IR 05000295/1987003
| ML20205T660 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zion File:ZionSolutions icon.png |
| Issue date: | 04/01/1987 |
| From: | Forney W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20205T629 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-295-87-03, 50-295-87-3, 50-304-87-03, 50-304-87-3, NUDOCS 8704070354 | |
| Download: ML20205T660 (14) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
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Report Nos. 50-295/87003(DRP);50-304/87003(DRP)
Docket Nos. 50-295; 50-304 License Nos. DPR-39; DPR-48 f
Licensee: Commonwealth Edisor. Company P. O. Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: Zion Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Zion, IL Inspection Conducted:
February 4 through March 17, 1987 l
Inspectors:
M. M. Holzmer P. L. Eng R. M. Lerch sic 1L > -
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Approved By:
W. L. Forney, Chie Reactor Projects Section 1A Date Inspection Summary Inspection on February 4 through March 17, 1987 (Report Nos. 50-295/87003(DRP);
50-304/87003(DRP))
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced resident inspection of licensee action on previous inspection findings; summary of operations; Unit I reactor trip breaker (RTB) opening on high flux signal; Unit 1 RTB opening during main-tenance on the 10 main steam isolation valve bypass valve; Unusual Event due to two diesel generators inoperable; Technical Specifications interpretation; plant startup after refueling; operational safety and engineered safety feature (ESF) system walkdown; surveillance observation; maintenance observation; licensee event reports (LERs); training; and folicwup of Region III requests.
Results: Of the 13 areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified in 12 areas, and 1 violation was identified in the remaining area, (Technical Specification violation - failure to test remaining diesel generators after the 18 diesel generator became inoperable - paragraph 6).
This violation was of minimal safety significance.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
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- G. Pliml. Station Hanager E. Fuerst, Superintendent, Production
- T. Rieck, Superintendent, Services
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W. Kurth, Assistant Station Superintendent, Operations R. Johnson, Assistant Station Superintendent, Maintenance J. Gilmore, Assistant Station Superintendent, Planning
- R. Budowle, Assistant Station Superintendent, Technical Services L. Pruett, Unit 1 Operating Engineer i
N. Valos, Unit 2 Operating Engineer M. Carnahan, Training Supervisor
- R. Cascarano, Technical Staff Supervisor
- C. Schultz, Regulatory Assurance Administrator V. Williams, Station Health Physicist
- J. Ballard, Quality Control Supervisor
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- W. Stone. Quality Assurance Supervisor
- Indicates persons present at exit interview.
2.
Licensee Actions On Previous Inspection Findings (92701)
(Closed)0)enItem(295/86019-07(DRP))RepairSourceofReactorCoolant System Lea (age (RCS). The licensee reported an event with excessive RCS leakage in LER 295/86021 at which time the precise source could not be identified due to the adverse steam environment. The licensee issued revision 1 to the LER (see paragraph 12 of this report), which stated that the leakage was identified as coming from pressurizer spray valve i
IPCV-RC06 and that the packing was replaced. This item is considered closed.
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3.
Summary of Operations j
U, nit 1 f
Unit 1beganthereportperiodincoldshutdown(mode 5),andwastaken
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tohotshutdown(mode 3)onFebruary 26, 1987.
Initial criticality and
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reactor physics testing took place on March 3 through 5,1987. The unit
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was not able to go on line prior to the end of the inspection period due i
to problems with the generator seal oil system, and the 1A and IB diesel generators (seeparagraph6).
Unit 2 Following a shutdown on February 3,1987, due to a leaky main steam isolation valve trip solenoid valve, the unit was returned to the grid on
February 4, 1987.
The unit operated at )ower levels up to 98% power and l
coasted down to approximately 75% power )y the end of the inspection i
period.
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4.
February 12. 1987, Reactor Trip Signal From Source Range High Flux (93702)
On February 12, 1987, Unit I reactor trip breakers opened due to a source range high flux signal. At the time of the trip, the reactor was in cold shutdown, the control rod motor-generator sets were de-energized and the control rod power cabinet fuses were removed. Members of the Technical Staff had just completed performance of Technical Staff Special Procedure (TSSP) 22-86, " Guidelines for Improving Source Range Indication," which had been conducted over a period of several months. During restoration to service of source range monitor IN31, it was discovered that the high voltage cable to the preamplifier was still disconnected, in order to reconnect the cable, the instrument power fuses were removed, resulting in a source range high flux reactor trip.
Investigation of the event revealed that the TSSP had been performed periodically over several months. TSSP 22-86 initial conditions required that the reactor trip breakers be open. Just prior to the event, the reactor trip breakers had been closed to facilitate safeguards testing which was required prior to leaving Mode 5.
When the TSSP was resumed, the initial conditions were not reviewed by the test engineer.
The test
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engineer also failed to verify that the source range high flux trip had
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been bypassed prior to resuming performance of the TSSP. With the trip breakers closed, removal of the power cabinet fuses for IN31 generated a reactor trip signal per system design.
The licensee stated that the root causes of this event were failure to re-verify initial conditions when continuing with a partially completed procedure, failure to notify the reactor operator of the initial conditions required for performing the TSSP, and failure of the test engineer to note that the reactor trip breakers were closed.
The engineer involved has been made aware of the importance of reverification of test initial conditions following a break in test activity.
In addition, Technical Staff (TS) personnel will be trained on the following:
Initial conditions and precautions should be reviewed for
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applicability whenever a procedure is re-entered.
Appropriate shift personnel should be contacted prior to performance
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of any testing or troubleshooting and informed of any required initial conditions.
TSSPs should have appropriate spaces for periodic checkoff of
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initial conditions and precautions.
Completion of the training of the Technical Staff is considered an Open Item (295/87003 016 304/87003 01).
No violations or deviations were identified. One Open item was identified.
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5.
February 27, 1987, Reactor Trip Signal During Maintenance On ID Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) (93702)
On February 27, 1987, the Unit I reactor trip breakers opened and the 1C auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump automatically started on low-low level in the 10 steam generator (SG) during maintenance on the 10 MSIV bypass I
valve. At the time, mechanical maintenance (MM) personnel were replacing the diaphragm on the air operator of the ID MSIV bypass valve. The MSIVs and their bypass valves were shut, and the steam header downstream of the MSIVs was depressurized. The reactor was in hot shutdown (mode 3), with all rods on the bottom. The reactor trip breakers were closed for control rod troubleshooting.
When the mms removed the spring from the air operator of the 10 MSIV bypass valve, steam pressure from the steam generator forced open the bypass valve, relieving steam to the main steam header, downstream of the MSIVs.
Theresultantlossof10SGinventory)causedlevelinthe10SG to decrease.
The Unit 1 Reactor Operator (RO, who was unaware of the
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work in progress on the 10 MSIV bypass valve, had just secured his AFW pump because his SG levels were in the high end of the desired range.
After he observed decreasing level in the 10 SG, he started the 10 AFW pump. The resultant shrink from the feedwater flow combined with the s6eam flow from the 10 MSIV bypass valve caused SG level to reach the low-low SG Icvel reactor trip setpoint of 10% narrow range SG level.
i The reactor trip breakers opened, and the IC AFW pump started per design.
After shift personnel realized the source of the steam demand, the ID MSIV bypass valve was manually jacked closed, terminating the event.
The licensee is investigating the root cause of this event. This is considered an Open Item pending NRC review of the results of their investigation,andofthecorrectiveactions(295/87003-02; 304/87003-02).
No violations or deviations were identified. One Open Item was identified.
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March 15, 1987, Unusual Event (UE) Due To IA Ind 10 Diesel Generators l
(DG) Inoperable (93702)
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On March 15, 1987, at 8:05 p.m., the licensee declared an Unusual Event
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(UE) due to two of three Unit 1 DG's being inoperable.
At the time.
l Unit 1 was critical and main turbine vibration testing was in progress.
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Reactor power was between 1 and 3%. All safety systems functioned normally following the trip, except that source range nuclear instrument (N!) channel N-31 did not automatically energize when intermediate range NI power level reached 10E-10 amps decreasing (P-6),
in order to support the turbine testing, the licensco keeps one DG
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running to prevent loss of the AC turbine lube oil pump in the event of loss of offsite AC power.
The 10 DG had been running for this purpose I
since about 6:00 a.m. that day. At about 4:05 p.m. the 10 DG tripped l
for no apparent reason. Operations personnel determined that the cause l
of the failure could be attributed to the engine and not the 4160 v.
electrical distribution and logic, but the exact cause of the engine trip
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was unknown.
Technical Staff assistance was requested for the IB DG.
At about 4:20 p.m., the 1A DG was started to support the turbine testing.
At about 6:00 p.m. a 100 psi relief valve lifted on the air line to the turning gear and fuel oil priming pump motors. The relief was reseated l
by the Equipment Operator (E0), but lifted later in spite of repeated
attempts to reseat it.
Starting air pressure, which also feeds control l
air, dropped so low t t the load on the 1A DG began to decrease (control air holds the fuel racks open). The licensee secured the 1A DG and i
declared it inoperable at 8:05 p.m. At that time they also declared the IB DG inoperable and declared an UE in accordance with their Generating Stations Emergence Plan (GSEP). Unit I was immediately shutdown to Mode 3.
The failed relief valve on the 1A DG was replaced, as well as its upstreamairregulatingvalve(reducer). The 1A DG was satisfactorily tested per PT-11 at 5:38 a.m. on March 16, 1987, and the UE was terminated at 5:48 a.m.
The failure of the IB DG was attributed to a leaking check valve in the control air system for the pneumatic first-out annunciator panel, as well as other control air system leaks which exceeded the control air makeup capacity. These leaks as well as the engine trip signal from the first-out panel would all be bypassed during an engineered safeguards system (ESF) start, and therefore would not afftet the operability of
the engine.
Technical Specification (TS) 3.15.2.C requires that when one DG is made or found to be inoperable, the operability of the remaining two DG's shall be demonstrated incediately and daily thereafter. Because the IB DG was not declared inoperable foliowing its failure until the failure of the 1A DG four hours later, immediate demonstrations of the 1A and 0 DGs were not performed.
ThisisconsideredaViolation(295/8700303).
The 1A DG was run inmediately following the 1B DG failure (15 minutes);
however, demonstration of o]erability should normally be done by performing test PT-11, whic1 records certain data and includes acceptance i
criteria. PT-11 was not performed on the 1A DG until its operability
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test on March 16, 1987. The O DG was satisfactorily tested per PT-11 l
immediately following the declaration of the UE.
One violation and no deviations were identified, i
7.
Interpretation Of Technical Specifications On February 2, 1987, hydraulic oil leakage on the 20 MS1V trip solenoid valvo led to a Unit 2 shutdown (see Inspection Report 295/86031(DRP)6 l
304/86031(DRP)). During the course of that event considerable discussion took place between the licensee and the Senior Resident i
Inspector (SRI)regardingwhichTechnicalSpecification(TS) applied,
whether the 20 MSly was operable, and whether a unit shutdown was required.
Following these discussions the licensee shut down Unit 2 within four hours after the leaking solenoid valve was isolated stating
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that, because the TS did not clearly define which requirement applied,
a shutdown would be the conservative action.
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On February 4,1987, the SRI and RI met with licensee representatives to discuss the interpretation of TS, both generally and as applied to the Unit 2 shutdown. The licensee stated that after reviewing the event, their initial assessment was that a shutdown (within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />) was required by TS Table 3.4-1. Item IV.2, "Steamline Isolation" which
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requires that 2 channels of automatic actuation of steamline isolation
be operable. The SRI stated that the NRC agreed with licensee's interpretation.
In addition, the SRI stated that a shutdown was also required under TS 3.0.3 which requires action within one hour to shutdown within the following 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
The SRI stated that loss of one of the two trip solenoid valves rendered the 2D MSIV inoperable.
TS 3.9.4.C required that if there is one I
inoperable MS!V which is capable of being closed but does not respond to automatic actuation, that the plant is to be taken to three-loop i
operation. Three loop operation is not permitted by the facility license, and therefore, the actions of TS 3.0.3 applied.
The licensee stated that they believed that the 20 MSIV should be considered operable.
because the remaining trip solenoid valve would have tripped the MSIV.
The SRI also stated that when different interpretations of TS were held
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by the licensee and the NRC, final resolution should be sought from the OfficeofNuclearReactorRegulation(NRR).
At the exit meeting on March 17, 1986, the SRI restated the Region III position that:
The isolation of one of the two 2D MSIV trip solenoid valves meant
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that there were less than two operable channels of main steamline isolation automatic actuation and that this condition required a
reactor shutdown per TS Table 3.4-1. Item IV 2, and
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The isolation of one of the two 2D MSIV tria solenoid valves
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rendered the 20 MS!V inoperable, and that t11s condition required
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a reactor shutdown per TS 3.0.3.
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The licensee stated that they were still reviewing the issue, and that they were considering resolution by correspondence with NRR. They also str.ted that they would continue to operate in a conservative manner until
resolution of this issue was complete.
No violations were identified.
8.
Plant Startup After Refueling (71711)
The inspectors reviewed the Unit 1 startup package, general operating procedures (GOPs) used during plant heatu) and startup, and reactor
physics testing procedures to determine wiether operating activities were properly documented, whether the procedures were technically correct, andwhethertheprocedureSwereproperlyreviewedandapproved(including temporary changes). System and control board lineups were reviewed for completeness.
Sulected plant heatup and startup activities were observed.
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The following procedures were reviewed:
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GOP-0 - Documentation Requirements and Review for Plant
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Startup GOP-1 - Plant Heatup
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GOP-2 - Plant Startup
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S01-31 - Main Steam
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l TSS 15.6.52 - Initial Criticality After Refueling and Nuclear
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Heating Level TSS 15.6.57 - Checkout of Bank Overlap Unit
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S01-4 - Safety Injection and Containment Spray (system lineup
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sectiononly)
S01-5 - Residual Heat Removal (system lineup section only)
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S01-7 - Isolation Valve Seal Water (system lineup section only)
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The following activities were observed:
Onsite review prior to leaving cold shutdown (mode 5)
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Hot Rod Drops
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1/M Plots and dilution prior to criticality
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Opening MSIVs
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The following comments and observations were discussed with the licensee
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during the course of the inspection:
GOPs have " bubble charts" which provide operations with a logical
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sequence of steps in the GOP's.
The bubble charts clearly show which steps must be performed sequentially and which may be performed in parallel. The use of these bubble charts was considered a good practice.
Test engineers performing reactor physics testing did a very good
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job at coordinating testing activities, monitoring the progress of plant evolutions, and communicating with operators.
They were knowledgeable about the physics testing activities and were responsive to questions and concerns raised by the resident inspectors.
Some documentation problems were noted with GOP-0. Appendix H.
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" Control Board Lineup".
Some sections which were recuired to be com)1eted prior to leaving cold shutdown (mode 5) hat a small number of alanks which were not filled in.
These were resolved promptly by shift personnel. None of the items identified were considered to have safety significance.
Three of the steps of GOP-1, " Plant Heatup", which were required
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to bc )erformed prior to leaving mode 5 were not signed off. The Shif t Engineer had identified those blanks and determined that the activities were properly performed, but had not been signed off.
Proper signoffs were subsequently obtained.
Three 501 valve lineups were reviewed with no deficiencies noted.
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Operators responded properly when questioned about procedures they
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were performing. Procedures were open and frequently accessed by operators.
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The inspector commented that TSS 15.6.57, " Check out of Bank Overlap
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l Unit", step 5.5 could be clarified to specify whether the required i
boron concentration for that test assumed all rods in or all rods out.
This would allow operators to correlate the test initial conditions with the boron concentrations in the startup baron concentration memorandum.
The licensee is evaluating this to determine whether or not a procedure change is warranted.
The inspector also conroented that TSS 15.6.52, had no tolerance
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bands for annunciator bistables. Proper tolerance bands would permit easier calibrations with no loss of safety. The licensee stated that while the current procedure can be tedious to perform,
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there are presently no plans to revise it.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Operational Safety Verification and Engineered Safety Features System Walkdown (71707 & 71710)
The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with cuatrol ruum operators from February 4 through March 17, 1987. During these discussions and observations, the inspectors ascertained that the operators were alert, fully cognizant of plant conditions, attentive to changes in those conditions, and took prompt action when appropriate. The inspectors verified the operability of selected errergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components.
Tours of the auxiliary and turbino buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks. and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for
equipment in need of maintenance.
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The inspectors by observation and direct interview verified that selected physical security activities were being implemented in accordance with l
the station security plan.
The inspectors observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and l
verified implementation of radiation protection controls. From february 4, 1987 to March 17, 1987, t1e inspectors walked down the accessible pnrtions of the 1A and 10 diesel generators, to verify operability.
These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under Technical Specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures.
The following comments and observations were discussed with station
management during the course of the inspection:
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It was suggested that G0P-2, " Plant Startup", step 22, opening
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MSIVs, might be improved by indicating how to bring the pressure across the MSIVs to within 15 psig prior to opening the MSIVs.
The licensee is considering this item but currently has no plans to revise this step in G0P-2.
When opening MSIVs, the Equipment Operator did not take a procedure
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with him to the MSIV valve room (the procedure was not required to be at the job site).
When operators attempted to open the B MSIV, a mispositioned
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hydraulic cross-tie valve prevented the MSIV from opening. The error was found after the foreman arrived at the MSIV valve room, and procedure 501-31, " Main Steam", was used to check the valve lineup. The error had no adverse consequences, except to delay opening the MSIVs.
Some MSIV hydraulic package oil pressure gages were difficult to
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read as a result of their size and location.
A large packing leak on the ID MSIV drain valve occurred when the
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valve was stroked.
The 1A and 1C MSIV valve room showed excessive dirt and oil
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accumulation, rags were adrift, and the anti-Contamination clothing bag at the stepoff pad from the tendon tunnel was completely filled.
The 18 and 10 MSly valve room had been painted during the outage resulting in a significantly better appearance.
Several comments were made regarding the housekeeping in the 1A and
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la DG rooms, including excessive oil leakage and accumulation in several areas; hoses, droplights, and extension cords adrift; ext.essive cavitation noises coming from the outlet of the IB DG jacketwaterheatexchanger(servicewaterside);concretedust accumulationi and lamps and fuses stored on electrical panels and junction boxes.
Lamps, fuses and other equipment were stored on electrical junction
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boxes in the Unit 1 auxiliary electric room.
None of these comments related to the violation of regulatory requirements or constituted degradations of safety, but were provided to i
the licensee for correction as appropriate.
In addition, while cleaning l
and painting at the station have improved the general appearance, the MS!V valve rooms and DG rooms need expeditious attention to improve the
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housekeeping anet material condition.
The licensee initiated corrective l
action for the housekeeping items addressed above.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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10. Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspector observed Technical Specifications required surveillance testing on the main steam system and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
The inspector also witnessed portions of the following test activities:
PT-23, " Main Steam Isolation Valve Refueling / Cold Shutdown
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Surveillance" No violations or deviations were identified.
11. Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
Station maintenance activities on safety-related systems and components listed below were observed or reviewed to ascertain whether they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides industry codes or standards and in conformance with Technical Specifications.
The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting conditions for uporation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls
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were implemented.
Work requests were reviewed to detennine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority was assigned to safety-related equipment q
maintenance which could affect system performance.
The following maintenance activities were observed or reviewed:
Replacement of a 2 second time delay relay on the 10 control rod
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drive motor generator (MG) set
following completion of maintenance on the 18 rod drive MG set, the
inspector verified that those systems had been returned to service
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properly.
No violations or deviations were identified, i
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12. Licensee Event Reports (LER) Followup (92700)
Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications.
The LER's listed below are considered closed:
UNIT 1 LER N0.
DESCRIPTION 85023-01 Failure to Review Temporary Procedure Change Within 14 Days 86021-01 Reactor Coolant System Leakage in Excess of Technical Specifications Due to Valve Packing Failure 86035 Minor Radioactive Release Into Control Room Due to Relief Damper Installation Deficiency 86037 Technical Specification Fire Watch Not Posted Due to Personnel Error 87004 Reactor Trip at Cold Shutdown due to personnel error in pulling source range Nuclear Instrumentation fuses while troubleshooting UNIT 2 LER NO.
DESCRIPTION 86-023-01 Violation of Containment Integrity, Manual Containment Isolation Valves Open Regarding LER 295/86021-01, at the time of the event, the licensee was unable to identify the root cause for the leak. During the 1986-1987 refueling outage, the leakage was determined to be from the packing on Pressurizer Spray Valve IPCV-RC06 and the packing was replaced.
The licensee issued Revision 1 to the LER identifying the source of leakage and repair.
Regarding LER 295/86035, review of this event has been documented in Inspection Reports 295/86025(DRSS);304/86025(DRSS)and 295/86028(DRP);
304/06028(DRP). The technical issues involved are under review as unresolved items 295/86028 01:304/86028-01.
Regarding LER 295/86037, on September 29, 1986, an hourly fire watch inspection per Technical Specification 3.21.6.0 was required due to inoperable fire barriers in the cable spreading rooms for both units.
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From 0700 to 0900 on September 29, 1986, the licensee failed to assign a fire watch due to an oversight by a supervisor. This event will receive additional review under existing unresolved item 295/86019-05.
Regarding Unit 1 LER 295/87004, this event is discussed in paragraph 3 of this report.
No violations or deviations were identified.
l 13. Training (41400)
During the inspection period, the inspectors reviewed events and occurrences which may have resulted, in part, from training deficiencies.
Selected events were evaluated to determine whether the classroom, simulator, or on-the-job training received before the event was sufficient to have either prevented the occurrence or to have mitigated its effects by recognition and proper operator action. Personnel qualifications were also evaluated.
In addition, the inspectors determined whether lessons learned from the events were incorporated into the training program.
Events reviewed included the events discussed in this report.
In addition,l.ERs were routinely evaluated for training impact.
One event reviewed this period was found to have training deficiencies as a
, contributu.
Investigation of LER 295/87004 revealed that although members of the Technical Staff are trained on the importance of adhering to procr.dures, reverification of initial conditions upon re-entry into a te:t procedure was not specifically addressed. Corrective actions associa'.ed with the LER related to training are delineated in paragraph 3 of this report.
The resident inspector attended portions of the PWR Systems course for non-licensed operators.
This course is required for members of the Technical Services staff which includes the technical staff, and chemistry and health physics departments; however, members of the maintenance department also attend the course.
The purpose of the class is to familiarize plant personnel who do not go through the reactor operator licensing process with nuclear plant operations. The inspector noted that the course instructors were knowledgeable in the subject matter and Were Certified on Zion plant specific operations. Questions designed to assist the trainee in determining whether sufficient understanding of the subject material had been obtained were assigned to the class each day. Answers to the homework were discussed the next day prior to introduction of new training topics. Numerous visual aids were used which effectively supported the training objectives. The course also included plant tours to associate actual plant components and equipment with system study.
Exam questions adequately evaluated trainee comprehension of the subject matter and effectively determined whether the learning objectives had been met.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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14. Followup Of Region III Requests (92701)
a.
In response to a request from Region III, the residents inquired as to the licensee's actions with regard to IEN 87-08, " Degraded Motor Leads in Limitorque DC Motor Operators." The licensee determined that there were no Limitorque DC motor operators in use or in storage at the Zion station.
b.
In a memorandum from C. E. Norelius dated March 3, 1987, resident inspectors were requested to obtain information regarding unqualified AMP splices. The following information was requested:
1.
Identify am kind of AMP splice or' terminal lug used in environmentally qualified (EQ) applications at the plant.
Include model type and insulation.
2.
Describe the installed configuration.
Include information on enclosures (Nema 3, weep hole), separation of AMP splices in same enclosure, and location of enclosure.
3.
Identify any use of AMP splices in an EQ instrumentation circuit.
4.
Submit a copy of the licensee's justification for continued operation for any unqualified AMP splices, and the licensee's appropriate corrective action (such as taping over with 3M tape).
Responses provided by the licensee are as follows:
1.
A list of all splices and terminations stocked by Zion Station was provided.
Those items potentially used in EQ applications were identified.
2.
Installed configurations include limit switch compartments, junction boxes, equipment termination boxes, conduit fittings, open cable trays and conduits. These may be in mild and harsh environments, including containment.
3.
Any of the splices listed, subject to wire size consideration, may be found in instrument applications. Generally, instrument wiring is #16 or smaller.
4.
Splices listed or referenced above are used only for mechanical termination and electrical continuity. Where the installation, EQ or not, requires insulating, the splice is insulated with Raychem heat shrink splices, Kerite tape splices, or other tape as appropriate to the service. All EQ splices are Raychem or Kerite EQ rated splices. The AMP connector insulation, where present, is not part of the splice qualification.
This item is considered closed.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
15. Open Items Open Items are matters which have been discussed with the licensec which will be reviewed further by the inspector and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. Two Open Items disclosed during this inspection are discussed in paragraphs 4 and 5.
16. Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
throughout the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection on March 16, 1987 to summarize the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The licensee acknowledged the inspectors' comments. On March 17, 1987 additional information was provided by the licensee regarding the failure of the 1A and 1B diesel generators. The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as proprietary.
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