedwater header on each OTSG. The resident inspectors have reviewed the licensee's quality assurance / quality control (.0A/QC) program and management controls for these repairs. They will continue to review these programs as changes occur.
In addition, the inspectors have been monitoring repair activities. As of this wri. ting, six holes have been drilled through each OTSG shell and cylindrical baffle.
External ring auxiliary feed headers and risers are being " fitted up" to the OTSGs.
Eddy current testing of both OTSGs is complete.
Nine tubes will be stablized and plugged in the "B" OTSG. Six are peripheral tubes, and have been selected due to their close proximity to the damaged auxiliary feed header (less than 1/4 inch). The additional three tubes to be plugged have shown (0D) flaws in excess of 40 percent of wall thickness (one peripheral and two lane tubes). Ten tubes will be stablized and plugged in the "A" 0TSG: six due to their close proximity to the damaged auxiliary feed header; four due to 0D flaws at about 40 percent of wall thickness or greater (three peripheral, one lane). One of the peripheral tubes which is less than a quarter of an inch from the damaged.,uxiliary feed header also has a dent and a flaw in the dent. No through wall failures were identified in either OTSG tubes.
Appropriate 10 CFR 50.59 reviews have been made for work completed or in progress. The licensee is looking towards a first of August 1982 hydrostatic test of the auxiliary feed water headers and a plant startup commencing mid-August 1982.
Flo items of noncompliance or deviations were identifieid.
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3.
M_aintenance Observations
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The inspectors observed portions of the maintenance activities listed below and verified that work was accomplished in accordance with approved procedures, that work was accomplished by qualified personnel, that provisions for stationing a fire watch to oversee activities involving welding and open flame were complied with, and that LCO requirements were met during repair.
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a.
Fire protection system repairs on the main transformer l A.
b.
Retention bas'in bypass valve operator repairs.
c.
"B" Auxiliary feed flow transmitter repair and calibration.
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Fire alarm station installation for Zone 42.
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Auxiliary feed headers' repairs.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
4.
Surveillance Observations
The inspectors observed portions of the below listed surveillance testing to verify that the tests were covered by properly approved procedures; that the procedures used were consistent with technical specification requirements; that minimum crew requirements were net; that test pre-requisites were completed; that special test equipment was calibrated
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and in service; and that the test results were adequate.
a.
SP206.03A - Monthly "A" diesel surveillance test.
b.
SP201.03B - Monthly diesel driven fire pump test.
c.
SP205.07A - quarterly valve inspection.
d.
SP201.03C - Monthly surveillance of plant fire pump and power supplies.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
5.
Review of Plant Operations I
l The resident inspectors exanined the licensee's facility o3erations in the
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area of Emergency Preparedness to ascertain compliance witi regulatory requirements. The inspectors examined the licensee's coordination with offsite agencies. This was done by attending a training session conducted by the licensee for an offsite agency.
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-4-The inspectors also examined the licensee's facilities and equipment, their means for monitoring release of radioactivity, their medical arrangements, and their training.
Finally, the inspectors witnessed a drill on June 9,1982, and an exercise on June 23, 1982.
The licensee's onsite response from the operations department was adequate. The health and safety of the public would have been protected had the licensee responded to events similar to those which were simulated during the drill and the exercise.
One reason for performing drills is to pick up problems with nrocedures and response actions so that the problems can be corrected before actual use. The one problem that directly affected the interface between the NRC resident inspector, the licensee, and other NRC locations was the use of the Emergency Notification System (ENS) phones.
10 CFR 50.72 states, in part, that the licensee shall establish and maintain an open, continuous comunications channel with the NRC Operations Center in Bethesda, Maryland, and shall close this channel only when notified by the NRC. This action was not taken during the complete running of the June 23, 1982 exercise scenario.
At the exit meeting on-June 30, 1982, the licensee comitted to looking into solutions for maintaining a " continuous" open comunications channel that won't burden operators who may be needed to respond to actual occurrences.
The above discussion and other comments will be addressed in an NRC inspection report on the witnessing of the June 23, 1982 exercise.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
6.
Design Changes and Modifications The Resident Inspector performed a record review of the design changes listed below, and verified that they were made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59; that the design changes were reviewed in accordance with technical specifications and the established Quality Assurance program; that acceptance and startup testing of modifications were conducted in accordance with technically adequate and approved procedures; that appropriate controls were implemented (for example:
firewatches, work clearances, welding and cutting controls, etc.);
that operating procedures modifications were made and approved in accordance with the technical specifications; and that records of the design changes were maintained as described in 10 CFR 50.59b and the established QA program, a.
ECN-A-3546 - Emergency Lighting for the Control Room.
Installed to comply with Appendix R, Section III-J (fire protection). The modification was completed on May 14, 1982.
b.
ECN-A-2933 - Redesign of the Over-Voltage and UnderJeegency Relays for the Class IE Electrical Distribution System. ThTs modification
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No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
7.
Follow-up on Headouarter's Requests During the month of June 1982, personnel from the NRC Headquarters in Bethesda, Maryland, requested information from the resident inspectors about the operation, design, and maintenance of the Rancho Seco power plant.
Information was obtained and transmitted to the NRC Headquarters on:
a.
Post accident sampling system; b.
Emergency Plan; c.
Status of 0TSG rework; and, d.
Loose parts monitoring system.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
8.
Follow-up on Regional Requests During the month of June 1982, personnel from the Region V office of the NRC in Walnut Creek, California, requested information from the resident inspectors regarding the operation and maintenance of the Rancho Seco power plant.
Information was obtained and transmitted to the Region V office concerning:
a.
Status of 0TSG rework b.
Emergency Plan No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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9.
Licensee Event-Report Follow-up (LER)
The resident inspectors performed an examination of the following LERs to ascertain,whether additional inspection effort or other IE response is warranted, whether corrective action discussed in the licensee's report appears appropriate, and whether the information reported to the NRC appears to satisfy reporting requirements.
In addition, the inspectors attempted to ascertain whether these events involved continued operation in violation of regulatory requirements or license conditions.
The LERs listed below appear to meet the above criteria and require no further follow-up at this time. However, some of these items may have been the subject of items of noncomoliance.
In these cases, further corrective action may be required in response to the citation.
-6-81-16-Tl (CLOSED) HPI Pump Operability 81-47-T0 (CLOSED) Pressurizer Heater Intermittent Operability 82-03-T0 (CLOSED) HPI Pump Operability 82-04-T0 (CLOSED) Chlorine Release 81-52-L0 (CLOSED) NSRW Pump Operability 81-54-L0 (CLOSED) RPS Surveillance Improperly Completed 81-55-L0 (CLOSED)' RPS Pressure Transmitter Drift 82-02-L0 (CLOSED) Snubber Failures 82-04-LO (CLOSED) RPS Pressure Transmitter Drift 82-05-L0 (CLOSED) "B" Diesel Generator Inoperable 82-12-L0 (CLOSED) "A" Decay Heat Pump Oil Leak No items of noncompliance or devia'tions were noted in the above examination except for LERs 82-03-T0 and 82-05-L0 which were subjects of citations described in Inspection Report 50-312/82-08.
10.. Independent ~ Inspection Effort Discussions were held between the~ resident inspectors and operations, security, and maintenance personnel in an attempt to better understand problems they may have which are related to nuclear safety.
These discussions will continue as a standard practice.
On numerous occasions, during the month of June 1982, the resident inspectors attended operations status meetings. These meetings are held by the Operations Suoervisor to provide all disciplines onsite with an update on the plant status and ongoing maintenance work.
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In addition to the above, independent inspection effort was performed
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on the following items:
a.
Velan stop check valve failure at Davis-Besse.
b.
Item 80-34-02 (OPEN) - Control of Vendor / Technical Manuals:
The licensee has been working on this issue since discovery in 1980. The main thrust of the control system is to deal with " approved" copies of manuals only.
Approval in this instance gives a user the assurance that the manual is the latest one onsite that has entered the system.
If anyone has access to different information in the form of newer copies of manuals, the person is requested to submit that copy for approval and entry into the system. Administrative controls l
still must be set up to implement the approval and system entry discussion above. Currently, the're are over 500 manuals which
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have not been approved. A project leader and clerical staff
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l have been appointed as of June 21, 1982, to commence cataloaing e
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Currently, about 79 percent of all manuals are not approved. A licensee representative stated that'by September 30, 1982, administrative guidance will be in place to handle the control of vendor / technical manuals.
This item will remain open pending completion of the above stated commitment.
c.
Item 80-34-05 (CLOSED) - Retraining and Replacement Training:
The inspector determined that responsible management now have an overview of training status for nonlicensed training. Manage-ment is requiring implementation of the program which is defined in A.P.700.
On one occasion during a daily management meeting which the inspector attended, a high level plant manager stated that training to be given that day had priority over planned maintenance work.
A number of studies have been made by consultants on the licensed and nonlicensed training programs. The referenced item discusses a September 19, 1980 study by General Physics Coproration in which many reconinendations were made regarding the most efficient ways to deliver effective training. Among other recommendations, General Physics proposed an " equilibrium" training organization. As of January 1, 1982, the licensee met or exceeded the proposed plan.
Currently, the licensee is filling various positions in the training organization with consultant-supplied personnel. The present organization is an amplification of the " equilibrium" organi-zation recommended by General Physics. An in-house study and another study by Q.E.S. Corporation have made further recom-mendations.
The A.P. 700 program is being implemented based on a review by the resident inspector and attendance in various lectures by the resident inspectors. The licensee is working on a July 1985 goal for complete implementation of their program with
in-hous:* personnel.
In addition to the work described above, the licensee is actively pursuing INP0 accreditation of their training program. Since, qualification and training of personnel at Rancho Seco have been the subjects of discussions by INPO, industry representatives, or the NRC since before the accident at Three Mile Island, Rancho Seco is planning to participate in a certification program on the adecuacy of training to be administered by INP0.
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-8-A major holdup in being able to state that A.P.700 is completely implemented rests in the delay of the computerized record system.
Progress has been made on a small scale with respect to documenting all the various training lectures given but the system is still
'more or less documented manually.
It is still handled by individual departments, but with more control on the part of manage-ment than in the past. The earliest date for the installation of a computerized management record status system is' January 1983.
Full implementation may take six months after installation. A licensee representative stated that the system should be "de-bugged" by June 1983.
Installation and implementation of the computerized record system will be followed up as a separate issue (.82-25-01).
At any rate, since so much progress has been made over the last two years, and since it appears that Section 5.5 to ANSI N18.1-1971 is now being complied with in the areas of reouire-ments and recommendations on retraining and replacement training, the inspectors consider Item 80-34-05 CLOSED.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
d.
Item 80-34-07 (CLOSED) - High Temperature Concrete:
The referenced item dealt with a 1974 open NCR which involved the temperature of the concrete around the containment pene-tration for the "B" main steam line. The licensee performed tests and a 10 CFR 50.59 review of the problem. The tests and inspection showed no visible effect on the concrete, and calcu-lations verified no adverse effect on the concrete's strength.
Further,thgFSAR(Section5.2.3.2.2) states,"Amaximumtempera-ture of 390 F may be tolerated for 120 days without appreciable deterioration of the concrete." The licensee has never seen such temperatures for such extended time periods.
There was missing insulation in the area around the pene-tration in question. This was corrected in November 1980.
The NCR was dispositioned in February 1981. This item has been resolved.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
e.
Item 80-34-08 (CLOSED) - Joint Utility Audits :
SMUD initiated correspondence, dated November 6,1980, with the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations to clarify the commitment stated in a July 22, 1976 letter to the NRC regarding the Quality Assurance Program. The committal was:
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"A management audit conducted by one member of the MSRC (with assistance as needed) is made annualy on
. Quality Assurance. No member of Quality Assurance is a member of the team. This management audit reviews conformance to the orange book and its attendant documents."
With this clarification, this item is considered closed.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
f.
Unresolved Item 81-17-Ol'(CLOSED): Administrative Procedure 22-was revised to correct the original concerns.
g.
Unrasolved Iten 81-12-06 (CLOSED):.The Inservice. Testing program was reviewed by the licensee to incorporate proper pump run durations in accordance with IWP 3500,' 4310, and 6220.
h.
Unresolved Iten 81-36-02 (CLOSED): No discrepancies were disclosed in the licensee's primary heat balance practices.
11.
Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives throughout the nonth and at the conclusion of the inspection on June 30, 1982 (.see paragraph 1). The inspectors sulnarized their 1.nspection findings.
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