IR 05000309/1990006
| ML20043G416 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 06/12/1990 |
| From: | Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20043G413 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-309-90-06, 50-309-90-6, NUDOCS 9006200260 | |
| Download: ML20043G416 (13) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No:
50-309/90-Of License No:
OPR-36 Licensee:
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company Inspection At:
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Plant, Wiscasset, Maine Conducted:
April 10 through May 15, 1990 Inspectors:
Cornelius F. Holden, Senior Resident Inspector Richard J. Freudenberger, Resident Inspector Approved:
U4 C. h (18+, )t.
6/n /To E. C. McCabe, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3A Date OVERVIEW Operations: Conservative operation of the temporary spent fuel pool cooling system enhanced its reder.dancy and reliability.
Operator responses to a SIAS (Safety Injection Actuation Signal) and a RAS (Recirculation Actuation Signal)
were timely and appropriate.
Further inspection will review the reportability of an inadvertent Rt.S.
Radiological Controls: Good management oversight was evident in manning of radiological controls satellite stations, in personnel exposure tracking, and in the resources allocated to emerging work.
Maintenance / Surveillance: Maintenance was controlled well.
Planning of the electrical bus outages for reinsulation focused on maintaining safety systems operable.
Security:
Site access was well controlled.
Identification of a degrac in a vital area barrier was not timely, but corrective actions were appropriate.
Engineering / Technical Support: Coaservative enoineerir,g decisions were made on the scope and type of steam generator tube inspection and the evaluation and repair of thermal shield positioning pins.
Safety Assessment / Assurance of Quality:
Use of the Outage Planning Integration Team for the 1990 refueling outage improved coordination among the plant de-partments. Also, the use of a dedicated Quality Assurance individual for daily ir. dependent review of radiological controls was useful for timely identifica-tion and resolution of weaknesses.
9006200260 900612 ADOCK 050 g 9 DR
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F TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE 1.
PlantOperations(IP 71707,90712)..................................,
I a.
Spent Fuel Pool Cooling.........................................
I b.
Fi re Suppression System Inoperability............................
c.
Safety Injection Actuation......................................
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d.
Recirculation Actuation Signa 1..................................
2.
Radiological Controls (IP 71707).....................................
a.
Worker Concerns (RI-90-A-54)..............................
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b.
Outage Management...............................................
3.
Maintenance / Surveillance (IP 62703,61726)...........................
4.
Security (IP71707)..................................................
a.
Access Contro1..................................................
b.
Vital. Area Barrier Degradation..................................
5.
Engineering / Technical Support (IP 37828,62703)........,.............
a.
Steam Generator (S/G) Tube Inspection...........................
b.
Thermal Shield Inspection.......................................
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Summary..........................................................
9-6..
Safety Assessment / Quality Veri fication (IP 40500)....................
a.
Outage Planning Inspection Team.................................
b.
Radiological Controls 0versight.................................-
101 c.
Contractor 0versight............................................
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Administrative.......................................................
a.
Persons Contacted...............................................
b.
Summa ry of Fa c i l i ty Ac ti v i ti e s..-...........-.....................
c.
Interface with the State Of Maine (IP 94600)....................
d.
Exit Meeting (IP 30703).........................................
e.
Inspection Meetings Conducted by Region Based Inspectors (30703)
f.
Inspection Hours..............................-..................
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DETAIL 1.
Picnt Operations During routine daily tours the following were checked:
manning, access control, adherence to procedures and Limiting Conditions for Operation, instrumentation, recorder traces, protective systems, control room annun-ciators, radiation monitors, emergency power source operability, control room logs, shif t supervisor logs, and operating orders.
The condition of the plant equipment, radiological controls, security and safety were assessed. Biweekly, the inspector reviewed a safety-related tagout, chemistry sample results, shift turnovers, and the posting of notices to workers.
Plant housekeeping and cleanliness were also evaluated.
The inspector observed selected activities, found compliance with the NRC's regulations, and identified no health or safety hazards.
The fol-lowing are noteworthy:
a.
Spent Fuel Pool Cooling The licensee utilized portable cooling towers to cool the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) heat exchanger during the refueling outage, when all fuel was taken from the reactor to the spent fuel pool.
As documented in Region ! Inspection Report 50-309/90-04, the inspectors had previously reviewed the engineering analysis justifying use of the cooling towers.
During this inspection, the inspectors witnessed the operation of the towers.
Contractors were assigned to continuously monitor the cool-ing towers. Discussions with these contractors revealed that they were knowledgeable of their duties. They were quick to report to the control room a local loss of power associated with a motor control center even though the cooling towers were not affected (local light-ing loss prompted the control room notification). Operations shift personnel responded in a timely fashion.
The cooling towers performed as designed and maintained spent fuel pool temperatures approximately 30 degrees below the administrative high temperature limit established by Engineering.
Backup power supplies were available. Once normal component cooling was restored to the SFP cooler, the cooling towers were kept in standby until an additional service water pump was available. These actions were con-servative when compared to the Technical Specifications and required two evolutions (instead of one) to place the SFP cooler back to its normal alignment. By operating the system in this f ashion, the lic-ensee provided a backup source of cooling to the component cooling system.
The inspector concluded that the licensee had conservatively operated the SFP cooling system with the cooling towers and had con-tinuously provided backup cooling in excess of the Technical Speci-fication requirements for shutdown condition.
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Overall, the spent fuel pool temporary cooling system was operated and removed from service with considerable effort to enhance safe operation.
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b.
Fire Suppression System Inoperability As required by Technical Specification 3.23.C.2, in a letter dated
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April 2. Maine Yankee notified the NRC of plans to remove a portion-of the CARD 0X fire suppression system from service.
The suppression
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system was removed from service for two reasons: to make modifica-tions for containment leak testing; and for personnel protection while the access to.the Reactor Motor Control Center Building was
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restricted due to containment penetration modifications.
In the let-ter, Maine Yankee stated that, when the system was inoperable, a fire watch would be established and backup fire suppression equipment would be available.
During routine plant tours the inspector ob-i served that fire watches were established and additional portable
fire extinguishers were staged in appropriate areas.
No inadequacies were identified.
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c.
Safety Injection Actuation On April 14, the plant was in cold shutdown with reactor vessel level at six (6) inches below the flange.
Preparations were underway to
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remove the reactor vessel head.
To facilitate maintenance on Inver-
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ter #4, 120 Vac vital busses #1 and #4 were cross-tied, Maintenance
on the inverter had been completed and the inverter was reenergized.
In order to repower the bus, the alternate power supply breaker first
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has. to be opened (due to the inability to synchronize the busses and i
to a mechanical interlock that prevents both the normal and alternate supply breakers from being simultaneously closed). At approximately
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11:00 p.m. on 4/14 an operator, attempting to restore Vital Bus #4 normal power, manipulated the Bus #1 transfer device versus the Bus
- 4 transfer device, opening the Inverter #1 supply breaker which was supplying both Busses #1 and #4. This resulted in the deenergization of two 120 Vac vital busses.
With two 120 Vac vital busses deenergized, two of the four pressuri-zer ' pressure channels failed high, automatically unblocked, and actu-ated a Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS). No automatic pump starts occurred because their controls were in " pull-to-lock." Desay heat removal was not interrupted.
However, the High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) isolation valves opened and water from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) gravity flowed into the reactor vessel.
The operators restored power to the busses, reset the SIAS, and
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closed the HPSI isolation valves. The highest level reached in the
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vessel was two (2) inches below the flange.
Personnel inside con-tainment verified that no water flowed onto the cavity floor. The cavity seal ring was installed at the time.
The NRC operations center was notified in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72.
Initial review of the inadvertent SIAS indicated that the human fac-tors engineering of the labels on the bus transfer devices was not
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adequate. A root cause evaluation of the actuation is planned. The
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inspector found the operators' actions to identify and isolate the flow from the RWST to the vessel to be timely and appropriate. The inspector will further review personnel performance implications, long term actions, and the root cause evaluation when the Licensee
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Event Repott is reviewed in accordance with the NRC inspection pro-
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gram, d.
Recirculation Actuation Signal On April 13, Instrument and Controls (I&C) surveillance procedure 3-6.2.1.5.4, " Safeguard Channel Calibration Safety Injection Actu-ation Signal," was commenced.
The procedure contains a prerequisite that the Refueling Water Storage Tank (PlST) be above the Recircula-
tion Actuation Signal (RAS) setpoint. A Recirculation Actuation Sig-
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nal is generated when there is less than 100,000 gallons in the RWST
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and a Safety Injection Actuation Signal is present. Due to delays,
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the surveillance procedure remained active for several days. Mean-while, filling of the refueling cavity resulted in approximately
52,000 gallons left in the RWST. On April 17, an I&C technician obtained authorization from operations to recommence the surveillance procedure. An SIAS was intentionally initiated as required by the procedure.
Since the RWST level was less than 100,000 gallons, an RAS was also generated.
The RAS resulted in several valves changing position and a trip with a ten-second lockout of the running residual heat removal pump. Since the refueling cavity was filled, decay heat removal capability was not affected. The residual heat removal pump
' was restarted shortly af ter the lockout cleared and valves which re-positioned were returned to their normal positions.
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Maine Yankee's initial review identified three items for long term corrective action. These were: 1) modify the surveillance procedure to place specific cautions at all steps that unblock SIAS to ensure that no actuation setpoints are exceeded, 2) Operations department evaluate controls placed on I&C surveillances which continue over several shifts, and 3) I&C revisit operational concerns / prerequisites when surveillances are prolonged (to ensure plant conditions have not changed),
Inspector review indicated that Maine Yankee does not consider in-advertent initiations of a Recirculation Actuation Signal as in-advertent actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF). There-fore, no formal report was made to the NRC. The interpretation was
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1 based on NUREG 1022, " Licensee Event Report System," and Supplement I to the NUREG. Maine Yankee committed to review the the basis for the interpretation and to provide that information to the inspector.
This matter is unresolved (50-309/90-06-01) pending further NRC re-view of the following:
Adequacy of and adherence to procedural controls over prerequi-
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sites for performing activities which can affect the operation
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of safety-related equipment.
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The licensee's basis for concluding that the RAS is not an ESF.
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2.
Radiological Controls Radiological controls were observed on a routine basis. Areas reviewed
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included Organization and Management, external radiation exposure control,
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and contamination control.
Standard industry radiological work practices,
conformance to radiological control procedures and 10 CFR Part 20 require-
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ments were observed.
Independent surveys of radiological boundaries and random surveys of nonradiological points were taken by the inspector.
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a, Worker Concerns (RI-90-A-54)
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logical control practices: allowing operations personnel to provide access'to locked high radiation areas for millwrights who were
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assigned to assist them in performing various evolutions to support outage work; and requiring HP technicians to enter the containment, which was posted as a locked high radiation area, and proceed to the HP satellite station prior to receiving a meter. The inspectors re-viewed both of these cases and discussed them with a radiation con-trols specialist inspector.
Resolution of these issues will be re-r ported in the specialist inspector's inspection report (IR 50-309/
E 90-09).
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Outage Management
a For the current refueling outage, the licensee revised their method
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of controlling work from satellite stations. As in past outages,
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satellite control points were established throughout the radiological
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control area.
Improvements in the maning of the satellite stations included a larger number of contractor technicians being available
and the a:r'pmert of contractor supervisors to each satellite sta-
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tion, allowing the Maine ankee technician at the station to assume
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an oversight function and be more flexible in addressing difficulties as they arose.
In general, these enhancements were assessed as n-sulting in an improvement in the radiological controls coverage pro-vided at work locations.
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Emergent work such as the expanded scope of the Steam Generator (S/G)
tube inspections increased the workload for the Radiological Controls
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staff. Additional contractor resources were utilized to provide ex-panded coverage. Access control to locked high radiation areas in containment was significantly improved through the installation of
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locked gates at each of the loop access doorways.
Hot particle con-trol for personnel entering the loop areas was accomplished through the use of a second check of worker knowledge prior to loop entry and
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the use of. hot particle buffer zones to allow frisking by a radio-logical controls technician prior to exiting hot particle ;reas.
Staffing increases at the various satellite stations (compared to previous outages) was accompanied by good prebriefings of workers and good oversight of the work in progress.
During the afternoon Outage Management Meeting, Radiation Protection
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Management presented the current total exposure as compared to the
planned exposure levels for the outage.
Individual department man-
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agers reported current exposure compared to planned.
Problems en-countered were discussed openly.
Responsible parties were identified for follow-up. This type of review provided a sound focus on iden-t tifying and correcting exposure problems as they occurred.
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Based on the above observations, management oversight of_the radio-t logical controls area during the outage was assessed as good.
(See Detail 6.b for an additional discussion of radiological controls oversight.)
3.
Maintenance / Surveillance t
The inspector observed and reviewed maintenance and problem investigation activities to verify compliance with regulations, administrative and main-tenance procedures, codes and standards, proper QA/QC involvement, safety tag use, equipment alignment, jumper use, personnel qualifications, radio-logical controls for worker protection, retest requirements, and report-r ability per Technical Specifications.
Also, the inspector observed parts of surveillance tests to assess per-i formance in accordance with approved procedures and Limiting Conditions
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for Operation, test results, removal and restoration of equipment, and
deficiency review and resolution.
The following were considered note-I worthy:
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The removal of Incore Instruments, inspection of the thermal shield, installation of a loop nozzle plug and retrieval of tools dropped into the reactor vessel were observed by the inspector.
The work
observed was conducted in accordance with applicable procedures and Radiation Work Permits (RWPs).
Time was allotted for trash cleanup, decontamination, and other housekeeping activities. That aided in minimizing industrial safety hazards and in controlling contaminatio
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The reinsulation of the medium voltage electrical buses associated with the plant's electrical distribution system was reviewed by the inspector for its impact on available power supplies during the out-age.
The reinsulation necessitated deenergizing significant portions
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of the electrical distribution system. The Outage Planning Integra-tion Team (OPIT) planned and coordinated the electrical bus outages to ensure the reliability of power supplies to equipment necessary for decay heat removal.
Overall, the inspector found the maintenance activities reviewed to have been conducted in a controlled manner, with an appropriate safety focus evident in the planning of the electrical system outages.
(See Detail 5, Engineering / Technical Support, for a discussion of associated surveil-lances and repairs.)
4.
Physical Security Checks were made to determine whether security conditions met regulatory requirements, the physical security plan, and approved procedures. Those checks included security staffing, protected and vital area barriers, vehicle searches and personnel identification, access control, badging, and compensatory measures when required, a.
Access Control During the outage, over one thousand additional contractor personnel were processed for plant access.
Shift turnover times were staggered to provide for reasonable flow of personnel through the main gate.
Additional deliveries and equipment were processed through the main gate to support outage work, Security processing of personnel and vehicles was improved over the last outage. The processing of per-sonnel was assisted by the assignment cf additional security officers at the gate house to assure personnel were properly monitored and to control the flow of personnel during security processing.
The modi-fications made to the gate house have significantly improved the access controls for the plant.
b.
Vital Area Barrier Degradation On April 11. Maine Yankee notified the NRC Operations Center of an uncompensated degradation of a vital area barrier.
A written report was submitted on May 10, in accordance with 10 CFR 73.71 (LER 90-502.)
NRC review of this event is documented in a security specialist in-spection (report 50-309/90-05).
5.
Engineering / Technical-Support The inspectors followed the licensee's installation and testing of numerous modifications.
Some of the significant work accomplished during the out-age included eddy current inspection of steam generator tubes and Inser-vice Inspection of the reactor vessel and thermal shiel _
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a.
Steam Generator (S/G) Tube Inspection At the start of the October 1988 refueling outage, the licensee iden-tified trace amounts of activity in Number 1 S/G (8.55 E-8 uCi/gm Iodine 133 and 8.4 E-8 uti/gm Cesium 137). Based on this informa-tion, the licensee switched the S/G eddy current inspection to the #1 S/G. A bobbin coil eddy current probe was utilized during this in-spection. Technical Specification 4.10 was followed with 3609 tubes inspected using eody current techniques.
Six tubes were plugged due to exceeding the 40% through wall defect criterion, one was plugged due to approaching the 40% criterion, and seven additional tubes were conservatively plugged for other reasons. The licensee documented the results of their inspection in a April 12, 1989 letter to the NRC.
During two shutdowns in 1989, the licensee again identified trace amounts of activity in #1 S/G (on the order of 4.5 E-8 uti/gm). At no tirne during the cycle was any tritium found in the S/G water chemistry samples.
(Tritium is considered the key to identifying a S/G tube leak.) The Technical Specification limit on secondary cool-
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ant activity of 0.10 uti/ gram Dose Equivalent I-131 was not approached.
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The repetitive detection of trace amounts of activity in secondary samples led to additional scrutiny of the sample results, additional secondary water chemistry samples, sampling steam from each S/G, and a special sampling of the three S/Gs during the plant shutdown at the beginning of the current (1990) outage. These samples indicated various iodine elements in the E-6 and E-7 range and xenon (Xe-135)
at approximately 2 E-8 (Dose Equivalent lodine was 2.0 E-6 uCi/gm).
These levels resulted in a calculated primary to secondary leak rate of 2 gallons per day. The Technical Specification limit on primary to secondary leak rate is I gallon per rdnute (gpm).
Based on these results, Maine Yankee chose to shif t the planned In-service Inspection (ISI) eddy current tube inspection from the #3 S/G to the #1 S/G. Additionally, a hydrostatic test of the #1 S/G was performed. After installing a camera in the primary side hot leg of the S/G, the secondary side was filled with demineralized water and pressurized to approximately 160 psig. The camera identified two tubes which leaked. A standard bobbin coil eddy current inspection of the leaking tubes did not identify any defects.
Further eddy current inspection of the S/G was conducted using a Motorized Rotating Pancake Coil (MRPC) eddy current probe, specific-ally looking for circumferential cracks. The results of the first sample of 514 tubes resulted in four indications of circumferential cracks in the area just above the tube sheet.
The sample size was expanded in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
Four in-dications were identified in this second group and the sample size l
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was again increased. The final results for #1 S/G were 23 indica-tions of circumferential cracks on the hot leg side of the steam generator and no indications of cracks on the cold leg side. All
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circumferent'il cracks were within 0.25 inches of the tube sheet.
A conference call between the NRC and Maine Yankee was held on 5/1/90 to discuss the results of the steam generator-tube inspections. Based on the results to date, Maine Yankee decided to continue eddy-current using the MRPC technique to perform an inspection of all S/G tubes until 100% of the tubes were examined or the results indicated the
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defects were limited to a certain regiori. During this conference call a' follow-up meeting was planned for later 1r. the outage.
The agenda for that meeting will also include a discussion of leak detec-
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tion methods and revised controls to be implemented for operation
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during the upcoming cycle. The inspector will follow the licensee's action toward resolution of the steam generator tube circumferential cracking issue during routine inspection.
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b.
Thermal Shield Inspection During the 1982 refueling shutdown, a ten year interval Inservice Inspection (ISI) of the reactor vessel and its internals was con-ducted.
Three (3) of the nine upper positioning pins were missing and were recovered from the reactor vessel. A commitment was made to the NRC to accelerate the next ten year ISI inspection.
During the 1984 shutdown, the three (3) upper positioning pins wsre replaced and
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thirteen (13) of the seventeen (17) lower positioning pins were veri-
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fied to be in contact with the core support barrel after eight (8) of
the lower positioning pins were advanced.
In order-to advance the positioning pins, a lock bar associated with each positioning pin was removed.
Once repositioned, a staking pin was.used in lieu of re-installing a lock bar.
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The accelerated ISI inspection was performed during the current (1990)
refueling outage. A detailed visual inspection of the core barrel and the therma) shield revealed that the core support barrel and the
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thermal shield maintained their integrity, with no significant indi-cations identified.
However, six of the nine roll pins installed in 1984 to stake positioning pins in place were missing. A piece of one l
of the pins was found on the core support plate and was removed.
L Inspection of the roll pins that remained in place revealed axial cracks. This indicated that the roll pins may have been splitting into two.
The six (6) positioning pins that had missing roll pins-were all lower positioning pins and showed signs of having loosened.
The eight-(8) lower positioning pins that had roll pins for staking
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l oevices plus one additional lower positioning pin which had its lock l
bar removed were then adjusted to be in contact with the core barrel and establish a preload. After these positioning 91ns were properly positioned, they were staked in place using a solid, knurled pin.
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After the completion of the positioning pin repairs, the seventeen (17) lower positioning pins now include eight with the original lock bars still installed and nine that had been preloaded and had a modi-fied staking pin installed. One upper positioning pin had its roll pin replaced with a modified staking pin.
An inspection of the reactor vessel lower head ares was conducted and it was vacuumed. Also, all three steam generator he.t and etid leg plenums were entered for steam generator tube inspectiors.
No parts other than the one located on the core suoport plate were identified.
An evaluation of the effect of the debris in the reactor coolant sys-tem was being performed by Yankee Atomic Electric Company for Maine Yankee at the end of the report period.
The inspector will review the evaluation in a future inspection.
This item is unresolved.
(UNR 50-309/90-06-02)
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Summary The inspector concluded ?
conservative decisions were made by Maine
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Yankee Engineering Department personnel with regard to the scope and type of steam generator tube inspection and the evaluation and repair of the thermal shield positioning pins.
6.
Safety Assessment / Quality Verification a.
Outage Planning Integration Team The inspector reviewed some of the methods the licensee used to con-trol refueling outage activities and provide oversight in specialty areas. Outage planning was enhanced by the Outage Planning Integra-tion Team (OPIT). OPIT consists of several supervisory level rep-resentatives from the various plant disciplines and was instrumental in the development of the outage schedule through the identification of system outage windows. Throughout the outage, OPIT studied emer-l gent issues and the impact on the schedule. OPIT then recommended changes to the schedule to minimize the impact of emergent work. As I
some refueling outage work experienced problems, such as the motor-operated valve overhaul and testing program, an additional coordina-tor was assigned to follow the project and address interfaces with other work stations.
These coordinators presented status of the pro-jects at the twice daily management meetings. The use of these co-ordinators allowed the Engineering staff to cer+1nue to resolve the technical aspects of outage activities while to. coordinators arranged resources and kept management informed of the status of the projects.
The establishment and use of the OPIT for the 1990 refueling outage was assessed as a positive initiative to improve the performance of f
outage activities through improved coordination of the plant depart-ments.
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b.
Radiological Controls Oversight
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.The Radiation Controls area during outages has been an area of con-
cern with the NRC. To provide additional oversight and aid in prob-lem identification, the Quality Programs Department provided a Qual-
'ity Assurance Technician to perform daily review of Radiological
practices throughout the plant. The contractor Quality Assurance Technician had previous Health Physics experience and interfaced daily with Maine Yankee first line supervisors and weekly with senior i
Radiation Protection Management. The use of this independent daily
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review was considered to be useful in resolving weaknesses in a timely fashion.
c.
Contractor Oversight Contractors were required to maintain individual corrective action programs, with financial penalties for recurrent safety problems.
Lead QC inspectors were assigned to certain high priority outage jobs to provide continuity. Welding activities had a QC weld supervisor-
and mockups were successfully used to eliminate rework.
The combina-
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tion of these controls provided for good oversight of contractor
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functions during the outage.
7.
Administrative
a.
-persons Contacted Within this report period, interviews and discussions were conducted with various licensee personnel,_ including plant operators, mainten-ance technicians and the licensee's management staff.
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b.
Summary of Facility Activities At-the start of the inspectinn, the plant was shutdown;for the Cycle 12 refueling. The plant remained in this refueling outage for'the remainder of the period.
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c.
Interface with the State of Maine Periodically, the resident inspectors and the onsite representative of the State of Maine discussed findings and activities of their cor-
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responding organizations.
No unacceptable plant _ conditions were identified.
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d.
Exit Meeting
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Meetings were periodically held with senior. facility management to i
discuss the inspection scope and findings. A summary of findings for
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the report period was also discussed at the end of the inspection.
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ei-Inspection Meetings Conducted by Region Bened Inspectors (30703)'
Inspection Reporting Dates Subject Report No, Inspector.
f 4/20/90 EDG Fuel Oil 90-07 Woodard!
5/3/90 Security 90-05 Lancaster-
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Inservice Inspection 90-08 Winters
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5/11/90.
Radiation Protection 90-09 Nimitz f.
Inspection Hours-
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This inspection involved 178 inspection hours, including -38 backshif t
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and 18 deep backshift hours.
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