IR 05000302/1975004
| ML19317G424 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River |
| Issue date: | 04/08/1975 |
| From: | Robert Lewis, Ouzts J, Whitt K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19317G417 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-302-75-04, 50-302-75-4, NUDOCS 8003030826 | |
| Download: ML19317G424 (11) | |
Text
-,
,
,
!
.
UNITED STATES
.p i
)
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGloN ll 230 PEACHTREE STREET, N. W. SulTE SIS
ATLANTA, GEO RGI A 30303
IE Inspection Report No. 50-302/75-4 Licensee: Florida Power Corporation
--
320134th Street, South P. O. Box 14042 St. Petersburg, Florida 33733
,
Facility Name: Crystal River 3
-
Docket No.:
50-302 License No.:
CPPR-51
-
Category:
B1 '
Incation:
Crystal River, Florida Type of License: B&W, PWR, 2452 Mwt Type of Inspection:
Routine, Unannounced Dates of Inspection: March 25-28, 1975 Dates of Previous Inspection: February 32-14, 1975 Principal Inspector:
K. W. Whitt, Reactor Inspector Facilities Section Facilities Test and Startup Branch Accompanying Inspector:
J. E. Ouzts, Reactor Inspector Nuclear Engineering Section Facilities Test and Startup Branch Other Accompanying Personnel:
W. C. Seidle, Chief (March 27-28, 1975)
Facilities Test and Startup Branch 4/7
4 U L t
Principal Inspector:
K. W. Whitt, Reactor Inspector Date Facilities Section Facilities Test and Startup Branch Ik[78
'
Reviewed By:
Date R.C. Lewis (JSeniorReactdrInspector Facilities Yection Facilities Test and Startup Branch d*
(h)
eoos oso 32s q
M76 19N
,
b
/
,
s l
O
\\s -
IE Rpt. No. 50-302/75-4-2-
.
.
.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
.
I.
Enforcement Matters t
There were no items of noncompliance identified during the inspection.
~ '
.
II.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Enforcement Matters There were no previously identified enforcement matters requiring
)
'
resolution.
-
III. New Unresolved Items 75-4/1 Design Change Control Discrepancies were identified in the program for handling design changes during the test phase.
(Details I, paragraph 3)
O-75-4/2 Improper Machining of Pistons in Colt Industries (Fairbanks-Morse) Diesel Generators (ROB 74-16)
An inspection and evaluation of the potential problem is to be made during startup of diesel generators.
(Details I, paragraph 7)
i 75-4/3 Incorrect Lower Disc Spring and Clearance Dimension in Series 8300 and 8302 ASCO Solenoid Valves (IEB 75-03)
FPC Engineering Department is in the process of determining whether the subject valve types are or will be used at Crystal River 3 (CR-3).
(Details I, paragraph 8)
75-4/4 Preoperational Test Procedure Review Certain comments resulting from the review of preoperational test procedures have not been resolved.
(Details II, paragraph 2)
IV.
Status of Previously Identified Unresolved Items 74-11/1 Operational Procedures f
This item was not inspected.
~.
I
~ ~
_
_ _ _ _
_.
_ _.. _. _
rA m
.
G.
,
.
(/)
s IE Rpt. No. 50-302/75-4-3-
-
..
..
.
74-11/2 Loose Parts Monitoring The FSAR has been changed to delete a statement which indicated
'
that the test program would not include a loose parts monitoring system test. This item is closed.
(Details I, paragraph 4)
,
75-1/1 Deficiency in ITE Molded Case Circuit Breakers, Type HE-3
,
(ROE 74-8)
A revised engineering change notice for replacement of 52 ITE circuit breakers has been approved by an appropriate individual.
This item is closed.
(Details I, paragraph 2)
75-1/2 Preoperational Test Procedure Review
,
Comments resulting from the review of preoperational test procedures during prcvious inspections have been resolved.
This item is closed.
(Details II, paragraph 3)
-
75 -1/3 Test Results Review This item was not inspected.
V.
Unusual Occurrences None VI.
Other Significant Findings
'
A.
Project Status General _
Construction was reported to be 95% complete and approximately 30% of the overall test program has been completed.
The latest
'
issue of the testing schedule indicates that hot functional testing
'
and other preparations necessary to support fuel loading will be completed by May 1976. Systems preparation and testing during the past three months have been conducted on or close to schedule.
B.
Operation Organization and Personnel Changes Mr. J. R. Wright has been promoted from Health Physics Supervisor to Chemical and Radiological Protection Engineer. The personnel (
changes that led to the vacant chemical and radiological protection i
'
engineer position was discussed in IE Report No. 50-302/75-1, Summary Section VI.F.
.
-
_ _.
-
_
.. _ _
____
_
-...
_
.m
.
+
J
,
\\s_ /
IE.Rpt. No.. 50-302/75-4-4-
.
VII.
Management Interview
,
'A management interview was held at the :enclusion of the inspection on March 28, 1975. The results of the inspection were discussed.
The following licensee personnel participated:
-
J. Alberdi - Manager, Nuclear Operation:s
'
G.' B. Beatty - Plant Superintendent H. L. Bennett - Director, Generation Construction J. C. Hobbs, Jr. - Manager, Generation '?esting
'
C. E. Jackson - Construction Superintendent
M. H. Kleinman - Director, Quality Prog::ams
'
'
D. W. Pedrick - Compliance Engineer
,
R. W. Slater - Quality Engineer
.
O e
O
J
.-
.
..
- -.
.
.
,-.
. -.
.
.
.
_
_
g
.
.
'N
.
O IE Rpt. No. 50-302/75-4 I-1 h/
4 7/75 l
DETAILS I Prepared by:.,
K.' W. Whitt, Reactor Inspector
- Date i
Facilities Section Facilities Test and-Startup Branch
~
,
.
Dates of Inspection * March '5-28, 1975
'
&
'//7/12
Reviewed by:
< - -
,
i R. C. Lewis, Sutior Reactor I(spector Datie
,
,
Facilities Section
j Facilities Test and Startup Branch
,
i
"
l 1.
Individuals Contacted
.
.-
<
Florida Power Corporation (FPC)
'
G. P. Beatty - Plant Superintendent i
-
H. L. Bennett - Director, Generation Construction
'
'
i J. C. Hobbs - Director, Generation Testing C. E. Jackson - Construction Superintendent M. H. Kleinman - Director, Quality Programs
,
-
D. W. Pedrick - Compliance Engineer
!
R. W. Slater - Quality Engineer K. O. Vogel - Testing Engineer
Babcock and Wilcox Company (B&W)
f E. L. Logan - Site Operations Manager H. J. Whorsham Jr. - Resident Project Manager 2.. Deficiency in ITE Molded Case Circuit Breahers, Type HE-3 (ROB No. 74-8)
This item was initially reported in RO Repeirt No. 50-302/74-10 and
- -
subsequently discussed in IE Report No. 50-302/75-1, Details I, Para-graph 2.
Fifty-two potentially defective ITE molded case circuit-
- -
breakers, type HE-3 were replaced by ciret:it breakers of the same type that had been manufactured after May 1974.
ITE certified that the replacement circuit breaker trip elements followed the published i
curves for this type breaker. Available documentation did not'indi-cate.that the Director, Generation Engineering, had approved the action
'
~ that had been taken.
Section 13.2.7.2 of the Final Safety Analysis l
Report (FSAR) specified that no field initiated design changes could
,
be performed without the approval of the Director, Generation Engineering, or his authorized delegate.
,
J
'
,
, ~ - - -
y e. -.,
,
,,.,.
_ -.,..,.,,,, -
,,,__m_-
,..
..u,,....,m
, -,
..mr,-
.
.
,
~_
_
e
'
.
-~
,.
h IE Rpt. No. 50-302/75-4 I-2 (b
^
During this inspection, the inspector reviewed a memorandum from the Director, Generation Engineering, in which he designated six
,
individuals as his alternates for approval of engineering change notices (ECN).
A revised ECN had been prepared and approved by one of the individuals designated.
The evaluation of the action
'
items of R0B 74-8 and the resulting corrective action has now been completed.
This item is considered closed.
f 3.
Design Change Control
.
A review was made of the documentation that describes the, method
.
utilized by FPC in the control of design changes.
Section 3.1.1
,
of the FSAR states, in part, that all activities established in
,
the test program are structured in accordance with AEC Regulatory.
Guide 1.68 and to comply with the provisions of 10 CFR 50, Appendix
'
B.
Criterion IIIof Appendix B to 10 CFR 50 states, in part, that design changes, including field changes, shall be subject to design control measures commensurate with those applied to the original: design'
and approved by the organization that performed the original design un-less the applicant designates another responsible organization.
The following examples of discrepancies were identified:
,
a.
The quality assurance manua? (QAM) does not contain a requirement for determining whether unreviewed safety questions and changes
,
to proposed Technical Specifications are involved for design changes performed on safety related equipment in the test phase, and Engineering Department implementing instructions do not aescribe the method to be used in making such determinations.
'
b.
The QAM and Engineering Department implementing instructions do not provide for subjecting the design changes to design control measures commensurate with those applied to the original design.
The Director, Generation Engineering, is required to obtain the
.
approval of the architect engineer, but an evaluation is not required or described.
c.
Implementing inctructions do,not assign responsibility or describe the method to be used for making changes to the FSAR when such changes are determined to be necessary as a result of a design change.
4.
Loose Part Monitoring
.
This unresolved item (74-11/2) was initially reported in RO Report i
No. 50-302/74-11, Details I, paragraph 5 and subsequently discussed in IE Report No. 50-302/75-1, Details I, paragraph 7.
A change has x
.been made to Table 13.2 of the FSAR to delete the statement indicating that the test prog am does not include a loose parts monitoring system
for reactor internals.
This item is closed.
,
.
- - -
.,.
,m
~
,
_ _.
.
_
.. -
._
.
..
.... - -
.-,
.
n
-
"
.
.
,
i IE Rpt. No.'50-302/75-4 I-3-5.
Regulatory Guide 1.68 - CR-3 Test Index Cross, Reference
,
,
!
' l j-FPC has developed a cross reference between the CR-3 test index
,
and the provisions of Regulatory' Guide 1.68, "Preoperational and
'
-
Initial Startup Test Programs for Water-Cooled Power Reactors."
This document was_ prepared by FPC as a working tool to aid-
'
,
l-in determining that necessary testing _is being performed at CR-3.
It is not:a part of the test program nor a commitment to, perform tests.
The inspector reviewed the portion of the
,-
-
cross reference that deals wit h preoperational-testing.
This review shows that test procedures have been identified for all
.
the tests listed in Regulatory Guide 1.68, Appendix A, Section-A.
i
. The extent of testing provided by.the procedures could not be
,
determined since only the titles were listed.
The' adequateness
-
j of testing is evaluated during test procedure and test results
.-
I review.
The. inspector has no further questions regarding this item.
- i
.
6.
Controls For Measuring and Test Equipment
,
^
l A review of the controls for measuring and test equipment was made by the inspector.
The review consisted of an evaluation of the QAM requirements and implementing instructions, dis-cussions with field supervisors and technicians, and inspection
.
'
of equipment and laboratory records.
No' discrepancies were identified.
The inspector has no further question concerning l
this item.
i 7.
Improper Machining of Pistons in Colt Industries (Fairbanks-Morse)
Diesel Generators (ROB 74-16)
,
[
The information requested by action items 1 and 2 of R0B 74-16 has been provided by the licensee.
Colt Industries (Fairbanks-Morse)
emergency diesel generators, type H7B, will be used at Crystal River Unit 3 (CR-3).
An inspection is to be made under the cognizance
'
of a Colt Industries representative to determine whether the pistons in'the CR-3 emergency diesel generators were improperly machined.
The -inspection will be made during startup of the diesel generators.
The licensee estimates that the diesel generators will be started up in late June or early July.
This item will remain open until the inspection has been made and any required corrective action has been
{
completed.
l 8.
Incorrect Lower Disc Spring and Clearance Dimension in Series 8300 and 8302 ASCO Solenoid Valves (IEB 75-03)
,
The. licensee.has received this IEB and it has been assigned to-the l
f/C Engineering Department for evaluation. This item will remain open.
,
r
-
.
a A
-.
n vw
,
v - -
w.',
-
e, o
-
w.,ea.
m.
. -, -,
n,-
-,
e.
-na
__
.
.
_
._
._
_
.
__
_
_ _
_
.-
..
.
O
-
.-
.
.
IE Rpt. No. 50-302/75-4 II-l
.
t
/-67 i
DETAILS II Prepared by:
-
-
j.
K E'. Ouzts, R4 actor Inspector Date i
Nuclear Engineering Section
.
Facilities Test and Startup i
Branch
/
Reviewed by:
.y
!
W. C. Seidle,Geting Senior Date
-
Inspector Nuclear Engineering Section
'
i Facilities Test and Startup
- -
Branch
'
I i
.
~
1.-
Individuals Contacted Florida Power Corporation (FPC)
,
J. C. Hobbs - Manager Generation Testing I
.
R. W. Slater - Quality Engineer K. O. Vogel - Chairman, Chairman Test Working Group (TWG)
,
2.
Preoperational Test Procedure Review
$
(a) Procedures Reviewed:
-
Fifteen preoperational test procedures were reviewed and comments as outlined below were discussed and remain to be resolved by the
,
licensee. The procedures reviewed were:
(1) 7 1 201 040 - Core Flooding System Instrumentation Preoperational Calibration (2) 7 1 203 040 - Decay Heat Removal System Instrumentation Preopera-tional Calibration
.
(3) 7 1 451 160 - Engineered Safeguards Motor Control Center and
'
Guards Electrical Functional Test (4) 7 1 266 210 - Decay Heat Removal Sea Water System Electrical Test
'
I (5) 7 1 204 040 - Reactor Building Spray System Instrumentation
Preoperational Calibration
,
r --- -,.., -,
..
.
^
-
,,
IE Rpt. No. 50-302/75-4 II-2
.
(6) 7 1 268 300 - Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling System Functional (7) 7 1 204 500 - Reactor Building Spray Ring and Riser Hydro-Flush
,
and Air Blowdown Test
(8) 7 1 203 200 - Decay Heat Removal System Electrical e
(9) 7 1 204 200 - Reactor Building Spray System Electrical
.
(10) 7 1 266 100 - Decay Heat Removal Sea Water Hydro
,
.
(11) 7 1 201 500 - Core Flood Tank Hydro
-
(12) 7 1 451 150 - 480 Volt Engineered Safeguards Switchgear
~
(13) 7 1 451 101 - Electrical Test - 480 Volt Engineered Safeguards Transformer (14)716000- Hot Functional Testing (15) 7 1 310 30 - Safeguards Detection and Actuation Test (b) General Comment In general the test procedures do not contain the source of the acceptance criteria such as FSAR, Technical Specifications, Technical Manuals, Design Data, etc, as required by Regulatory Guide 1.68.
Florida Power Corporation (FPC) agreed to investigate the sources of acceptance criteria provided in the test procedures, and where these sources were found to contain the acceptance criteria, to reference the source in the test procedure.
(c) Specific Comments (1)71451160- Engineered Safeguards Motor Control Center
<
Electrical and Functional Test.
How are the trip setpoints for the engineered safeguards equipment circuit breakers verified as required by Regulatory
'
Guide 1.79? Where is acceptance criteria specified?
,
,
!
i l
i L -_ _
'
~
_.
(
/
IE Rpt. No. 50-302/75-4 II-3
'
.
FPC reported that circuit breaker trip setpoints are set in accordance with Test Guides to acceptance criteria specified by equipment manufacturers curves for the particular equipment.
.
Based on verbal reports engineered safeguards equipment setpoints may be set to provide a greater margin to trip, but at the same time provide what is considered safe trip points for protecting
'
the equipment. The Chairman of the Test Working Group will investigate this with the FPC Engineering Department and report
-
back on the procedure used in mal..mg these setpoints for engineered safeguards equipment.
-
(2)7131030 Safeguards Detectors and Actuation Test There is a discrepancy between the test procedure and the FSAR for the setpoint value for the High Pressure Injection Bypass Bislable. The preliminary procedure gives 1750 psi, the FSAR paragraph 7.1.3.2.3a gives 1700 psi. Table 7.3 of the FSAR lists 1720 psi and Tigure 7.4 of the FSAR shows 1750 psi.
The latest issue of the test procedure gives 1700 psi, which O
agrees with paragraph 7.1.3.2.3a of the FSAR. Table 7.3 and Figure 7.4 are apparently incorrect. The differences shown for this setpoint will be investigated by FPC, and a report on the corrective action to be taken will be made.
(3)716000 Hot Functional Testing The tolerances shown for some RCS parameter setpoints, as they are shown on the data sheets appear to be wide, i.e.,10 i 1.5 ma, 30 1 1.5 ma etc.
'
The licensee agreed to investigate the basis for these tolerances shown and justify these tolerances or advise as to what revisions will be made.
(d) Previous Comments on Preoperational Test Procedures During previous inspections a number of comments applicable to preoperational testing procedures were identified.
During this inspection, followup action on these coments were evaluated.
The results of this followup are as follows:
,
(1) Paragraph 3, Details II of IE Rpt. No. 50-302/75-1, committed to review at a subsequent inspection the use of appropriate
.
O operating procedures when conducting a test.
l
!
\\
-
i l
,
.
.
O
-
_
,
,m IE Rpt. No. 50-302/75-4 II-4
.
.
The review showed that operating procedures are being used in the test program, where appropriate, basically during systems functional testing.
As a result of these findings,
-
this item is closed.
)
(2) Paragraph 3(a) 1 of Details to IE Rpt. No. 50-302/74-13 - A.
.
'
comment was made on the use of vendor's manuals for performance of portions of a test.
In accordance with the requirements of
-
Criterion V of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50, the appropriate sections of these manuals shall receive the same review as the test procedure.
.
A followup on this comment at this inspection showed this require-ment is being implemented, by including in the test procedure reproduced sections from the vendor's manual, such that.these
.
sections receive the same review as the test procedure. Based on these findings this item is closed.
(3) Paragraph 3(a) 2 of Details to IE Rpt. No. 50-302/74-13 - A comment was made on how the test status of a safety related O
system is maintained when the system is hydrostatically tested in sections.
A review of the test results of a safety related system that had been tested in sections show that the test status of the system had been recorded by lining out the appropriate piping on the system drawing.
This drawing was being maintained as part of the test results.
Based on these findings this item is closed.
(4) Paragraph 5, Comment 2, Details I to R0 Rpt. No. 50-302/74-9 -
This comment concerned a requirement in the controlling, cleaning and flushing procedure (CC-1) to require written approved procedures for manual cleaning of components. No such requirement could be found in this controlling document (CC-1), although construction procedures for manually cleaning of components were reportedly issued, as committed in the FSAR.
The licensee has this controlling dscument u-der review for incorporation of this requirement.
This wi'i be an item for reevaluation at a subsequent inspection an 4 in the meantime carried as an open item.
,
,
i i
.,
..
--