IR 05000312/1982006
| ML20050B849 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 03/19/1982 |
| From: | Canter H, Obrien J, Thomas Young NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20050B845 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-***, TASK-TM 50-312-82-06, 50-312-82-6, NUDOCS 8204070486 | |
| Download: ML20050B849 (13) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report No.
50-312/82-06 (OPS)
Docket No.
50-312 License No.
DPR-54 Safeguards Group Licensee:
Sacramento Municipal Utility District P. O. Box 15830 Sacramento, California 95813-Facility Name:
Rancho Seco Unit 1 Inspection at:
Herald, California (Rancho Seco Site)
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Inspection conducted:
February 1-26, 1982 Inspectors:
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HarveyL.CatedSeniorQR,es.identI/ispector Date Signed
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Jdhn O' Brien, Un{ Resi t,I~spect r Date Signed
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Approved by:
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T. Young, Chief, fe actorPkqje t5 Section #2, Date Signed Reactor OperationLProjects Br h-Summt.,ry:
Inspection between February 1-26, 1982 (Report No. 50-312/82-06)
Areas Inspected: Operational safety verification; maintenance observations; surveillance observations; review of plant operations; licensee event report follow-up; follow-up on TMI modifications; followup on Headquarters requests; follow-up on regional office requests; and independent inspection effort.
The inspection activities involved 168 inspector-hours by the Resident Inspectors.
Results: Of the nine areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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B204070486 820319 RV Form 219(2)
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- R. Rodriguez, Manager Nuclear Operations
- P. Oubre', Plant Superintendent D. Blachly, Operations Supervisor
- E. Bradley, Emergency Plant Coordinator N. Brock, Electrical /I&C Maintenance Supervisor
- R. Colombo, Technical Assistant
- G. Coward, Maintenance Supervisor
- S. Crunk, Associate Nuclear Engineer
- J. Dowson, Quality Control Coordinator D. Elliott, Quality Assurance Engineer H. Heckert, Quality Assurance Engineer F. Kellie, Assistant Chemical and Health Physics Supervisor V. Lewis, Site Project Engineer
- R. Miller, Chemistry / Radiological Supervisor J. Newey, Senior Chemical and Radiation Assistant T. Perry, On-site Quality Assurance Supervisor
S. Rutter, Quality Assurance Engineer
- L. Schwieger, Quality Assurance Director
- B. Spencer, Assistant Operations Supervisor T. Tucker, Planner / Scheduler
- D. Whitney, Engineering and Quality Control Supervisor
- lichert, Mechanical Engineer
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The inspectors also talked with and interviewed several other licensee employees, including members of the engineering, meinten-ance, operations and quality assurance (QA) organizations.
- Denotes those attending the Exit Interview on February 26, 1982.
2.
Operational Safety Verification The plant was critical and at power for the entire month.
From February 18, 1982, through the end of the month, the licensee operated at approximately' 60 percant power due to an agreement with Pacific Gas and Electric that if SMUD spilled water at their hydro
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projects, they would reduce power an equivalent amount at Rancho Seco.-
The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators.
The inspector verified the operability of selected. emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components.
Tours of the auxiliary building and turbine building were conducted to observe plant equipment. conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify'that maintenance requests had been initiated
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for equipment in need of maintenance.
The inspector verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
The inspector examined plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified the implementation of radiation protection controls.
The inspector also walked down the accessible portions of the auxiliary feed system and emergency power system to verify opera-bility, and witnessed portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with radwaste barreling.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
3.
Maintenance Observations The inspectors observe'd portions _of the maintenance activities listed below and. verified that work was: accomplished in accordance with approved procedures, that work ~was accomplished.by qualified personnel, that provisions for stationing a fire. watch to ovarsee activities involving welding and open flame were complied with and that limiting conditions.for operations (LCO) requirements were met during repair.
a.
Overhaul of two failed Grinnell hydraulic snubbers b.
Repair of the "B" diesel room' supply fan
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Reassembly of a "B" decay heat removal pipe support d.
Replacement of body to bonnet studs on PLS-88 (Anchor Valve)
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
4.
durveillance Observations The inspectors observed portions of the below listed surveillance testing to verify that the tests were covered by properly approved procedures; that the procedures used were consistent with technical specification requirements; that minimum crew requirements were met; that test prerequisites were completed; that special test equipment was calibrated and in service; and, that the test results were adequate.
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SP206.03A - Monthly test of the " A" diesel generator b.
SP206.03B - Monthly test of the "B" diesel generator c.
SP201.10A - Safety System Hydraulic Snubber inspection d.
SP205.02 - Local component leak rate test:
Personnel hutch (inner and outer seals)
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie.
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5.
Review of Plant Operation
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a.
Environmental Protection On February 23, 1982, the Resident Inspector accompanied
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licensee personnel on an environmental sampling run.
Samples of milk, algae, mud, and silt were taken from the areas sur-rounding the plant. Written environmental sampling guidelines were being followed for the performance of the sampling.
The inspector also verified that requirements of Surveillance Procedures SP212.01A and C were completed.
b.
Emergency Preparedness The inspectors observed and verified that a sampling of emergency equipment, facilities, and systems were provided as described in the emergency plan and were operable.
The inspection also observed tests o' communications systems onsite and at the Emergency Offsite Facility (EOF).
An inspector attended a training session for two plant crews on Emergency Response Actions.
This training was given as part of the licensee's implementation of an emergency pre-paredness training program.
The attendees supplied the contractor's instructors with numerous questions and comments, which were fed back into other training sessions given between February 15 and 26, 1982.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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Licensee Event Repo'rts Follow-up 1 i Through direct observation's, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records,- the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished', and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been ac'complished.in accordance with technical
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specifications.
a.
LER 82-01 (0 pen)i Loss of Containment Integrity This Licensee Event Report discusses an event in which both air lock doors were open simultaneously with the reactor plant critical.
The two to five minutes that the doors were open I
represents a violation of Containment Integrity provisions and thus became reportable as an LER.
The licensee tuok adequate i
corrective action during the event. The Plant Review Committee recommended investigation of specific methods to avoid door misoperation.
Until the results of the investigation are reported and acted upon, this item will remain open, t
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LER 82-05 (0 pen) Failure of "B" Diesel Generator Breaker to Close On February 11, 1982, the licensee informed the Resident Inspectors that the "B" diesel generator was found to be inoperable due to a tripped fault relay in the output breaker
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closing circuit.
This open relay would not have prevented the diesel from starting under any condition, but would have prevented closure of the output breaker.
Circumstances that
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were revealed during the inspection resulted in the Resident Inspectors recommending to the regional office that this item be considered for an.-item of noncompliance.
Follow-up is
being conducted, and will' be reported in Special Inspection
Report 50-312/82-08.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified except as
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noted in paragraph 6.b.
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TMI Action Plan Verification
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Previousinspectionreportsbocumentvariousactionstakenbythe Sacramento Muni.cipal Utility. District.to comply with NUREG-0578 and NUREG-0737 TMI Actio~n P1an requireme,nts.
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This paragraph d'ocuments further activities performed by the inspec-tors in support of;the NRC verification activities!
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The inspection results that follow represent the latest available
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information for. completion dates' supplied by the licensee.
The commitment dates shown as Reference 82 or Reference 84 stand for the refuelings' scheduled for 1982 and 1984, respectively.
The 1982
. refueling outage is scheduled to commence'in September.
SMUD's 0737#
Subject 0737 Due Date Commitment Date a.
I.A.1.3.2-
. Shift Manning July 1, 1982 June 1985 Comments:
Item 81-07-04 remains 0 PEN.
The licensee in a letter, Mattimoe to Stolz (February 11,1982), reinforced earlier correspondence on this issue.
The July due date will apparently be missed, b.
I.C.1 Short Term Accident and Procedures Review 2.B-Inadequate Core Cooling Procedures Ref. 82 June 1,1982 3.B Transient & Accident Procedures Ref. 82 June 1,1982 Comments:
The commitment to complete these procedure revisions
.by June 1,1982, was given in a letter dated November 16, 1981 Mattimoe to Denton.
This commitment was based on the NRC staff approving the Abnormal Transient Operator Guideline program review by
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Subject 0737 Due Date Commitment Date c.
II.B.1.2 Reactor Coolar.t System Vents July 1, 1982 Ref. 82 d.
II. B.1. 3 Reactor Coclant System Vent Proc.
July 1, 1982 July 1, 1982 Comments:
This item was to deal with procedures which address the use and condidions of use of the RCS vents.
The inspector noted that in a January 18, 1982 letter, Stolz to Mattimoe, that more information was needed by NRR on this issue. The latest information the insr)ector has on this issue comes from a January 1, 1982 telecon report from SMUD.to NRR which states that the procedures will be submitted by "approximately July 1,1982."
This implies thst the modifications will be completed during the.1982-refueling outage because NUREG-0737 asked for the procedures six months prior to the installation of the vents.
Discussions with SMUD Generation Engineering personnel on February 26, 1982, indicates that the vents are planned.to be installed before the startup coming out of the September,1982 refueling o'utage, e.
II.B.2.28 Plant Shielding flods.
January 1, 1982 Ref. 82 Comments:
The commitment date wa's given to the NRC in a September 1981 meeting in Bethesda, Maryland.
It was documented in the NRC Meeting Summary document dated September 26, 1981, Stolz to SMUD.
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II.B.2.3 Equipment Qualification June 30, 1982 June 1983 Comments:
The source of this commitment date is the same as Item e, above, g.
II.B.3 Post Accident Sampling January 1,1982 Ref. 82 Comments:
The source of this commitment date is the same as Item e, above.
h.
II.B.4.2 Mitigating Core Damage October 1, 1981 Complete Comments:
The inspector verified that the mitigating core damage training was completed and documented as required.
. FW System Evaluation 1.
II.E.1.1.1.x A
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Short Term Mods.
July 1,1981 Compl ete 2.
Long Term Mods.
January 1, 1982 Ref. 82 j
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SMUD's 0737#
Subject 0737 Due Date Commitment Date Comments:
NUREG-0737 is not too definitive on the differences between Short Term and Long Term modifications. Al so,
Item II.K.2.8 appears to address the same issue.
The inspector determined that Short Term Auxiliary Feedwater System modifications were those accomplished shortly after the TMI event and were required for plant startup in mid 1979. Accordingly, this issue (II.E.1.1.1)
is closed. The inspector's understanding of the Long Term modifications, those due on January 1,1982, according to NUREG-0737, consists of three issues:
(1) Automatic loading of the auxiliary feedwater pumps onto diesel buses; (2) Changing the auxiliary feedwater piping arrangement se that single-failure criteria can be met with respect to valve FWS-055.
(Note:
FWS-055 is a manual full flow valve in the recirculation and exercice line to the low pressure condenser at the discharge of the dual drive Auxiliary Feed Pump, P-318); and (3) Installation of the Emergency Feed-water Initiation and Control System (EFIC).
Discussions with licensee personnel on February 26,1982 and during tne first week in March 1982, a review of a
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November 17, 1980 letter, Bossenmaier to Reid, and a review of the letter referenced in Item e disclosed that Items (1) and (2) are committed to be done during the 1982 refueling outage as an interim solution.
But, Item (3) may not be accomplished during this outage.
It may not be until the 1984 refueling outage that the final Auxiliary Feedwater system upgrade (that is, EFIC) will be installed.
It is the inspector's understanding that Items (1) and (2)
will then be finalized as part of the new EFIC system.
These items will be followed up by the inspectors as more definitive information becomes available.
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II.E.1.2.1 AFW Safety Grade Initiation July 1,1981 Ref. 84 Comments:
The licensee stated that during the 1982 refueling outage, the electrical driven Auxiliary Feed Pump (P-319) will be made auto-loadable onto a diesel bus.
During the 1984 refueling outage, the Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control system (EFIC)
will be installed and a complete safety grade initiation system will be a reality.
Consequently, Open Item 80-23-06 will remain OPEN. This item dealt with the fact that for the duel drive Auxiliary Feedwater Pump, P-318, the overspeed trip relay does
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Subject 0737 Due Date Commitment Date not annunciate in the Control Room. This item was forwarded to NRR for consideration in September 1980.
The licensee has not responded to the inspector's concerns on this issue as of this date other than stating that no immediate changes on this issue are contemplated.
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II.E.1.2.2 AFW Safety Grade Flow July 1, 1981 Ref. 82 Comments:
The source of this commitment date is the same as
Item e.
Item 81-21-04 is CLOSED for tracking purposes.
An October 9, 1980 letter, Mattimoe to Eisenhut, addresses the fact that the July 1,1981 deadline would not be met. Another followup Item 80-23-05 is aisc CLOSED. The Auxiliary Feedwater Pump functional test is covered in Procedure I-032 dated 12/19/80.
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II.E.4.1.2 Dedicated H Penetration $
July 1, 1981 Ref. 82 Comments:
The installation of the Class 1 valves for this modification is scheduled for the refueling 1982 outage. This may become a hard 3 pot because the valves may not be available until February 1983.
These valves will be installed on a spare (containment)
penetration and will require a Type C test as a minimum. Also, Item 80-23-04 which dealt with revisions to Procedure A.52 is CLOSED.
A.52 was revised on December 8,1981.
The licensee has
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decided to hold to the past position that these Hydrogen system' valves do not require dual verifi-cation.after use.
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II.E.4.2.5 Containment Press.
Setpoint July 1, 1981 No Commitment Comments:
Attachment 5 to a January 16, 1981 letter, Mattimoe to Reid present the SMUD position on this item.
The attachment states, "The existing' set point was established to provide for prompt isolation with either a loss of coolant accident or steam line break accident inside the containment.
The set point provides for initiation of emergency core cooling systems, in-addition to containment isolation."
Based on this statement and others, the licensee stated that a change to the containment pressure setpoint "...would achieve little. improvement in containment isolation." Therefore, no commitment to
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SMUD's 0737#
Subject 0737 Due Date Commitment Date change the setpoint has been tendered, nor is any i
further work being done on this issue.
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II.E.4.2.7 Radiation Signals on
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Purge Valves July 1, 1982 Ref. 82
Comments:
This work is scheduled to be performed in conjunction with the work on item II.F.1.3 according to Attach-ment 3 to a July 1,1981 letter, fbttimoe to Stolz.
The source of this commitment date is the same as Item e.
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II.F.1.1 Noble Gas Monitor January 1, 1982 Ref. 82
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II.F.1.2 Long Term 1 /Part.
Sampling Jan'uary 1, 1982 Ref. 82 q.
I I. F.1. 4 Containment Pressure
. January 1, 1982 Spring 84 r.
II.F.1.3 Containment High-Range- ' January.1, 1982 Ref. 82
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II.F.1.5-Containment Water Level January 1 1982 Ref. 82
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II.F.1.6 Containment H Jan'uary 1,'1982 Ref. 82
Comments:
The source of the commitment dates for the II.F.1 Accident-Monitoring requirements is the same as
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Item e.
The licensee informed a Resident Inspector that there is a possibility that II.F.1.4 will be completed during the 1982 refueling outage.
The contract will be let in March 1982 and a six-month delivery is expected.
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II.F.2 Vessel Level Instrumentation January 1, 1982 No Commitment Comments:
A letter dated November'16,1981, Mattimoe to Denton, states that SMUD is "commiting to proceed with the design and installation of instrumentation to measure the water level in the reactor coolant system."
Dis-cussions with licensee representatives on February 26, 1982, indicated that no work on site or within the SMUD. organization in Sacremento is occurring on this issue. The work is apparently being done by a B&W technical support group. The B&W Owners Group, a SMUD spokesman said, is working on this issue for all B&W plants. The licensee representative gave no dates for completion of'the design or schedule of completion of this work. -
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SMU'D' s 0737#
Subject 0737 Due Date Commitment Date v.
II.K.2.8 AFS Upgrade January 1, 1982 See II.E.1.1
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II.K.2.9 FMEA on ICS To'bcdete) mined Complete Comments:
The licensee has submitted the Failure Modes and d
Effects Analysis referenced in NUREG 0737 and
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By letter dated January 13, 1982, Stolz to Mattimoe, this issue was CLOSED.
Any future work on this issue will be followed as part of Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A.47 by NRR.
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II.K.2.10 Safety Grade Reactor Trip July 1, 1981 Ref. 82 Comments:
A number of documents including the source document
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stated in Item e address this issue.
The licensee plans to install a safety grad 5 flux /feedwater flow anticipatory reactor trip which they feel is desirable for the loss of feedwater event.
This trip may not be installed until the auxiliary feedwater upgrade is installed in 1934.. Insthe interim, the licensee will install a safety grade Main Feedpump status trip. A new position on this issue may be documented by the licensee soon.
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II.K.3.6.B RCP Auto Trip March 1,1982
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1.s Comments:
This issue remains open.
The licensee has n'ot proposed
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a new commitment date.
This is another issue that" the B&W Owners Group is pursuing-for all B&W plants as part of the' work being done on small break loss, N of coolant, accidents.
The SMUD effort on this issue may be tied to work being done at the Loss of Fluid
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Test (LOFT) facilit'y'in Idaho.
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III.A.2.1 Early Warning System -
March 1, 1981 May 1982
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Comments:
The early warning'strebs and tone alerts have not been installed.
This is the' Subject of a Notice of Violation-dated.. February 12, 1982.
On'the same date,
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the licensee sent their first' response to the citation. The Resident Inspector and other NRC organizations are being kept current on the' status of the system _ installation and. testing.
As of this writing on March 5,1982, the-system completion is
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expected in May 1982.
The licensee is having trouble in taking, delivery on the sirens because of problems
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with their motors, but the May 1982 completion date remains unchanged.
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8.
Followup on Headquarter's Requests During the month of February 1982, personnel from the NRC Head-quarters in Bethesda, Maryland, requested information from the Resident Inspectors about the operation, design and modification of the Rancho Seco power plant.
Information was obtained and trans-Mtted to the NRC Headquarters on the following items:
a.'
High Pressure injection nozzle thermal sleeves b.
Emergency Procedures for Steam Generator tube rupture c.
Early Warning System installation status d.
Loss of Containment Integrity (LER 82-01) (See Paragraph 6)
No itcus of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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Followup on Regional Requests During(the month of February 1982, personnel from the Region V office of the NRC in Walnut Creek, California, requested infor-mation from the Resident Inspectors regarding the operation and maintenance of the Rancho Seco power plant.
Information was obtained and transmitted to the Region V office concerning the following items:
a.
NSEB construction schedule b.
Meteorological tower modifications i
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Pressurizer spray block valve maintenance
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d.
Background contamination of flags in front of the Administra-
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tion Building.
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e.
Ginna Event:
On January 25, 1982, a Site Area Emergency occurred at the Ginna Nuclear Plant in New York due to a Steam
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During the month cf February, the inspectors discussed this eventwith Plaqt Management, oper-s
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ators, Sh' staff.ift Technical advisors,' engineers, and members of the training The event was also. mentioned at morning s
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~ Rancho 'Seco staf f meetings.
The ihspectors verifled that all the parties interviewed understood',the significance of the
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Ginna* event and that future training sessions would possibly p
I discuss,this event. Training already includes discussions on
'~"s Steam, Generator Tube Breaks, including a similar event that occurred at St.3Lucie Nuclear Plant.
Training on steam
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generator tube leaks and awareness of saturation pressure /
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temperature restraints also exists for Rancho Seco' personnel.
- This training is given onsite and at the simulator in Lynchberg, l Virginia.,
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No items of-noncompliance or deviations were identified.
10. _ Independent 'Inspectidn Effort
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Discussions' were heJd between the. Resident Inspecto,rs anh opera-
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tions, security and maintenance personnel in.an attempt to better,
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understand problems they may have which are relat,e6 to nuclear
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safety. These discussions will continue as a standard _ practice.
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On numerous occasions, during the month of Feb,rua9y, the Resident
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Inspectors attended operations status meetings. fThess. meetings are held by the Operations Supervisor to provide all 'di,sciplines onsite
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with an update on the plant status and ongoing, maintenance work.
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In addition to the above, indepenaent inspection effort was'per-formed on the following items:
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Certified Welder Inspector qualification
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b)
QA Class I pipe storage 7-c.
Anchor valve repair status d
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d.
Background contamination of flags in front of the Administration Building The latter item was not, considered a significant event Lased on inspection findi_ngs; but, due to media interest, the inspectors verified the licensee took appropriate actions.
The event" occurred on February 5,1982, at dusk. A security guard took down the National and State flags 'in front of the Administration Building.
When he left the' controlled area to store the~ flags, the portal radiation monitor alarmed.
Gamma scanl(spectrographic) analysis revealed th'at the" California State flag was contaminated with Radon daughter products. The licen'see~ assumed this'sas due to background
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radiation coupidd with a thermal inversion.,0perational logs >.
confirmed that the contamination co' ld not -haver been* caused by any
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plant related source.
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No items of noncompliance or deviations were' identified.
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Exit Intervied
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The inspectors met with. licensee representatives throughNt the month and at the conclusion of the. inspection on Februaiy 26, 1982.
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(See Paragraph 1).
The inspectors summarized their inspection findings.
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' Also, the inspectors informed the licensee that the next Systematic
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Appraisal of Licensee Performance (SALP) meeting is scheduled for 10:00 a.m. on March 23,1982, at the Sacramento Municipal Utility
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l-District office' in Sacramento.
The purpose of the meeting will be i
to discuss the licensee's performance between June 1980 and June j
1981.
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