IR 05000302/1993028
| ML20059C163 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 12/09/1993 |
| From: | Butcher R, Cooper K, Holmesray P, Landis K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059C160 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-302-93-28, NUDOCS 9401040414 | |
| Download: ML20059C163 (17) | |
Text
, ~ _ .- _ _ .. ...
UNITED STATES f*p nao\
-
. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l 3y -k REGloN 11 j
" " 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900
%;
y ATLANTA, GEORGIA 303230199 l
%,*..*/ .
i l
Report No.: 50-302/93-28 Licensee: Florida Power Corporation !
3201 34th Street, South !
St. Petersburg, FL 33733 l
Docket No.: 50-302 License No.: DPR-72 ;
Facility Name: Crystal River 3 ;
Inspection Conducted: November thru December 3 $
~
Inspector: W /2-T-7 7 R. Butcher, Senior Resident Inspector Date Signed Inspector: Ad P. liolmes-Ray, SenM r Resident Inspector i2~f*NJ Date Signed .
Inspector: 'N /2 0- 93 T. Cooper, Resident Inspector Date Signed
,
Approved by: +4/ -4 /Z-9- K.Lanq/s,S6ctionChief Date Signed Divisi6n of Reactor-Projects .
SUMMARY
Scope: !
This routine inspection was conducted by the resident inspectors in the areas of plant operations, radiological controls, security, . surveillance e observatias, maintenance observations, licensee event reports, licensee self ,
assessment, and cold weather preparations. Numerous facility tours were conducted and facility operations observe Backshift inspections were i conducted on November 9, 10, 11, 16, 17, and 1 ,
Results:
Within the scope of this inspection, the inspectors determined that the licensee continued to demonstrate satisfactory performance to ensure safe .
!
9401040414 DR 931210 -
ADOCK 05000302 '
_ _
'
,
.
r
plant operations. In addition, the licensee, through self assessment, took prompt action to correct the following non-cited violation:
50-302/93-28-01, Non-cited Violation. Failure to Perform a Technical Specification Required Surveillance. (paragraph 5)
During this inspection period, the inspectors had comments in the following Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance functional areas:
Plant Operations:
'
A weakness was identified in the failure to adhere to the documentation requirements to skip a step in enclosure 16 of AI-500, Conduct of Operations. (paragraph 8)
Maintenance: (Surveillance) l
.
A NCV was issued regarding a missed TS surveillance. (oaragraph 5)
Enaineerina: (Technical Support) i
'
Engineering involvement in system outages; system engineers functioning as outage management, planning and coordinating the outage activities, i is considered a strength. (paragraph 4.a) :
The inspectors reviewed the following outstanding items:
Item Number Status Description and Reference ,
LER 91-03 Closed Water Intrusion Into Pump Motor Leads to Loss of Circulating Water Pump, Emergency :
Feedwater Actuation and Manual Reactor J Trip. (paragraph 9.a)
LER 92-15 Closed Emergency Feedwater Actuation on Low Steam Generator Level While Isolating Steam From ,
the A Steam Generator. (paragraph 9.b) I
)
LER 92-17 Closed Improper Switch Adjustment and Solenoid Failure Cause Partial Loss of Auxiliary Building Ventilation Exhaust and Entry into Technical Specification 3. (paragraph 9.c) !
i
_ -.
- . . . . . _ - . - - ..- . . . . . . - - .- ~. -. - -
i
'
e .
-
. ;
!
REPORT DETAILS }
.: Persons Contacted j Licensee Employees b
- J. Alberdi, Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations j
- G. Becker, Manager, Site Nuclear Engineering Services ;
- G. Boldt, Vice President Nuclear Production l
- J. Campbell, Supervisor Nuclear Plant Security l
- R. Davis, Manager, Nuclear Plant Maintenance ;
- J. Frijouf, Nuclear Regulatory Specialist j
- Froats, Manager, Nuclear Compliance !
- Garry, Corporate Health Physics -
,
- Hickle, Director, Nuclear Plant Operations ,
- Johnson, Manager, Nuclear Chemistry and Radiation Protection ;
- W. Lagger, Health Pyhsics Supervisor .;
- W. Marshall, Nuclear Operations Superintendent 1 P. McKee, Director, Quality Programs >
- A. Miller, Senior Nuclear Scheduling Coordinator lj
- L. Moffatt, Manager, Nuclear Plant Technical Support
- B. Moore, Manager, Nuclear Integrated Scheduling ;
- W. Rossfeld, Manager, Site Nuclear Services l
- R. Widell, Director, Nuclear Operations Site Support :
- D. Wilder, Radiation Protection Manager l K. Wilson, Manager, Nuclear Licensing .;
t
'
Other licensee employees contacted included office, operations, engineering, maintenance, chemistry / radiation,' and corporate personne ,
NRC Resident Inspectors
!
- R. Butcher, Senior Resident Inspector- :
P. Holmes-Ray, Senior Resident Inspector ,
'
- T. Cooper, Resident Inspector Other NRC Personnel on Site K. Landis, Section Chief, Projects Branch II, Region II
- Attended exit interview 1 Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the 1 last paragrap . Other NRC Inspections Performed During This Period .;
AREA INSPECTED
-
!
REPORT N INSPECTION PERIOD 50-302/93-20 11/15-19/93 Operator License j Requalification Program l
50-302/93-26 11/15-19/93 Chemistry, MIC and Effluents .
50-302/93-29 11/29-12/3/93 Radiation Protection l
!
!
!
_ _
,_ .
,
.
,
,
3. 01 ant Status At the beginning of this reporting period, Unit 3 was operating at 100%
power and had been on line since September 20, 1993. The following evolution occurred during this reporting period. At 8:00 p.m. on 1 December 2, 1993, a power reduction to approximately 80% was initiated ~c in order to repair a sheared pin in the amertap debris filter installed in the inlet of the A circulating waterbox. The A waterbox was returned to service and a power increase to 100% reactor power was initiated at 4:25 a.m. on December 3, 1993. See paragraph 4.a for more informatio . Plant Operations (71707 & 93702)
Throughout the inspection period, facility tours were conducted to observe operations and maintenance activities in progress. The tours ;
included entries into the protected areas and the radiologically !
controlled areas of the plant. During these inspections, discussions were held with operators, health physics and instrument and controls technicians, mechanics, security personnel, engineers, supervisors, and ,
plant management. Some operations and maintenance activity observations were conducted during backshifts. Licensee meetings were attended by a the inspector to observe planning and management activities. The inspections confirmed FPC's compliance with 10 CFR, Technical Specifications, License Conditions, and Administrative Procedure I Operational Events !
At approximately 10:00 p.m. on November 17,1993, a 1200 gallon plastic tank containing about 1000 g61ons of a 6% sodium hydroxide solution was dropped on the turbine deck (143 foot elevation). Operators used rags and sandbags in an attempt to contain the spill but some of the spill -
leaked thru floor openings onto the 119 foot and 95 foot elevations and '!
onto equipment on those elevations. No safety related equipment was [
affected by the spill. The 1A ARP auto-started inadvertently and the :
breaker was racked out to prevent possible damage. The resident inspectors were notified at 11:30 p.m. and responded to the sit Licensee personnel initiated cleanup by vacuuming, using rags to absorb >
'
the spill, and by wiping down equipment. Initial cleanup was completed by the end of day shift on November 18, 1993, and detailed walkdowns to ;
open control boxes, examine cable trays, etc., followed immediatel The resident inspectors monitored the licensee's cleanup effort l The licensee initiated Problem Report PR-93-0254, Na0Fi Spill, to i document this event for further evaluation and corrective actions as ,
appropriate. The Nuclear Plant Technical Support group was given ;
responsibility for coordinating an engineering assessnent following the ;
sodium hydroxide spill. Nuclear Plant Systems Engineering issued ,
memorandum NPTS93-0536 dated November 24, 1993 with recommended short and long term corrective actions. Due to the relatively low ,
concentration of the sodium hydroxide spill, many clean up operations on !
operating equipment and controls will be deferred until the next outag l Some equipment has already been repaired and returned to service (i.e., ,
,
i
>
,
v
-
.
the IB ARP electric motor was replaced). An HPES evaluation to -
determine the root cause of the spill is on going at this tim ,
On November 29, 1993, at 11:00 p.m., EGDG-1B was removed from service to improve its operational reliability and reduce shutdown risk. This was '
accomplished by the upgrade and replacement of various instrumentation that was obsolete and/or non-functional. Numerous outstanding work requests correcting system fuel and air leaks were also completed. The j scheduled down time for the EGDG-1B was 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />. The inspectors attended preoutage meetings where all the affected departments reviewed the planned work to ensure parts were available, work packages were -
prepared, work scope could be accomplished within the allocated time '
frame and job responsibilities were understood. The inspectors reviewed the outage justification report which was required by AI-255, System Outage Scheduling and Implenentation. A determination was made that a ,
safety benefit would result from the proposed outag .
TS 3.8.1.1, action b. requires with one EGDG inoperable, demonstrate-the 1 operability of the remaining AC sources by performing surveillance ,
requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a within one hour and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> !
thereafter; and 4.8.1.1.2.a.4 within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Further, to require that the licensee restore two EGDGs to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be >
in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and cold shutdown within 3 the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. The inspectors verified that the TS require-ments were satisfied. EGDG-1B was returned to service at 6:15 a.m. on December 2, 1993. The inspectors followed the outage activities and considered the EGDG-1B outage to be well planned and coordinated. The ,
use of the system engineers as outage managers who are responsible for i helping plan and coordinate the outage activities is considered a strength. The system outage objectives were accomplished. A post outage critique is scheduled to provide lessons learned for future system outages. The residents will attend the post outage critiqu On December 2, 1993, the system engineer notified the NSS that the shear pin for one of the debris filters for the A waterbox appeared to be ,
broken. The NSS issued the following instructions for the A waterbox:
-
Do not run the amertap balls; Once per hour manually backwash the debris filters; and
'
-
-
Monitor the inlet pressure. If inlet pressure reaches 7 psig, then secure the A CW ,
'
At 8:00 p.m. on December 2, 1993, a power reduction to 80% reactor power was initiated and CWP-1A was shutdown to allow repairs to the A waterbox debris filter unit shear pi It was found that the shear pin was not broken but the broken shear pin indication was misaligned. The shear pin indication was realigned and some shell was removed from the tube At 4:25 a.m. on December 3, 1993, the A waterbox was returned to service and a power increase to 100% reactor power was initiate *
,
_ __ _
.
. ;
I
,
4 : Radiological Protection Program .
Radiation protection control activities were observed to verify that these activities were in conformance with the facility policies and procedures, and in compliance with regulatory requirements. These observations included: -
- Entry to and exit from contaminated areas, including step-off pad conditions and disposal of contaminated clothing;
-
Area postings ar. controls; !
- Work activity within radiation, high radiation, and contaminated areas; r
- RCA exiting practices; and
-
Proper wearing of personnel monitoring equipment, protective clothing, and respiratory equipmen ;
The implementation of radiological controls observed during this l inspection period were proper and conservativ )
f Security Control In the course of the monthly activities, the inspector included a review of the licensee's physical security program. The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily activities to include: protected and vital areas access ' controls; searching of personnel, packages, and vehicles; badge issuance and retrieval; escorting of visitors; patrols; and compensatory posts. In addition, the inspector observed the operational status of protected ;
area lighting, protected and vital areas barrier integrity, and the security organization interface with operations and maintenance. No performance discrepancies were identified by the inspector ' Fire Protection Fire protection activities, staffing, and equipment were observed to verify that fire brigade staffing was appropriate and that fire alarms, extinguishing equipment, actuating controls, fire fighting equipment, emergency equipment, and fire barriers were operabl i Violations or deviations were not identifie . Surveillance Observations (61726)
The inspectors observed TS required surveillance testing and verified that the test procedures conformed to the requirements of the TSs; .
testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures; test :
instrumentation was calibrated; limiting conditions for operation were l met; test results met acceptance criteria requirements and were reviewed ;
by personnel other than the individual directing the test; deficiencies !
were identified, as appropriate, and were properly reviewed and resolved by management personnel; and system restoration was adequat For
. - .. _- . ._ . _ __. -
)
'
.
'
a
!
5 l completed tests, the inspectors verified testing frequencies were met and tests were performed by qualified individual The inspectors witnessed / reviewed portions of the following test
.
activities:
- SP-34t,A, RWP-2A, SWP-1A and Valve Surveillance; and
- SP-510, Weekly Battery Check (Units 1 & 2). o On November 30, 1993, the licensee became aware that SP-510, Weekly -
Battery Checks (Units 1 & 2), was not accomplished within the allowable time interval. SP-510 was last accomplished on November 18, 1993. TS .
-
3.8.1.1 requires two separate battery / charger combinations supplying DC -
control power to the 230 kV switchyard breakers be operabl Surveillance requirement TS 4.8.1.1.1.c.1 requires each battery ,
supplying DC control power to the 230 kV switchyard breakers be .
demonstrated operable at least once every 7. days by verifying:
- The electrolyte level of each pilot cell is between the minimum and maximum level indicating marks; ,
- The pilot cell specific gravity, corrected to 77'F, and full electrolyte level is 2: 1.20; ,
- The pilot cell voltage is 2: 2.15 volts; and ;
i
- The overall battery voltage is 2120 volt >
Since the TS 3.8.1.1 action statements do not address the situation where both batteries that supply DC control power to the 230 kV switchyard breakers are inoperable TS 3.0.3 was applicable. TS 3. states: !
When a Limiting Condition for Operation is not met, except as provided in the associated ACTION requirements, within I hour accion shall be initiated to place the unit in a MODE in which the Specification does not apply to placing it, as applicable, in: .
>
At least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, At least H0T SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and At least COLD SHUTDOWN within the subsequent 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Where corrective measures are completed that permit operation under the ACTION requirements, the ACTION may be taken in accordance with the specified time limits as measured from the time of failure to meet the Limiting Condition for Operatio .
Exceptions to these requirements are stated in the individual !
Specification ;
i
!
i
. - . . --
-
. l
-
. ;
t
s The NSS entered TS 3.0.3 on November 30, 1993, at 1:11 p. SP-510 was successfully completed on two batteries and TS _3.0.3 was exited at 1:46 Investigation by the licensee indicates that SP-510 was initially l directed to be accomplished by the responsible nuclear supervisor. The ,
Units 1 & 2 personnel who were designated to accomplish SP-510 were ;
under the impression that the improved TS were in effect and therefore SP-510 was no longer required. The failure to accomplish SP-510 was i never relayed back to the appropriate nuclear supervisor and was not ,
'
recognized as not being accomplished until the allowable time interval had expired. It is noted that the improved TS, which are to be issued !
in the near future, does not require this surveillance to be performe PR 93-0259, Failure to Perform Surveillance (SP-510) on Time, was '
initiated to document root cause and recommended corrective action The failure to perform the surveillance required per TS 4.8.1.1.1. within 7 days (plus 25% extension allowable per TS 4.0.2) is a j violation. This violation will not be subject to enforcement action because the licensee's efforts in identifying and correcting the !
violation meet the criteria specified in Section VII.B of the !
Enforcement Policy. This NCV will be tracked as NCV 50-302/93-28-01, Failure to Perform a TS Required Surveillanc .
One non-cited violation was identifie . Maintenance Observations (62703)
Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components were observed and reviewed to ascertain they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes and standards, and in conformance with the TS The following items were considered during this review, as appropriate:
LCOs were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; procedures used were adequate to control the activity; troubleshooting
'
activities were controlled and repair records accurately reflected the maintenance performed; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; QC records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were properly implemented; QC hold points were established and observed where required; fire prevention controls were implemented; outside contractor force activities were controlled in accordance with the approved QA program; and housekeeping was actively pursue ,
l The inspectors witnessed / reviewed portions of the following maintenance l activities in progress .
I
,
. -
.. . .
.
'
.
. :
- WR NU301993,. Install thermowells in diesel generator lube oil and {
jacket water. piping for new temperature switch probes; ;
- WR NUO314617, Provide I&C support for RW flow measurement testing; f
- WR NUO314890, NI 14 trouble shooting; ,
- WR NUO314933, Repair leaking pipe connection on FSV-101; i
- WR NUO315155, EGDG-1B air compressor unloader periodically sticks !
in the unloaded position; and j WR NUO315220, Clean out the tubes on the IB SW heat exchange ]
For those maintenance activities observed, the inspectors determined-that the activities were conducted in a satisfactory manner and that the i work was properly performed in accordance with approved maintenance work [
order Violations or deviations were not identifie . Self Assessment (40500) l
During this reporting period the inspectors attended sev ral PRC !
meetings to observe conduct of the meeting, the makeup of the committee, i the topics reviewed and verifie:i that TS 6.5.1, Plant Review Committee i (PRC), requirements were met. The meetings were conducted in a formal :
and professional manner by a quorum of qualified personnel from diverse disciplines. The agenda was fol'. owed and presentations were thoroug l The PRC committee asked probing questions to determine acceptability of :
requested changes. The inspector determined that the PRC was operating i in a manner that met TS requirements and promoted plant safet ;
On November 10, 1993, the licensee held a NGRC meeting as required by TS
'
6.5.2, Nuclear General Review Committee (NGRC). The inspectors verified the composition of the NGRC and that a quorum was present. The agenda was followed with subcommittee reports covering topics in the major ,
plant areas. Presentations on other current plant concerns and plans were covered. The NGRC composition was determined to cover various background experiences to adequately address potential plant problems, i The inspector determined that the NGRC was operating in a manner that met TS requirements and promoted plant safet ,
Violations or deviations were not identifie . Cold Weather Preparations (71714) ]
'
Periods of cold weather are infrequent and intermittent at the Crystal River Site, intermixed with intervals of mild weather. The licensee therefore performs the Adverse Weather Conditions Checklist, enclosure '
16 to licensee procedure Al-500, Conduct of Operations, several times during the winter season. The checklist included verification of
_
~
.
.
operation of heat tracing, realignment of ventilation systems and recirculation or verification of heater operation for outside tank .
The inspectors reviewed several completed checklists, from recent days of cold weather that occurred during the inspection period. The inspectors noted that generally, precautions were adequately taken to prevent components and systems from experiencing problems with freezin '
The inspectors did note, however, that not all performers of the checklist adhered to the guidance offered by step 4.3.2.3.7 of AI-500 i
!
regarding the proper method for not performing a step in a procedur These requirements include marking the step N/A, writing a note explaining why the step is being skipped, and having either the NSS or '
ANSS initial and date the note. The inspectors considered this a weakness. It was also noted that the procedure did not specify when '
this checklist should be done. The NSSs have the checklist accomplished when they deem it necessary due to weather forecasts. The licensee is evaluating whether to add initiating criteria to the procedur Violations or deviations were not identifie . Onsite Followup and In-Office Review of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events and 10 CFR Part 21 Reviews (90712/90713/92700)
The Licensee Event Reports and/or 10 CFR Part 21 Reports discussed below were reviewed. The inspectors verified that reporting requirements had been met, root cause analysis was performed, corrective actions appeared :
appropriate, and generic applicability had been considere t
~
Additionally, the inspectors verified the licensee had reviewed each event, corrective actions were implemented, responsibility for corrective actions not fully completed was clearly assigned, safety <
questions had been evaluated and resolved, and violations of regulations or TS conditions had been identified. When applicable, the criteria of 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, were applie (Closed) LER 91-03: Water Intrusion Into Pump Motor Leads to toss of Circulating Water Pump, Emergency Feedwater Actuation and Manual Reactor Tri ,
This LER reports an event that took place on April 20, 1991, when a circulating water pump (CWP-1A) tripped duo to water intrusion into the pump motor during a severe rain storm. Crystal River 3 was operating at 47% power with B and C condenser waterboxes out of service. At 6:50 a.m. CWP-1A tripped removing cooling from condenser waterbox A and the A SCHE. The B SCHE was not in operation. The SC system cools the secondary side heat loads such as the main turbine bearings. The operators were reducing power and tripped the main turbine when bearing temperature alarms were :
received. No automatic reactor trip was initiated since the power level was below the Anticipatory Reactor Trip System logic bypass ,
setpoint. After the turbine trip, the AMSAC logic detected main feedwater/ reactor power signals which met actuation setpoints and
,
. . . .. . - ..
,
-
i i
- ,
~
,
9 j
>
initiated EFW. The operators then tripped the reactor due to EFW initiation at powe i This event was caused by rainwater intrusion into the CWP-1A motor i during a 5: Tre stor j Corrective cion for this event included providing weather .
'
protection for the CWPs and procedural changes were made to place both SCHEs in service if the plant is to be operated with two condenser waterboxes out of service. Also, the in-service SCHE is to be fed from the side with two waterboxes if one waterbox is out of service. This LER is close ,
t The licensee is performing an engineering analysis / calculation and ,
!
hardware selection to reduce the string error in the AMSAC Enable i
Setpoint. This is being tracked by the licensee as NOTES Item 20606C and is scheduled for completion January 3,1994. The resident inspectors will follow the pending completion of NOTES :
Item 20606 , (Closed) LER 92-15: Emergency Feedwater Actuation on Low Steam j Generator Level While Isolating Steam From A Steam Generato >
The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions associated with this LER and subsequent revisions and the actions taken to implement the .
Licensee procedure OP-202, Plant Heatup, was revised on August 27, ;
1993, to assure that both main feedwater pumps are capable of i; controlling level when the integrated control system is in j automatic differential pressure control mode. MSV-21 was repacked i on July 17, 1992, by WR NUO287259. The licensee included a
description of the event in the annual operator licensee requalification training pla The inspector verified that an engineering evaluation was completed, under problem report 92-79. As a result of the
evaluation, MARS 92-05-09-01 and 92-07-20-01; and WR NU306346,
'
306416, 306442, 306565 and 306658 were performed. Monitoring was performed during startup and the feedwater controls behaved .r satisfactorily during low flow condition !
This LER is close ; (Closed) LER 92-17: Improper Switch Adjustment and Solenoid l Failure Cause Partial Loss of Auxiliary Building Ventilation !
Exhaust and Entry into Technical Specification 3. :
The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions associated with the LER and the actions taken to implement them. On December 22, 1992, the licensee installed warning signs adjacent to the appropriate limit switches; reminding personnel of the importance ,
,
. _ . . _ _ _ _ _ . _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _
.
--
--
'
.
~
.
i 10' ,
i of the. limit switch settings. The four solenoid valves in the :
15AB air handling panel have been placed in a regular preventative maintenance replacement program. The inspectors verified that these valves were included in the program as of April 14, 199 This LER is close Violations or deviations were not identifie ,
10. Exit Interview
"
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on December 3, 1993 with those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The inspectors described the t.reas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed below. Proprietary information is not contained in this repor ,
'
Dissenting comments were not ret:ived from the license Item Number Status Description and Reference LER 91-03 Closed Water Intrusion Into Pump Motor .
Leads to Loss of Circulating Water l Pump, Emergency Feedwater Actuation
'
and Manual Reactor Trip. (paragraph ;
9.a)
LER 92-15 Closed Emergency Feedwater Actuation on Low Steam Generator Level While -
Isolating Steam From the A Steam Generator. (paragraph 9.b) i LER 92-17 Closed Improper Switch Adjustment and I Solenoid Failure Cause Partial Loss i of Auxiliary Building Ventilation Exhaust and Entry into Technical :
'
Specification 3.0.3. (paragraph 9.c)
NCV 50-302/93-28-01 Closed Failure to Perform a TS Required Surveillance. (paragraph 5) ;
,
1 Acronyms and Abbreviations AC - Alternating Current AI - Administrative Procedure i ante meridiem i AMSAC - ATWS (anticipated transient without scram) I
'
mitigating system actuation circuity ANSS - Auxiliary Nuclear Shift Supervisor ARP - Air Removal Pump ,
CFR - Code of Federal Regulations !
CWP - Circulating Water Pump DC - Direct Current EGDG - Emergency Diesel Generator !
_ _ _. o
e ,
EFW - Emergency Feedwater System F - Fahrenheit HPES - Human Performance Evaluation System I&C - Instrumentation and Control kV - kilovolt LCO - Limiting Condition for Operation LER - Licensee Event Report MAR - Modification Approval Record MIC - Microbiologically Induced Corrosion MSV - Main Steam Valve Na0H - Sodium Hydroxide NCV - Non-cited Violation NGRC - Nuclear General Review Committee NI - Nuclear Instrument NOTES - Nuclear Operations Tracking and Expediting System NRC - Nuclear Regulatory Commission NSS - Nuclear Shift Supervisor OP - Operating Procedure post meridiem PR - Problem Report PRC - Plant Review Committee psig - pounds per square inch gauge QC - Quality Control QA - Quality Assurance RCA - Radiation Control Area RW - Nuclear Services Decay Heat Exchanger RWP - Radiation Work Permit SC - Secondary Closed Cycle Cooling SCHE - Secondary Cooling Heat Exchanger SP - Surveillance Procedure SW - Nuclear Services Closed Cycle Cooling System SWP - Service Water Pump TS - Technical Specification WR - Work Request l
l
l l
\
n L _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _