IR 05000309/1990005
| ML20043C561 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 05/24/1990 |
| From: | Keimig R, King E, Lancaster W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20043C559 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-309-90-05, 50-309-90-5, NUDOCS 9006050325 | |
| Download: ML20043C561 (11) | |
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S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION I
Report No.
50-309/90-05 Docket No.
50-309 License No.
OPR-36 Licensee: Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station
'fi) Edison Drive Augusta Maine 04336 Facility Name:
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station Inspection At: Wiscassett, Maine Inspection Conducted: April 30, 1990 - May 3, 1990 Type of Inspectton:
Special Unannounced Physical Security
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Inspectors:
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. K. Lancaster, PhysT 41 Security Inspector
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E.,. King, Physical 'Secutity inspa.: tor
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Approved by:
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R. R. Keimig, Chief, Safeguards Section Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards Inspection Summary:
Special Unannounced Physical Security Inspection on ApriTTo,~T9$0 - May 3,1990 (heport No. 50-309/90-05)
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Areas Inspected:
Physical Barriers - Protected, Access Control and Vital Areas; Detection Aids - Protected, Access Control and Vital Areas; lighting; Assessment Aids; Compensatory Measures; Locks, Keys and Combinations; Access Control - Personnel, Packages and Vehicles; Personnel Training and Qualifications; Testing and Maintenance; on-site follow-up of a Report of a non-routine event; on-site follow-up of Previously Identified Items; Licensee Action on findings from the NRC's Regulatory Effectiveness Review; and Land Vehicle Bomb Contingency Procedure Verification.
Results: The licensee was found to he in compliance with NRC requirements in the areas inspected. However, a licensee-identified violation in the area of Vital Area Access was reviewed by the inspectors.
9006050325 900524 PDR ADOCK 05000309 Q
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DETAILS
1.
Key Persons Contacted
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a.
Licensee Personnel
- P. Lydon, Vice President Finance and Administration
- R. Blackmore, Plant Manager
- P.
Mietivier, Security Director
- B..Castonguay, Manager, Administration
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- J. Frothingham, Manager of Quality Programs
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- S. Nichols, Licensing Section Head
- H. Torberg, Security Supervisor, Operations
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Contractor Personnel (Hall Security]
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- C. Clune, Deputy Chief of Security
- G. Everett, Training Director
- B. Collins, Senior Vice President
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- C Urgrehart, Chief of Security
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V. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Personnel
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- C, Holden, Senior Resident inspector i
R. Freudenberger, Resident inspector
- indicates those present at the exit meetino on May 3, 1990 The inspectors also interviewed other licensee employees and members of the Hall contract security force.
2.
Purpose __and Scope of the Inspection The purpose of this inspection vis to reexamine as many specific areas of the station's security program during the current outage as were examined
in a routine NRC security inspection (conducted November 14-18, 1988, during the last station outage). This was-being done as a result of
numerous-violations being identified by the NRC during the last station
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outage (NRC Inspection Report No. 50-309/88-20).- During this inspection, the inspectors attempted to determine if the licensee was implementing an effective security program during the current outage.
Specific areas of the station's security program which were inspected during this outage were as follows:
a.
Physical Barriers - Protected Areas - The inspectors conducted a physical inspection of the protected area (PA) barriers and isolation zones on April 30, 1990. The inspectors determined, by observation, that the barriers and isolation zones were installed
i and maintained as described in the NRC-approved Physical Security
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Plan (the Plan). No dircrepancies were noted.
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b.
Detection Aids - Protected Areas The inspectors observed the PA perimeter detection aids on April 30, 1990 and determined that they were installed, maintained and operated as committed to in the Plan.
No discrepancies were noted.
c.
Lighting The inspectors conducted a lighting survey of the PA and isolation zones on April 30, 1990, from approximately 8:30 p.m. to 9:30 p.m.,
while accompanied by a representative of the licensee's security organization.
The inspectors determined, by observation, that lighting in the PA and isolation zones was adequate.
The licensee maintained an excellent PA lighting program during the current outage. No discrepancies were noted, d.
P_hysical Barriers - Access Control and Vital Areas The inspectors conducted a physical inspection of both access control area (ACA) and vital area (VA) barriers on May 1 and 2, 1990. The inspectors determined, by observation, that the ACA and VA barriers were installed and maintained as described in the Plan.
No deficiencies were noted, e.
Detection Aids - Access Control and Vital Areas The inspectors observed the ACA and VA dettetion aids and determined that they were installed, maintained and operated as committed to in the Plan.
No discrepancies were noted, f.
Asy ssment Aids The inspectors observed the PA assessment aids and determined that they were generally installed, maintained and operated as committed to in the Plan (with the exception of one area as discussed in Section 4.b. of this report). No discrepancies were noted, g.
Compensatory Measures The inspectors observed the implementation of compensatory meas w s taken in response to failed equipment for a PA barrier. The compensatory measure was implemented in conforrrance with Plan commftments and the Plan implementing procedures. No deficiencies were noted, b.
Locks, Keys and Combinations The inspectors reviewed the licersie's procedures for lock and key control and determined that they ( fe consistent with commitments in the Plan. The inspectors also revie,<ed the PA, ACA, and VA key
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inventory logs, and discussed lock and key procedures with members
of the security force and the licensee's security staff. No d
deficiencies were noted.
1.
Access Control - Personnel _
The inspectors determined that the licensee was exercising positive control over personnel access to the PA, ACAs and VAs.
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determination was based on the following:
(1) The inspectors verified that personnel are properly identified, and authorization is checked prior to issuance of badges and key-cards.
No deficiencies were noted.
(2) The inspectors verified that the licensee has a program to confirm the trustworthiness and reliability of employees and contractor personnel.
This program includes checks on employment, credit and criminal history, and a psychological
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examination.
The inspec: ors also conducted a random audit of the contractor
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access authorization records to ensure that the access require-
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ments were being satisfied.
No deficiencies were noted.
(3)- The inspectors verified that unescorted access to ACAs and VAs is limited to authorized individuals. The access list is revalidated at least once every 31 days as committed to in the
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Plan. No deficiencies were noted.
(4) The inspectors verified that the licensee takes precautions to ensure that an unauthorized name cannot be added to the access list by having only one member of security management authorized to make changes to that list.
No deficiencies were noted.
(5) The inspectors determined, by observations, that individuals in
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the PA, ACAs, and VAs display their access badges as required.
No deficiencies were noted.
(6) The inspectors verified that the licensee has esecrt procedures for visitors to the PA, ACAs and VAs. No deficiencies were noted.
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Access Control - Packages The inspectors determined that the licensee was exercising positive control over packages and material entering the PA via the main access control portal.
The inspectors reviewed the package and
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material control procedures and found that they were consistent with
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commitments in the Plan. The inspectors also observed package searches and interviewed members of the security force and the
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licensee's security staff about package and material control procedures.
No deficiencies were noted, k.
Access h atrol _ Vehicles The inspectors determined that the licensee properly controls vehicle access to and within the PA.
The inspectors verified that vehicles are properly authorized prior to being allowed to enter the PA.
Identification is verified by the security force member (SFM) at the main vehicle access portal.
This procedure.is consistent with the commitments in the Plan. The inspectors also reviewed the vehicle search procedures and determined that they were consistent with commitments in the Plan.
The inspectors determined that at least two SFMs control vehicle access at the main vehicle access portal.
The inspectors also observed vehicle searches and interviewed members of the security force and the licensee's security staff about vahicle search pr6cedures.
No deficiencies were noted.
1.
Personnel Training and Qualificationt The inspectors reviewed training records and procedures and found them to be in accordance with the NRC-approved Training and Qualification (T&Q) Plan.
The inspectors also interviewed members of the security organization and found them to be knowledgeable of their assigned duties and responsibilities. No deficiencies were noted, m.
Testing and Maintenance The inspectors determined that the licensee was conducting testing and maintenance of security systems as committed to in the Plan.
The inspectors made this determination based upon a review of the test records for security equipment, observatior, of functional testing of security search equipment located in the main-access control portal; witnessing functional testing of VA barrier access door Intrusion Detection System (IDS) equipment; and protected area barrier IDS equipment.
No deficiencies were noted.
In summary, the inspectors detcrmined that the licensee was implementing an effective security program during the current station outage.
Corrective measures taken by tht Licensee (as a result of NRC Inspection Report No. 50-309/88-20) since the last station outage, appeared to have been effective in preventing recurrences of previously identified violations.
3, On-site Follow-up of a Report of a Non Routine Event l
The inspectors also reviewed a security event that was reported to the l
NRC under the requirements of 10 CFR 73.71(b). At 6:41 a.m. on April 11, 1990 a contract Security Officer, while on patrol, observed a I
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I man sized opening in a security vital area barrier. Upon detection, the posting of a Security of ficer as a compensatory measure was immediately imolemented.
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EIS PAWWil CDMA!!IS SAFECUAriDS I:i?P.I'"! !.013 Di F0il PURIC NSC!Ei li IS IEU!DNAllY LEffOLI!3.
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The inspectors determined that the licensee failed to comply with the above requirements in the NRC approved Maine Yankee Physical Security Plan in that armed nuclear security force members were not performing a thorough eearch of the area during their patrols.
In addition, security personnel made the wrong assumption concerning the barrier penetration.
Failure to identify a degraded vital area barrier while conducting patrols of the area represents an apparent violation (VIO 50-309/90-05-01). This is a Severity Level IV Violation, however, a Notice of Violation will not be issued because this violation satisfies all the conditions as set forth in Section V.A. of 10 CFR 2 Appendix C.
The following conditions were met by the licensee:
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-This event was identified by the licensee.
-This event fits in Severity Level IV.
l l-This event was reported as required.
-This event was not a violation that could reasonably have been
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exploited.
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-This event was corrected in a reasonable time frame including the following measures to prevent recurrence.
1.
Penetrations of barriers have been stenciled indicating that
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Security must be contacted prior to opening or removing.
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2.
Security Of ficer patrol schedules have been reorganized to allow more time to complete their patrols during outages.
3.
The Security Officers who performed patrols during the period in question were counseled.
4.
Security concerns will be covered during maintenance and I&C personnel annual requaltraining.
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5.
Secu-ity will sign off all discrepancy reports affecting prot'seted areas, vital areas, and access control area barriers.
Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2, Appendix C, this event will be classified as a non cited violation and no response from the licensee is required.
4.
On-site Follewup of Previously_ Identified items a.
(0 pen)IFl 50-309/89-19-01:
Security force morale was identified a:
i a weakness by the inspectors.
The security force morale issue was discussed with the Security Director and his staff during the inspection. The licensee has taken corrective actions towards improving the moral of the security force.
Some of these actions include pay increases, adding additional manpower during the current outage, and establishing overtime constraints.
The morale of the security force appears better, however, until formal interviews with security force members (SFMs) are conducted this item will remain open and will be reviewed during subsequent inspections.
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l THis PARERAPH CONTAINS SAFECUEDS lEini!") If.D is NOT FOR PUBLIC l
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THis PAPf,tPl.PH CONTAINS SAFEtuARDS 13,f Edhil:ll ED is HDI FOR PultlC DISS!0SCE, II 15 lHIENT!0KALLY LEFT ELEK.
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(Closed)V10$0-309/89-24-01:
The licensee was found to be in non compliance with NRC requirements in the control of vital area keys.
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The licensee's corrective actions, as documented in a January 29, 1990, letter to the NRC, were verified and found to be satisfactory, e.
(Closed) VIO 50-309/89-24-02: The licensee's Operations Department procedure for inventory of vital area keys under its control stipulated a frequency that was less than that required by the licensee's NRC approved Security Plan. The licensee's corrective actions, as documented in a January 29, 1990 letter to the NRC, were verified and found to be satisfactory.
5.
l.).censee Action on Find.ings f rom the NRC's Regulatory Effectiveness Review (RER)
On November 2-6, 1987, the NRC conducted a Regulatory Effectiveness Review (RER) at the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station.
The NRC RER identified seven potential inadequacies, seven weaknesses, and one observation of the licensee's :,ecurity program. NPC Inspection Report documented t e satisfactory resolution of five of the No. 50-309/88-05 n
items identified in the RER Repnrt.
During this inspection, the remaining items (RER Report paragraphs 2.2.2, 2.2.3, 2.2.4, 2.2.5, 2.2.7, 2.3.2,2.3,3,2.3.6,2.3.7,2.4.1) were reviewed.
a.
RER Findino 2.2.2 THIS PARAGU.PH CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS l'if0iWAll01 ED 13 NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSCE, li IS INTENT!0NAllY LEFTBLMK.
The NRC considers this RER item (2.2.2) to be resolved.
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_RER Findings 2.2.3 THl3 PARAttAPH CONAINS SAFECUARDS 14F0EM!tT01 IJ'D IS NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLGEE, li IS INT!U!0NALLY
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LEFT ELANK.
The NRC considers this RER item (2.2.3) to be resolved.
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RER Finding 2.2.4
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THIS PARAGRAPH 00NTAlts SAFECUARDS 14FORMAil0N AND IS NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSEE, li IS INTENTIONALLY lEfT BlAi!N.
The NRC considers this RER item (2.2.4) to be resolved, d.
_RER Finding 2.2.5 THIS PARAGRAPH CONTAINS SAFEtuARit 14FOREll:J1 AND IS NOT FOR PulG 0!S0l0 SIT.E, li IS INT NT!0NALLY IEFT CLA! 1 The NRC considers this RER item (2.2.5) to be resolved.
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RER Finding 2.2.7 f
I THIS Pl.tAGRAPil CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS 14!Di; Ell:3 IJiD IS NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE, II IS INTENT!0MALLY LEFT BLA!!K.
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Tills PARAllAPH COMIAINS SAFESUAtts IWF0F.?".T13 IJiD IS NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLE.E, li IS INTENT!0Ni1LY LEFTPLillK.
The NRC considers this RER tten (2.2.7) to be resolved.
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RER Finding 2.3.2 THIS PARAGRAPH CONTAINS SAFECUARDS
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14FSREil3 IJ:D IS NOT FOR PUBLIC
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The NRC considers this RER item (2.3.2) to be resolved.
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RER Finding 2.3._3 THl3 PARAGRAPH C(AITAINS SAFECUARBS I4FORI.!.il !11,ND IS NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLDSURE, IT IS INTENil0NAllY LEfi BLANK.
The NRC considers this RER item (2.3.3) to be resolved, h.
RER Finding 2.3.6
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Tills PARAGRAPH CONTAINS SAflGUARDS
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l The NRC considers this RER item (2.3.6) to be resolved.
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RER Findings 2.3.7
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Tills PARAGRAPil COEAINS SARGilARDS I4f0EATC' f.!D IS 140T IOR PUlllC DISCLOSU2E, li IS INiilm0NAllY LEFT BLAllK.
The NRC considers this RER item (2.3.7) to be resolved.
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RER Finding 2.4.1
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11115 PARAGRAPil CONTAINS SARGUARDS i
INf0EAil03 f,ND IS liOT FOR P15Lil; DISCLOSU!!E, II IS INTENTIONALLY
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lEfiBLAK The NRC considers this RER item (2.4.1) to be resolved.
In summary, all RER findings are considered closed.
6.
Land Vehicle Bomb Contingency Procedure Verification The inspectors conducted a review of the licensee's Land Vehicle Bomb Contingency Procedure. The licensee's procedure details short-term actions that could be taken to protect against attempted radiological sabotage involving a lard vehicle bomb if such a threat were to materialize.
The procedure appeared adequate for its intended purpose.
No discrepancies were noted.
7.
E_x_it Interview The inspectors met with the licensee representatives identified in Paragraph 1 at the conclusion of the inspection on May 3, 1990. At that time, the purpose and scope of the inspection were reviewed, the findings presented and commitments made by the licensee's representatives during the inspection were confirmed.
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