IR 05000302/2002006

IR 05000302-02-006, on 06/03-21/2002, Crystal River Unit 3. Biennial Baseline Inspection of the Identification & Resolution of Problems

ML022030239
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	07/14/2002
From:	Wert L NRC/RGN-II
To:	Young D Florida Power Corp
References
IR-02-006
Download: ML022030239 (21)

Text

uly 17, 2002

SUBJECT:

CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 - NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-302/02-06

Dear Mr. Young:

On June 21, 2002, the NRC completed an inspection at your Crystal River Unit 3. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on June 21, 2002, with Mr. J. Franke and other members of your staff.

This inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as they relate to the identification and resolution of problems, and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your operating license. Within these areas, the inspection involved a selected examination of procedures and representative records, observations of plant equipment and activities, and interviews with personnel.

On the basis of the sample selected for review, the inspectors concluded that in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, and resolved within the problem identification and resolution programs. The inspectors identified one Green finding. Corrective actions were not implemented to address a feedwater transient that occurred on December 15, 2001. In addition, several examples of minor problems were identified where conditions adverse to quality were not entered into the corrective action program; condition reporting evaluations lacked thoroughness or were too narrowly focused; and corrective actions were not comprehensive or were not implemented as intended.

FPC 2 In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRCs "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS).

ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Leonard D. Wert, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-302 License No. DPR-72

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 50-302/02-06 w/Attachment

REGION II==

Docket No: 50-302 License No: DPR-72 Report No: 50-302/02-06 Licensee: Florida Power Corporation (FPC)

Facility: Crystal River Unit 3 Location: 15760 West Power Line Street Crystal River, FL 34428-6708 Dates: June 3 - 21, 2002 Inspectors: J. Zeiler, Senior Resident Inspector, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant D. Lanyi, Resident Inspector, St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant S. Sanchez, Resident Inspector Approved by: Leonard D. Wert, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IR 05000302-02-06, on 06/03/2002 - 06/21/2002, Florida Power Corporation, Crystal River Unit 3. Biennial baseline inspection of the identification and resolution of problems. One Green finding in Initiating Events.

The inspection was conducted by three resident inspectors. One Green finding was identified.

The significance of issues is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) and was determined by the Significance Determination Process in the NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/index.html.

Identification and Resolution of Problems Based on the results of the inspection, one finding and several negative observations were identified. The licensee was effective at identifying problems at a low threshold and putting them into the corrective action program. Although two issues were identified that the licensee had not entered into the corrective action program, these were considered isolated instances and not indicative of a weakness in this area. Generally, the licensee properly evaluated issues and implemented effective and timely corrective action. Formal root causes for issues classified as significant conditions adverse to quality were especially thorough and detailed.

The inspectors identified several examples in which condition reporting evaluations lacked thoroughness or were too narrowly focused, and some corrective actions were not comprehensive or were not implemented as intended. One finding of very low safety significance was identified. The inspectors identified that corrective actions to address a feedwater transient had not been implemented. Licensee audits and self-assessments were effective in identifying deficiencies in the corrective action programs. In addition, audit and assessment findings were consistent with the inspectors observations. Based on interviews of plant personnel from various departments, personnel indicated that they felt free to input safety issues and conditions adverse to quality into the corrective action and employee concerns programs. A safety conscious work environment was evident at Crystal River.

Cornerstone: Initiating Events

• Green. The inspectors identified that corrective actions to address a feedwater transient which occurred on December 15, 2001, had not been implemented.

This issue was more than minor because the feedwater transient required operator intervention in order to stabilize the plant and resulted in cavitation of a feedwater booster pump, which if it had tripped or become damaged, could have resulted in more severe consequences. Therefore, it was important that corrective actions should have been implemented. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) by the significance determination process because the impact was limited to a slightly increased likelihood of a plant transient. (Section 4OA2.c)

Report Details 4. OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution a. Effectiveness of Problem Identification (1) Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed 151 Nuclear Condition Reports (NCRs) and Precursor Cards (PCs) (pre-June 2001 condition reporting program nomenclature) which documented issues identified by the licensee as being significant conditions adverse to quality, conditions adverse to quality, or improvement items to determine if problems were being properly identified, characterized, and entered into the corrective action program (CAP).

The review primarily focused on six risk significant systems: D.C. Control (DP), Auxiliary Electrical Power (MT), Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling (DC), Decay Heat Removal (DH), Nuclear Services and Decay Heat Sea Water (RW), and Nuclear Services Closed Cycle Cooling (SW). The inspectors also reviewed selected NCRs and PCs (included in the 151) that were identified and evaluated by the major plant departments including operations, maintenance, engineering, security, chemistry, health physics, and emergency preparedness. The reviews included a selection of reports entered into the CAP since September 2000 which coincided with the last NRC baseline identification and resolution of problems inspection.

The inspectors reviewed Superintendent Shift Operations logs from January through April 2002 and selected 46 maintenance work requests (WRs) associated with the aforementioned six risk significant systems to determine if deficiencies were being entered into the CAP in accordance with licensee procedure CAP-NGGC-0200, Corrective Action Program. The inspectors also conducted walkdowns of these six systems with the assigned system engineers to determine if deficiencies existed that had not been entered into the CAP.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's evaluation of 14 selected industry experience items including event reports and NRC generic communications to assess if issues applicable to Crystal River Unit 3 were appropriately addressed.

Documents requested to support the inspection and documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

(2) Findings The inspectors determined that the licensee was generally effective at identifying problems and placing them into the corrective action program. However, the inspectors identified two issues that the licensee had not entered into the CAP:

• WR 368321 identified an as-found test failure of a 480 volt non-safety-related breaker that was being refurbished. The inspectors determined that similar model breakers were used in safety-related applications. The inspectors determined that this represented a condition adverse to quality as defined in the

licensees procedures and should have been entered into the CAP to investigate the cause of the failure and address any corrective action that may have been prudent for common cause considerations and for trending purposes. The licensee was unable to find that this issue had been entered into the CAP. The licensee subsequently initiated NCR 64561 to address the failure to enter this issue into the CAP.

• Superintendent Shift Operations Log, dated February 20, 2002, stated that during scheduled maintenance on Fire Service Control Panel #1, a loose wire had been found in the circuit that affected the smoke detection systems in two Cable Spreading Room fire zones. While fire watches were implemented until the wiring was corrected, the licensee had not entered this issue into the CAP.

The licensee subsequently initiated NCR 63197 to address the failure to enter this issue into the CAP.

The inspectors concluded that these negative observations were isolated occurrences and not indicative of a programmatic problem with identifying and documenting issues in the CAP. In general, the threshold for documenting problems was at a very low level, commensurate with the issues risk significance and ease of discovery, and it was evident that management encouraged employees to enter problems into the CAP.

b. Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues (1) Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the aforementioned 151 NCRs, PCs, and 14 operating experience items to determine if the licensee appropriately prioritized and evaluated problems in accordance with licensee procedure CAP-NGGC-0200, Corrective Action Program, and CP-111, Processing of Precursor Cards for Corrective Action Program.

The licensees problem prioritization methodology since June 2001 involved three categories as described in CAP-NGGC-0200. Priority 1 NCRs are defined as significant conditions adverse to quality and require formal root cause evaluations. Priority 2 NCRs are defined as conditions adverse to quality and Priority 5 NCRs are defined as improvement items. The majority of the items initiated by the licensee and reviewed by the inspectors involved Priority 2 NCRs. The inspectors evaluated whether root or apparent cause(s) were adequately identified and technically adequate. The inspectors verified that proper consideration was given to plant risk, Maintenance Rule impact, operability and reportability requirements. The inspectors evaluated whether appropriate corrective actions were identified commensurate with the safety significance of the issues.

The inspectors also attended a daily management meeting and a NCR Unit Evaluator Meeting to determine if plant problems were being properly characterized, prioritized, assigned, and if appropriate management attention was applied to significant plant issues.

(2) Findings Overall, the inspectors determined that when conditions adverse to quality were identified, the licensee entered those conditions into the CAP, prioritized them appropriately, and normally performed adequate evaluations. Formal root cause evaluation for significant conditions adverse to quality were especially thorough and detailed. The inspectors identified several negative observations involving investigations that lacked thoroughness or were too narrowly focused. These issues included the following:

• NCR 40364 discussed the failure of safety relief valve RWV-61 to lift during testing due to seawater attack and shell growth on the valve internals. The investigation incorrectly stated that RWV-61 was the shell side decay heat closed cycle cooling heat exchanger safety-relief valve versus the tube side relief. Also, the NCR did not address the extent of condition regarding the potential vulnerabilities of similar reliefs that were subjected to the same environment. The inspectors discussed this concern with the system engineer who reviewed similar relief valve performance data, at which time, it was noted that similar failures due to seawater attack and shell growth had occurred. The licensee initiated NCR 62079 to address this issue. In that the function of the relief valves in question was to protect the DC heat exchangers when they are out service and isolated for maintenance, the inspectors determined that this issue had no potential to impact the capability of the heat exchangers to perform their designed safety function.

• NCR 50188 documented lower than acceptable cooling water flow rate to containment cooling fans (AHF-1A) during routine testing. The investigation assumed that this was an equipment problem associated with a drifting cooling water throttle control valve. However, no evidence was provided to support this conclusion, nor the conclusion that there was no operabilty concern, and no corrective actions to address the assumed drift problem were developed. Based on review of design flow data, the inspectors determined that the flow had not reduced below design basis assumptions for minimum cooling water supply to the cooling fan, and past or current operability was not a concern. The licensee initiated NCR 63336 to address this item.

• NCR 52809 documented a feedwater transient that resulted in cavitation of a feedwater booster pump due to excessive flow conditions. The NCR did not address whether an assessment to determine if the pump had sustained damage due to the cavitation was performed. The licensee initiated NCR 63230 to address this item (This issue is also addressed in Section c below).

c. Effectiveness of Corrective Actions (1) Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the 151 NCRs and PCs to determine if appropriate corrective actions for issues were identified and implemented in a timely manner. The inspectors verified that common causes and generic concerns were addressed when appropriate.

The inspectors reviewed eight condition reports initiated by the licensee associated with NRC Non-Cited Violations (NCVs) and licensee event reports to verify that the licensee had appropriately addressed corrective actions for the associated issues.

The inspectors also reviewed a sample of licensee audits and assessments, trending reports, system health reports, maintenance rule implementation documents, and various other documents related to problem identification and resolution. The inspectors compared the audit and assessment results with self-revealing and NRC issues, such as those in licensee event reports and NRC integrated reports, to verify that deficiencies had been corrected and to assess the effectiveness of the licensees corrective actions.

(2) Findings Overall, corrective actions developed and implemented for issues were effective in correcting the problems. The inspectors generally found that the scope and depth of corrective actions implemented by the licensee were appropriate for the severity and risk significance of the problem identified. One Green finding and several negative observations were identified in which corrective actions were not comprehensive or were not fully implemented as intended.

The inspectors identified a Green finding associated with corrective actions to address a feedwater transient that occurred on December 15, 2001. The planned corrective actions or other appropriate measures had not been implemented.

NCR 52809 described a feedwater transient that occurred on December 15, 2001. The transient occurred while placing the second main feedwater pump in service at 50%

rated thermal power in accordance with power ascension procedure OP-204, Power Operations. When the second main feedwater pump was placed in service, the only running feedwater booster pump experienced cavitation due to excessive flow conditions. In response to the resulting feedwater transient, operators took feedwater and reactor instrument control systems to manual and stabilized the plant at 48% power.

The licensees investigation determined that starting a second main feedwater pump with its recirculation valve open with only one booster pump in service results in too much flow through the booster pump at 50% power. The licensee determined that flow through the booster pump possibly reached 14,000 gpm when the design capacity of the booster pump is 12,760 gpm.

The planned corrective actions documented in this NCR was to revise OP-204 to ensure that the second feedwater booster pump was started prior to placing the second main feedwater pump in service. The inspectors reviewed the current revision of OP-204 and identified that the licensee had not implemented the procedure change. While an

assignment task was identified in the NCR investigation section for opening a tracking item (CAPR) to revise OP-204 by March 15, 2002, no tracking item was apparently generated. The NCR was closed on May 5, 2002, with neither the department supervisor nor the unit evaluator, identifying the failure to initiate the tracking item.

The inspectors noted that this transient required operator intervention in mitigating its consequences and resulted in cavitation of a feedwater booster pump which if it had failed or become damaged, could have resulted in more severe consequences. As such, this issue was considered to be more than minor. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) by the Significance Determination Process because the impact was limited to a slightly increased likelihood of a plant transient.

The inspectors determined that this issue did not involve a violation of NRC requirements, since it did not directly involve safety-related activities. This issue is addressed in the licensees corrective action program as NCR 63230.

The negative observations included:

• Operating Experience (OPEX) item 40090 was initiated to review NRC Information Notice 2000-14 involving a non-vital bus fault at another nuclear facility that led to a fire and subsequent loss of offsite power event. The recommended actions of the OPEX item included further evaluation into the potential for a similar fire in the plants startup transformer. However, the inspectors noticed that no followup action to perform the evaluation was assigned, and as a result, the evaluation was not performed. Upon notification of this deficiency, the licensee reopened the OPEX item to perform the previously intended evaluation and initiated NCR 63299 to address this negative observation item.

• NCR 47566 identified a station air valve that was found mispositioned. The investigation concluded that the most likely cause was due to either of two scenarios, both of which involved operator human errors in the use of the same controlling alignment procedure. The NCR did not identify any corrective actions necessary for this mispositioning incident, even though misuse of an alignment procedure was identified as the most likely source of the problem. The licensee initiated NCR 64187 to address this item.

• NCR 50397 identified a failure to enter Technical Specification action conditions for an out of service main steam valve during a Mode change. One of the three planned corrective actions stated in the problem description section of the NCR indicated that this and other compliance issues would be communicated to the operations shifts by means of an Operations Study Book entry. The inspectors noted that this particular corrective action item was not identified in the investigation section due to an apparent oversight, therefore, a tracking assignment was not created to implement this intended action. The licensee initiated NCR 64188 to address this item.

• NCR 58704 identified a reverse current trip of an emergency diesel during routine testing due to excessive unloading rate of the engine by the operator.

While the investigation was very thorough and identified training and

communication weaknesses that contributed to the incident, all the corrective actions focused on the two individuals involved and did not address the potential need for similar training and communications lessons learned for other operators. A recent operations self-assessment indicated that these types of human errors would be shared with other operators via communications through the Operations Study Book program. The licensee initiated NCR 64188 to address this item.

Overall, Nuclear Assessment Section (NAS) audits and departmental self-assessments were effective in identifying issues and directing attention to areas that needed improvement. For example, as a result of weaknesses identified by NAS during a 2001 audit, increased management attention had been focused on improving the effectiveness and quality of self-assessment and benchmarking programs. The creation of the Self-Evaluation Unit in 2001 was also indicative of managements commitment toward continual improvement in these and other general areas of the sites CAP.

d. Assessment of Safety-Conscious Work Environment (1) Inspection Scope The inspectors interviewed licensee operations, maintenance, engineering, health physics, chemistry, emergency preparedness, and security personnel to develop a general view of the safety-conscious work environment at Crystal River and to determine whether any conditions existed that would cause workers to be reluctant to raise safety concerns. The inspectors questioned licensee staff to determine whether any conditions existed that were not placed in the corrective action program.

The inspectors also checked the licensees employee concerns program designated by the licensee as an alternate means for employees to identify deficiencies and to raise safety concerns while remaining anonymous. The inspectors reviewed the employee concerns database of items submitted from September 2000 to the present and selected several concerns to evaluate in detail to verify that issues were being adequately assessed and resolved.

(2) Findings The inspectors found that licensee management emphasized the need for all employees to identify and report conditions adverse to quality using the methods established within their administrative programs. The inspectors did not identify any reluctance on the part of licensee staff to report safety concerns.

4OA6 Exit Meeting The team discussed these findings with Mr. J. Franke and other members of the licensee's staff on June 21, 2002. Licensee management did not identify any materials examined during the inspection as proprietary.

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Florida Power Corporation M. Annacone, Manager, Operations S. Bernhoft, Manager, Regulatory Affairs R. Davis, Manager, Training J. Franke, Plant General Manager C. Gurganus, Manager, Maintenance S. Johnson, Supervisor, Corrective Action Program M. Folding, Superintendent, Security S. Powell, Supervisor, Licensing D. Roderick, Director Site Operations J. Stephenson, Supervisor, Emergency Preparedness J. Terry, Manager, Engineering R. Warden, Manager, Nuclear Assessment D. Young, Vice President, Crystal River Nuclear Plant NRC S. Stewart, NRC Senior Resident Inspector ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED None

ATTACHMENT DOCUMENTS REQUESTED FOR INSPECTION 1. A copy of all corporate and site level procedures associated with the corrective action process, operating experience program, risk assessment programs, maintenance rule program, employee concerns program, self-assessment programs, NRC reportability, and operability determination process 2. A list of all condition reports initiated since September, 2000 (corresponding to performance of last PI&R inspection) by individual plant departments 3. A list of all condition reports initiated since September 2000 for the following risk significant systems: DH, DC, RW, SW, DP, and MT 3. A listing of all condition report documents issued since September 2000 associated with licensee event reports, Cited and Non-Cited NRC violations, and NRC inspection report findings 4. A list of documents entered into the industry operating experience program since September 2000 5. A copy of audits and self-assessments of the corrective action processes since September 2000 6. A list of all Employee Concern Program items received since September 2000 7. Provide current risk related information for plant systems, including dominant sequences, system importance rankings, system and component risk achievement worths, etc.

8. A copy of System Health Reports issued since September 2000.

9. A list of systems which are or have been classified as (a) (1) in accordance with the Maintenance Rule since September 2000 10. A list of all maintenance work orders generated on the systems discussed in Item #2 since September 2000 LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Procedures and Drawings CAP-NGGC-0200, Corrective Action Program CP-111, Processing of Precursor Cards for Corrective Action Program AI-302, Self Evaluation Programs CAP-NGGC-0203, Benchmarking Program AI-1850, Human Performance Improvement Program CP-150, Identifying and Processing Operability Concerns CP-151, External Reporting Requirements

ADM-NGGC-0101, Maintenance Rule Program CP-153B, Monitoring the Performance of Systems Structures and Components Under the Maintenance Rule ADM-NGGC-0003, Conduct of Probabilistic Safety Assessment Unit Operations, Rev. 4 CAP-NGGC-0202, Operating Experience Program NGGD-1400, Corrective Action, Operating Experience, Self Assessment, and 10CFR21 REG-NGGC-001, Employee Concerns Program Drawings FD-302-601, Sheets 1-5, Nuclear Services Closed Cycle Cooling Drawings FD-302-611, Sheets 1-4, Nuclear Services and Decay Heat Sea Water Nuclear Condition Reports 41296 MUV-544 Failed to Open For SP-370 40994 DLP-5 Tripped Following EGDG-1A Surveillance 40738 A 15 VDC Power Supply Was Replaced in ES Channel 3 40388 SP-349A Aborted Run of EFP-1 40144 Discovered ARV-117 Stuck Open 50247 Fuel Oil Assessment Weakness #5 56666 MUV-452 Failed Its PMT After PM-178A 51353 DCV-10-FR Found Out of Tolerance 42167 MUP-1A Discovered to be Leaking at 3.39 GPM 54700 B DH Train Pressure Reached 310 psi During Performance of SP-412 40798 The New Negative Sequence Relay For EGDG-1A Has Failed 52300 AHF-14C Failed to Start 50477 Unexpected Entry onto ITS 3.1.7 Condition B 41654 SP-190A Operability Requirements are Wrong 42012 Fuel Handling Hoist Moves on Its Own 42240 RPS Channel D Trip Indicator Lamp is Dim 43229 Use of Bulk Grease Guns 44194 Battery Procedure Inconsistency 45207 Breaker Not Refurbished as Planned 45905 Replacement of Wooded Scaffolding 46670 Inadvertent Transfer of Water From RCBT to MUT 48518 MSSV Testing Lessons Learned 49045 Lost Security Badge 49784 CFV-5 Inadvertently Opened by MOVATS Personnel 50147 Missed Performance of Section 4.7 in SP-175 51286 EGDG-1A Cylinder Inspection Cap Found Off 54447 ES Relay Slow to React 54895 Maintenance Work Cannot Occur Around CWP 1A through 1D 55638 Repeat Work on Piping Downstream of RWV-131 57473 WS-11-CR is Out of Tolerance 58469 RM-A12 Failure 60016 Damaged Motor 52293 For Cause FFD Test Criteria 60742 Repeated Failures of PAB-4 Air Conditioner 53256 VBIT-1D In Sync Light is Out 48648 MSV-33 Failed

41092 EXV-4 Failed 41359 Channel D RPS Channel Tripped 41765 Recurring Failure on HT-007-TR 42304 Inadvertent Fire Service Deluge Actuation 51940 Personnel Injury Due to Fire Hose Failure 49526 Employee Shocked 47620 IAP-4 Would Not Load and Then Tripped 47549 Apparent Seal Ring Leakage on DHV-4 57368 DH-19-LS Found Out of Tolerance 45834 DHV-91 Stroke Failure 42511 Inappropriate Removal of Restraint Rigging on DHV-3 42459 Rejected QC Holdpoint on DHV-3 Canopy Seal 61543 DHV-111 Standby Light Not Functioning 42306 FWP-2 Discharge Pressure Too High 61411 IWCC Generated to Correct Zero Shift Criteria 43024 RM-L3 is in Warning After Startup 42012 Second Occurrence of Fuel Hoist Moving By Itself 42447 FWV-46 Failed 54893 NRC Identified a Potential for a Loss of 4160 V Bus 50280 Missed EGDG Maximum Load Test fo Last Cycle 61764 Fire Detection Surveillance Was Deleted From Work Week Plan 54537 SP-162 Incorrectly Evaluated and Transmitted 42456 MTSW-3J-3B Failed To Close 50005 Breaker 3395 Failed to Close From Control Room 49967 DPDP-1D-9-FU-01&02 Appear Undersized for Application 51244 Peanut Shells and Cigarette Butts Found Inside the RCA 41636 Found PASS Room to be an Airborne Radioactivity Area 40087 PI for Security Equipment Has Exceeded 75% of the Green Band Margin 43550 RM-L3 Setpoint Change 44378 RM-L3 Setpoint Change 60949 Incorrect Data Submitted for Chemistry Tritium KPI 40206 Incorrect Boron Concentration for RCBT Reported to Control Room 51574 Flow Through WDDM-2A Causes Rods to Move More Than Calculated 48964 RCS Boron Lower Than Required by the COLR in Mode 6 40834 DPBA-1A&2A Failed SP-522 As Left Visual Inspection 40893 DPBA-1B&2B Failed SP-522 As Left Visual Inspection 53157 Missed Opportunity to Troubleshoot C Battery Ground 42302 Found Overcurrent Protective Relaying Dropped Flags Tripped for BSP-1A 45102 BEST and OPT Temperature Switch Calibration Performed by Substation Personnel 45875 Clarification on PC-98-3171 and PC-00-1222 46130 Additional Training on Transformer Failure Modes/Dangers 47187 Relay AH (27BY) Failed During SP-907B 49725 Breaker 3211 Remote Shutdown Undervoltage Trip Defeated 49741 Breaker 3209 Will Not Open Via Control Handle on Main Control Board 49921 Breakers 1661 & 1662 Breaker Failure Relays Failed Trip Check 40317 2000 RERP Exercise ARCA: Incorrect Emergency Classification 40754 Declining Trend in Siren Reliability PI 42421 2001 Exercise Enhancements - Various Equipment Deficiencies 51874 Tabletop Drill Implementation Improvements Needed

52327 Unsatisfactory Completion of State Warning Notification Form 55317 Harris Plant Benchmarking Trip 58438 Item for Consideration From Benchmarking Trip to FP&L 59134 Out of Date Procedures Found in Five EOF Emergency Manuals 40133 Rebar-Spike Security Barriers Present a Significant Personnel Hazard 40567 Unsafe Work Practice Observed 41917 Badging Personnel Did Not Check Identification of NRC Personnel 47651 Security Tabletop Exercises Need Improvement 48925 Incomplete Vehicle Search at the Primary Gate 56232 Incomplete Corrective Action to Consolidate Ownership of All Site Keys 59255 Increased Safety Awareness for Weapons Handling in Security 59416 Security Nuisance Fence Found to be Degraded 41138 Site Indicator For Gaseous Effluents Exceeded Target Value 59861 RM-A6 Warning and High Setpoint Change 48050 Material Lost During Reactor Building Entry 40109 RWP-3B Exceeded Unavailability Performance Criteria 40364 RWV-61 Failure to Lift During Testing 40809 RW-2-PI Found Out of Calibration 40966 RWP-36 Failure to Close 40967 Continued Failures of RWP-1 Discharge Pressure Indication 42076 RW-2-PI Gauge Indicating Inaccurately 42389 Through-wall Leak Downstream of RWV-131 49830 High Vibration on RWP-3A 51662 Instruments RWV-150-FR2 and RWV-150-IP Out of Calibration 54655 RWP-2B Elevated Vibration Levels 55273 RWP-3A High Discharge Pressure 55638 Repeat Maintenance on Piping Downstream of RWV-131 55642 Pinhole Leak on RWP Flush Water Piping 55714 RW Leak Downstream of Weld of RWV-131 56389 RW Spool Piece Wall Thickness Degraded 39665 SWP-1A Pump Flow Rate Too High 39749 SWV-151 Failed Stroke Time Test 39936 SWV-80 Failed Stroke Time Test 41108 490 of 545 Tubes in SWHE-1A Are Clogged 41949 SWV-399 Found Out of Calibration 42106 SWV-399 Possible Repeat Maintenance 42341 SWV-151 Stroke Time Failure 45182 SWV-151 Stroke Time Failure 49435 SWV-151 Stoke Time Exceeded 50188 AHF-1A Failed Service Water Flow Test 51626 SWH-372 is Operable but not Fully Qulified 53418 As-Found Condition of SW-229-TC Was not as Expected 56004 SW-86-PT Found Out of Calibration 57588 Replaced SW-208-FI, Still Over Ranged 58746 SWV-355-PS Found Out of Tolerance 42501 Operator Work Around Guidance Needs Improvement 43024 RM-L3 In Warning Following Plant Startup 45775 RB Airborne Indicates RCS Leak Associated with Pressurizer 47566 SAV-420 Valve Mispositioning

51951 ARV-20 Found Out of Position 50397 Failure to Enter ITS 3.7.4 52809 Placing FWP-1B In Service Resulted in Feedwater Transient 52817 Feedwater Transient When FWV-28 Was Closed 53437 FSV-167 Found with No Seal 54543 WDV-887 Found Out of Position 54835 FSV-1166 Found Out of Position 57237 Conduct a Self-Assessment of 2001 Operation Configuration Control Issues 57804 ASV-23 Position Restored Incorrectly 58704 Breaker 3209 Tripped During Testing 60920 FSV-106 Found Out of Position Precusor Cards 01-0091 DHP-1A in Alert Range for Vibration 01-1353 Found Crack in DHV-3 Yoke 00-1670 Electrical Buses Required to be Operable per ITS 3.4.8 Not included in 3.4.9 ITS List 01-0769 Badging Personnel Did Not Check Identification Of NRC Personnel Proir to Issuing Their Badge 01-0012 Continuous Fire Watch Not Performed As Required 00-2741 Findings Addressed in NRC Inspection Report Not Addressed In CAP Operating Experience (OPEX/NCR) Items 58781 NRC IN 2002-12 Submerged Safety Related Cables 49544 NRC IN 2001-14 Problems With Incorrectly Installed Swing Check Valves 53768 NRC IN 2001-19 Improper Maintenance and Reassembly of Oil Bubblers 40090 NRC IN 2000-14 Non-Vital Bus Fault Leads to Fire and Loss of Offsite Power 40091 NRC IN 2000-13 Review of Refueling Outage Risk 41133 NRC IN 2000-21 Detached Check Valve Disc Not Detected 59844 NRC RIS 2002-04 Proposed Changes to NRC Performance Indicators 46085 NRC RIS 2001-15 Performance of DC-Powered MOV Actuators 46937 NRC RIS 2001-15 Corrective Actions 52620 NRC RIS 2001-13 Reset Fault Exposure Hours For Safety System Unavailability 52243 NRC RIS 2001-20 Revision to Guidance on NOEDs 40446 New Information Received Regarding PSC 2-00 50129 Vital Bus Transfer Switch Control Card Issue 44794 10CFR21 Notification/Review Process Is Inadequate Work Order Documents 367899 Decay Heat Tank Filter PM 371499 Install Temporary Modification for Seal Injection on DHV-4 371117 Hot Torque Bonnet Bolting on DHV-4 370137 Reinjection of Sealant into DHV-3 368808 Remove and Replace Relief Valve DHV-38 368739 Eliminate Leaks From Decay Heat Pump, DHP-1A

370998 Prepare and Install Vibration Absorber Clamp on DHP-1A 370629 Replace Oil in DHP-1A 370229 Repair Cracked Yoke on DHV-3 370233 Replace Valve Yoke Clamp on DHV-3 368635 Provide Support for Mechanical; Testing of EXV-4 368905 Replace High Flux Trip Bistable on Channel D RPS 371062 Inspect DHP-1B Motor Shaft and Keyway 371811 Clean/Repair/Replace Damaged PI Connector 372403 Troubleshoot Failure of AHF-14C to Start 369817 Troubleshoot Negative Sequence Relay Failure on EGDG-1A 372727 Repair Leaks on DHP-1A Vent Connection 267899 Troubleshoot DCV-10-FR Failure 364990 Troubleshoot MUV-452 Failure 367518 ARV-117 Stuck Open 365205 Replace 15 VDC Power Supply on ES Channel 3 368851 Adjust MUV-543 Valve Actuator Limit Switch 370125 Refurbish Breaker MTSW-2E-3B8 368455 Repair Battery Connections 216833 Perform Infrared Surveys 368190 Clean DPBA-1C Battery Cell Connections 216358 Clean DPBA-1C Battery Cell Connections 216455 DC Ground Present on Non-1E Battery 368456 Repair Battery Connections 216966 Periodic Checks For Battery Grounds 370248 Determine Why Breaker MTSW-3J-3B Failed To Close 216526 Repair Breaker MTSW-3J-3B 370795 Inspect Internal Wiring on Breaker MTMC-7-5C 369227 Replace Stripped Bolts on MTDG-1 368321 Refurbish Breaker MTSW-3E-4C 367097 Correct Control Wiring Discrepancies in RWP-2B 367394 Rebuild Pump RWP-3A 369364 Perform UT Exam of Piping at RWP-1 Discharge 369935 Perform UT Exam at RWV-146 370225 Repair RWP-4 Loss of Flow Indication 370303 Replace SWV-84-KS1/KS2 Limit Switches 370695 Adjust Speed Controls to SWV-151 370972 Rebuild SWHE-1B Tube Side Relief Valve 371438 Install Flow Plugs in RCP-1B Seal Coolers 371993 Clean RWSP-1A 372465 Verify Correct Wiring on Output Isolator Modules Engineering Documents System Health Reports, 4th Quarter 2000 through 1st Quarter 2002 Maintenance Rule System Scoping Report for Crystal River 3 Crystal River 3 Probabilistic Safety Assessment, Level 1 Qualification Notebook

Quality Assurance Documents CNAS-2001-07, Corrective Action Program CNAS-2001-13, Operations Functional Area Assessment CNAS-2001-20, Engineering Section Assessment CR-3 Trend Rollup Reports from 1st Quarter 2001 to 1st Quarter 2002 CR-3 Self-Evaluation Board Meeting Minutes from 2001 to 2002