IR 05000309/1990004

Insp Rept 50-309/90-04 on 900306-0409.Major Areas Inspected: Plant Operations,Previous NRC Findings,Repts,Events,Maint, Surveillance,Security,Radiation Protection & Fire Protection

ML20042E699
Person / Time
Site:	Maine Yankee
Issue date:	04/20/1990
From:	Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20042E698	List: IR 05000309/1990004 ML20042E697
References
50-309-90-04, 50-309-90-4, GL-87-12, IEB-87-002, IEB-87-2, NUDOCS 9004300343
Download: ML20042E699 (9)

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U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORtCOMMISSION i

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REGION I?

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Report No:

50-309/90-04 License No:

DPR-36-

Licensee:

- Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company-lo InspectioniAt:iMaine: Yankee Atomic Power Plant, Wiseasset, Maine l

d Conducted:

March'6.through April;9,;1990-

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' Inspectors:

- CorneliuslF. Holden, Senior Resident Inspector

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- Richard J. Freudenberger, Resident Inspector Richard: Barkley,' Project Engineer Approved:

$ I. M M-f, h-4Idd90 E. C. McCabe, Chief,leactor Projects Section. 3B -

Date

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Resident inspection-(147 hours0.0017 days <br />0.0408 hours <br />2.430556e-4 weeks <br />5.59335e-5 months <br /> including 30 backshift and-31 deep backshift hours) of plant' operations, previous NRC findings, reports, events, maintenu ance, -surveillance, security, radiation protection, and: fire;- protection, J

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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Operations were found to be conducted ~ safely.- Operator activities-associated with high Steam Generator chlorides-and an increase'in reactor coolant leak I

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rate were deliberate and effective,-

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A comprehensive licensee radiological controls self-assessment was noted as a

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. positive' contributor to performance. Additionally, the recent shift in re -

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- sponsibilities for. the radiological exposure budget to individual departments:

has resulted in' improved planning.

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s Maintenance and surveillance were generally. good. A minor discrepancy in re-a turning the waste gas monitor to' service.was identified.

Very good control of j

spent fuel pool heat exchanger cleaning was noted, but two minor; incidents of

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workers contaminating areas outside of the work area were'also noted.

Good security was-noted. Recent security gate house improvements and addi-

tional security staffing resulted in improved access controls for the outage.

Good Engineering and Technical Support for-the outage were noted.. The 0utage

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.x Planning Integration Team successfully. identified ~and resolved interferences between work items for the outage. The use of temporary coolers'for the spent'

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fuel pool heat' exchanger conservatively leaves the fire. pond as an emergency >

y backup and provides an additional backup cooling supply. Availability of elec-

'i trical power for fuel cooling was addressed.

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Follow-up on NRC Bulletin 87-02 related to fasteners found proper disposition -

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ing of the related issues and an acceptable program to prevent use of unquali-

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fied fasteners, j

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TABLET,0F CONTENTS-

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1; PlanOOperations.(IP 71707,:03702)....................-....-.........'.

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.RadioNgical Co n t rol s ( I P 717 07 ).............................. -...... l.

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' Maintenance / Surveillance (IP_ 62 703, 61726 )........'.........:.... :.... c..mi L2 -

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S e c u r i ty ( I P 717 0 7 )...................... -.... ;.c................. -.... I. 4

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Engineering / Technic'al Support-(IP 3 7 828, < 3 77.0 0 ).....................,---5.

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~ Safety Assessment / Quality-Ver,itication'(IP:40500 TI:25027)

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-(NRC' Bu11stin 87-02, Fasteners)'(TI 2500/27)........i.....'...

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Administrat1veh......'.............................,..................

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Summary of Facility Activir.ies.......................-.........'.. - - 6

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Interf ace wi th the tState of Maine 1(IP 94600).........:...........:

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Interface with.th Department.offLabor...........)...a..........

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Exit: Meeting (IP.30703)L

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DETAILS 1.

Plant Operations During daily routine facility tours, the following were checked: manning, access control, adherence to procedures and LCOs, instrumentation, recor-der traces, protective systems, control room annunciators, radiation moni-tors, emergency power source operability, operability of the Safety Para-meter Display System (SPDS), control room logs, shift supervisor logs, and operating orders. Weekly, selected Engineered Safety Features (ESF)

trains were verified to be operable.

The condition of plant equipment, radiological controls, security and safety were assessed. Biweekly, the inspector reviewed a safety-related tagout, chemistry sample results, shift turnovers, portions of the containment isolation valve lineup, and the posting of notices to workers.

Plant housekeeping and cleanliness were also evaluated.

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The inspector observed selected plant operations to determine compliance with NRC regulations.

The inspector also concluded that the areas in-spected and tit licensee's actions did nn'

stitute a health or safety hazard to the public or plant personnel.

following are noteworthy.

On March 19, 1990 at 11:06 a.m., condenser "A" waterbox conductivity in-creased rapidly.

In accordance with Abnormal Operating Procedure 2-27, a power decrease was commenced.

Condenscte chlorides (Cis) were reported at 130 ppb.

Steam generator (S/G) Cls were later found to be 450 ppb in #1 S/G, 1150 ppb in #2 S/G, and 500 ppb in #3 S/G, The inspector observed, from the control room, that the power decrease was being well controlled.

The "A" waterbox was ramoved from service and a leak was identified in one of its tubes.

Th-location and the sudden occurrence of the leak sug-gested that debris eight have been the cause.

Eddy current testing was performed in the viciHty of the leaking tube and a piece of foreign mate-rial was identified on the shell side of the waterbox.

The licensee de-cided to leave the material in place and to plug tubes in the immediate vicinity.

The plant was later returned to full power.

On March 27, 1990 at 7:45 p.m. the control room operator began investigat-ing an unexpected volume control tank (VCT) level decret.se. A computer everage leak rate was conducted and reactor coolant system leakage was identified as 1.08 gpm.

The Technical Specifications limit the unaccounted for leakage to 1 gpm.

Plant personnel began searching for possible sources of the increased leakage.

Technical Sp<tcification 3.14 requires an in-vestigation of the source and safety implications withia four hours.

The primary drain tank was observed to increase at about the rame rate as the VCT lev $1 dec eased, and efforts were concentrated on these sources. At 10:15 p.m the stem leakoff valve (PD-64) for the normal letdown valve (LD-A-9) wai shut and the leak rate dropped to 0.15 gpm. The letdown sys-tem removes w't:- from the reactor coolant system, reduces the p+ essure, purifies the water anc sends it to the VCT where the charging pumps take suction and return :ne water to the RCS.

LD-A-9 and LD-A-10 are redundant

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valves in the letdown system.

When the stem leakoff from LO-A-9 was iden-tified as the source of the excess leakrate, LO-A-10 was placed in service and LO-A-9 was isolated.

The TS leakage remedial action was exited at 11:24 p.m.

Planning for the repair was commenced.

LO-A-9 was returned to service prior to plant shutdown for the outage.

The inspector had no fur-ther comments.

2.

Radiological Controls Radiological controls were observed on a routine basis. Areas reviewed included Organization and Management, external radiation exposure control, and contamination control.

Standard industry radiological work practices and conformance to radiological control procedures and 10 CFR Part 20 re-quirements were observed.

Independent surveys of radiological boundarios and random surveys of nonradiological points throughout the facility were taken by the inspector.

On April 5, 1990, members of the Region I staff met with representatives of Maine Yankee and of Westinghouse Radiological Services to discuss the findings of an evaluation of the radiological control program at Maine Yankee. The licensee's Radiological Controls Improvement Plan included provisions for a comprehensive assessment of the program.

The asse'isment was performed by Vestinghouse during February and March of 1990 and was critical evaluation of several aspects of the program.

The results of the evaluation were presented as well as Maine Yankee's short and long term actions to address the weaknesses identified.

This licensee self-

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assessment initiative was evaluated as a very positive input to improving radiological controls performance. The effectiveness of these actions will be reviewed in future progrartmatic NRC inspections of radiological controls.

In preparation for the refuelity outage, the licensee closely monitored the ALARA budget assigned the each department.

Emphasis has f.hifted from the Radiological Controls Section to the 'ndividual departments conducting the work.

During the refueling, key personnel review enosures received during the preceding day.

Each work group was required to f actor the ALARA budget into their work plans.

The result has been closer scrutiny of work, significant reductions in the exposures projected for the catage, and ownership of the ALARA goals t,t the working level.

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Mtintenance/ Surveillance The inspector observed and reviewed mainter,ance and problem investigation activities to assess compliance with regulations, admini'strative and main-tentace procedures, codes and !tandardt, proper QA/QC invalve'arant, safety tag use, equiptrent alignment, jumper use, personnel qualifications, radio-logical controls for worker protection, retest requirements, hrd report-ability per Technical Specifications.

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,1 Also, the inspector; observed parts'of. surveillance; tests to assess, per -

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~ formance-in accordance withiappvoved procedures and 1.imiting Cor:ditions

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' for Operation.,xtest tesultC removal and restoration ofjequipient', and:

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.k deficiency review arid reso,lution.

The?following 'were noted.: '

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WhiteconductingaplanftourlonApri1L6,U990,4heinspeethrnotedthati

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O"R the waste gas radiatiori monitoring systera (RMS)51ocal indication was' not =

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3 unctioning. At:thit time, the plant was conducting aLwasteigas tant s.a j

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.leasei /ine cable? connecting the' meter to the wasteLgas detector-was nots

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m attached? An I&C/techn.ipian' indicated that the local: meter was probably

disconnected during recent calibrationlactivities, and -notJeconnected..

'That t'echnician contacted the 'contro1 room and the mete'/ das' reconnected.

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"The control room operators! cenducted a. test of themaste gas RMS,iverf fy--

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irig itsioperability.f RMSt ablTity to tenninate the? war,te gas release $as *

not impacted. The licensee initiated an Unusu'al: OccurrenceEReport: to:

,j track thit, iter.. VOR follow-up determined that 1&C procedure 3-6.2.1445, D

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Transfer Calibration of thri Gaseous; Monitoring ; System,( had been performed'

the previous ravening. This procedureLrequired three actions taireturnithe

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' waste gas RMSi o service, with~on psign.off.<7 pparently, the sygnoff por-

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tion was accoinplished without completinrall!three: tasks. ?0perating pro-

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cedure OPH1-21"3, Vaste Gas.Ru' lease, requires: the loper'ators/ to: set the-l

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trip signal for thejreirs.: into the RMS audiverifylthe operability of the

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3 rip function. 'During the release ( if the? release;iictivity< exceeds ~the:

calculated setpointJ the-release will tutomatically, terminate via trip 1

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va l ve -WD-p-211'.

The OOR rec & amended, changing; the-OP to%cludeJaf stepi D

9equiring verificat. ion-of centrcl room ^and local metep'4 indications-prior;

to start of thea release. TheJinspector concluded that the wasteigas!re-j T

lease was conducted within Technical SpecificationJ11mitr O Corrective a

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actions, including a separate signoff for/ return.ofithe' local: indicator,

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In preparation sfer vi refuteling outagefsch/ deled t'odaegin Apri137,.1990,,

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L the spont fuel pool cooling hsst exchanger Waie resaved,from service / fore, l j f

, cluaging during the w?ek of> Mdech 19.: AtLMaine 'ftalkee, spent! fuel sool'

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coolir.g ir a esingle trainL systwi with > redundant cifcul_ating pumps. : There

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is!cre heat exchanger cooled! by one!:rainiof compobent -cooling water. "An,

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'c c:eiergency ' supply 'of coming : water can be: provided by: t'$3 fire system.

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Poo1> water carnbe > circulated through t.he heat exchanger by either ofitwo' /I';

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.rumas..Since there is a single heat exchanger, durint the tiroolthat.it

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would be out of servlee, there is, si crialingirnochanism availabli.4 -

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Severet actions sere taken by Maire Yankee persohnel,to. ensure the.rua7n--

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Penance evolution tn clean the heat ekchanger,was conducted safely.

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Thedheat,exchangerwasscheduledforcleaning[ust:phior,tbthrbre!

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fuelingLoutage, when the heat load in"the pool was low."(The most

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T recently discharged fwei was from th'a October-1988 o'utage.)

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Prior to. removing the heat exchanger from service 3 or cleaning,?the_

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. cooling system was isolated for a'short period of time.,' This enabled'

an accurate estimate of-the'. heat-up rate of the pool water and thet

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time that~the heat exchanger could be out of; service, y

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Temperature detectors located in the fuel racks were monitored byl

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Operations Department personnel at 'an increased frequency.1 A conservative' administrative limit on the pool water temperature was X

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established. requiringcthe cleaning evolution.to be stopped and nor--

mal cooling reestablished.

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The cleaning evolution included passing individual plugs through each tube,

on-the tube (pool water)f side and a flush of~ the shell (cooling water)'.

-side. ~ Efforts were.made to prevent theispread~of contamination from the

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highly contaminated tube' side of the heat: exchanger '..However, on'two occasions that the: inspector observed, areas outside the" posted contami-nated area became contaminated as workers exited the-contaminated' areas.'

These incidents were promptly identified by Radiological Controls tech-nicians and appropriate' actions were taken to prevent further: spread ofL

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the contamination.. After the cleaning of the heat exchanger was'com-pleted, the entire spent. fuel cooling heat exchanger 1 cubicle was decon-taminated to levels below those that existed prior to the start of worki

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The spent fuel pool heat exchanger cleaning was well-controlled, with sig-nificant management attention to minimizing-the impact of the -rem' oval from

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service.

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'A portion of the Cardox system istanticipated to be-removed from service for a period of 36 days in support of containment penetration modifica-tions.

Due to the modifications, personnel access to.the from the pene -

Dl tration room will-be severely limited.- 'As a precautionary measure, the.

l licensee has removed the automatically initiated Cardox system from opera-

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tion and substituted a fire watch. Maine Yankee; submitted a notification-

to the NRC in accordance with Technical Specification 3.23.C.2.

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No unacceptable conditions were found.

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Physical Security Checks were made to determine whether security condi.tions met regulatory I

requirements, the physical security plan, and approved procedures. Those

checks included security staffing, protected and vital area barriers, i

vehicle searches and personnel identification, access. control, badging, and compensatory measures when' required. The inspectors witnessed access control processing of contractor personnel for the outage' including vehicle i

and personnel searches.

During shift changes, additional security force

personnel were available in the gate house to monitor access. These addi-

. l tional personnel were instrumental in contro111ng'the-flow of people. The-l inspectors also observed that the processing of vehicles for plant access; i

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e swas well controlled. Trailers brought'onsite for,the. outage were checked during backshift inspections for proper lighting. _ No;discrepanciesf were

K-identified.

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Engineering / Technical Support

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The inspector reviewed outage plans with various licensee. organizations.

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Based on.the licensee's lessons ~ learned from the last outage, a number of >

q changes have been implemented, j

- i The111censee designated a multidisciplinary Outage' Planning' Integration Team (OPIT).of operations, mainten_ance,'and radiation-protection per-sonnel. 1 0 PIT reviewed the scope of_each outage job and 1dentified interR ferences and system' windows. -Within these vindows, OPIT-determined how to

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best perform the work necessary. As.a result,: coordination'of work has-been improved. Also, the licensee initiated the use of; a temporary _ outage'

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- organization in order to better support.the-outage work. The outage or-ganization assigned additional people to monitor and control. work pro--

gress, direct support and resolve conflicts.

The inspector reviewed the licensee'siplansLfor utilizing cooling-towers-to cool the Spent Fuel pool. (SFP) heat exchanger during1the upcoming out-age. During the-outage the licensee plans to remove,the Primary Componentt

Cooling (PCC) system _from' service. Duringithis time the licensee plans to-

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use cooling towers to supply temporary cooling for the: spent fuelepool.

The onsite fire pond is the. emergency backup source of cooling'for the-

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spent ' fuel pool via the fire ~ main..The li_censee-decided not.to rely on : _

the emergency backup system'during-this pe'riod of(full core'offloadito.the

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spent fuel pool. The licensee's-plans call for:two cooling towers to.be

operated in series and provide cooling.for the spent fuel pool' via' tempor-

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ary hose connections.

The plans also address contingency plans'for.

supplying another backup source of coo _ ling should-both' the cooling towers

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and the fire pond'become unavailable.

The licensee'sievaluation' addressed the adequacy of electrical power supply. availability since electrical'

maintenance is planned for all buses =during the outage, including the over-g'

haul of one of the'.two Emergency Deisel Generators. The inspector con-cluded that the licensee has addressed'not only the immediate needs of providing for SFP cooling but'also has acceptable contingency. plans for:

J unexpected problems, _

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Safety Assessment / Quality Verification The-inspector reviewed Maine Yankee's January 15 and 29,.1988 responses'to Bulletin 87-02 as well as their July 21, 1988 response to Bulletin Supple -

H ments 1 and 2.

Maine Yankee ide'ntified-six safety-related-fasteners, out l

of a sample of 20 fasteners, which had either chemical or hardness devi-ations from their required material characteristics. An engineering.

evaluation determined that none of the deficiencies affected the-safety-related function of the fasteners.

Further, Maine Yankee requested re-L sponses from the vendors which supplied the fasteners to determine how-deviations in fastener quality would be prevented in the future. -All but

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q one. vendor (no longer on_ the approved vendors list) provided: appropriate-l

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responses. Maine Yankee-continues.to'. independently sample and. test

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safety-related fasteners on a' random basis. The results of the licensee's;

< program to:date:ha~ve not identified any evidence of deficient bolting, y

TheihspectorreviewedLMaine. Yankee'sJanuary~15,1988" response ~t'othe'

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Bulletin and Nonconformance Report -(NCR): 88N-001, which tracked the cor.-

s rective-actions taken to: handle out of-specification' bolting material.-

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The. inspector noted that,,off the six-lots of bolts represented by the de-

4 ficient. safety-related fasteners, 2 of the11ots were> scrapped, 2 of_the:

lots were reclassified, and'2 were considered;acceptablet following:an.-

engineering evaluation. The inspector reviewed.the results of?the ongoing

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independent random samplingtand testing program!for safety-related fas-

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teners.

No-problems were noted.

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The inspector toured. Maine-Yankee's warehouse and reviewed the a'dministra-

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tive> controls.on safety-related fasteners.

Control and segregation _~of_

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. safety-related and non-safety-related, fasteners appea. red adequate.-

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In summary, Maine: Yankee identified'several-deficiencies with safety-re.

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lated-fasteners. LAll of these_were: minor-and' presented no safety concern.:

'Fasterers-which were deficientLwere either; scrapped,3 reclassified or;

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accepted-as-1s:following an_ appropriate engineering evaluationb Long-term 1 corrective actions were taken to' sample and test-selected safety-related a

fasteners to determine'conformance with' material' specifications The-in-spector considered Maine Yankee's actions-in response' to~ this Bulletin and-its Supplements to'beitimely-and' acceptable.

TI 2500/27 is closed, d

The inspector also reviewed the licensee's response to GenericJLetter l(GL):

J 87-12, Loss'of _ Residual Heat: Removal (RHR) while the Reactor Coolant 1Sys -

tem (RCS)iis Partially Filled, -dated _ July 9,1987. _.. Maine' Yankee hast no?

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_ plans to operate'in;atpartially filled > condition'during1this' outage.

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cedures for such operations have been developed but-have not'been. reviewed or approved pending completion of. changes to the primary Inventory Trend

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System this outage. tThe 1.nspector reviewed licensee procedure 1-17-6',i

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Lowering of the Reactor Vessel Level to 1 Ft. Below the~ Flange: for Head -

j Removal. LThat procedure was found-to have appropriate' precautions for the

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evolution.

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i Acceptable Assurance of Quality measures were found during this 'inspec-I tion.

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Administrative a,

' Persons Contacted

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Interviews and discussions.were conducted with-'various licensee per--

sonnel, including plant operators, maintenance technicians and the -

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licensee's ma'nagement staff.

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. Summary of Facility Activities!

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At the start of the inspection period the plant was at full power.-.

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i On, March 13 the plant began coastdown operations (plant power.was:.

fallowed to gradually reduce:at=end of core ~ life). :The plant reduced'

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power on March 19 in response.to chloride.inleakage into the main-condenser. After corrective action, plant power was ; increased.toi approximately;95' percent on March 21;and coastdown, operations' con s

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l tinued.

The plant shut down from'90 percent; power to begin a routine

refueling outage.on April 1 ; 1990.

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.j

o-Maine Yankee and; member of Region I management' met ~on April 5,:1990-lk at Region-I offices inLKing of: Prussia ;Pa' to; discuss alrecent-lic -

il ensee contractor evaluation of the' Health: Physics program at Maine.

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Yankee (see Detai.1 2).'

c.

Interface w'ith the State:o'f Maine

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p Periodically, the resident. inspectors and thelonsite representative-

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of the State of Maine discussed findings and' activities of--their cor-responding organizations. No. unacceptable conditions were-identi-:

r fied.

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d.

Interface with the-Department of Lab'or

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.

The NRC received a; letter from the Department of Labor.; dated December.

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"-

29, 1989. That. letter was-in reference :to'an incident involving the:

~

collapse of a radiologicalicontrolitent on:0ctober 12, 1989. Three

.

people were in the-tent when'it collapsed due~.to the negative-ven-tilation applied. The Department-of:' Labor,' Occupational: Safety and

,

Health Administration considered the case satisfactorily closed. iThe

inspector had no further-questions.,

i,

. e.

Exit Meeting F

Meetings were periodically held with.seniorjfacility ma'nagement to:

discuss the inspection scape and. findings. A summary of findings for j

the report period was also: discussed at the conclusion.of;the inspec--

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tion.

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'q

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