IR 05000302/1993023
| ML20059K378 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 11/02/1993 |
| From: | Butcher R, Holmesray P, Landis K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059K374 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-302-93-23, NUDOCS 9311160022 | |
| Download: ML20059K378 (3) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION UMITED STATES
.11 REGloN 11 -
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_E 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900 r.
j ATLANTA, GEoRG?A 303234199
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Report No.:
50-302/93-23 Licensee:
Florida Power Corporation 3201 34th Street, South St. Petersburg, FL 33733 Docket No.:
50-302 License No.: DPR-72 Facility Name: Crystal River 3 Inspection Conducted: September 12 - October 9, 1993 Inspector:
C,8.(wg foe la f2ii3 P. Holmes-Ray, Shnior Resident Inspector Date Sig dd-Inspector:
O. @,lm L lb 'f3 R. Butcher, Serdor~ Resident Inspector Date Signed
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Approved by:
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' // ' $3 5-K.' Landis,Mection Chief Date Signed Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY l
l Scope:
This routine inspection was conducted by the resident inspectors in the areas of plant operations, security, radiological controls, Licensee Event Reports and facility modifications. Numerous facility tours were conducted and facility operatiens observed.
Bachshifts inspections were conducted on 9/18, 19, and 22.
Results:
In the area of plant operations, the following was identified:
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A plant trip on September 18, 1993, was caused by loss of one reactor coolant pump due to an equipment failure. The operators responded well to the trip.
The cmphasis by management to reduce personnel errors is having a. positive effect.~
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In the area of maintenance / surveillance, The work observed during this reporting period was performed in a professional and timely manner.
9311160022 931103 PDR ADDCK 05000302 G
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
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Licensee Employees
- 1 Alberdi, Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations
- L. Clewett, Manager, Nuclear Mechanical Shop G. Boldt, Vice President Nuclear Production R. Davis, Manager, Nuclear Plant Maintenance E. Froats, Manager, Nuclear Compliance
- F. Fusick, Manager, Design and Modifications G. Halnon, Manager, Nuclear Plant' Systems Engineering
- B. Hickle, Director, Nuclear Plant Operations
- S. Johnson, Manager, Nuclear Chemistry and Radiation Protection
- G. Longhouser, Nuclear Security Superintendent.
- W. Marshall, Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations
- P. McKee, Director, Quality Programs
- R. McLaughlin, Nuclear Regulatory Specialist
- A. Miller, Senior Nuclear Scheduling Coordinator
- L. Moffatt, Manager, Nuclear Plant Technical Support
- B. Moore, Manager, Nuclear Integrated Scheduling W. Neuman, Supervisor, Inservice Inspection V. Roppel, Nuclear Engineering Services Supervisor W. Possfeld, Manager, Site Nuclear Services
- R. Widell, Director, Nuclear Operations Site Support
- K. Wilson, Manager, Nuclear Licensing
- R. Yost, Supervisor, Quality Audits
Other licensee employees contacted included office, operations,
engineering, maintenance, chemistry / radiation, and corporate personnel, i
NRC Resident Inspectors
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- P. Holmes-Ray, Senior Resident Inspector
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- R. Butcher, Senior Resident Inspector
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- Attended exit interview Acronyms and initialisms used thrare ;ut Js report are listed in the last paragraph.
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Plant Status and Activities The plant continued in power operation -(Mode 1) for the duration 'of this inspection period except for a reactor trip on September 18 due to-
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equipment failure. _ Power operation commenced on September 20, 1993, and continued for the remainder of the reporting period.
On September 21 and 22, the Regional Administrator, Region II, and the Section Chief, DRP Section 2B were on site for a site visit and quarterly press conference.
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3.
Plant Operations (71707, 93702, & 40500)
Throughout the inspection period, facility tours were conducted to
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observe operations and maintenance activities in progress.
The tours included entries into the protected areas and the radiologically controlled areas of the plant.
During these inspections, discussions were held with operators, health physics and instrument and controls technicians, mechanics, security personnel, engii.eers, supervisors, and plant management.
Some operations and maintenance activity observations were conducted during backshifts.
Licensee meetings were attended by the inspector to observe planning and management activities.
The inspections confirmed FPC's compliance with 10 CFR, Technical Specifications, License Conditions, and Administrative Procedures.
a.
Operational Events On September 18, 1993, at 11:48 p.m., the reactor tripped on a flux / delta flux / flow signal.
The "D" RCP B phase surge capacitor failed to ground, causing the protective relays to trip the RCP.
Loss of the D reactor coolant pump resulted in reduced flow and also caused the ICS to run back the plant.
During the runback, A/B/C RPS channels detected a flux / flow imbalance mismatch and the RPS bistables tripped.
Plant response was as expected, but a main steam safety valve (MSV-42) did not reseat properly. The licensee determined that the manual lift device adjusting nut had vibrated to a position such that the manual lift device was holding MSV-42 slightly open.
The manual lift device was restored to proper adjustment and MSV-42 reseated with no leak by.
The operator response te this trip was prompt, appropriate and timely.
In the recent past, plant management has placed emphasis on reducing personnel errors.
During the trip and the restart there were no reported personnel errors. The lack of personnel error indicates that the management initiative to reduce personnel error is having results.
b.
Self Assessment The inspector attended several PRC meetings including the one at j
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which the reactor trip and the restart requirements were a topic of review. The questioning attitude observed previously was again
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present as the cause of the trip and the work necessary to be accomplished prior to restart were discussed.
Once again the errphasis was on plant safety.
-~-~ Ebe!P"ud.fG9 to1% ui.eti. ion Program i
i Radiation protection control activities were observed to verify that these activities were in conformance with the facility l
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policies and procedures, and in compliance with regulatory requirements. These observations included:
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Entry to and exit from contaminated afeas, including step--
off pad conditions and disposal of contaminated clothing;
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Area postings and controls;
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Work activity within radiation, high radiation, and
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contaminated areas;
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RCA exiting practices; and
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Proper wearing of personnel monitoring _ equipment, protective clothing, and respiratory equipment.
The implementation of radiological controls observed during this
inspection period were proper and conservative.
A result of the October 1, 1993, implementation of the new 10 CFR 20 was.the
changing of the plant postings in accordance with the new requirements.
There are fewer high radiation areas in the plant than previously which makes more areas accessible.
d.
Security Control j
t In the course of the monthly activities, the inspector revi2wed the licensee's physical security program. The performance of
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various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily activities to include: proter:ted and vital areas access controls; searching of personnel, packages, and vehicles; badge
issuance and retrieval; escorting of visitors; patrols; and compensatory posts.
In addition, the inspector observed the operational status of protected area lighting, protected and vital i
areas barrier integrity, and the security organization interface
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with operations and maintenance. No performance discrepancies
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were identified by the inspectors.
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Fire Protection Fire protection activities, staffing, and equipment were observed-to verify that fire brigade staffing was appropriate and that fire alarms, extinguishing equipment, actuating controls, fire fighting equipment, emergency equipment, and fire barr'ers were operable.
Violations or deviations were not identified.
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4.
Maintenance and Surveillance Activities (62703 & 61726)
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Surveillance tests were observed to verify that approved procedures were
being used; qualified personnel were conducting the tests; tests were
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adequate to verify equipment operability; calibrated equipment was
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utilized; and TS requirements appropriately implemented.
The following tests were observed and/or data reviewed:
SP-110, Reactor Protection System Functional Testing;
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- SP-130, Engineered Safeguards Monthly' Functional Test;
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- SP-300, Operating Daily Surveillance Log;
- SP-317, RC System Water Inventory Balance;
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- SP-353, Control Room Emergency Ventilation System and RM-A5 Monthly
Test; and
- SP-457, Refueling Interval ECCS Response to a Safety. Injection Test
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Signal.
In addition, the inspector observed maintenance activities to verify that correct equipment clearances were in effect; work requests and fire
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prevention work permits, as required,-were issued and being followed; quality control personnel performed inspection activities as required; and TS requirements were being followed.
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Maintenance was observed and work packages were reviewed for the following maintenance activities:
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- WR303271, install check valve SWV-764;
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- WR311378, makeup pump maintenance MVP-1B;
- WR312881, transfer, neutralize and discharge sodium hydroxide; and
- WR314413, repack raw water pump RWP-3B.
The following items were considered noteworthy:
a.
The work on RWP-3B was performed in a timely manner. The causelof
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the packing leak was determined to be a small amount of corrosion
inside the stuffing box which kept the gland follower from freely
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moving to compress the packing evenly. The stuffing box was
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cleaned and the pump packing replaced.
Post maintenance testing l*
verified correct operation.
b.
Transfer of the surplus sodium hydroxide for neutralization and discharge commenced this report period.
The inspector observed the setup and transfer of the neutralizing agent (sulfuric acid).
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Good safety. practices were followed while handling the acid both
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with respect to personnel safety and prevention'of spills. ' Action had been taken to provide for containment of the acid if a spill should occur. This job was well controlled. After the initial
discharges a problem developed with the amount of total dissolved
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solids in the prior to release samples and all transfers for discharge of the sodium hydroxide were halted until the cause of the high total dissolved solids could be corrected.
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Overall, surveillance and maintenance activities observed and
discussed above were performed in a satisfactory manner in
accordance with procedural requirements and met the requirements
of the TS.
Violations or deviations were not identified.
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5.
Safety Systems Walkdown (71710)
The inspector conducted a walkdown of the accessible portions of the DH system to verify that the lineup was in accordance with license requirements for system operability and that the system. drawing and procedure correctly reflect "as-built" plant conditions. Drawing FD-302-641, sheet 1, revision 54; sheet 2, revision 44; and sheet 3,
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revision 30 were used to conduct the walkdown.
Procedure OP-404, Decay Heat Removal System, revision 88, enclosure 3,. Valve Check List, was used to determine the required position of the system valves.
Violations or deviations were not identified.
6.
Review of Licensee Event Reports (92700)
LERs were reviewed for potential generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective actions appeared appropriate.
Events that were reported immediately were reviewed as they occurred to determine if the TS were satisfied.
LERs were also reviewed in
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accordance with the current NRC Enforcement Policy.
a.
(Closed) LER 90-02:
Fire Dampers May Not Close Under Ventilation Flow Conditions Due to Failure to Consider Flow Conditions in Original Design Criteria.
The status of this LER was last discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-302/92-29.
It was left open pendiig the completion of the licensee's engineering study of all the fire dampers in the _
facility, their design basis, and recommendations for appropriate-
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actions to resolve all aspects of the issue.
On September 30, 1993, the licensee. issued Revision 3 to LER 90-02. The corrective action for Revision 3 states,that FPC will conduct an evaluation to determine the bounding conditions for shutdown of HVAC system fans.
Portions of HVAC systems have heat detection shutdown circuits which require no operator action to achieve a no flow condition and damper closure. The licensee will revise procedures to direct operators to secure certain HVAC fans during a fire to stop flow and allow the dampers to close. Also, the fire damper PM program is to be made more aggressive. The completion of these actions is being tracked by the licensee's
corrective action tracking system which shows a scheduled completion date of 12/31/93'for revision of operating procedures, 2/28/94 for revision to the fire prevention PM program and 4/30/94 for the completion of the bounding conditions evaluation.
This item is closed.
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b.
(Closed) LER 91-13: Test Switch Installation Error Causes Entry Into Technical Specification 3.0.3.
This LER reported a series of events involving the EFP that took
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place on November 19, 1991 during a reactor startup. The plant was in Mode 3 and ES testing was in progress. TS 4.7.1.2a
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requires testing of the steam driven EFP within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of entry
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into Mode 3 to demonstrate operability of the pump. Due to problems with the ES test the steam driven EFP was not tested within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of entering Mode 3 and the pump was declared inoperable per TS 4.7.1.2a.
At this point both EFPs were considered inoperable, the motor driver due to ES test equipment
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installation problems resulting from a drawing error, and the steam driver because of more than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> in Mode 3 without testing. Both EFPs inoperable in Mode 3 requires entry into TS 3.0.3 and TS 3.0.3 was properly entered. To recover from TS 3.0.3
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the A ES bus was realigned to the normal offsite power supply
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from the test lineup and that action removed the standing start signal which had been generated by the ES test. TS 3.0.3 was-exited 24 minutes after entry.
During this event, there was some confusion as to whether TS
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3.0.5, as well as TS 3.0.3, should have been entered because it
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was initially believed that both the motor driven and steam driven l
EFPs were inopet able.
However, later analysis showed that the
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motor driven EFP was capable of performing its intended function.
On November 19, 1991, the ES test equipment was properly installed i
and the test completed satisfactorily and the steam driven EFP was
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satisfactorily tested. Operators received training on this event,
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and the lessons learned.
The drawing error that led to the
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improper test equipment installation was corrected, and walkdowns
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were conducted to determine if other drawing changes were needed.
Several drawing changes were identified by the walkdowns and DCN 92-543 was generated to accomplish the changes.
This item is closed.
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Violations or deviations were not identified.
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Design, Design Changes and Modifications (37828)
Installation of new or modified systems were reviewed to verify that the
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changes were reviewed and approved in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59, that the changes were performed in accordance with technically adequate and I
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i approved procedures, that subsequent testing and test results met acceptance criteria or deviations were resolved in an acceptable manner, and that appropriate drawings and facility procedures were revised as necessary.
This review included selected observations of modifications and/or testing in progress.
The following MAR was reviewed and/or associated testing observed:
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- MAR 93-08-12-01, change set point on MUV-491.
MUV-491 is the hydrogen regulator to the makeup tank.
This MAR was an important, safety related change because the hydrogen over-pressure on the makeup tank, if excessive for the specific tank level, can lead to gas binding of the high pressure injection pumps.
The MUV-491 setpoint change was the topic of discussion in severai PRC meetings before the PRC was satisfied that the right approach was being followed.
The pressure increase in the makeup tank was to increase the dissolved hydrogen in the RCS to greater than 25 cc/kg.
Violations or deviations were not identified.
8.
Followup of Onsite Events (93702)
On September 19, 1993, at 00:30 a.m.,
the senior resident inspector responded to the site when notified of a reactor trip that had occurred at 11:48 p.m. September 18, 1993, caused by the failure of one of four reactor coolant pumps (see paragraph 3.a).
The control room demeanor was professional and response to the transient was in accordance with procedures.
The shift manager provided a coordination function that relieved the operators of some of the control room traffic and assured a t;mely, coordinated effort toward recovery. This is the first reactor trip since the shift manager's position has been fully implemented.
The inspector observed this enhanced capability function and consider it a strength Violations or deviations were not identified.
9.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on October 13, 1993
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with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
Proprietary information is i
not contained in this report.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
j ltem Number Status Description and Reference j
LER 90-02 Closed Fire Dampers May Not Close Under Ventilation Flow Conditions Due to Failure to Consider Flow Conditions in Original Design Criteria.
(paragraph 6.a)
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LER 91-13 Closed Test Switch Installation Error Causes Entry Into Technical Specification 3.0.3.
(paragraph 6.b)
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Acronyms and Abbreviations a.m.
- ante meridiem CFR
- Code of Federal. Regulations DH
- Decay Heat System DRP
- Division of Reactor Projects ECCS - Emergency Core Cooling System (s)
- Emergency Feedwater Pumps ES
- Emergency Safeguards FPC
- Florida Power Corporation HVAC - Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning ICS
- Integrated Control System-LER
- Licensee Event Report MAR
- Modification Approval Record MSV
- Main Steam Valve MVP
- Make-up Pump NRC
- Nuclear Regulatory Commission OP
- Operating Procedure p.m.
- post meridiem PM
- Preventive Maintenance PRC
- Plant Review Committee RC
- Radiation Control Area RCP
- Reactor Coolant Pump RCS
- Reactor Protection System RWP
- Raw Water Pump SP
- Surveillance Procedure TS
- Technical Specification WR
- Work Request
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